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Abstract 
 
This thesis explores the formation of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) identity in 
everyday life. It accounts for unpacking the underlying processes and factors that shape 
the identity of the MB’s members. It thus examines the MB’s recruitment and 
mobilization mechanisms, meaning and symbolic productions, social networking, and 
the resilience of the MB identity.  
This study attempts to answer a key question: how does the MB construct its identity in 
everyday life? It investigates the identification and socialization process that happens 
within the MB. The study reveals that ikhwanism, a sub-culture that encompasses and 
guides the MB leaders and members in everyday life, plays a pivotal role in preserving 
the MB’s identity. Ikhwanism denotes the cognitive system of norms, values, standards, 
and symbols that informs and guides the MB’s members in everyday life. Thus, to be an 
ikhwani does not only mean to embrace the MB’s ideology and worldview but also to 
act as a committed and obedient member in everyday life. Therefore, the study 
investigates the tools and mechanisms that are utilized by the MB in order to forge and 
reshape members’ perceptions and behaviour. 
In addition, the thesis explores the effects of the semi-authoritarian policies on the MB’s 
identity and coherence. It examines how the MB survived under the autocratic regime of 
Hosni Mubarak despite the relentless waves of repression and exclusion. The findings of 
the study reveal the ability of the MB to operate under regime repression and to sustain 
its coherence and identity. Primary data was collected through interviews with several 
members and leaders in the MB. The data reflects the complexity of the MB as a social 
organization. It demonstrates that the MB could blend the ideational and institutional 
factors in order to articulate and preserve its identity. Moreover, the findings of the 
study reveal the power struggle within the MB between the so-called conservatives and 
reformists. The study demonstrates that regime repression enabled the conservatives to 
control the MB at the expense of the reformists. It predicts that the former will likely 
dominate the MB for years to come. 
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Note on Transliteration 
 
Throughout this thesis I have used a simplified transliteration scheme that roughly 
follows the logic of the Library of Congress system, except principally for the diacritics. 
I have generally designated the ‘ayn (for example, shari‘a, da‘wa or jama‘a) and medial 
hamza (Qur’an not Quran), but not terminal hamza (‘ulama, for example, not ‘ulama’). 
The spellings of individual and place names that are commonly used in English, 
particularly as used in reference to Egypt, are adopted here – e.g., Badie (not Badi‘), 
Ismailia (not Isma‘iliyya). ‘Mohamed’ is thus used for all individuals, except the 
Prophet Muhammad. 
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Chapter One 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. BRIEF BACKGROUND 
When Hasan al-Banna established the Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwan al-
Muslimun) in 1928, he sought to re-embed Islamic identity in everyday life. 
Disenchanted at the removal of the Ottoman Caliphate by the Turkish leader Mustafa 
Kemal Atatürk in 1924, al-Banna sought to re-establish the Islamic state. According to 
al-Banna, the cornerstone of such a state is to reformulate society to adhere with the 
Islamic principles and values as he envisaged them. For him, this could only happen 
through establishing a movement that would embody these ideals and moral values in 
everyday life. According to him, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) was to be the vanguard 
that would reshape the Egyptian society to become truly Islamic in order to establish the 
Islamic state.  
Over the course of the past century, the MB has proved to be one of the most 
powerful and resilient movements in Egypt and beyond. Since its foundation, the MB 
has played a pivotal role in shaping the Egyptian polity. During the 1930s, the 
movement was mainly involved in charitable and social activities. It was not until the 
beginning of the 1940s that al-Banna plunged the MB into formal politics. By the end of 
the 1940s, the MB was trapped in violence against the British occupation and the 
Egyptian government, which subsequently led to the assassination of al-Banna in 12 
February 1949. Under the Nasser regime, the MB experienced harsh repression and 
attempts at exclusion during the 1950s and 1960s. Thus, the movement was outlawed in 
1954 and hundreds of its members were arrested, prosecuted in military courts, and 
tortured. However, at the beginning of the 1970s, when Sadat took power he released 
many MB leaders and members. Under Mubarak, the MB once again became a powerful 
movement. It was heavily involved in formal and informal politics, expanded its social 
network, and collaborated with liberal and secular forces. However, for the Mubarak 
regime, the MB was perceived as is the main political threat. Hence, its leaders and 
members encountered different types of repression, exclusion, and elimination. It was 
not until the popular uprising that toppled Mubarak in February 2011 that the MB took 
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power and one of its devoted cadres became the new ruler of Egypt following eight 
decades of anguish. Furthermore, under Mubarak, the MB was able to develop its 
political and religious ideology. This started by renouncing violence, attuned to the rules 
of the game, and accepting democratic values, at least rhetorically. 
Nevertheless, the question as to how the MB was able to continue for so long 
despite the repression has not received much attention from academic research. The vast 
majority of literature on the MB concentrates on its historical development (Mitchell, 
1969; Lia, 1998), its political and social activism (Munson, 2001; Wickham, 2002), or 
its relationship with different regimes (Al-Awadi, 2004; El-Ghobashy, 2005).  
The identity of the MB did not get much attention in the scholarly work. The 
vast majority of studies on the MB fall short in examining the process of identity 
construction in everyday life and what mechanisms, tools and strategies the MB 
employs in order to maintain its identity. The questions raised by this study are of great 
importance. How the MB constructs its identity how could it maintain members’ 
solidarity and loyalty to the movement’s ideology and leadership? What are the impact 
of authoritarian context on the MB and how the latter responded to regime’s repression? 
This study explores the ability of the MB to construct and maintain its identity. It 
examines the process of identity formation as it occurs within the organization. It 
contends that the MB’s identity played a crucial role in preserving its unity and 
coherence under regime repression. In other words, this study attempts to unravel the 
internal logic behind the MB’s resilience and coherence. It thus unpacks the underlying 
processes that forge the MB identity in everyday life. It probes the interplay between the 
ideational and institutional factors that shape the MB’s identity. For instance, the study 
investigates the recruitment and selection process of MB members. It reveals the 
membership system of the MB and how individuals become fully-fledged members. In 
addition, the study reveals the identification and socialization process that happens 
within the movement. To be a member in the MB is not only to embrace its ideology but 
also to act as a committed member in everyday life. Thus, the study investigates the 
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tools and mechanisms that are used by the MB in order to reshape members’ perceptions 
and worldviews. 
Furthermore, the study examines the effects of repression on the MB identity. 
During Mubarak’s rule, the MB experienced almost incessant repression and exclusion. 
Its leaders were a target of regime repression. They were systematically arrested and 
tortured. Operating within a hostile and repressive environment placed significant 
pressure on the MB. However, the movement was able to preserve its unity and identity. 
Therefore, it was not subject to any significant schism over the past two decades.  
 
1.2. SIGNIFICANCE AND IMPORTANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
The durability of the MB has puzzled many scholars and observers; not only because 
of its ability to survive different types of repression under the Mubarak regime but also 
because it was able to maintain its political activism and preserve its unity. This study 
explains the extraordinary ability of the MB to construct and maintain its identity under 
regime repression. As an ideological movement, the MB tends to reshape individuals’ 
perceptions and worldview in order to align with the movement’s aims and objectives. 
The MB is not only a political movement that seeks power but also an identity maker 
that aims to reshape societal norms and values. Thus, it is heavily involved in 
construction of meanings and production of symbols that can encompass and guide 
members in their everyday life. Put differently, to comprehend the political and social 
activism of the MB, one needs to unpack its ‘identity’. As a social movement, the MB 
tends to allocate resources, mobilize individuals, and set ideological frames that can 
bind members and foster their commitment and allegiance to the movement’s leadership. 
It consistently capitalizes on social networks, kinship, close relationships, and religious 
circles to expand its influence. 
The title of this thesis is ‘The Construction of Islamic Identity in Everyday Life: 
The Case of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt’. However, the study is not simply a 
synopsis of findings on Islamism, rather it goes beyond the stereotypes and clichés about 
Islamists as rigid and immutable actors. It therefore does not treat Islamists as 
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monolithic or homogeneous movements but rather as socio-political agents that are 
involved in the production of meaning and symbols in everyday life. In other words, this 
study is concerned with the very nature of Islamists as social actors who have material 
and ideational interests in altering individuals and societies in order to align with their 
perceptions and worldview.  
The research questions, aims and objectives are the basics of design research 
methodology, data collection and data analysis. In the following paragraphs, the main 
objectives and research question are discussed. Based on the research question, a 
research methodology and data collection techniques are outlined. 
 
1.3. RESEARCH AIMS, OBJECTIVES, QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESIS 
1.3.1. Research Aims 
This study has three primary aims, all of which correspond to the main research 
question. First is to explore and unpack the MB’s identity. It is important to emphasize 
that the research focuses on the textual and contextual factors that shape the MB’s 
identity in everyday life. That is, it examines the interplay between the institutional and 
ideational factors on shaping the MB identity. The study contends that identity is a 
social construct that originates from the interplay between different factors and 
processes. Therefore, it treats identity as a social construct, or as Berger and Luckmann 
(1967) point out, as a social reality that reflects the interaction between individuals and 
society whereby both constitute each other. 
The second aim is to unravel the MB’s internal dynamics and probe its effects on 
the identity construction. As a complex organization, the MB has adopted a well- 
disciplined internal structure that enabled it to last for more than eight decades. For 
instance, it has a firm and strict system of membership, identification, and socialization 
processes. This study reveals the recruitment and mobilization tools and tactics within 
the MB. It also explores the mechanisms and strategies that allow the movement to 
reinforce individuals’ commitment and loyalty.   
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The third aim is to explore and examine the impact of repression on the MB’s 
identity and coherence. It probes the ability of the MB to operate under regime 
repression. Intuitively, an open and flexible environment enables the MB to recruit, 
allocate resources, and most importantly to influence regime policies, whereas a closed 
and repressive environment undermines its ability to generate collective action. 
However, the research highlights how the MB was able to employ repression in order to 
maintain unity and coherence. Hence, it reveals the interplay between repression and the 
internal dynamics of the MB. 
 
1.3.2. Research Objectives 
a) To grasp the process of the identity construction in social movements. 
b) To unpack the identity formation process as it happens within the MB. 
c) To understand the interplay between the MB’s ideology, structure and 
environment. 
d) To comprehend the recruitment and mobilization mechanisms in the MB. 
e) To examine the effects of repression on the MB’s identity and coherence. 
 
1.3.3. Research Questions 
The main research question is: how does the MB construct its identity in 
everyday life? Collective identity, as defined by Alberto Melucci, is “an interactive and 
shared definition produced by a number of individuals (or groups as a more complex 
level) concerning the orientations of their action and the field of opportunities and 
constraints in which such action is to take place” (1996, p.70). This definition reveals 
the dynamic and interactive character of collective identity. The MB, as a social 
movement, tends to create a sense of commitment and solidarity among members that 
facilitate the identity construction process. It employs different mechanisms in order to 
foster members’ commitment and solidarity. The research question entails a number of 
sub-questions, including: What are tools and mechanisms the MB utilizes in 
constructing its identity? How does the movement employ religion in the identity 
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construction process? How can individuals become members in the MB? What does it 
mean to be an ikhwani (a member of the MB)? And most importantly, what are the 
effects of repression on the MB identity and integration?  
 
1.3.4. Hypothesis 
The main hypothesis of this study is that identity formation is an intricate process 
that reflects the relationship between MB’s ideology, structure and environment where it 
operates. This study proposes a crucial and interactive link between these three factors 
that shape the MB identity. It contends that identity is a social construct that entails 
different processes and dynamics that shape individuals’ worldview and affect their 
mind-set. This hypothesis is tested by examining the interplay between three main 
factors: the MB aims and objectives; its internal structure; and the environment in which 
it operates. It is argued that identity is a social construct that reflects the interaction 
between the different factors. The MB’s aims and objectives constitute the guidelines 
that encompass and direct members in their everyday life. The study outlines these aims 
and objectives and investigates the role of Hasan al-Banna in articulating them. It 
contends that the internal system of the MB plays a crucial role in forging and 
maintaining its identity. It identifies the membership system, the movement’s norms and 
standards, and the interactions between members and the leadership. In addition, the 
environment in which the MB operates contains opportunities and constraints that affect 
its role and activism. The study argues that the status of the environment, and whether it 
is inclusive or exclusive, affects the process of identity construction in the MB. It thus 
examines the response of the MB to the political opportunities and constraints that 
occurred under the Mubarak regime.  
 
1.4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
After specifying the aims, objectives, questions and hypothesis, an appropriate 
research methodology is established. As noted by Gilbert (2001, p.15), methodology in 
social research refers to the techniques and epistemological pre-suppositions, which 
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contribute to how information is identified and analysed in relation to a research 
problem  
This thesis adopts social constructivism as the analytical framework to examine 
the MB’s identity. The strength of constructivism lies in its ability to uncover the ways 
in which individuals and groups participate in the creation of their perceived social 
reality. Berger and Luckmann (1967, p.194) point out that identity is formed by social 
processes and is maintained, modified and reshaped by social relations. Moreover, 
constructivism assumes that individuals tend to surround themselves with meaning 
constructions and symbolic relationships. Moreover, social constructivism considers 
how a social phenomenon develops in social contexts (Boghossian, 2001). As Burr 
describes, constructivism is “an artefact of a social group” (2003, p.7). According to 
Hakan Yavuz, social constructivism assumes that “any society is a human construction 
and subject to multiple interpretations and influences” (2003, p.20). 
To avoid the essentialist and contextualist approaches, this thesis benefits from 
the privileges of social constructivism as a realistic and reflective approach. It draws 
upon the premises of social constructivism in order to combine ideational and 
institutional factors that can explain the MB’s identity. Despite the fact that theoretical 
inquiry of this thesis is situated within the realm of social movements, it incorporates 
other disciplines in order to understand the MB’s identity. Hence social psychology and 
the sociology of religion are employed in certain instances in order to explain specific 
aspects of the MB’s identity.  
 
1.4.1. Methodology 
The thesis is primarily based on a qualitative discursive analysis. As highlighted 
by Strauss and Corbin (1998, p.10), the term qualitative means any kind of research that 
produces findings not arrived at by means of statistical procedures or other means of 
quantification. It can refer to research about persons, lives, stories, behaviour, but also 
about organizational functioning, social movements, or interactional relationships. 
Therefore, in order to obtain an in-depth understanding of the MB and its identity 
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construction process, this research incorporates both primary and secondary data. The 
primary data is collected through observations and interviews. The secondary data 
consists of existing data and documents on the MB, such as statements, textbooks, 
leaflets, and the writings of the MB leaders and ideologues, as well as books and articles 
on the MB.  
In terms of methods, this study relies mainly upon semi-structured interviews, 
which involve direct interaction between the interviewer, who is seeking information 
and the interviewee, who is giving information (Allan & Skinner, 1991). The semi-
structured interviews provide valuable primary data on the MB, from prominent MB 
figures, ordinary members, academics, and commentators.  
 In order to carry out the field research and collect the required data, the 
researcher travelled to Egypt twice. The first trip was between December 2010 and 
January 2011 during which interviews were conducted with a number of MB members, 
as well as some academics. The second was between March and April 2012 during 
which interviews were conducted with many MB members and leaders in Cairo, 
Shariqya, and Daqahliya. During the first visit to Cairo, the researcher encountered a 
number of difficulties in approaching some MB members because of the security issue. 
However, I was able to get in touch with Essam al-Eryan, a senior leader in the MB, by 
then a member of its Guidance Bureau, Ibrahim El-Bayoumi Ghanim, a respected 
academic who has extensively studied the legacy of al-Banna, and Salah Ghorab, a 
middle-rank member in the MB, in addition to several young members.  
During the second visit, which was after the Egyptian uprising that toppled 
Mubarak in February 2011, the researcher was able to conduct interviews with many 
young and old members of the MB. I also managed to visit a number of the MB regional 
and local branches, where I met with low and middle rank members. I conducted semi-
structured interviews with the MB leaders and members and attended some local 
activities in Zagazig, Sharirya. I also conducted some online interviews by using Skype 
during January and February 2012. 
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The interviews were conducted on two levels: the leadership and grassroots. As 
for the first level, the researcher met with some of the senior leaders of the MB in order 
to understand the mechanisms of structure and relationship between leadership and 
rank-and-file of the MB. On the grassroots level, several interviews were conducted 
with ordinary members in urban, suburban, and rural areas in order to understand the 
recruitment and socialization process in the MB. It was essential to compare between 
leaders and members’ views on different issues, e.g. membership, recruitment, 
allegiance, etc.  
In addition, some interviews with non-MB and former members were conducted. 
The researcher interviewed a couple of experts on the MB, Dr. Ibrahim El-Bayoumi 
Ghanim and Alaa Hamouda. I also interviewed some of young members of the MB who 
were disenchanted and alienated over the past few years. They provided valuable 
information on the recruitment and indoctrination process within the MB. I also met 
with  
It worth to mention that all interviews were approved by Ethics and Risk 
Committee in the School of Government and International Affairs and abide by the 
ethical rules and code of Durham University. 
In addition to the interviews, the researcher had access to numerous secondary 
data and materials, e.g. books, statements, and testimonies of the MB leaders and 
veteran members that enriched the thesis. While it was not easy to have access to these 
materials, the researcher could build good contacts with many sources within the MB 
who were willing to provide these materials. For instance, it was critical to understand 
the process of reshaping the mindset and worldview of MB members to have the 
textbooks that are used in socialization process within the MB. These textbooks are not 
available to the public. However, some interviewees were willing to provide the 
researcher some of these materials. Books and statements of General Guide and 
members of Guidance Bureau provided invaluable data and information on the internal 
dynamics of the MB. Building on these materials coupled with the interviews and 
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personal observations, the study could provide a discursive analysis to the process of 
identity construction as it happens within the MB. 
 
1.5. CAVEATS ON THE TIME SPAN OF THE RESEARCH  
 It should be noted that this thesis covers the Mubarak era mainly. More 
specifically, it primarily investigates the period from 1981, the year that Mubarak took 
power, until his downfall after popular uprising in February 2011. Hence it does not 
study the developments that occurred in Egypt during or following the uprising. This is 
not only because of the limited time since the downfall of Mubarak which could affect 
the findings of the study but also because of the fluid and unfolding nature of events in 
Egypt since the uprising which makes it hard to capture their impact on the MB. In 
addition, this research opens the door for subsequent research on the MB and provides 
new horizons for a comparison between the MB identity before and after the revolution. 
 
1.6. RESEARCH STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION 
The thesis is divided into eight chapters, which evolved during the research 
strategy. The research content and organization is developed as follows: Chapter One 
provides an outline and introduction to the study. It contains the significance and 
importance of this study, its aims and objectives, research questions, hypothesis and the 
methodology. 
Chapter Two provides a survey to the literature on Islamists. Using a critical 
analysis, the chapter examines various approaches that have tackled the subject of 
Islamism since the 1970s. In particular, the chapter unpacks the essentialist and 
contextualist narratives that have dominated the study of Islamist movements. It reveals 
the weaknesses of dealing with Islamism whether as a rigid and monolithic phenomenon, 
as essentialists argue or as a mere reaction to the modernization and urbanization crises 
that have wracked the Middle East during the second half of the twentieth century as the 
contextualists contend. The chapter also provides a critical analysis of the emerging 
social movement trends that have analysed Islamist movements over the past decade. 
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Nevertheless, despite the critique of social movement theory, the study views it as a 
useful tool if incorporated with other theoretical disciplines. Hence, the study 
interweaves social movement theory with social constructivism in order to analyse the 
MB’s identity. The chapter also critically examines the literature on the MB in order to 
reveal its defects. 
Chapter Three articulates the theoretical framework of the study. It draws upon 
social constructivism and social movement theory to build an analytical framework that 
can explain the process of identity construction in the MB. Moreover, it deconstructs the 
notion of the Islamic collectivity and how it is intertwined with the MB’s identity. It 
reveals that the concept of Islamic identity is a social construct articulated by al-Banna 
and adopted by subsequent MB leaders. It is a combination of the religious notion of 
jama‘a (collectivity) and social activism. It reflects the ability of the MB to produce 
symbolic meanings and constructions that encompass members in their everyday life. 
Chapter Four explores the role of Hasan al-Banna, the founder and chief 
ideologue of the MB, in articulating the master framework of the MB identity. It traces 
the ideological and intellectual influences on al-Banna and how they shaped his vision 
and worldview. In addition, the chapter reveals how al-Banna was able to interweave the 
collective identity of the MB. He constructed what the study calls the jama‘a paradigm, 
which refers to cognitive system of meanings, norms, values, and actions that guide MB 
members in their everyday life. It contains material, moral, and expressive aims, tools, 
and the strategies of the MB. 
Chapter Five explores the various manifestations of the MB’s identity in 
everyday life. It attempts to answer two key questions: how does the MB select and 
recruit its members or how to become an ikhwani? And how does the MB consolidate 
and strengthen the identity of its members or what does it mean to be an ikhwani? The 
aim of this chapter is to reveal the impact of the recruitment and selection processes on 
the construction of MB members’ identity. The chapter reveals that the affiliation and 
membership in the MB is a complex, yet meaningful, process that plays a profound role 
in creating and consolidating the MB’s identity.  
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Chapter Six examines the effects of the internal structure of the MB on identity 
construction. It explores the interplay between structure and norms, members and 
leadership, and organization and identity. In addition, the chapter explores the sub-
culture of the MB which the study dubs ikhwanism. It refers to the cognitive code of 
identity that encompasses and guides the MB’s members in everyday life. It highlights 
the values and rituals that create a unique and distinctive identity for the MB and 
maintain its organization and structure over time. 
Chapter Seven explores the effects of repression on the MB identity and internal 
coherence. It investigates how the MB was able to maintain its identity and unity under 
regime repression. The chapter also reveals the interplay between the repressive 
environment and the MB’s internal dynamics. It contends that the Mubarak regime’s 
repression against the MB helped create a resilient identity. By unpacking the effects of 
repression on the MB, the chapter reveals the balance of power within the MB. It 
examines the relationship between the conservative and reformist currents within the 
MB. 
Chapter Eight provides summary and findings of the study and proposes areas 
for future research. 
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Chapter Two 
ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS: A LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
Since the early-1980s, the rise of Islamist movements has dominated the 
academic milieu, not only because of the political and social activism of these 
movements, but also because of their ability to survive and act under harsh and brutal 
autocratic regimes around the Muslim world. Furthermore, the unprecedented upsurge 
of moderate and violent Islamist groups in the aftermath of 9/11 posed many challenges 
to social scientists. 
Much scholarly work attempts to reveal the multi-faceted nature of Islamist 
movements and to elaborate a coherent approach to studying them. However, many 
questions remain unanswered, including: How should Islamist movements be studied? 
Are they religious movements or social agents seeking change? What is the ultimate 
goal of these movements; is it applying Islamic law (shari‘a) or establishing an Islamic 
state or both? Why do they succeed in mobilizing people while others fail? How do they 
construct their political and religious identity? Finally, and most importantly, why can 
Islamist movements not seize power in many Islamic countries in spite of their 
excessive political presence? 
Importantly, Islamist movements do not follow a single approach in order to 
achieve their goals. True, many of these movements have similar ideological and 
religious beliefs; however, they adopt different political tactics. Accordingly, the 
analysis of Islamist movements is not confined to their ideology or political discourse 
but should include a study of the different variants, and, most importantly, the 
relationship between the state and the movement. For instance, the inclusion of Islamist 
movements can, however not necessarily, lead to the adoption of a moderate and 
progressive ideology, such as in the cases of the Islamic Action Front Party (IAFP) in 
Jordan and the Party of Justice and Development (PJD) in Morocco. However, exclusion 
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and suppression of Islamists might lead them to use violence as happened in Egypt in 
the 1980s and Algeria in the 1990s. 
The aim of this chapter is to survey the literature and academic studies on 
Islamist movements. The goal of this literature review is to elaborate a coherent and 
plausible framework that can explain the activism of Islamist movements. In doing so, 
this chapter discusses different theoretical approaches and narratives that have been 
applied to Islamist movements during the last three decades. It will address the defects 
of these approaches as a step to elaborate a different approach that could answer the 
questions raised by this study. 
 
2.2. HOW TO STUDY ISLAMISM? THE ENDURING POLEMIC 
Theorizing religion is problematic. Social scientists tend to tackle religion as a 
social phenomenon with different manifestations in everyday life, whereas theologians 
are interested in its sacred and metaphysical character. Nevertheless, the controversy 
over religion does not preclude sociologists, anthropologists, psychologists, and political 
scientists from developing various theoretical approaches to comprehend the intricacy of 
religious phenomena. However, the variety of religious studies hampers the possibility 
of attaining one coherent approach that can capture the essence of religious phenomena.  
Max Weber and Emile Durkheim’s contributions in sociology of religion prove 
how complex it is to construe religious and social behaviour. While the former draws 
attention to the role of individuals, such as a prophet, priest, or religious leader, in 
constituting religious beliefs, attitudes, and values system (Weber, 1993, p.70), the latter 
gives society the main role in achieving such outcomes (Durkheim, 1926). Thus, many 
Weberians and Durkheimians study religion differently, if not contradictorily (Budd, 
1973; Beckford, 2003). 
Studying Islam and Muslims is not an exception. The vast majority of the 
scholarly work on Islamist politics raises more questions than answers. While some 
scholars are preoccupied by Islam as a faith and a system of beliefs, others focus on its 
cultural, social, and political components. Notwithstanding, the massive literature on 
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Islam, the Muslim world, and Islamist movements, many problems are obscuring this 
terrain. Significantly, social scientists, historians, and theologians who study Islam are 
faced with tremendous difficulties in scrutinizing its real essence. According to Richard 
Martin, Islamicists, those who study Islam, “have come under increasing attack in recent 
years for their academic provincialism and for the distorted images of Islamic peoples 
and cultures many say they have created” (Martin, 1985: p.3). However, the core 
problem in Islamic studies is not confined to the lack of knowledge about Islam as a 
faith or religion but rather to the confusion over studying Muslim cultures, societies, and 
values. Ali Shariati aptly reveals the shortcomings of the academic knowledge about 
Islam by stating: 
There are some Islamic scholars who understand Islam and there are some 
Islamic scholars—many, as a matter of fact—who have only learned about 
Islam. On the other hand, there are some who understand Islam well but are 
not considered to be Islamic scholars (Shariati, 1997) 
 
Studying Islam has usually been accompanied by questioning its political 
character. As noted by Fred von der Mehden, the public perception of Islam is 
articulated by ignorance, confusion, and misinformation (Von der Mehden, 1993). 
Therefore, to avoid generalization in studying Islam and Islamic politics, Piscatori raises 
two important questions: Whose Islam, and when? (Piscatori, 1983). To which can be 
added a third: where? A number of scholars consider Islam as a stagnant, homogenous, 
and dogmatic creed, whereas others, such as Huntington (1996), Lewis (2002), Harris 
(2007) portray it as an anti-modern, anti-democratic, and a fanatical religion. 
Despite the belated recognition that studying Islam is a thorny and polemical 
phenomenon (Esposito, 1984; Halliday, 1995), reductionist approaches to Islamic 
studies can still be found. Patrick Bannerman points out the misunderstanding of Islam 
theoretically and practically is widespread and fundamental mistakes regarding Islamic 
history are continually repeated (Bannerman, 1988). 
Therefore, the crucial question is: how should Islam be studied? This question 
entails various ontological and epistemological dilemmas. The manifestations of these 
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dilemmas are embedded in the confusion between Islam as a faith and Islam as a 
political ideology. Overwhelmingly, Islam has been tackled by using philological and 
historical approaches. However, these approaches have failed to explore the diversity of 
the Muslim world. Jacob Neusner highlights the limits of these approaches by stating: 
Even though, through philology, we understand every word of a text, through 
history, we know what just happened in the event or time to which the text 
testifies, we still don’t understand that text. A religious text serves not merely 
the purpose of philology or history (Martin, 1985, p.11). 
 
Put differently, the ascendancy of a monolithic image of Islam and Muslims 
hinders many scholars from discerning the enormous differences amongst Muslim 
societies. A number of scholars, such as Bassim Tibi and Daniel Pipes, tend to deal with 
Islam and Muslim societies as a homogenous and static phenomenon. In addition, the 
legacy of Orientalism obscures the appropriate understanding of Islam. Edward Said 
reveals the superficial view of Islam by stating: 
Generally, this has disqualified it [academic studies of Islam] to cover Islam 
in ways that might tell us more than we are otherwise aware of beneath the 
surface of Islamic societies. Then too, there are numerous methodological and 
intellectual problems that still need settling: Is there such a thing as Islamic 
behaviour? What connects Islam at the level of everyday life to Islam at the 
level of doctrine in the various Islamic societies? How really useful is “Islam” 
as a concept for understanding Morocco and Saudi Arabia and Syria and 
Indonesia? If we come to realize that, as many scholars have recently noted, 
Islamic doctrine can be seen as justifying capitalism as well as socialism, 
militancy as well as fatalism, ecumenism as well as exclusivism, we begin to 
sense the tremendous lag between academic descriptions of Islam (that are 
inevitably caricatured in the media) and the particular realities to be found 
within the Islamic world (Said, 1981, p.38). 
 
Ironically, a substantial number of studies have persistently conflated the terms 
Muslims and Islamist movements. Within the latter, words such as Islamists, 
fundamentalists, Salafis and Jihadists have been used synonymously (Sivan, 1985; 
Choueiri, 1990). The ascendance of violent and radical movements, such as Al-Qaeda in 
the wake of 9/11, has created difficulties in categorizing Islamist movements. For 
instance, scholars can fail to distinguish between radical and moderate movements, 
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religious and political clusters, fundamental and reformist parties, etc. The diversity of 
Islamist actors leads to a deep misunderstanding of Islam and Muslim politics. 
Nevertheless, a number of scholars study Islam differently through using 
geographical, comparative, ethnographic and cross-cultural approaches. For instance, 
Motaz A. Fattah implies that Muslim countries have a wide divergence in terms of 
political values, cultural heritage, and democratic tendencies (Fattah, 2006). 
Furthermore, John Esposito reveals that there is no one Islam but there are many Islams 
(Esposito and Mogahed, 2007; Esposito 2010). He states: 
While we commonly speak of “Islam,” in fact many Islams or interpretations 
of Islam exist. The images and realities of Islam and of Muslims are multiple 
and diverse: religiously, culturally, economically, and politically. Muslims are 
the majority in some fifty-seven countries, and they represent many 
nationalities, languages, ethnic and tribal groups, and customs (Esposito, 2010, 
p.11). 
 
Furthermore, the legacy of 9/11 added more complexity to the field of Islamic 
studies. Two arguments have recurred. The first assumes that Islam has an authentic 
problem with politics (Milton-Edwards, 2004; Tibi, 2009). The second, and broader 
argument, contends that Islam, as a culture, is not compatible with modernity (Lewis, 
2002). And whilst some argue that Islam has apolitical ‘exceptionalism’ as a faith and 
political ideology (Pipes, 1983; Tibi, 2009), others refute such a notion by stressing the 
role played by the early Islamic state in appropriating the religion (Ayubi, 1991). Nazih 
Ayubi contends that Islamic scriptures (Qur’an and Sunna) do not stipulate a specific 
form for the state or the government. Nevertheless, he underscores the role of ‘ulama1 in 
politicizing religion by incorporating the state into shar‘ia (Ayubi, 1991). 
Despite Ayoubi’s notion on the politicization of Islam, scholars such as (Pipes, 
1983; Tibi, 2009) argue that establishing an Islamic state remains the ultimate goal for 
many Muslims. As Esposito (1997) argues, the interjection of western political 
terminologies, such as state, government, political system, and legitimacy, into the field 
of Islamic studies creates confusion for studying Islam and Islamist movements. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The term ‘ulama refers to religious and legal scholars in Islam who study and interpret the Islamic texts. 
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The Qur’an and Sunna do not force Muslims to follow a specific formula of 
government. However, the Islamic experiment under the Umayyad (661-750 AD) and 
Abbasid (75-1258) caliphates created a structure for governing based on legal and 
jurisprudential interpretations of the Islamic texts. Furthermore, Muslim ulma developed 
various and flexible jurisprudence doctrines (madhahib fiqhiyya) 2  that helped in 
developing Islamic political thought. Therefore, contextualizing political ideas 
throughout Islamic history remains essential in understanding the evolution of the 
relationship between Islam and politics. 
Moreover, unlike Christianity, Islam has not experienced the separation between 
faith and politics. True, some Muslim countries have been enforced to adapt such 
separation as the case in Turkey under Kemalist’s rule during the 1920s and 1930s and 
Tunisia under Bourguiba’s epoch during the 1960s. However, the term secularism has 
been distorted amongst Muslims. Secularism has negative connotations regarding the 
relationship between religion and modernization. Therefore, Talal Asad warns against 
the dangers of transplanting the western religious experiment when studying Islam. He 
notes that “while religion is integral to modern western history, there are dangers in 
employing it as a normalizing concept when transplanting it to Islamic traditions” (Asad, 
1993, p.7). In addition, Esposito reveals the robust manifestation of Islam and politics:  
A review of the role of religion in politics and society in early Islam reveals a 
rich and complex history. Islam proved to be a faith in which religion was 
harnessed to political power. The Islamic community was both spiritual and 
temporal, church and state (Esposito, 1984, p.14). 
 
The shortcoming of the argument of the confusion between Islam and politics 
lies in its tendency to question Islam as a faith regardless of the cultural and political 
nature of Muslim societies. For instance, Pipes (1983) claims that Sharia is the main 
obstacle that hinders the progression of Muslim countries. He states: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Madhahib Fiqhiyya refers to the jurisprudence trends and school of thoughts that emerged in Islam 
during the first three centuries of its existence. They are four main Sunni schools (Maliki, Hanafi, Shafii, 
and Hanbali). 
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[I]t [Sharia] entails a whole mentality and a way of life which, when fully 
adhered to permeates the minds, actions, and feelings of Muslims … the 
Islamic mentality is characterized by dichotomies; things either conform to 
Islam or they oppose. Persons are believers (Muslims) or not (kafirs); territory 
is ruled by Muslims (Dar al-Islam) or not (Dar al-Harb); non-Muslims are 
under Muslim control (dhimmis) or not (harbis); warfare is righteous (Jihad) 
or not (fitna) … The dualistic mentality is not aberrant, but fundamental to 
Islam with roots going back to the Qur’an (Pipes, 1983, p.34). 
 
The tenor of Pipes’ argument is that Islam has a dichotomy that creates an 
intransigent mind-set. However, it overlooks the evolution of Islamic jurisprudence over 
centuries and resorts to obsolete terminology. Similarly, Lewis (1986) claims that 
Qur’an and Sunnah contain authoritarian political language that encompasses shared 
memory and common heritage of Muslims everywhere. He states that: 
Exponents of authoritarian principles frequently cite the Qur'anic verse (4: 59) 
‘Obey God, obey His Prophet and obey those in authority over you' In support 
of the meaning which they find in this verse, the defenders of authoritarian 
politics quote numerous hadiths, the general purport of which is that the 
subject owes unquestioning and immediate obedience to the legitimate 
authority-that is, to the lawful head of the umma, the Islamic religio-political 
community. Since the head of the umma has the right to appoint persons to 
act in his name, the duty of obedience also extends to those officers and 
officials who exercise properly delegated authority on behalf of the duly 
constituted sovereign (Lewis, 1986, p.43). 
 
In addition, the thesis of inconsistency between Islam and modernity tends to be 
constructed on rhetoric rather than on genuine truths. Whereas some scholars claim that 
Islam and Muslims are innately hostile to modernity and democracy (Munson, 1988; 
Tibi, 1988), others refute such arguments through deconstructing modernity discourse 
(Hefner, 1998; Nettler, Mahmoud et al., 2000; Ramadan, 2001). For instance, Robert 
Hefner criticizes the notion of ‘Muslim Exceptionalism’ from modernity. He points out 
the influence of the rapid cultural and social changes that shape public religion in the 
modern Muslim world (Hefner, 1998). Similarly, Bobby Sayyid criticizes the 
Eurocentric tendency in studying Islam and Muslims. Based upon Edward Said's notion 
of Orientalism, Sayyid questions the modernity triumphant hypothesis and disputes 
	  
	  
	  
	  
20	  
Fukuyama’s notion of the End of History (Sayyid, 1997). Eurocentrism, according to 
Sayyid, is “the discourse that emerges in the context of the decentring of the West; that 
is, a context in which the relationship between the western enterprise and universalism is 
open to disarticulation and re-articulation” (Sayyid, 1997, p.128). Islamic actors, 
according to Sayyid, do not recognize the victory of western liberal capitalism but pose 
a different universal project that threatens western hegemony.  
 
2.3. APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS 
Despite the burgeoning literature on Islamist movements, the agreement amongst 
scholars over terminologies and classifications is still elusive. Hence, Islamism has 
become a label that covers different, and sometimes contradictory, clusters and 
movements rather than explaining them. Terminologies such as fundamentalism, 
revivalism, radicalism, revolutionism, reformism, Salafism, and conservatism are used 
synonymously without clear distinction (Ismail, 2002). In addition, movements as 
diverse as the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), the Tukish AK Party (Justice and 
Development Party), Hizbullah, Hamas, and the Moroccan PJD (Party of Justice and 
Development) in Morocco, are, sometimes, studied identically. 
The literature relating to Islamist movements shows a considerable diversity of 
theoretical approaches and patterns. However, before demonstrating this diversity, three 
important observations should be highlighted. The first is the profound impact of the 
Iranian Revolution in 1979 on Islamic studies over the past three decades. It influenced 
not only the terrain of Islamic studies but also induced many to rethink the 
secularization theory and the role of religion in public life. According to Bayat, Foucault 
described the Iranian revolution as the “first post-modern revolution of our time” while 
Giddens treated it as a sign for “the crisis of modernity” (Bayat, 2005, 894). The second 
is the impact of militant and guerrilla movements in countries such as Egypt, Algeria, 
Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Palestine, and Afghanistan on the political and social realms. 
The third is the polemic raised by the events of 9/11 over the scrutiny of methods and 
approaches that study the phenomenon of Islamism. 
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The discussion now focuses on the literature that examines the emergence of 
Islamist movements. It is divided into two parts: the first part deals with different 
approaches of studying Islamist movements and highlights the three main approaches; 
the crisis approach, cultural/essential approach, and social movements approach. The 
second covers literature on the Muslim Brotherhood as the focus of this study. 
 
2.3.1. The crisis approach 
This approach emphasizes the significance of the political and socio-economic 
contexts in explaining the resurgence of Islamist movements. According to the 
proponents of this approach, the rise of Islamist movements is merely a reaction to the 
fundamental political and economic crises that faced many Arab states during the 
second half of the twentieth century. According to the advocates of this approach, 
authoritarian durability and socio-economic failure fuelled the Islamist resurgence 
(Hudson, 1977; Ayubi, 1991; Esposito, 1997). They argue that the legitimacy crisis that 
wrecked many Arab regimes created a prolific environment for Islamist movements to 
strengthen their presence (Hudson, 1977).3 Ali E. Dessouki, for instance, captures the 
complex nature of this crisis. He points out the revival of Islamic movements is the 
“product of a crisis situation characterized by economic difficulties, moral and 
ideological confusion, and political instability” (Hilal, 1981, p.183). In particular, Laura 
Guazzone contends that the failure of Arab nationalism ideology in the aftermath of 
1967 war between the Arabs and Israel was the seed of the Islamist rise in the Arab 
world (Guazzone, 1995). Guazzone and Dessouki agree on the profound impact of the 
Arab defeat on the secular Arab regimes. François Burgat points to the switch of many 
Arab intellectuals from nationalism to Islamism by the end of 1970s. He refers to figures 
such as Rached Al-Ghannouchi, the leader of Tunisian Islamist movement, Al-Nahda, 
and Tariq Al-Bishri, the renowned Egyptian intellectual, who changed their ideas and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Michael Hudson explains the crisis of legitimacy in the Arab world during the second half of the 
twentieth century. He points out “the shortage of this indispensable political resource largely accounts for 
the volatile nature of Arab politics and the autocratic, unstable character of all the present Arab 
governments” (Hudson, 1977, p.2). 
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discourse after the demise of the ideology of Arab nationalism (Burgat and Dowell, 
1997).  
However, Yvonne Haddad disagrees with this argument. She asserts that the 
1967 defeat is not the sole reason for the growth of Islamist movements (Haddad, 1992). 
Scholars such as Lisa Anderson argue that the tremendous appeal of Islamist movements 
is not confined to the crisis of Arab nationalism but can be attributed to the structural 
deficit of the Arab state. She reveals the importance of the institutional factor in 
interpreting the surge of Islamist movements, arguing that the persistence of absolute 
monarchies and authoritarian regimes creates political grievances that are used by 
Islamist movements (Anderson, 1997). Gudrun Krämer expands on Anderson’s idea by 
exploring the consequences of restricted political liberalization policies on Islamist 
activism. She argues that Islamist movements became the key opposition force as a 
result of the unavoidable political opening that occurred in the Arab world during the 
1980s and 1990s (Krämer, 1995). According to Krämer, restricted political pluralism 
was accompanied by economic deprivation and social turmoil in many Arab societies. In 
addition, Guazzone, Ibrahim, and Entelis stress that the sizeable lower and middle 
classes faced alienation, fragmentation, and marginalization that encouraged them to 
join Islamist movements (Guazzone, 1995; Ibrahim, 1996; Entelis, 1997). Some 
countries like Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen, Jordan and Morocco encountered economic 
hardship as a result of economic privatization and structural adjustment policies. 
Consequently, Islamist movements utilized the social vacuum that was created by such 
policies to build welfare and economic networks and increase their popularity (Entelis, 
1997). 
According to the proponents of this approach, Islamist movements penetrated the 
civil and public spheres, and rooted themselves in universities, professional associations, 
worker unions, and schools creating a strong network of supporters and beneficiaries 
(Ayubi, 1991; Ibrahim, 1996; Tessler, 1997). Islamist movements launched what Saad 
Eddin Ibrahim calls ‘Islamic Business’ to recruit members and spread their ideologies 
among the population (Ibrahim, 1996). In Egypt, for instance, the MB encouraged many 
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of its members and supporters to establish Islamic institutions, banking, schools, health 
centres, and enterprises. It succeeded in extending its service coverage to the poor and 
middle classes around the country (Ibrahim, 1996, p.60). Similarly, in Algeria, 
economic liberalization was crucial in muting the Islamist challenge inside the country. 
According to Dirk Vandewalle, the structural economic reforms had immediate impact 
on the poor and generated support for the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) (Vandewalle, 
1997). Moreover, the pioneering role of Islamist networks in building religious and 
public institutions, such as mosques, clinics, and day care centres, gave advantages to 
Islamists in the political arena.  Mark Tessler contends that Islamist movements, unlike 
secular parties, have the advantage of criticizing Arab regimes and delivering services at 
the same time (Tessler, 1997). 
Nazih Ayubi has a sophisticated argument using the crisis approach. He contends 
that the appeal of Islamist movements is an upshot to the urbanization and 
modernization crises that face many Arab states. According to Ayubi, the rapid 
urbanization policies in countries such as Egypt and Syria left many of the poor 
frustrated and alienated (Ayubi, 1991). Such alienation worked in the favour of Islamists 
who offered a new path with which to re-engage the youth.  
Despite the importance of the crisis approach in understanding the re-emergence 
of Islamist movements, many scholars highlight its shortcoming. Salwa Ismail, for 
instance, raises two main difficulties. First, the failure to securitize the micro changes 
that shape the environment where Islamist movements operate. According to Ismail, 
“The focus on the macro level comes at the expense of the micro level where the 
everyday-life communities wrestle with the effects of the macro changes, initiate new 
forms of action, and struggle for and contribute to a reconfiguring of the political scene” 
(Ismail, 2002, p.14). Second is the inability to examine the impact of structural 
transformations on cultural and symbolic aspects of everyday life. Although she 
disagrees with the essentialist approach that gives primacy to culture over other factors, 
Ismail considers the impact of the political and economic transformations on shaping the 
public sphere (Ismail, 2002, p.14). 
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In addition to Ismail’s criticisms, there are other problems with the crisis 
approach. First, it does not answer the question: why do only Islamist movements seize 
the opportunity presented by the political and socio-economic crises in the Arab world 
to enhance their presence? Similarly, why do people prefer to join Islamist organizations 
rather than other ideological trends? Secondly, the crisis approach might not be relevant 
to studying Islamist movements. Historically, the emergence of Islamist movements 
came before the creation of many Arab states. For instance, the Muslim Brotherhood, 
the largest and oldest Islamist movement, was founded in 1928 and launched plenty of 
offshoots all over the Arab world during the first half of the twentieth century. Thirdly, 
the crisis approach overlooks the developments that occurred in the Arab world during 
the 1980s and 1990s as well changes inside Islamist movements, let alone the changes 
brought by the so-called Arab Spring. 
 
2.3.2. The essentialist approach 
The main premise of this approach is that the emergence of Islamist movements 
reflects the tensions between Islam and modernity. The proponents of this approach 
argue that the ascendancy of Islamist movement is merely a response to the dilemmas 
that face Muslim societies caused by modernity, westernization and globalization. 
Moreover, they claim that Islam has a profound cultural problem with modernity (Pipes 
1983; Sivan 1985; Vatikiotis 1987; Watt 1988; Huntington 1996; Tibi 1998; Berman 
2004). Thus, they, tend to identify Islamic culture as a rigid cluster of idioms and 
symbols that shapes Muslims’ vision toward the self and the other (Ismail, 2002). Put 
differently, The essentialist approach treats Islam as a set of fixed texts and doctrines 
(Yavuz, 2003). Bassam Tibi, one of the most well-known essentialists, claims that Islam 
is a cultural system prone to politicization. Although he distinguishes between Islam and 
Islamism, Tibi contends that the problem of the Muslim world does not lie in the 
political ideology of Islamist movements but rather in the cultural crisis of Islam (Tibi, 
2001). He states, “Political Islam is the result of a crisis which has emerged from 
Islam’s predicament with modernity … political Islam is the Islamic response to cultural 
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modernity and that it is, as well, a revolt against the West” (Tibi, 2001, p.4). Tibi 
implies that modern Islam is characterized by what he terms ‘defensive culture’ which 
shapes Islamic political thought (Tibi, 1988). Based upon Jurgen Habermas’ 
Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, Tibi assumes that Islam has historical tensions 
with the cultural dimension of modernity. Hence, he contends that this tension is the 
main source for current international conflict (Tibi, 2009).  
According to Hakan Yavuz’s study, Islamic Political Identity in Turkey, 
essentialists have exaggerated the role of Islamic doctrines on the conduct of individuals 
and society (Yavuz, 2003). Despite his criticism of philological and anthropological 
approaches in studying Islam, Tibi makes the same mistake when he suggests the need 
for historicizing the Quran as a precondition for reforming Islam. He points out that “If 
Islam is not essentialized, then it can be reformed and culturally renewed. If all kinds of 
essentialism are dismissed, and reference to the Quran itself is done in a historicizing 
manner, then it is possible to legitimate change in the direction of modernity” (Tibi, 
2009, p.11).  
Furthermore, Tibi asserts that fundamentalism, which according to him is an 
aspect of all Islamist movements, is a reaction to the problems of globalization and 
fragmentation that impacts on all Muslim countries. He insists that Islamic civilization 
has a holistic worldview that has never been able to trigger globalization of its own 
design (Tibi, 2009, p.12). Tibi concludes that fundamentalism is a regressive 
phenomenon that revolts against the essence of modernity and poses challenges to 
Western hegemony (Tibi, 1998). 
Daniel Pipes, another essentialist, claims that Muslims have an unavoidable 
problem with modernity. He stresses that westernization is a prerequisite for 
modernization. According to Pipes, the ‘Muslim Anomie’ from modernity lies in the 
truth that Muslims are not able to adapt to western civilization. He states: 
[U]ntil 1800, Chinese, Indian and Islamicate civilizations enjoyed roughly the 
same social power as Europe and possessed full civilizations-with cities, 
classic traditions, written languages … and formal institutions, which could 
compete with Europe’s. Of these three people, the Muslims had much hardest 
	  
	  
	  
	  
26	  
time coping with Europe’s primacy …. Civilized peoples faced more 
difficulties than primitive peoples and Muslims faced more than the other 
civilized peoples. In short, Muslims experienced the greatest travails in 
coping with modernity; this was the special Muslim dilemma (Pipes, 1983, 
p.168). 
  
Pipes’ argument has built not only on a selective and literal understanding of 
Islamic texts, but also on a Eurocentric narrative that was grounded in the hegemony of 
the Western modernity model over other cultures. He asserts that modernization should 
be associated with westernization. Thus, he contends that for Muslims to be modernized, 
they should abandon shari‘a, embrace secularism, and imitate the western way of life. 
For Pipes, shari‘a remains an immense concern. He states: 
Westernization being inimical to the observance of the shari‘a, Muslim 
attitudes toward the west became embroiled in the question of fulfilling the 
sacred law [Shari’a]. With Westernization becoming urgent, “the crucial 
question is whether Islam should serve as a guide and inspiring ideal, or as a 
rule of life”, should Muslim abandon Shari’a or keep it as always? (Pipes,  
1983, p.111) 
 
In addition, Pipes points out that western Muslims cannot be Muslims and 
western simultaneously. According to him, it is very difficult for a western Muslim to 
maintain the precepts of the shari‘a while living in the west. Like Tibi, Pipes points out 
that Muslims have to reconcile shari‘a with the cultural dimension of modernity, in 
other words, to be westernized (Pipes, 1983). 
In line with Samuel Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilizations’ thesis, Pipes asserts 
that Islam and the west are entirely incompatible. He argues that Islamic and western 
customs are different in so many details. Ironically, Pipes explains the surge of Islamic 
revival as a product of the west’s declining power and prestige. However, he concludes 
that fundamentalists mislead people when they assume that modernization could happen 
without westernization (Pipes, 1983, p.197). 
In addition, a new generation of essentialists has emerged over the past decade 
particularly after 9/11 under the rubric of “terrorism” studies (Stern 2003, Ranstorp, 
2009, Hoffman 2006). This trend of scholarship tends to link Islam with terrorism. 
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Therefore, the notion of “Islamic terrorism” has become widespread within academic 
and policymaking circles over the past decade or as Jacson puts it, “A ubiquitous feature 
of contemporary terrorism discourse, observable in a great many political, academic and 
cultural texts, is the deeply problematic notion of ‘Islamic terrorism’, a term that comes 
laden with its own set of unacknowledged assumptions and embedded political-cultural 
narratives.” (Jacson, 2007, pp. 394-395). The concept of “Islamic terrorism”, as Jacson 
explains, took different lables and terms and discursive formation over the past decade. 
Notions like “extermisim”, “radicalism”, “jihadists”, etc. became pervasive in the 
western discoudse towards the Muslim world. 
The critique of the essentialism paradigm is not confined to its orientalist 
tendency, but also concerns the invalidity of its assumptions. On one the hand, it follows 
the discourse that Islamism is based on unchanging textualism, while on the other hand, 
it overlooks the diversity of Muslim discourses and cultures and the evolution of 
Islamist movements. It is true that Islamist leaders, such as Hasan al-Banna, Abul-ala 
Mawdudi, Sayed Qutb, and Aytollah Khomeini, establish their discourses on a 
monolithic and conservative understanding of the Islamic teachings; nevertheless, the 
Islamist arena contains highly diverse currents ranging from reformist to progressive 
and liberal ones. 
Recent studies on secularization and post-structuralism reveal the inability of 
essentialist narratives to explain religious, mainly Islamist, phenomena (Casanova, 1994; 
Berger, 1999). For instance, Peter Berger reveals the superficiality of linking 
modernization and secularization. Berger goes further when he stresses the crucial role 
of religion in the current world. As he pointed out, “The assumption that we live in a 
secularized world is false … The proposition that modernity necessarily leads to a 
decline of religion is, in principle, ‘value free’” (Berger, 1999, pp.2-3). 
Another set of critiques of essentialism comes from the realms of post-
modernism and multi-culturalism (Ayubi, 1991; Ahmed, 1992; Halliday, 1995; 
Eickelman and Piscatori, 1996; Ismail, 2002; Roy, 2004). According to this trend, the 
main problem with essentialism lies in its reliance on modernity theory. James Piscatori 
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and Dale Eickelman explore the limitations of modernist arguments towards the Muslim 
world by dismissing the casual relationship between modernization and westernization. 
According to them, the main defect of modernization theory “lies in the sharp contrast 
between two artificial constructs, “modernity” and “tradition” (Eickelman and Piscatori, 
1996, p.23). They go further by asserting that Islamic ’tradition’ operated, sometimes, as 
a vehicle for revolutionary change. 
Fred Halliday expands on Eickelman and Piscatori’s thoughts when he unveils 
the ideological exploitation of the modernity narrative. He criticizes the notion of 
universalism vis-à-vis particularism. He argues that this dichotomy is misleading and 
disguises reality (Halliday, 1995). Halliday points out that the particularism of the 
Middle East, like the universalism of the capitalist modernizer, is shaped by material 
and ideological interests (Halliday, 1995, p.14). Unlike essentialists, Halliday asserts 
that the rise of Islamist movements is not a trans-historical phenomenon but rather a 
response to political and social problems. He states: “Where Islamist movements arise, 
or where particular groups identify themselves primarily as ‘Muslim’, they are 
responding not to a timeless influence [as essentialists presume], but to the issues their 
societies and communities face today” (Halliday, 1995, p.118). 
Similarly, Bobby Sayyid provides a harsh critique of modernist and Eurocentric 
narratives. He argues that modernity creates a hegemonic discourse similar to that which 
Islamists espouse. He states that Islamists claim that they have an authentic construction 
of identity not contaminated by western influences (Sayyid 1997). Thus, he reveals that 
Islamism invents a counter-hegemonic movement based on Islamic particularism which 
threatens the universality of the western paradigm (Sayyid, 1997, p.139). 
Likewise, Nazih Ayubi repudiates the notion of the authenticity of Islamism. He 
stresses that political Islam is a spurious phenomenon that does not have its roots in 
Islamic history (Ayubi, 1991). He points out that: 
political Islam is a new invention—it does not represent a “going back” to any 
situation that existed in the past or any theory that was formulated in the 
past… Furthermore, political Islamists want to reverse the traditional 
relationship between the two spheres [religion and politics] so that politics 
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becomes subservient to religion, and not the other way round, as was the case 
historically (Ayubi, 1991, p.3). 
 
For some scholars, essentialist contentions regarding the Muslim stance on 
globalization and modernization are provocative and inaccurate. Akbar Ahmed reveals 
the spuriousness of these arguments by stressing the global element of Islam. He 
criticizes the linearity of the modernist narrative in creating a causal relationship 
between modernization and westernization. He states: 
Islamic history has had long periods in which we recognize elements from 
what we today call globalization: societies living within different ethnic, 
geographic and political boundaries, but speaking a language understood 
throughout, enjoying a common cultural sensibility and recognizing the same 
overarching ethos in the world-view (Ahmed, 2002, p.27). 
 
Ahmed argues that Islamist revivalism is both a cause and effect of post-modernism. 
Despite his criticism of modernists, Ahmed stresses that Islamic movements exemplify a 
response to authoritarian policies and local identity conflicts (Ahmed, 1992, p.14). 
Another nuanced critique of essentialism conducted by the French sociologist 
Oliver Roy rejects the rigid textual and cultural understanding of Islam and Islamism. 
According to Roy, Islamism is a modern phenomenon, not a traditional one. He reveals 
the dynamic nature of Islamist movements and the modern background of its audiences. 
Roy goes further by comparing Islamist movements with Marxist and revolutionary 
ones (Roy, 1994). Moreover, Roy disagrees with those scholars who espouse the 
Weberian reading of Islam which treats it as a culture, a civilization, and a closed 
system (Roy, 1994, p.7). He points out: 
The [Orientalist] presupposition consists, among Western specialists or 
essayists, in defining a timeless “Islamic Culture,” a conceptual framework 
that structures both political life and urban architecture, the thoughts of the 
ualmas and of their detractors, and whose consequence would be the 
nonemergence of capitalism and the absence of an autonomous space for 
politics and institutions (Roy, 1994, p.7). 
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Roy’s critique of essentialism entails two significant points: first, the 
generalization of its judgments; and second, the confusion between Islam as a religion, 
and Islamic culture which encompasses people from different cultures and traditions 
(Roy, 2004). Unlike essentialists, Roy warns against fabricating a causal relationship 
between religion and culture, arguing that the former might have a relative effect on the 
latter. 
To sum up, the battlefield of essentialists is texts, religious discourses, and 
traditions. Thus, the various critiques by academics from different theoretical 
backgrounds highlight that essentialism has failed to provide an accurate and relevant 
explanation for the Islamist phenomenon. 
 
2.3.3. The social movements approach 
During the last decade, many contributions to Islamist studies have adopted 
social movement theory as an approach for examining the dynamism of Islamist 
movements. This new trend attempts to overcome the shortcomings of the previous 
approaches in studying Islamist movements. Based upon various sociological concepts 
such as mobilization, protest, collective action, framing, and political opportunity 
structures, proponents of this approach tend to re-define Islamism as a type of social 
activism or collective action. They contend that studying Islamist movements through 
the lens of mobilization and contention variables can be more accurate than relying on 
essentialist or contextualist approaches. Thus, instead of looking at texts, idioms, and 
slogans of Islamist movements, social movements scholars examine allocating resources, 
mobilizing tactics, network building, and framing processes which occur in social 
movements (Munson, 2001; Wickham, 2002; Wiktorowicz, 2003; Yavuz, 2003; Bayat, 
2005). The main argument of this trend is that Islamist movements are social agents that 
seek to unleash political and/or social change. It treats Islamist movements as a type of 
social movement that reflects a combination of individuals, interests, and networks that 
meld together and act as a collective entity. Unlike the previous approaches, it should be 
noted that social constructivism approach does not explain why Islamist movements 
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emerge but rather it focuses on their nature and activism and how they articulate Islam 
in everyday life. 
This approach has three different, but related, strands; the first tackles Islamist 
movements in their political context. The second focuses on political opportunity 
structures. The third addresses the cultural framing process inside Islamist movements. 
The next section will sketch these strands. 
2.3.3.1 The political process strand 
This strand examines Islamist movements within their political and social 
contexts. It emphasises the importance of political process in shaping Islamist 
movements’ actions and strategies. The adherents of this strand argue that the political 
environment determines resources, ideational frameworks, and institutional factors that 
affect Islamist movements (Hafez, 2003). It is concerned with the interaction between 
Islamism, as a social movement, and the political regime, primarily within a repressive 
environment. Mohammed Hafez argues that the political process approach gives 
primacy of process over structure in any collective action (Hafez, 2003, p.21). Despite 
its dynamism, this strand espouses the structural view that treats social movements as 
mechanical agents who react to the political environment without being able to change 
or alter it. Jeff Goodwin and James Jasper have captured the structural bias of political 
process theory (Goodwin and Jasper, 2004). Despite acknowledging its vast influence in 
the social movements milieu, they have profoundly criticized the vagueness of its 
concepts. They stated, “PPT [political process theory] in its current form provides a 
helpful, albeit limited, set of ‘sensitizing concepts’ for social movement research” 
(Goodwin and Jasper, 2004, p.5). Moreover, this strand overlooks the dynamics and the 
interactions that occur inside these movements. 
2.3.3.2. Political opportunity structures model 
This strand tackles political opportunity  structures and spaces (Wiktorowicz, 
2003; Yavuz, 2003). According to this strand, political opportunities play a vital role in 
articulating the trajectory of social movements. It helps movements to allocate resources, 
mobilize people, and build allies for collective action (Gamson, 1975; Tarrow, 1994; 
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McAdam, McCarthy et al. 1996; McAdam and Snow, 1997; Diani and McAdam, 2003). 
Sidney Tarrow points out that political opportunity structure has four dimensions that 
provide incentives for people to undertake collective action: 1) access to participation; 2) 
shifts in ruling alignment; 3) building strong allies; and 4) splits within the ruling elite 
(Tarrow, 1994, p.86). Building on Tarrow’s four dimensions, Quintan Wiktorowicz 
argues that political opportunities and constraints shape the calculations of Islamist 
movements and help them in making rational decisions (Wiktorowicz, 2003). 
However, some scholars noted the shortcoming of using the opportunity 
structure in explaining the activism of Islamist movements. For instance, Hakan Yavuz 
makes clear distinction between opportunity spaces and opportunities. He highlights the 
importance of opportunity spaces in enhancing the ability of Islamists to reshape the 
public sphere. He states:  
The concept of “opportunity spaces” is more useful than “opportunity structure” 
since it brings micro and macro forces together and identifies the interactions 
between external and internal resources to indicate direction of change (Yavuz, 
2003, p.24). 
 
According to Yavuz, the new opportunity spaces open up new possibilities for 
Islamist movements to exist in the public sphere. In addition, these spaces help Islamist 
movements in articulating a new socio-political consciousness which can be used in 
achieving political change (Yavuz, 2003, p.25). 
However, this strand falls short in answering the crucial question: why are 
religious, specifically Islamist, movements and not other groups able to allocate 
resources, mobilize people, and seize political opportunity space? In addition, the 
political opportunity thesis confuses social movement emergence with movement 
activism. The main assumption of this thesis is that people tend to join social 
movements whenever there is political opportunity for doing that. However, this does 
not explain whether movements work to create such opportunity through collective 
action or they just expand their activism when the space is opened (Goodwin and Jasper, 
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2004). Jeff Goodwin and James Jasper reveal the dilemma of defining the concept of 
political opportunity. They state: 
“The more broadly one defines political opportunities, the more trivial … the 
political opportunity thesis becomes; conversely, the more narrowly one defines 
political opportunities, the more inadequate or implausible the political 
opportunity thesis becomes an explanation for the rise of any particular social 
movement” (Goodwin and Jasper, 2004, p.6).   
 
Following from this, Ziad Munson, despite stressing the importance of the 
political opportunity structure thesis, criticizes its shortcomings when examining 
specific cases. Munson argues that the political opportunity aspects, mentioned by 
Tarrow, cannot explain the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt during the 1930s 
and 1940s (Munson, 2001). According to Munson, despite the repressive political 
environment in Egypt during that period, the MB succeeded in expanding its 
organizational and social structure to different urban areas (Munson, 2001, pp. 496-497). 
Asef Bayat suggests another important factor in explaining how Islamists 
perceive themselves and how this affects their activism, which he calls ‘imagined 
solidarity’ (Bayat, 2005). He argues that solidarity is the cement that binds Islamists 
together and pushes them into taking collective action (Bayat, 2005). He claims that 
social movements act, sometimes, independently from external factors such as state 
repression. Moreover, he assumes that social movements can influence their own 
environment and their relationships with the surrounding social and political forces and 
institutions (Bayat, 2005, p.898). 
2.3.3.3 Cultural framing process 
The third strand of the social movement theory concentrates on the cultural 
framing process within Islamist movements (Eickelman and Piscatori, 1996; Ismail, 
2002; Wiktorowicz, 2003; Yavuz, 2003). According to social movement theorists, the 
term framing is used to describe the process of meaning construction (Snow and 
Benford 1986; Kriesberg, Misztal et al. 1988; Morris and Mueller 1992; Benford and 
Snow 2000). However, the American sociologist David Snow points out that the process 
of creating or manufacturing meaning from the traditional culture is complex. Thus, he 
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reveals the importance of frame alignment. He highlights four alignment processes, 
which social movements go through to formulate their message in relation to the 
existing culture: frame bridging; frame amplification; frame extension; and frame 
transformation (taken from Tarrow 1994, p.110). Wiktorowicz claims that Islamist 
movements use such framing mechanisms as interpretive devices that translate 
grievances and perceived opportunities into the mobilization of resources and movement 
activism (Wiktorowicz, 2002, p.205). 
Building on the framing process concept, Piscatori and Eickelman illustrate the 
importance of meaning manufacturing in the Muslim world. They argue that Muslim 
politics revolves around contesting both the interpretation of symbols and the control of 
the institutions that produce and sustain them (Eickelman and Piscatori, 1996). 
According to them, Islam constitutes the language of politics and Islamic vocabulary 
contains words of political resonance (Eickelman and Piscatori, 1996, p.12). Ismail 
takes Piscatori and Eickelman argument a step further by stressing the changing 
character of meanings and symbols. She reveals the deployment of religious symbols 
and the use of frames of reference derived from religious traditions. Thus, Ismail 
concludes that there are no inherited meanings to the texts (Ismail, 2002, p.17). The 
nuanced work of Yavuz on political identity examines the interaction between Islamic 
daily life and the meaning construction process. He contends that political identity is an 
outcome of the interaction between individuals and society in a constructive way (Yavuz, 
2003). 
Despite the significant contribution of social movements theory in studying 
different types of collective actions, it overlooks the religious component of Islamist 
movements. Apart from its western origins,4 social movement theory tends to deal with 
Islamist movements as merely mechanical social agents without giving much attention 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Charles Tilly explains the main reasons that lie behind the emergence of social movements by referring 
to the social and political changes that took place in Europe and the US during the 18th century. These 
reasons were anchored in parliamentarization, market capitalization, urbanization, and proletarization 
(Tilly, 2004). In addition, Alberto Melucci stresses that the new social movements are the product of post-
industrial societies. 
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to their religious rationale. Therefore, it does not distinguish between various types of 
movements such as traditional and reformist, radical and moderate, violent and peaceful. 
Furthermore, several social movements theorists tend to distinguish religious 
movements from social movements (Touraine, 1981; Habermas, 1987; Melucci, 1996). 
They assert that religious movements have a regressive and anti-modern nature. For 
instance, James Beckford, Habermas, Alain Touraine, and Alberto Melucci exclude 
religious movements from the realm of new social movements (NSMs) (Beckford 2003). 
Beckford criticizes the Marxist foundations of NSMs, while stressing the importance of 
NSMs in studying New Religious Movements (NRMs). 
The social movements approach provides an important perspective for 
understanding the dynamism of Islamist movements through outlining their mobilization 
mechanisms and resource allocating strategies. Nevertheless, it needs to be incorporated 
with other approaches and disciplines to be able to explain why Islamist movements 
emerge and how they maintain their activism and identity. Therefore, this study attempts 
to incorporate social movements theory with social constructivism in order to provide a 
better understanding for Islamist movements. As will be discussed in the next chapter, 
social constructivism has a plausible and robust interpretive framework that can 
examine the underlying factors and processes that shape Islamist movements’ identity 
and collective action. 
 
2.4. LITERATURE ON STUDYING THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD 
Despite the importance of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB hereafter) as the oldest 
and the most powerful Islamist movement in the Muslim world, many questions about 
the movement remain unanswered. The legal outlawing of the MB over the past six 
decades made it significantly hard to many scholars to have access to its members and 
leaders. Hence, the analysis and literature on the MB suffer many gaps and defects. It 
can be divided into four main streams. The first traces the historical and chronological 
background of the MB. The second illustrates the social formation of the movement and 
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its social presence. The third reveals the relationship between the MB and the various 
Egyptian regimes. The fourth highlights the ideology and discourse of the movement. 
Under the first stream, after Richard Mitchell’s pioneering study of the MB, 
subsequent attempts to study the movement lacked comprehensiveness and depth. 
Mitchell’s work provides an influential historical account for the MB during the 1950s 
and 1960s (Mitchell, 1969). However, in the 50 years since Mitchell’s study, the 
movement has experienced many changes and developments that need to be covered and 
analysed.  
Bayat’s study on the significance of social formation of the MB falls under the 
second stream. Bayat addresses the role of the middle class in articulating the structure 
of MB by exploring the interaction between the social background of MB members and 
the movement’s political presence (Bayat, 1998). He contends that the MB exemplifies 
the only real threat to the incumbent regimes in the Arab world. Similarly, Ninette 
Fahmy attempts to examine the significant presence of the MB in Egyptian professional 
syndicates during the 1990s (Fahmy, 1998). Fahmy claims that the MB management of 
these syndicates was no different from that of their non-MB predecessors in terms of 
incompetence and the lack of ethical conduct (Fahmy, 1998, p.521). 
Barbara Zollner’s work on Hasan Al-Hudaybi, the second General Guide of the 
MB, falls under the third stream. Zollner highlights the relationship between the MB and 
the Nasser regime (Zollner, 2009). Zollner illustrates the impact of Nasser regime on the 
MB internal dynamics. She contends that the brutal polices against MB members in 
prisons inspired the radical faction which adopted Sayyid Qutb’s ideology. 
The relationship between the MB and Anwar Sadat’s regime during the 1970s is 
covered by Abdelmoniem Said Aly and Manfred Wenner (Aly and Wenner, 1982). Aly 
and Wenner contend that MB tried to bargain with Sadat over the shape of the state. 
They explore the clash that occurred between both parties over amending the 
constitution in 1971. In addition, they reveal the changes that took place in MB strategy 
to reach the public through the mass media and to propagate their ideology in 
universities. 
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However, Saad Eldin Ibrahim disagrees with this analysis. He contends that the 
MB has achieved many gains during Sadat’s epoch (Ibrahim, 1996). Ibrahim highlights 
the ability of MB to re-articulate its ideology to a more moderate stance in order to gain 
greater tolerance. He, thus, concludes that the MB succeeded in expanding its social 
network of the MB during 1980s. Yet Ibrahim claims that since the death of Hasan al-
Banna, the MB has lacked a charismatic leader who can lead the movement into a new 
era. 
Another prominent scholar, Gilles Kepel, argues that MB is responsible for the 
flourishing Islamist ideology across the Middle East and North Africa (Kepel, 1995). He 
claims that the ultimate goal of the MB, and other Islamists, is to establish an Islamic 
state. However, he differentiates between radical and moderate Islamists’ strategies in 
achieving this goal. Accordingly, while radical Islamists resort to violence to topple 
secular regimes, moderates or conservatives prefer to change society itself before 
establishing an Islamic state (Kepel, 1995, 45). Kepel highlights the mutual interests 
between the MB and Mubarak’s regime in containing violent Islamists. Thus, he argues 
that the coexistence between the two parties is based on rational calculations. However, 
Hesham Al-Awadi disagrees with Kepel’s notion about the coexistence between 
Mubarak’s regime and the MB. Al-Awadi argues that Mubarak launched an offensive 
strategy to eradicate the MB in the mid 1990s (Al-Awadi, 2005). The reasons behind 
this, according to Al-Awadi, were: the social growth of the movement; the political 
presence of the MB; and the security challenge posed by violent Islamists which gave a 
pretext for Mubarak to suppress the MB (Al-Awadi, 2005, pp. 75-76).  
The fourth stream deals with developments in MB ideology. Mona El-Ghobashy 
explores the metaphors of the MB (El-Ghobashy, 2005). She refutes the allegation of the 
MB having a stagnant ideology. El-Ghobashy contends that the MB had to reconstruct 
their ideology and political discourse to adapt to changing political developments in 
Egypt. Moreover, she asserts that the ideological changes were driven by its political 
participation, primarily in the parliamentary elections during the 1980s and 1990s. 
Furthermore, Bruce Rutherford takes El-Ghobasy’s argument a step further by assessing 
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the transformation in MB ideology and strategy (Rutherford, 2006). He traces the 
consequences of the MB’s participation in politics. Rutherford contends that the ultimate 
goal of the MB is not to establish an Islamic state but rather to endorse Islamic 
governance. He states that “The MB has shown considerable flexibility and originality 
in its efforts to develop a viable conception of Islamic governance” (Rutherford, 2006, 
p.707) 
In their nuanced study, Robert S. Leiken and Steven Brooke highlight the main 
differences between MB ideology and other, mainly radical, Islamist movements 
(Leiken and Brooke, 2007). Based on extensive interviews with different MB offshoots 
throughout the Middle East and Europe, Leiken and Brooke criticize the monolithic 
view of the MB in the west. They affirm the tendency of the MB to embrace democratic 
and moderate ideology and to be engaged with the west. More notably, Leiken and 
Brooke imply that MB plays a crucial role in preventing violence in Muslim societies. 
They point out that: 
Other critics speculate that the Brotherhood helps radicalize Muslims in both 
the Middle East and Europe. But in fact, it appears that the Ikhwan works to 
dissuade Muslims from violence, instead channeling them into politics and 
charitable activities (Leiken and Brooke, 2007, p.112). 
 
 
2.5. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has shown that the study of Islamist movements is intricate. The 
many attempts to understand the MB have fallen short in unpacking the internal 
dynamics of the movement.  Clearly, despite the grwoing literature on Islamist 
movements, particularly on the MB, many questions remain without plausible answers. 
For instance, how do Islamist movements construct their identity? To what can extent 
identity generate and sustain movement activism? How do Islamist movements respond 
to regime repression? To what extent does political openness or closure affect the 
internal dynamics of Islamist movements? Therefore, this study attempts to provide 
plausible answers to these questions. In doing so, it avoids the dichotomy of essentialist 
and contextualist approaches. By incorporating social constructivism with social 
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movements’ theory, the study would unpack the process of identity construction as it 
happens within the MB. It treats identity as a social construct that is shaped by interplay 
between different factors. It examines how the MB produces meaning constructions and 
symbolic production to generate collective action and preserve its existence.  
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Chapter Three 
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISM AND ISLAMIC IDENTITY 
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter explores the theoretical framework of this study. It examines how 
social movements construct their collective identity, thereby revealing the underlying 
processes of identity construction in everyday life. It scrutinizes the strategies, 
mechanisms, and tools that enable collective actors to produce meanings, symbols, 
norms and values that shape its collective identity.  
The key objective of this chapter is to propose an analytical framework that 
could explain the process of identity construction as it occurs within Islamist movements. 
This framework seeks to answer the following questions: how do social movements 
construct their identity? What are the components of collective identity? To what extent 
can collective identity sustain collective action? What are the implications of the identity 
construction process on identity consolidation and coherence? And last but not least, 
what is the relationship, if there is any, between political environment and identity 
construction? 
In addition, this chapter will discuss the construction of Islamic identity within 
Islamist movements, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood. It will be argued that the 
construction of Islamic collective identity is contingent upon the movement’s aims and 
objectives, its internal structure, and the political environment whereby the movement 
operates. Islamic identity will be treated as a frame of reference which Islamist 
movements employ to recruit members, generate collective action, and preserve their 
existence. 
  
3.2. ECHOES OF THE SELF: WHAT IS IDENTITY? 
 The concept of identity is immensely problematic. Not only because of its 
relative character but also because of the implicit meanings and connotations it entails. 
Despite the plethora of literature on identity, the concept itself remains something of an 
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enigma. Marilynn Brewer points out that identity as a term has no single or shared 
meaning as “the problem with trying to extract any common definition is that the term is 
integrally embedded in separate theoretical structures and literatures with little or no 
cross-citation or mutual influence” (Brewer, 2001, p. 115). Moreover, Zygmunt Bauman 
contends that ‘identity’ is a matter of grave concern as it contains vexing dilemmas for 
individuals and communities (Bauman and Vecchi, 2004). In his words, “Identity-
seekers invariably face the daunting task of ‘squaring a circle’: that generic phrase, as 
you know, implies tasks that can never be completed in a ‘real time’, but assumed to 
able to reach completion in the fullness of time - in infinity …” (Bauman and Vecchi, 
2004, pp. 10-11). 
 The difficulty of defining identity stems not only from its epistemological 
relativity but also from its multiple empirical usages. The concept is widely used in 
different academic fields such as psychology, sociology, anthropology and, recently, 
political science. The scrutiny of its essence is the subject of much theoretical and 
empirical inquiry. 
 The roots of identity theory can be traced from the sociologist George Herbert 
Mead’s major work, Mind, Self, and Society (1934). Mead’s primary framework of 
identity is based on the interaction between the self and the society (Mead and Morris, 
1934). He explores the genesis of the self as an organism that communicates and 
responds to other social organisms. Mead aptly describes the interplay between the self 
and the society by what he calls “the generalized other” which refers to individuals’ 
tendency to behave as an “organized community” or social group (Mead and Morris, 
1934, p. 154). This process of interaction depends upon what Mead identifies as “self-
consciousness”. According to Mead, an individual organism enters the social 
environment through self-consciousness (Mead and Morris, 1934, p. 172).  
 Despite criticism of Mead’s insights on identity as simplistic and ambiguous, 
many theorists have built on his notion of interactionism as a catalyst for interpreting 
social behaviour (Hogg, Terry et al., 1995; Stryker and Burke, 2000). To overcome 
Mead’s reductionist approach to identity, Sheldon Stryker, Peter Burke, and Richard 
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Serpe have developed an identity theory departing from Mead’s notion about social 
interactionism (Stryker, 1968; Stryker and Serpe, 1982; Stryker and Burke, 2000). 
Identity theory thus explains how social structures affect the self and how the latter 
shapes social behaviours. The main assumption of identity theory is that the self is a 
multifaceted phenomenon which tends to undertake different social roles (Stryker and 
Burke, 2000). Social roles, the theory assumes, are “expectations attached to positions 
occupied in networks of relationships; identities are internalized role 
expectations”(Stryker and Burke, 2000, p. 286). In addition, Stryker and Burke contend 
the self has many identities and social roles that reflect how these identities are 
organized within the self (Stryker and Burke, 2000, p. 286). Moreover, Hogg, Terry, and 
White assert the self as a reflection of society and it should be regarded as an organized 
construct (Hogg, Terry et al., 1995, p. 256). 
Building on the notion of social roles, Stryker and Burke developed the sub-
theory of role-identity. This explains how social behaviour becomes a role-choice 
behaviour and why individuals choose one particular course of action (Stryker and 
Burke, 2000, pp 285-286). This notion stems from Mead’s concept of self-reflection 
which he identifies as a prerequisite for social interaction (Mead and Morris, 1934). Pert 
Callero takes role-identity theory a step further by identifying the social character of the 
self (Callero, 1985). Callero defines role-identity as “a particular social object that 
represents a dimension of the self” (Callero 1985: 204). He asserts role-identity must be 
shared, socially recognized, and defined by action. Furthermore, Michael Hogg, 
Deborah Terry and Katherine White contend that role identities are “self-conceptions, 
self-referent cognitions, or self-definitions that people apply to themselves as a 
consequence of the structural role positions they occupy, and through a process of 
labeling or self- definition as a member of a particular social category” (Hogg, Terry et 
al., 1995, p. 256). In this sense, identity is therefore regarded as a crucial link between 
social structure and individual actions which implies that identity should entail action by 
default (Hogg, Terry et al., 1995, p. 257). 
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3.2.1. Scrutinizing Identity: From the Self to the Social 
To reveal the essence of identity, theorists are divided into two camps. Whereas 
some scholars focus on self-identity or what they call identification or self-verification 
(McCall and Simmons, 1978; Stryker, 1980; Stryker, Owens et al., 2000), others tackle 
the social aspect of identity through what they call self-categorization (Tajfel, 1981; 
Turner, 1987; Hogg and Abrams, 1988). The former exemplifies identity theory and the 
latter represents social identity theory. The main assumption of identity theory is that 
identity reflects the individual’s role-related behaviours (Hogg, Terry et al., 1995). 
However, social identity theory explains group processes and intergroup relations. It 
argues that identity can be defined as a part of the social group. It presumes that any 
social group is “a set of individuals who hold a common social identification or views 
themselves as a part of social category” (Stets and Burke, 2000, p. 225). Moreover, Jan 
Sets and Peter Burke contend that identity is the composition of two processes of 
identification and self-categorization. According to them, social identity is a “person's 
knowledge that he or she belongs to a social category or group” (Stets and Burke, 2000, 
p. 225). 
However, the segregation between the two camps of identity is not clear-cut. The 
proponents of both theories assert identity cannot be defined without revealing its dual 
character (Hogg and Abrams, 1988; Stets and Burke, 2000). Terry and White, for 
instance, stress that both theories of identity build their theoretical assumptions on the 
multifacetness of the self that mediates between social structure and individual 
behaviours (Hogg, Terry et al., 1995, p. 255). Furthermore, Stets and Burke argue: 
“one's identities are composed of the self-views that emerge from the reflexive activity 
of self-categorization or identification in terms of membership in particular groups or 
roles” (Stets and Burke, 2000, pp. 225-226). 
Therefore, examinations into identity not only reveal its theoretical and abstract 
character but its social manifestation and usages. Hence, identity theorists tend to treat 
identity instrumentally depending on the context and the purpose of using the concept 
(Brubaker and Cooper, 2000; Stryker and Burke, 2000). In this context, Stryker and 
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Burke highlight three popular usages of identity: 1) to refer to the culture of a people; 2) 
to show a common identification with a collective or social category; and 3) to reflect 
parts of a self-composed of different meanings and multiple roles (Stryker and Burke, 
2000, p. 284). Similarly, Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, who extensively 
criticize attempts at using identity as a concept in social sciences without 
comprehending its derivative meanings, connotations, and usages, stress the difference 
between using identity as a category of practice and a category of analysis (Brubaker 
and Cooper, 2000). Accordingly, they highlight five different uses of identity: 1) to 
describe non-instrumental modes of social and political action, whether individual or 
collective; 2) to describe a common set of values among members of a group or 
category which they call the ‘sameness’; 3) to identify the integral aspects 
of ’selfhood‘ of individuals and social groups; 4) to highlight the processual interactivity 
of collective-understanding, solidarity and groupness that enhance collective action; and 
5) to reflect the unstable and fragmented nature of the contemporary ’self‘ (Brubaker 
and Cooper, 2000, pp 6-8). 
In addition to its instrumental character, Stryker contends that when it is 
explicitly addressed, identity invokes cultural meanings (Stryker, Owens et al., 2000). 
He states: “[I]dentity is made equivalent to the ideas, beliefs, and practices of a society, 
its features implicitly ascribed to all members of that society” (Stryker, Owens et al., 
2000, p. 22). Since it reflects individuals’ and a group’s sense of belonging, identity 
cannot be defined without revealing its collective character. In a similar way, Lori Peek 
defines identity as “an individual’s sense of self, group affiliations, structural positions, 
and ascribed and achieved statuses. Identity results from internal subjective perceptions, 
self-reflection, and external characterizations” (Peek, 2005, pp 216-217). Likewise, 
Hogg and Dominic Abrams define identity as “people's concepts of who they are, of 
what sort of people they are, and how they relate to others” (Hogg and Abrams, 1988, p 
2). 
Nevertheless, the crucial question is: how do individuals move from self to 
social identity? To answer such a question, identity theorists tend to differentiate 
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between two levels of identity: personal and social (Hogg, Terry et al., 1995; Stets and 
Burke, 2000; Stryker, Owens et al., 2000). The former refers to personal traits that 
create a sense of self-reflection. The latter refers to traits in groups of people that create 
a sense of collectivity or what is called “social identity” (Hogg, Terry et al., 1995; Stets 
and Burke, 2000; Stryker, Owens et al., 2000). Despite the difficulty of separation 
between personal and social identity, scholarly work attempts to define each separately. 
For instance, Taylor (1989) points out that the starting point of defining personal 
identity is to ask: Who am I? Where do I stand? (Taylor, 1989). He states: “My identity 
is defined by the commitments and identifications which provide a frame or horizon 
within which I can try to determine from case to case what is good, or valuable, or what 
ought to be done, or what I endorse or oppose” (Taylor, 1989, p. 27). This abstract 
definition reveals the intrinsic nature of identity which reflects the self-consciousness of 
individuals. It also traces William James’s (1890) notion of the self. James distinguished 
the dual character of the ‘self’ as a subject and as an object (in Leary and Tangney, 
2005). 
More significantly, the self cannot be revealed without being reflected by others. 
Mark Leary and June Tangney point out that people view themselves as they believe 
others see them (Leary and Tangney, 2005, p. 91). That is, the social aspect of 
personality comes to the fore when individuals conceive themselves as a part of others’ 
consciousness. According to Charles Cooley, the self is a product and a reflection of 
social life (cited in Holland, Fox et al., 2008). Cooley calls this interactionism the 
‘looking-glass self’ whereby he asserts the idea the self cannot be separated from social 
influences (cited in Holland, Fox et al., 2008, p. 22). According to Cooley, such a self is 
a ‘social self’ as it refers to “any idea, or system of ideas, drawn from the 
communicative life, that the mind cherishes as its own” (cited in Holland, Fox et al., 
2008, p. 161). 
Following this, identity theorists have produced what is known as symbolic 
interactionism (Stryker, 1968; Stryker, Owens et al., 2000; Leary and Tangney, 2005; 
Holland, Fox et al., 2008).  This refers to the meaningful interactions that occur between 
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individuals as human actors (Stryker, Owens et al., 2000). The main proposition of 
symbolic interactionism stems from the mutual relationship between self and society. It 
assumes that “society shapes self shapes social behaviour” (Stryker, Owens et al., 2000, 
p. 27).  
For individuals to move from personal to social identity, they need to be 
involved in social groups. Leary and Tangney assert individuals not only occupy a role 
in society but they are also members of different groups which yield their social identity 
(Leary and Tangney, 2005, p. 145). Individuals are thus inclined to act collectively 
when their personal identity is aligned with social identity. Leary and Tangney point out 
that such alignment occurs through a process of depersonalization whereby an 
individual’s perception shifts from being unique as a self towards the perception of the 
self as a member of a social category (Leary and Tangney, 2005, pp 145-146). It is the 
move from ‘I’ or ‘me’ towards ‘we’ where a person sees him or herself as the 
embodiment of the group rather than as a unique individual. 
Another crucial concept that links self and social identities is ‘identity salience’ 
(Stryker, Owens et al. 2000). This refers to “the probability that an identity will be 
invoked across a variety of situations, or alternatively across persons in a given situation 
(Stryker and Burke, 2000, p. 286). It denotes the multifaceted composition of self-
identities, and assumes that identities are tied to roles and positions in organized social 
relations (Stryker, Owens et al., 2000, p. 28). Hence, identity salience creates self-
commitment that helps in engaging individuals in collective action. Stryker and Burke 
contend that identities in the self are organized in a salience hierarchy that reflects the 
social importance of each identity (Stryker and Burke, 2000). 
Furthermore, a number of sociologists contend that salience facilitates the 
interplay between personal and social identity (Callero, 1985). It helps individuals who 
tend to undertake social roles to be involved in social groups and networks. It thus helps 
social movements to generate collective action. Stryker and Burke contend that the 
salience of religious identities predicts the time spent in religious activities while at the 
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same time the salience of religious identities is predicted by the commitment to role 
relationships based on religion (Stryker and Burke, 2000, p. 286). 
However, identity theorists have come to a consensus that identity is not a fixed 
and immutable concept but rather an evolving process of ‘becoming’ instead of ‘being’ 
(Cerulo, 1997; Stryker and Burke, 2000; Stryker, Owens et al., 2000; Peek, 2005). This 
study thus treats identity as both a fluid and a constructed concept. That is to say, despite 
the genesis of identity as a concept which can be manifested in different aspects of 
human behaviour, its construction is determined by actors’ agency and by the social 
context in which they operate. As Charles Taylor aptly puts it, “answering the question 
of ‘who I am’ cannot be possible without defining where I speaking from and to whom” 
(Taylor, 1989, p. 36). 
 
3.2.2. Activating Identity: From Social to Collective Identity 
Social identity is important to reveal individuals’ tendency to interact and 
communicate with other social groups; however, it is not sufficient to explain why 
certain individuals take part in specific actions. Hence, to understand the rationale of 
collective action, one needs to distinguish between social identity and collective identity. 
The former refers to the physiological structural relationships between the self and other 
social groups. The latter treats the self as an active agent in society. In other words, the 
social and physiological traits of individuals do not guarantee their involvement in 
collective action until these traits are activated and invoked by collective actors 
(Johnston and Klandermans, 1995; Stryker, Owens et al., 2000). Thus, collective 
identity should not be perceived as an aggregation of social identities but rather as 
“constructed, activated, and sustained only through interaction in social movements 
communities” (Taylor and Whittier, 1995, p. 172). That is, collective identity is 
exemplifies the locus of collective action (Gamson, 1995; Johnston and Klandermans, 
1995; Melucci, 1996). William Gamson argues that collective action entails a sense of 
collective identity (Gamson, 1995). He states: “Being a collective agent implies being a 
part of ‘we’ who can do something” (Gamson, 1995, p. 99). For Gamson, symbols and 
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language are key tools for the collective actor to frame its collective identity (Gamson, 
1995).  
Nevertheless, for individuals to move from social to collective identity, they 
need to be involved in an organized, permanent and meaningful collective action. Thus, 
social movements embody the vehicle that links between collective action and collective 
identity. Gamson argues that social movements tend to enlarge individuals identities to 
include the relevant collective identities as a part of their definition of the self (Gamson, 
1991, p. 41). Moreover, according to Taylor and Whittier, collective identities are 
embedded in social movements communities (Taylor and Whittier, 1995). Hence, 
creating a collective identity is crucial for preserving collective action. In addition, 
collective actors retain the agency in creating collective identity (Melucci, 1996). 
Melucci states: “the actors produce the collective action because they are able to define 
themselves and their relationship with the environment” (Melucci, 1995, p. 43). 
Therefore, collective identity, to some extent, reflects the combination of cultural 
and ideational components of the collective action. Verta Taylor and Nancy Whittier 
stress the importance of culture in identity construction (Taylor and Whittier, 1995). 
More significantly, they contend that using collective identity instead of ideology is 
more adequate in understanding collective phenomenon (Taylor and Whittier, 1995). 
They thus define collective identity as “the shared definition of a group that derives 
from members’ common interests, experiences, and solidarity” (Taylor and Whittier, 
1995, p. 172). 
This study therefore contends that collective identity is a social construct that 
reflects the interactive relationship between structure and agency, meanings and actions, 
values and interests. Collective actors are required to give meaning to what they are 
doing. Thus, they are involved in the production of meanings, symbols and values to 
ensure members’ commitment and participation in collective action.  
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3.3. SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND IDENTITY 
The past three decades have witnessed a growing interest in the study of the 
cultural and symbolic aspects of collective actors (Hunt, 1994; McAdam, McCarthy et 
al., 1996; McAdam and Snow 1997; Stryker, Owens et al. 2000; McAdam, Tarrow et al. 
2001). A number of scholars argue that the emergence of this interest embodies a major 
distinction between classical theories of social movements which focus on structural 
factors such as classes, races, genders, mobilization and deprivation, and the new social 
movements (NSMs) theory which concentrates mainly on identity, culture, and the 
symbolic aspects of collective actors (Gamson, 1992; Laraña, Johnston et al. 1994). 
Thus, identity has increasingly become a major concern in the study of social 
movements (Touraine, 1981; Habermas, 1987; Melucci, 1988; Della Porta and Diani, 
2006). Moreover, Stryker asserts that the collective search for identity is a fundamental 
activity for NSMs (Stryker, Owens et al. 2000). 
Additionally, the interest in studying collective identity within social movements 
originates from the changes that have shaped the global arena since the 1960s and 1970s. 
These changes are a consequence of the emergence of NSMs in Europe and the US that 
tackled new and different issues such as feminism, environmentalism, and peace issues 
(Calhoun, 1994; Melucci, 1996). More importantly, it reflects the mounting need to 
overcome the shortcomings of mobilization and political process models in studying 
social movements (Melucci, 1996; Polletta and Jasper, 2001; Meyer, Whittier et al., 
2002). Francesca Polletta and James Jasper point out that social movement theorists 
have turned to focus on collective identity for three reasons: first, to fill the gaps in 
resource mobilization and political process models that account for emergence, 
trajectories and impacts of social movements. Second, to overcome the limitations of 
structural analyses of social movements. Third, to respond to many new questions raised 
by social movements such as: why do people take part in collective action? What are the 
catalysts of social movements’ action? What is the role of social movements’ identity in 
fuelling collective action? (Polletta and Jasper, 2001, p. 283). More importantly, they 
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argue that collective identity plays a crucial role in social movements’ emergence, 
trajectories, and outcomes (Polletta and Jasper, 2001, p. 285).   
Furthermore, studying identity is at the heart of the emergence of NSMs. David 
Snow, Robert Benford and Scott Hunt point out the NSMs perspective holds that the 
collective search for identity is a central aspect of movement formation (Hunt, 1994). 
Melucci describes this shift as a move from the dualistic character of social movements 
studies between structural analysis and the analysis of individual motivations towards 
concentrating on how actors ‘construct’ their action (Melucci, 1996, p. 16). 
However, a number of sociologists contend that the growing interest in studying 
identity reflects the crisis of modernity paradigm (Touraine, 1981; Melucci, 1988; 
Calhoun, 1994). Touraine stresses the importance of the cultural aspects of social 
movements in post-industrial society. According to him, a social movement is “[T]he 
combination of a principle of identity, a principle of opposition, and a principle of 
totality” (Touraine, 1981, p. 81). Hence, the target of NSMs is not changing the state, as 
classical movements were doing, but rather to change society (Touraine, 1981, p. 96). 
Melucci (1988) argues that the post-modern (information) society poses new challenges 
for individuals and movements. He points out that social movements have shifted their 
focus from structural issues, class, race, and other traditional issues towards cultural and 
symbolic issues (Melucci, 1988). Hence, Melucci treats collective identities as ‘social 
constructs’. He aptly states: “[C]collective identity is thus a process in which actors 
produce common cognitive frameworks that enable them to assess their environment 
and to calculate costs and benefits of their actions” (Melucci, 1988, p. 35).  
More significantly, Calhoun claims that by focusing on identity, NSMs theory 
deconstructs the essential and natural assumptions about social behaviour (Calhoun, 
1994, p. 12). Although Calhoun does not consider the ‘newness’ of social movements, 
he admits that identity construction is the main activity for these movements. Moreover, 
Calhoun thus reveals the paraxial character of NSMs. He points out that despite the 
modern discourse of NSMs, modernity has imposed various dilemmas which force these 
movements to respond by emphasizing their identities. He states: 
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Recent approaches to issues of identity have stressed the incompleteness, 
fragmentation and contradictions of both collective and personal experience. 
They have shown how complex is the relationship among projects of identity, 
social demands and personal possibilities. (Calhoun, 1994, p. 14). 
 
However, Calhoun’s notion of identity presumes that collective actors lack 
rationality as they are merely a reaction to identity dilemmas. This notion has been 
criticized by many social movements theorists such as Cohen (1985) and Polletta and 
Jasper (2001). Cohen contends that social movements are rational actors who build their 
own actions on strategic calculations (Cohen, 1985, p. 707). He assert most 
contemporary movements are involved in two main activities: identity-creating and 
strategic/rational calculation (Cohen, 1985). In addition, Poletta and Jasper have aptly 
responded to Calhoun’s notion simultaneously with other assumptions on the rationality 
of social movements. According to them, collective identity responds to the 
inadequacies of instrumental rationality as an explanation for strategic choice (Polletta 
and Jasper, 2001, p. 284). 
More importantly, by focusing on identity, NSMs theory has fostered the cultural 
studies of collective actors (Johnston and Klandermans, 1995; Melucci, 1996; Meyer, 
Whittier et al., 2002; Goodwin and Jasper, 2004; Della Porta and Diani, 2006). Social 
movements are involved in articulating their own culture through meaning, 
constructions and symbolic codes. By creating a cognitive map for adherents, social 
movements can construct a distinctive identity from the dominant culture in society 
(Johnston and Klandermans, 1995). According to Johnston and Klandermans, social 
movements not only invest in a society’s culture but also can add, change, reconstruct 
and reformulate it (Johnston and Klandermans, 1995, p. 5). They claim that by creating 
a distinctive culture, social movements can maintain activism and longevity (Johnston 
and Klandermans, 1995, p. 12). Moreover, culture can be used as cognitive repertories 
to construct collective action. According to Della Porta, culture provides ideational 
elements such as beliefs, ceremonies, language and rituals that orient people and 
influence their identity (Della Porta and Diani, 2006, p. 73). 
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Nevertheless, many theorists have rejected the instrumental usage of culture in 
studying social movements (Steinberg 2002; Goodwin and Jasper, 2004). For instance, 
Marc Steinberg contends that cultures constructed through contention are only partly the 
product of calculated action (Steinberg, 2002). Jeff Goodwin and James Jasper 
extensively criticize attempts of using culture as a constant structure for analysis 
(Goodwin and Jasper, 2004). They contend that using culture as fixed frames in social 
movements distorts culture and limits understanding the rationale of collective actors. 
According to them, culture is a broader concept than frames as it encompasses symbols, 
emotions, codes, narratives, ideologies and discourses that have a massive role in 
generating collective action (Goodwin and Jasper, 2004, pp 27-28).  
Thus, the critical question is: how has the NSMs approach tackled identity? The 
writings of Doug McAdam, David Snow, Scott Hunt, Sidney Tarrow, Robert Benford, 
and Charles Tilly reflect an attempt to answer this question (Tilly, 1978; McAdam, 1982; 
Hunt, 1994; Tarrow, 1994; Benford and Snow, 2000; Snow and McAdam, 2000). 
However, one could divide this literature into two main models: identity work and the 
framing process. Snow and McAdam claim that the convergence between individual and 
collective identities can be achieved through what they call ‘identity work’, a concept 
that refers to “the range of activities individuals engage in to create, present, and sustain 
personal identities that are congruent with and supportive of the self-concept” (Snow 
and McAdam, 2000, p. 46). By identity convergence, Snow and McAdam refer to the 
coalescence of a movement and individuals who already identify with it (Snow and 
McAdam, 2000, p. 47). Other scholars argue that such convergence happens when 
linking individual and collective identities with grievances that affect everyday life 
(Hunt, 1994). Furthermore, Snow argues that collective identity is the outcome of the 
correspondence between ‘one-ness’ and a sense of ‘we’ (Snow, 2001). Thus, he claims 
that collective identity is constituted by the shared and interactive sense of ‘we-ness’ 
and collective agency (Snow, 2001, p. 3). 
On the other hand, the correspondence between individual and collective 
identities occurs when both are aligned. Such alignment takes place within social 
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movements through the ‘framing process’ (Snow and Benford, 1986; Tarrow, 1994; 
McAdam, McCarthy et al., 1996). Snow and McAdam claim that for identity to be 
framed, it needs to pass four operating processes within social movements: identity 
amplification; identity consolidation; identity extension; and identity transformation 
(Snow and McAdam, 2000, p. 49). The outcome of these processes is identity 
construction. According to this model, social movements tend to use frame alignment as 
a mechanism that mediate various forms of identity construction. Moreover, Snow, 
Burke Rochford, Steven Worden and Robert Benford stress the importance of frame 
alignment in articulating collective identity and generating collective action within 
social movements (Snow and Benford, 1986). 
In addition, the framing process assumes that social movements tend to involve a 
meaning construction process. Benford and Snow define framing as “an active, 
processual phenomenon that implies agency and contention at the level of reality 
construction” (Benford and Snow, 2000, p. 614). Building on Erving Goffman’s work 
(1974) on framing who defines it as a “schemata of interpretation" that enable 
individuals "to locate, perceive, identify, and label" occurrences within their life space 
and the world at large” (Goffman, 1974, p. 21), Benford and Snow contend that social 
movements tend to use these schemata to construct meanings and norms that could 
generate collective action (Benford and Snow, 2000). They point out that collective 
action frames are constituted by two sets of characteristic features: an action-oriented 
function (core framing tasks) and the interactive and discursive processes to these core 
framing tasks that generate collective frames (Benford and Snow, 2000, p. 615). Yet 
Benford and Snow assert collective action frames are not merely an accumulation of an 
individual’s beliefs and perceptions but also the outcome of the negotiation of shared 
meanings (Benford and Snow, 2000, p. 614). 
Therefore, the connection between framing and identity construction is crucial. 
According to Snow, Benford, and Scott Hunt, identity constructions are inherent in all 
social movement framing activities (Hunt, 1994). They point out that “not only do 
framing processes link individuals and groups ideologically but they proffer, buttress, 
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and embellish identities that range from collaborative to conflictual” (Hunt, 1994, p. 
185). This link can be explored through three generic categories: protagonists, 
antagonists, and audiences (Hunt, 1994, p. 191). 
Despite its remarkable contribution in revealing the construction of collective 
identity, these two models have faced many critiques (Polletta and Jasper, 2001; Snow, 
2001; Meyer, Whittier et al. 2002; Goodwin and Jasper, 2004). The main critique 
revolves around the linear relationship between individual and collective identities. For 
instance, the assumption that individuals are inevitably inclined to join a social 
movement to enhance their personal identities is simply misleading (Snow, 2001). It 
assumes that the relationship between social movements and individuals is automatic. 
Snow highlights the troublesome nature of the identity work model. He points out that 
members of social movements can have multiple identities which might create conflict 
in constructing collective identity. He states: 
A not uncommon problem with analyses of collective identity is the tendency to 
reify the collective identity, and thus take-for-granted the link between the 
individuals that make-up the collectivity and the shared, overarching identity. 
This gloss is particularly troublesome in light of the observation that people 
typically have multiple identities that vary in salience and pervasiveness. (Snow, 
2001, p.7) 
 
In addition, the framing process entails structural bias in analyzing social 
movements. Goodwin and Jasper extensively criticize Snow and Benford’s framing 
formula because of its structural bias (Goodwin and Jasper, 2004). They reveal its 
dichotomy as either successful framing or not. Goodwin and Jasper assert frames should 
not be treated as windows (such as the case with opportunity structures) that are either 
open or closed (Goodwin and Jasper, 2004, p.24). They point out that collective 
identities are not simply cognitive or discursive meaning;, they often have emotions and 
psychological dimensions (Goodwin and Jasper, 2004, p.25).  
The aforementioned debate reveals the interplay of concepts, models and 
approaches that attempt to explore the construction of the collective identity process. 
This study, however, contends that in order to grasp this process, it is essential to 
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integrate different theoretical models. Yet this integration should not presume a linear 
connection between identity and specific presuppositions. It “avoid[s] a priori 
assumptions about causal mechanisms and allows for a number of different relationships 
between cultural and discursive practices on the on hand, and legal, political, economic, 
and social structures on the other” (Polletta and Jasper, 2001, p.285). In addition, to 
conduct such an integrative framework, first one needs to address the questions that 
collective identity seeks to answer. In this context, Polletta and Jasper have raised 
several such questions, including: Are collective identities constructed by movements or 
imposed on them? Do individuals adopt collective identities for self-interests or do the 
latter flow from identities? Is identity a cause or an outcome of collective action? 
Yet this study contends that to grasp the process of identity construction as it 
happens within social movements, many other questions should be asked, such as: To 
what extent does the formation process of social movement affect its collective identity? 
Does the nature of the movement shape its identity? To what extent do external variants 
help or hinder articulating collective identity? What are the impacts of ideational factors 
(religion, culture, ideology and beliefs) on formulating identity? 
By raising these questions, this study seeks to explore how Islamist movements 
construct their collective identities. The departure point of this study stems from Alberto 
Melucci’s notion about collective identity. For Melucci, collective identity “is not a 
datum or an essence, a ‘thing’ with a ‘real’ existence” (Melucci, 1996, p.77). It thus 
treats collective identity as a socially constructed phenomenon. It is the reflection of the 
multiple processes and interactions that occur inside social movements and that are 
shaped by the opportunities and constraints in the external environment. However, to 
understand these interplay processes, this study adopts social constructivism as a 
framework of analysis that could explain how Islamist movements construct their 
collective identity. 
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3.4. PREMISES OF SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISM 
To reveal the identity formation process, one needs to contextualize it. Identity 
per se is a social construction. It is not something that could be measured; however, it 
can be imagined and manifested. This study contends that social constructivism enables 
an exploration, a deconstruction of the imposed identities and examination of the new 
collective identity formation process in social movements. By bridging the gap between 
‘objective’ conditions and ‘subjective’ motives, behaviour and meaning, between 
‘structure’ and ‘agency’, social constructivism reveals the collective agency of social 
actors (Melucci, 1996, p.69).  
Furthermore, if the conventional wisdom of NSMs theory, which treats action as 
a ‘social construct’, is true, then collective identity exemplifies the manifestation of this 
social construction. The NSMs theory accounts for revealing the collective character of 
social behaviour in everyday life (Tilly, 1978; Tarrow, 1994; McAdam and Snow, 1997). 
Thus, in order to give meaning to collective action, social movements tend to construct 
collective identity that could link between structure and meaning (Johnston and 
Klandermans, 1995; Melucci, 1996; Della Porta and Diani, 2006). Such a link was 
overlooked in the dominant dualism of structuralist and essentialist approaches that 
tackled collective phenomenon (Melucci, 1996). Hence, the mounting interest in culture 
and meaning constructions has made collective identity focal in NSMs studies. 
Social constructivism challenges the idea that identity is an immutable and rigid 
phenomenon. It denaturalizes the notion of identity as something produced by acts of 
individual will (Calhoun, 1994, p.13). Identity as a social reality reflects the interaction 
between individuals and society whereby both constitute each other (Berger and 
Luckmann, 1967). Cerulo argues that every collective becomes a social artefact or entity 
moulded, refabricated and mobilized in accord with reigning cultural scripts and centres 
of power (Cerulo, 1997, p.387). Thus, one could argue collective identity is the outcome 
of these processes of interactions between the self and society, individuals and groups, 
structures and meanings which take place in everyday life. According to Berger and 
Luckmann, identity is formed by social processes and is maintained, modified and 
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reshaped by social relations (Berger and Luckmann, 1967, p.194). The main premise of 
constructivism is stressing the human agency as the prime mover of history (Yavuz, 
2003). It assumes that any society is a human construction and subject to multiple 
interpretations and influences (Yavuz, 2003, p.20). 
 Accordingly, social construction of identity entails various processes of meaning 
manufacturing. Identity is thus an ongoing process of creating meanings, norms, images 
and values for social agents. Such process underlies individuals’ attitudes, perceptions, 
attitudes and actions in response to the external world. Put differently, constructivism 
reveals the ways in which individuals and groups participate in creating their perceived 
social reality. By integrating cultural, institutional and ideational frameworks, social 
constructivism can reveal the process of identity formation in social movements. 
This study contends that individuals tend to surround themselves by meaning 
constructions and symbolic relationships. Hence, social movements tend to be involved 
in different processes of meaning constructions to reshape individuals’ identity. 
Johnston and Klandermans highlight three different processes of meaning construction 
in social movements: public discourse, persuasive communication, and consciousness 
raising during episodes of collective action (Johnston and Klandermans 1995: 10). 
Social constructivism allows examining the complex relationship between individuals 
and society or as, Yavuz states, between agency and structure, symbols and action, and 
text and context (Yavuz, 2003, p.20). 
Most importantly, social constructivism illustrates how collective identity helps 
social movements to generate collective action. That is, collective identity will be 
treated as a social construct which reflects the interplay between individuals’ interests, 
values, and behaviours. Collective action, as Melucci asserts, “[m]ust be understood in 
terms of the processes through which individuals communicate, negotiate, produce 
meanings and make decisions within a particular social field or environment” (Melucci, 
1988, p.20). Hence individual identity, which reflects personal and biological traits, is 
brought to the social space by participating in a social movement that changes this 
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identity formation and reconstructs its traits socially and politically (Laraña, Johnston et 
al., 1994, p.12). 
Therefore, social constructivism provides an analysis framework that tackles the 
interplay between incentives, grievances and values of society members (Snow ,2001). 
By examining the complex relationship between human understanding and social reality, 
social constructivism explores mechanisms whereby social movements engender 
collective action. Melucci points out, “collective phenomena are viewed as the result of 
various types of action and elements of structure and motivation” (Melucci, 1988, p.19). 
Moreover, social constructivism interprets how and why collective actors seek to 
construct a distinctive identity for its members. Such identity helps social movements 
not only to sustain collective action but also to challenge other identity makers in society. 
For instance, Islamist movements are inclined to employ cultural and symbolic capital to 
construct their own collective identity as well as to respond to the challenges and 
pressures coming from other collective rivals and, more importantly, from the state.  
In this context, constructivism will be used as a hermeneutical and interactive 
approach which seeks to examine the multiple relationships between aims and interests, 
beliefs and practices, internal and external environment. However, one needs to stress 
that “constructivism does not confer agency to a reified Islam but rather to living 
Muslims whose actions are embedded in particular loyalties and networks” (Yavuz, 
2003, p.21). By revealing the interplay between aims and objectives, systems of 
relationships, and environment, constructivism can reveal the process of identity 
construction that takes place within Islamist movements. 
 
3.4.1. The Construction of Collective Identity 
 How do social movements construct collective identity? To answer this question, 
first one needs to define collective identity. This study stresses that defining collective 
identity is inseparable from its construction. It thus does not treat collective identity as a 
‘datum’ but rather as a constructed concept. To begin with, William Gamson defines 
collective identity as “a process in which movement participants socially construct a ‘we’ 
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that becomes, in varying degrees with different individuals, part of their own definition 
of self” (Gamson,1991, p.45). For Della Porta and Diani, collective identity is a part of 
the collective action. Della Porta and Diani state: “identity production is an essential 
component of collective action” (Della Porta and Diani, 2006, p.92). In other words, 
collective identity is the manifestation of collective action whether it is expressed in 
symbols and meanings or translated into collective behaviour. Accordingly, collective 
identity is not an ‘essence’ or a thing with ‘real’ existence, but rather ‘an interactive and 
shared definition produced by a number of individuals (or groups at a more complex 
level) concerning the orientations of their action and the field of opportunities and 
constraints in which such action is to take place” (Melucci, 1996, p.70). This interactive 
character of collective identity comes through negotiations and interactions among 
different actors (Melucci, 1996, p.70). Despite the operational character of Melucci’s 
definition of identity, it reveals the manufacturing process of identity which takes place 
within social movements. It also reflects the interplay processes whereby individuals 
and collective actors are involved in creating meanings, norms, codes and symbols that 
construct collective identity. 
 Nevertheless, to overcome the operational aspect of Melucci’s definition of 
identity, Polletta and Jasper have attempted to integrate emotions and moral aspects of 
identity (Polletta and Jasper, 2001). They have drawn attention to the crucial role that 
emotion can play in constructing collective identity. While it is true that Melucci 
touches upon the ‘emotional’ aspect of collective identity, he treats it instrumentally. For 
instance, he states: “a certain degree of emotional investment is required in the definition 
of collective identity” (Melucci, 1996, p.71). However, Polletta and Jasper place 
emotion at the heart of collective identity. They define it as “an individual’s cognitive, 
moral, and emotional connection with a broader community, category, practice, or 
institution” (Polletta and Jasper, 2001, p.285). By this definition, Polletta and Jasper 
attempt to integrate the cultural and institutional components of collective identity as a 
base for analysis. Such integration, they argue, can resolve the conflict over which 
factors, interests or values, structures or meanings, strategies or tactics determine the 
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articulation of collective identity. Yet Polleta and Jasper point out that if it is true that 
collective identity is expressed in cultural materials such as names, symbols, rituals and 
clothing, not all cultural materials are expressions of collective identity (Polletta and 
Jasper, 2001, p.285). Moreover, they make the claim that although collective identity 
can be constructed by outsiders, its activation depends on the acceptance of those to 
whom it is applied (Polletta and Jasper, 2001, p.285). The main contribution of Polletta 
and Jasper’s definition is to draw attention towards the intangible components which 
play a role in forming collective identity. 
 The construction of collective identity originates from the ability of individuals 
to identify themselves in terms of ‘we’ in front of the other or ‘them’ (Melucci, 1996; 
Polletta and Jasper, 2001; Della Porta and Diani, 2006). In this context, Della Porta and 
Diani point out that collective action cannot occur in the absence of a ‘we’ characterized 
by common traits and solidarity (Della Porta and Diani, 2006, p.94). Such solidarity, 
Della Porta and Diani argue, facilitates individuals’ involvement in collective action as 
it strengthens a sense of belonging and eases the risks and uncertainties that might result 
from this collective action (Della Porta and Diani, 2006, p.94). This notion explains how 
Islamist movements can sustain activism in spite of the political repression they might 
face. Moreover, such repression can be employed by collective actors as a tool for 
identity consolidation. For instance, the Muslim Brotherhood, which has experienced 
different kinds of political repression since its banning in 1954, tends to use state 
repression to construct and consolidate its collective identity. 
Furthermore, construction of collective identity mirrors the recognition dilemma 
that faces collective actors (Calhoun, 1993; Yavuz, 2003; Della Porta and Diani, 2006). 
In this sense, identity is a double-sided coin which entails ‘we’ vs. ‘them’. Della Porta 
and Diani point out that identity emerges from the process of self-identification and 
external recognition (Della Porta and Diani, 2006, p.105). However, the process of self-
identification is not easily achieved as it conflicts with other social groups and, more 
importantly, with the state over recognition. Calhoun contends that recognition is rooted 
in the heart of collective action (Calhoun, 1994). He points out that recognition becomes 
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problematic when many collective actors contest to get recognition for their identities 
(Calhoun, 1994, p.20). Yavuz succinctly highlights the key role of recognition in 
identity construction (Yavuz, 2003). He states: “every identity, by definition, carries its 
‘other’ within it as a constituting element” (Yavuz, 2003, p.22). More significantly, 
recognition reflects the relational dimension of collective identity which in turn reflects 
the connection between the collective actor and its environment. This environment 
contains the constraints and opportunities which determine the characteristics of 
collective actors (Melucci, 1996). Melucci contends that auto-identification of the 
collective actor is contingent upon social recognition. He states: “A collective actor 
cannot construct its identity independently of its recognition (which can also mean 
denial or opposition) by other social and political actors” (Melucci, 1996, p.73). 
Moreover, Melucci asserts every collective actor must make the assumption of having a 
distinction from others to ensure collective action (Melucci, 1996, p.73). 
As a result, this study contends that recognition exemplifies an integral 
component of the collective identity of Islamist movements. Islamist actors struggle to 
get recognition not only from the society and other collective rivals but also from the 
state. For instance, the MB has struggled since the 1950s to obtain legal recognition 
from the Egyptian state. This struggle, as this study will show, has shaped the way that 
the MB articulates its collective identity. That is to say, the struggle for recognition 
reveals the mechanisms and strategies that collective actors employ to construct their 
collective identity.  
In addition, and more significantly, collective identity as a construction process 
guarantees the permanence and continuity of the collective actor over time (Gamson, 
1991; Melucci, 1996). For instance, Gamson stresses the key role of collective identity 
in preserving collective action. Hence, he assumes that the durability of collective 
identity is contingent upon the ability of the collective actor to link solidarity, movement 
and organizational layers in the participants’ sense of self (Gamson, 1991, p.41). In this 
context, Melucci highlights three main functions whereby collective identity ensures the 
persistence of social movement: it regulates the memberships of individuals; it defines 
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the requisites for joining the movement; and it draws on the criteria by which members 
recognize themselves and are recognized (Melucci, 1996, p.75). These functions, 
Melucci asserts, reveal the dynamic character of collective identity as a social 
construction. Moreover, this dynamism can explain the capacity of collective actor to act 
autonomously and to maintain continuity over time. Yet collective identity should not be 
treated as a reaction to social and environmental constraints but rather as a process of 
producing meanings and symbolic orientations for individuals (Melucci, 1996, p.73). 
 Another important component of the construction of collective identity is 
differentiation (Calhoun, 1993; Swartz, 1997; Della Porta and Diani, 2006). Indeed, the 
struggle for recognition reflects the tendency of collective actors to construct a sense of 
differentiation not only among adherents but also from other collective actors. 
Differentiation creates a sense of distinctiveness for collective actors and helps them to 
recruit new members. Yet to achieve such differentiation and distinctiveness, collective 
actors are involved in meaning and symbolic production (Della Porta and Diani, 2006). 
For instance, Islamist actors are extensively involved in constructing rituals, slogans, 
and symbols to distinguish their movements and adherents from others. They invest in 
what Pierre Bourdieu has called ‘symbolic capital’, which refers to all nonmaterial 
practices that enhance actors’ ability to obtain power and distinctiveness (Swartz, 1997). 
In addition, rituals play a crucial role in articulating collective identity (Yavuz, 2003; 
Della Porta and Diani, 2006). Della Porta and Diani state:  
rituals represent forms of symbolic expression by which communications 
concerning social relationships are passed on, in stylized and dramatized 
ways … they contribute to the reinforcement of identity and of collective 
feelings of belonging; and at the same time, they enable the movement actors to 
give free rein to their emotions. (Della Porta and Diani, 2006, p.109) 
 
As this study concerns an examination of Islamic identity construction, one 
needs to stress the crucial role of religious capital, rituals, scripts and idioms in the 
construction process. Religious actors are inclined to capitalize in nonmaterial goods to 
produce meanings and cognitive map for adherents (Taylor and Whittier, 1995; Yavuz, 
2003; Della Porta and Diani, 2006). The importance of religious capital originates not 
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from its theological or ontological connotations but rather from its reflection on 
practices of everyday life. Building on Durkheim’s notion on religion, Verta Taylor and 
Nancy Whittier assert the crucial role of ritual in social movements (Taylor and Whittier, 
1995). They contend that ritual mediates between symbolic divisions, sacred and 
profane, to produce solidarity and maintain group equilibrium (Taylor and Whittier, 
1995, p.175). For example, Islamist movements tend to employ Islamic rituals and 
idioms to maintain solidarity among members. As this study will show, the MB has the 
ability to construct a cognitive map and norms system that attract potential members to 
join the movement. However, the penetration of Islamist movements into the public 
sphere depends upon their ability to transform religious idioms and rituals into everyday 
practices (Yavuz, 2003; Tuğal, 2009). 
As a process, identity construction entails different interactions and interplay 
relationships. Taylor and Whittier highlight three main interrelated process of identity: 
the construction of group boundaries, which draw differences between a challenging 
group and dominate groups; consciousness, which entails the interpretive framework of 
the group; and the politicization of everyday life through the use of symbols and 
everyday actions to resist or restructure existing systems of domination (Taylor and 
Whittier 1995, p.173). For Gamson, construction of collective identity is embedded in 
three integral layers: organizational, movement, and solidary (Gamson, 1991). Gamson 
claims that these different layers are so closely integrated that they become a single 
amalgam: “a movement arises out of a particular solidary group with widespread 
support from it, and one particular organization comes to embody the movement” 
(Gamson, 1991, p.41). 
Notwithstanding its importance, Islamist movements have been studied as NSMs 
(Wickham, 2002; Wiktorowicz, 2003; Bayat, 2005). Two important points in studying 
collective identity have been disregarded and scholars have treated them as secondary. 
First are the features that distinguish Islamic collective identity from other forms of 
collective identity. Second is the impact of constructing collective identity on 
individuals, the basic unit of the social movement.  
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Unpacking these aspects can be helpful in answering a number of questions that 
have been unresolved in social movements’ literature. For instance, what factors 
determine the character of collective identity and are they elastic or rigid, exclusive or 
inclusive, and do they lean towards openness or closure? What is the role of the external 
environment in formulating social movement’s identity? To what extent do the aims and 
interests of social movement forge its identity? What are the weight and the role of 
individuals, the main underpinning of a collective actor, in constructing collective 
identity? What are the impacts of collective identity on individuals? What is the role of 
individuals in extending collective identity to encompass others? 
 These questions are fundamental to examining Islamic collective identity from 
the social movements’ perspective. As this study will show, Islamist movements tend to 
formulate a distinctive collective identity for adherents. In order to achieve this, they 
contest values, symbols, slogans, imagination and norms with other collective actors in 
everyday life. This struggle for reshaping societal values, norms and sometimes laws has 
a significant impact on constituting individuals attitudes, perceptions and, above all, 
identity. 
To this end, this study reveals the underlying factors that affect the construction 
of collective identity within Islamist movements. It discards the monolithic narratives 
that deal with Islamist movements as merely power seekers. Thus it will be argued 
Islamist movements, and more specifically the MB, are identity-created movements that 
seek to encompass state and society under its collective identity. It does not treat identity 
as a given product but rather as a fluid and constructed one. In this context, identity will 
be tackled not only as a presupposition of Islamic collective action but also as an 
objective per se for Islamist movements. 
In order to reveal the construction of Islamic identity, this study will examine 
three interlinked aspects of Islamist movements: their objectives and aims, the internal 
dynamics and structure, and the external environment where this identity is contested 
and manifested. This study contends that unpacking the rationale and logic of Islamist 
actors, what they stand for and what aims they seek to pursue, is essential to revealing 
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the process of constructing their collective identity. For instance, to explore how the MB 
constructs its collective identity, one needs to examine first the aims, objectives, targets 
and structure of internal interactions of the movement. In other words, this study is 
concerned with how the internal dynamics of Islamist movements impact on individuals’ 
perceptions, attitudes and, most importantly, their identity. It tackles the process of 
identity construction in the everyday life of the Islamist as an individual before 
becoming a part of a collective actor. 
 
3.4.2. Islamic Social Movements 
 As mentioned earlier, the shift in studying collective actors from classical to 
NSMs theory was marked by concentrating on society as the main target of collective 
action instead of the state (Touraine, 1981; Cohen, 1985; Habermas, 1987; Melucci, 
1988; Calhoun, 1993). This new interest in society was accompanied with a focus on 
identity issues: identity politics (Calhoun, 1993), culture (Johnston and Klandermans, 
1995) and emotions (Goodwin, Polletta, and Jasper 2004). Building on this burgeoning 
literature, a number of scholars have attempted to extend the NSMs umbrella to include 
a scrutiny of Islamist movements (Wickham, 2002; Wiktorowicz, 2003; Yavuz, 2003; 
Clark, 2004; Bayat, 2005; Tuğal, 2009). Their work examines roles of identity (Yavuz), 
solidarity (Bayat), political opportunity structures, resource mobilizing and framing 
(Wiktorowicz and others), network building (Clark), and everyday practices (Tuğal) 
within Islamist movements. However, despite its fruitful contribution to Islamic studies, 
this trend is still emerging and more research needs to be done to discern the nature of 
Islamic social movements. Therefore, this study seeks to contribute to the literature by 
focusing on the construction of Islamic identity within Islamist movements. 
Nevertheless, before doing so, one needs to highlight three main distinctions 
between Islamist movements and social movements. First, although there is 
commonality between Islamist movements and social movements in terms of 
networking, mobilizing and protesting, the former are inclined to rely extensively upon 
ideational factors (religious, cultural, emotional, etc.) to generate collective action. This 
	  
	  
	  
	  
66	  
tendency sheds light on the tremendous capability of Islamist movements as meaning 
producers. Second, unlike social movements which focus on collective action as the 
locus of analysis, Islamist movements tend to focus on collective identity as the locus of 
action. Third, whereas society is the main target for NSMs (Touraine, 1981; Habermas, 
1987; Melucci, 1996), Islamist movements target both society and the state (Yavuz, 
2003; Tuğal, 2009). 
 
3.4.3. The Construction of Islamic Identity 
Islamist movements are not merely power seekers but also identity makers. 
While it is true many Islamists tend to be involved in political activities, for example 
forming political parties, contesting elections and sometimes attaining power, 
reformulating society’s values and norms remains the ultimate goal of these movements. 
Moreover, establishing an Islamic state, which is perceived as the fundamental goal for 
Islamists, is contingent upon its commitment to endorsing Islamic values and moral 
codes in Muslim societies. More significantly, the legitimacy of many Islamist 
movements is derived from their tendency, even rhetorically, to establish an ‘Islamic’ 
society, regardless of what definitions and connotations they attach to this word. They 
capitalize on Muslims’ religious nostalgia for the primordial Islamic society founded by 
the Prophet Muhammed in the seventh century to claim authenticity. 
The Islamists’ task is thus not confined only to establishing Islamic society but 
also to identifying its norms, boundaries and cognitive codes. They are involved in 
creating what Olivier Roy has called the ‘virtuous’ society (Roy, 1994; 2004). 5 
Therefore, for many Islamists, the first step in establishing this postulated society is to 
reformulate individuals’ attitudes, perceptions and practices in everyday life.6 Such a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Although Roy’s argument, in a broader sense, is based on an essentialist view which treats Islamist 
movements as monolithic entities having the same imagination, it still has some plausibility if we deal 
with it instrumentally. By this I mean Islamist movements employ such an ‘imagined’ society as an 
incentive to attract, recruit and fuel their collective action and, more importantly, to justify it. Hence, one 
can understand how Islamist movements can maintain solidarity and commitment over time. 
6 To illustrate, there are a number of different approaches whereby Islamist movements seek to establish 
the Islamic society. First is the bottom-up approach which departs from the assumption that changing the 
moral and value codes to be more Islamic will inevitably lead to the establishment of the Islamic society. 
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reformulation shall constitute a new Islamic identity for individuals and subsequently 
the society. In this context, individuals exemplify the underpinnings of Islamist 
movements; it is postulated that if they do not change their identity then ‘Islamic’ 
society will remain elusive. Yavuz points out Islamic actors tend to reconstitute 
identities, institutional structures, ways of life and the moral code of society through 
penetrating the cultural, economic and educational spheres (Yavuz, 2003, p.23). 
Accordingly, this study contends that the construction of Islamic identity is 
fundamental for Islamic movements. It argues that the permanence of Islamist 
movements is contingent upon its success on articulating a unique and distinctive 
identity for its adherents. In Muslim societies, where there is no rigid segregation 
between religious and political spheres, Islamic actors tend to contest values, beliefs and 
symbolism over claiming authenticity. For them, producing an Islamic identity, 
regardless of what definition they attach to it, is critical for attracting and recruiting new 
members, and more importantly, to preserve their existence. This assumption challenges 
the prevailing tradition of social movements which reduces a movement’s action to 
either challenging political power or disrupting the existent system (Bayat, 2005).7 
However, it is mainly concerned with forming a distinctive identity for adherents as a 
goal per se. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
For example, Salafi trends focus on propagation as the main tool for reshaping individuals’ identity and 
consequently the society. The second approach adopts a top-down style. It focuses on attaining power by 
any means including violence as a step to establishing the Islamic state and consequently the Islamic 
society. For example, this is seen in violent and jihadist movements. The third approach is to penetrate the 
public sphere by creating different political, cultural and social codes not only to contest with other actors, 
mainly the state, but also to appropriate the private sphere as well. This is the approach taken by, for 
example, the MB and other reformist and moderate movements. Nevertheless, despite the major 
distinctions between these movements in terms of ideology, targets, and strategies, the individual remains 
the sine qua non for establishing the Islamic society. 
7 This assumption is nuanced by Asef Bayat’s article “Islamism and Social Movement Theory” where he 
profoundly criticizes the attempts of applying social movement approaches to Islamist movements without 
discerning their distinctions. Bayat points out that challenging political power is crucial; however, social 
movements may also succeed in changing civil societies, cultural symbols and value systems, which will 
lead, in the long term, to confronting political power (Bayat, 2005, p.898). However, this study extends 
Bayat’s notion by assuming that changing members’ attitudes, perceptions and norms is per se a goal for 
social movement. For instance, the MB focuses on rearticulating individuals’ perceptions and practices to 
confront political regimes and to expand its code of values and norms to encompass the entire society. 
	  
	  
	  
	  
68	  
By Islamic identity, this study refers to the cognitive elements, symbols, norms, 
values and emotions whereby Islamist movements view themselves, perceive the world 
and delineate their actions. It reflects the frame of reference that Islamist movements 
employ to construct collective action (Yavuz, 2003). Such a frame is used both to 
mobilize adherents and nurture movement action, and to reshape and solidfy individuals’ 
identity. It is the deliberate process of socialization and internalization that helps 
individuals to align their goals, norms and identities with those of the movement. Such a 
process helps individuals to identify themselves not as fragmented identities but as a 
solid and meaningful entity. 
However, one should stress the significant role of Islamic rituals, values, idioms 
and symbols in constructing Islamic identity (Yavuz, 2003; Tuğal, 2009). Based on 
Muslims’ comprehension of their religious duties and moral commitments, Islamist 
movements tend to produce a distinctive identity that could respond to these tendencies. 
According to Yavuz, Islamic political identity provides a cognitive bridge between 
interest and action, society and state, and tradition and modernity in much of the Islamic 
world (Yavuz, 2003: 7). In this context, Islamist movements can be described as both 
identity producers and respondents. By investing in Muslims’ tendency to become more 
politically and religiously represented, Islamist movements produce cognitive codes that 
encompass and integrate fragmented Muslims and foster their sense of belonging. On 
the other hand, they also respond to those who are inclined to identify themselves as 
active Muslims. According to Yavuz, Islamic political identity has two intertwined 
dimensions: one governs the individual’s religious devotion and shapes his or her 
perception of the self and the other. The other is related to the social practices and norms 
that direct Muslims in everyday life (Yavuz, 2003, p.21). The success of Islamist 
movements in combining these dimensions and fusing them into its organizational 
structure helps them to articulate collective identity. This means that the persistence of 
Islamist movements can be explained relatively by their ability to respond to individuals’ 
emotional, religious and social aspirations. 
 
	  
	  
	  
	  
69	  
3.4.3.1. Manufacturing Islamic Collectivity 
This study contends that revealing Islamic collective identity is contingent upon 
deconstructing the rationale of Islamist movements. That is, Islamic identity 
construction reflects the relationships among a movement’s aims and objectives, targets, 
internal system and environment where the movement operates. The greater the 
movement can internalize its aims, objectives, interests and norms into the individuals’ 
identities, the more the collective identity can be produced and consolidated. This study 
thus seeks to scrutinize the process of building Islamic identity as it happens within 
Islamist movements.  
To do so, this study will build an analytical framework that integrates 
cultural/ideational and institutional aspects of Islamist movements. As discussed earlier, 
this integration is crucial to overcome the shortcomings of the political process and 
resource mobilization paradigms in studying social movements. Many attempts have 
been made to achieve such integration (Polletta and Jasper, 2001; Meyer, Whittier et al. 
2002; Goodwin and Jasper, 2004); however, this study seeks to extend these attempts to 
discern the realm of Islamist movements. 
The point of departure in this model originates from Melucci’s insights on 
collective identity. Analytically, Melucci treats collective identity as “an interactive 
process through which several individuals or groups define the meaning of their action 
and the field of opportunities and constraints of such an action” (Melucci, 1996, p.67). 
That is, for this process to be constructed and maintained, it should contain two related 
dimensions: the inner complexity of an actor (its plurality of orientations) and the 
actor’s relationship with the environment (constraints and opportunities) (Melucci, 
1996). In addition, Melucci treats collective identity as a process of interactions and 
negotiations which might entail “contradictory processes lying behind what appears as 
stable and coherent definition of a given collective actor”(Melucci, 1996, p.72). In this 
context, collective identity is not tackled as a monolithic unity of the subject but rather 
as a system of relations and representations (Melucci, 1996, p.76). Thus the construction 
of collective identity depends on how this set of relationships is held together (Melucci, 
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1996, p.76). In Melucci’s words collective identity is “a laborious process where unity 
and equilibrium are reestablished over and over again in reaction to shifts and changes 
in the elements internal and external to the field” (Melucci, 1996, p.76).  
However, although this study will build on Melucci’s insights on collective 
identity, it seeks to go beyond its instrumental character to permeate the 
cultural/ideational aspect into collective behaviour. This can be achieved by evoking 
Polletta and Jasper’s insights on collective identity (Polletta and Jasper, 2001). As 
discussed earlier, Polletta and Jasper treat collective identity as a combination of various 
components: values and interests, structure and agency, emotions and rational 
calculations, etc. They thus define collective identity as “an individual’s cognitive, 
moral, and emotional connection with a broader community, category, practice, or 
institution” (Polletta and Jasper, 2001, p.285). This definition encompasses both the 
institutional and cultural aspects of the collective actor. 
To make such a linkage more plausible, Bayat proposes what he has called 
“imagined solidarity” (Bayat, 2005). Bayat contends that what can bring fragmented and 
fluid actors together are not just shared beliefs and common interests but rather 
imagined solidarities. An imagined solidarity, Bayat states, is “one which is forged 
spontaneously among different actors who come to a consensus by imagining, 
subjectively constructing, common interests and shared values between themselves” 
(Bayat, 2005, p.904). Similarly, Melucci asserts the critical importance of solidarity in 
maintaining the collective action. He argues that solidarity ties individuals to each other 
to enable them to withstand the breakdown of social relations induced by conflict 
(Melucci, 1996, p.74).  
Nevertheless, neither Bayat nor Melucci explains how collective actors can 
create such solidarity and on what basis. For instance, while Bayat stresses the crucial 
role of solidarity in a closed and authoritarian context, he does not elucidate how such a 
sense of solidarity and unity can be constituted and, more importantly, preserved. In 
other words, as Gamson points out, solidarity refers to the strength of our loyalties and 
commitment to a movement’s collective identity (Gamson, 1991). It is concerned by the 
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question: “to what extent, people may ask themselves, is their collective entity worthy of 
sacrifice and how much it should take priority over the needs of everyday life, including 
surviving?” (Gamson, 1991, p.45). Furthermore, Bayat’s notion does not answer the 
perennial question of why particular collective actors, for example, Islamist movements, 
can create a stronger sense of solidarity and commitment among members than others 
do.  
Therefore, this study seeks to answer these questions by revealing the internal 
and external factors that shape solidarity among individuals. For instance, the MB used 
to operate in a repressive and closed environment whereby political opportunity 
structures are restricted and attempts of mobilizing resources are hindered. However, the 
movement succeeded in creating a high degree of solidarity and coherence among its 
members. 
 
3.4.3.2 The construction of Islamic collectivity...  the notion of the jama‘a 
This study contends that Islamic identity is the outcome of the interaction 
processes that occur within Islamist movements and are affected by the external 
environment. As Melucci points out, collective identity is “the outcome of various axes 
of interaction between collective actor, identification declared by the actor, and the 
identification given by others” (Melucci, 1996, p.76). This study argues that Islamic 
identity construction reflects the interplay among three key components: the 
movement’s aims and targets; its internal system; and the constraints and opportunities 
that exist in the external environment. By deconstructing these interactions, one will be 
able to grasp the character, elasticity and complexity of collective identity.  
To begin with, the aims and objectives of collective actors are identified by the 
movement’s leaders. Melucci points out that leaders formulate the aims of the 
movement and also determine a system of priorities which can respond to the changing 
conditions (Melucci, 1996, p.339). In this context, aims and objectives can be divided 
into two categories: expressive, which refer to the ultimate goals that the movement 
seeks to pursue, and instrumental, which can help in reaching the general aims of the 
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movement (Melucci, 1996). It is the leader’s task to align individual goals and 
objectives with those of the movement. Moreover, leaders play a key role in the framing 
process which takes place within social movements (Melucci, 1996; Benford and Snow, 
2000; Della Porta and Diani, 2006). In the case of Islamist movements, leaders and 
ideologues have a significant role in setting the general aims of the movement and 
drawing strategies and tools to achieve them. For instance, Hasan al-Banna, the founder 
of the MB, identified the movement’s aims and objectives, strategies and stages. A 
charismatic leader, Al-Banna articulated the master frames and ideology of the MB 
which is still hitherto highly respected and followed by the movement’s members. 
Despite the fact that Islamist leaders tend to set very broad and general aims, for 
example, to establish an Islamic state or to apply shari‘a, they employ these objectives 
to ensure the commitment and solidarity of its adherents. For instance, al-Banna set a 
very loose and broad aim of the MB of “dominating the world and mastering the 
humanity according to the Islamic teachings” (al-Banna, 2002). However, in order to 
pursue this aim, al-Banna laid out six objectives to be achieved, namely to build: the 
Muslim individual; the Muslim family; an Islamic society; an Islamic government; an 
Islamic state; and an Islamic umma (khilafa) (al-Banna, 2002).8 Yet the accomplishment 
of these objectives is contingent upon the dedication of all brothers. Al-Banna states: 
The creation of nations, the education of people, the realisation of hopes, and the 
defence of principles. The nation which tries to achieve this or the group which 
is calling for this will need at the very least a mighty spiritual strength which 
may be manifested in numerous ways: a strong will which no weakness can 
penetrate; a steady loyalty unassailable by fickleness or treachery; a noble spirit 
of self-sacrifice, unaffected by greed or avarice; a knowledge of the principles, 
having faith in them evaluating them, and making sure they are immune to error. 
They must ensure that there is no deviation, quibbling or betrayal about it (which 
are the characteristics of the soul). Upon this awesome spiritual strength and 
high principles will be erected, resurgent nations who will create educated and 
zealous people, life will be renewed in those who have been deprived of it for 
many years (al-Banna, 2002). 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 These objectives are perceived by many members of the MB as the blueprint stages which should be 
followed simultaneously to achieve the ultimate goal. 
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Nevertheless, the distinction between the expressive and instrumental objectives 
is not rigid. The may in fact be seen as expressive in order to maintain unity and 
integration within its organizational structure. For instance, while the MB considers 
establishing an Islamic state as an ultimate objective, to achieve it, members should 
commit themselves to the movement and give bay‘a (allegiance) to its leadership. 
Moreover, some leaders are inclined to diffuse a movement’s objective to make it 
difficult for members to evaluate success or failure of the movement (Melucci, 1996). In 
this context, many Islamist leaders tend to broaden their movement’s aims and 
objectives not only to appease members and maintain their allegiance but also to impede 
any attempt to account for them.  
In addition, self-preservation of the movement can become an end per se 
(Melucci, 1996). Melucci points out that the organizational apparatus in some 
movements tend to develop its own interests which do not necessarily coincide with 
those of the movement (Melucci, 1996, p.314). However, in the case of Islamist 
movements, self-preservation becomes essential not because leaders manipulate 
adherents but as an inward reaction to the repressive environment where they operate. 
For instance, during the 1930s and 1940s the MB endorsed political and social change in 
Egypt and had expanded its organizational network all over Egypt; however, after the 
clash with Nasser’s regime in the 1950s and 1960s, the movement had limited its 
objective to survival. 
 In addition, there is a need to look at the target of the social movements and 
whether it is the state or the society or both. Indeed, in the case of many Islamist 
movements, they usually target the state and society together. Yavuz has suggested an 
insightful typology for Islamist movements based on its targets and strategies (Yavuz, 
2003). According to Yavuz, Islamist movements can be divided into two main 
categories: 1) society-oriented movements which seek to change society from within, 
and 2) state-oriented movements which seek to change the political system and take 
over power as a tool to transform the society. The former, Yavuz contends, is peaceful 
as it accepts to operate from within the framework set by the state. Their main tool, 
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Yavuz asserts, is to employ opportunity spaces to penetrate and reshape the public 
sphere. He thus divides these movements into two sub-categories: inward-oriented 
movements which focus on changing individuals’ identity and consciousness, and 
everyday-life movements which are concerned with changing individuals and society by 
constructing networks and spaces for adherents in the economy, education and media 
(Yavuz, 2003, p.30). On the other hand, the state-oriented movements tend to impose 
change from above by attaining power. According to Yavuz, these movements are 
characterized by a dogmatic ideology which “seeks total transformation of society by 
means of the state” (Yavuz, 2003, p.29). Yavuz divides state-oriented movements on the 
basis of its strategies into two sub-categories: revolutionary movements which reject the 
existent political system and use violence to change it, and reformist movements which 
participate in political processes and are involved in building alliances with other parties 
in a hope to capture the state or reshape its policy.   
However, despite the plausibility of Yavuz’s framework, its terminology and 
typology are blurred. For instance, it is not enough for an Islamist movement that 
abandons violence to be described as reformist. The Moroccan Al-Adl wal-Ihsan 
movement does not adopt violence; however, it has a revolutionary ideology which 
targets state and society that seeks to change rules of the game and reshape societal 
norms and attitude to align with its religious worldview. Likewise, one cannot put the 
MB in the same category of Al-Adl wal-Ihsan just because both abandon violence and 
neglect other significant differences between them. In addition, Yavuz’s typology does 
not explain why and how some inward-oriented movements change their character to 
become everyday-life movements that seek to change society, for example the Salafi 
movements in Kuwait and Egypt. In other words, Yavuz’s analysis does not fit all 
Islamist movements types and, to some extent, it neglects the dynamic character of 
Islamist movements which change their targets and strategies over time due to changes 
in its environment. 
Notwithstanding its drawbacks, Yavuz’s typology is still valid as a tool for 
examining the impact of a movement’s targets on identity construction. That is, Yavuz 
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contends that state-oriented movements tend to adopt a rigid and homogeneous identity 
based on religious dogma (Yavuz, 2003, p.29). However, society-oriented movements 
are inclined to espouse a flexible and open identity. Their main goal, Yavuz argues, is 
“defining and living the “good life” (Yavuz, 2003, p.31). This study will expand 
Yavuz’s notion on the relationship between targets and identity to examine socio-state 
oriented movements. It will be argued that the MB is a movement that targets both the 
state and society. Thus its identity construction is the outcome of the MB’s attempts to 
reformulate societal norms and values and to alter the state to become Islamic. 
The second component of identity construction process lies in a movement’s 
internal structure, norms, and interactions. According to Melucci, the internal system of 
the collective actor is designed for pursuit of the movement’s objectives, adaptation to 
the environment, and ensuring unity and self-preservation of the movement (Melucci, 
1996, p.315). It articulates power relationships and identifies organizational roles, 
membership and affiliation rules, and the structure of incentives which all together 
constitute the movement’s character and identity. Building on Melucci’s insights, this 
study divides the internal system of social movements into two main categories: 
inclusive and exclusive. The former refers to a flexible system of membership and 
affiliation based on a participatory style of management and interactions. On the other 
hand, the exclusive system is characterized by rigidity and homogeneity of membership 
and reflects an authoritarian style of management. For instance, movements that require 
intense ideological identification tend to impose an exclusive internal system that 
requires a high degree of commitment (Melucci, 1996, p.315). Moreover, exclusive 
organizations demand a rigid discipline and intrude upon every aspect of their members’ 
lives (Della Porta and Diani, 2006). Della Porta and Diani state: “the greater the degree 
to which an organization is founded on symbolic incentives—either ideological or 
solidarisitc—the more exclusive it will be” (Della Porta and Diani, 2006, p.126). In 
addition, the importance of a movement’s internal system stems not only from helping 
the members in allocating resources and building a solid network but also from enabling 
the movement to produce symbols, values, and rituals that form its collective identity. 
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Identity thus embodies a reflection of interactions that occur within the social movement. 
It is the outcome of conflicts, negotiations and bargaining relationships that take place 
within the movement.  
 The third integral component of identity construction is the environment where 
the collective actors operate. Social movements do not operate in a vacuum. They 
engage in conflict with other adversaries, antagonistic competitors and repressive 
authorities over recognition and allocating resources for collective action. Moreover, the 
environment exemplifies the place where the potential members reside and where the 
movement needs to provide incentives to attract them. It is the locus of collective action. 
In addition, the environment entails the ‘other’ which creates the movement’s self-
identification. The response of the adversary, the tolerance or repression, constitutes the 
movement’s strategies and ability to achieve its objectives (Melucci, 1996).  
The impact of the environment on identity construction is therefore crucial. If the 
movement is operating in a hostile and repressive environment, its objectives, strategies 
and behaviour might become radical and antagonistic (Melucci, 1996). Moreover, a 
repressive environment makes the requirement of affiliation more tightened. For 
instance, Islamist movements which operate in a hostile and repressive environment 
tend to impose a high degree of commitment on membership to ensure loyalty and 
maintain unity. Furthermore, during conflict with other adversaries, the internal system 
of the movement reinforces identity and guarantees it (Melucci, 1996). In this context, 
Melucci states: “people feel a bond with others not because they share the same interests, 
but because they need that bond in order to make sense of what they are doing” 
(Melucci, 1996, p.74). However, the link between a repressive environment and 
radicalization of a movement’s aims and strategies is non-linear. Sometimes, a hostile 
environment enforces the movement to moderate its objectives and aims and 
consequently its identity.9 For Melucci, the environment is made up of the wider society 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 This assumption has empirical validity in revealing the transformations of radical and violent Islamist 
movements. In many cases, the repressive response of authorities towards Jihadists has led, in some cases, 
to moderate the movement’s aims and strategies such as in Egypt and Saudi Arabia during the 1990s and 
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where the movement is situated and draws its support base (Melucci, 1988, p.323). It 
contains the opportunities and constraints that enable the collective actor to formulate its 
collective identity (Melucci, 1996). 
 
Fig. 1 Components of identity construction 
 
Figure 1 reveals linkages that shape the identity construction process in social 
movements. It reflects how Islamist movements construct their own identity framework 
based on integrating cultural and institutional factors. Such a framework creates what 
can be called the jama‘a notion which determines a movement’s identity features, 
development and permanence over time. However, before we go further in applying this 
notion to the MB, three important points should be stressed. First is the interweaving 
character of the Jama‘a. This study does not claim a linear relationship between these 
components but rather reflects the intertwining that reveals the processes of identity 
construction in Islamist movements. Second, this model recognizes the significant role 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2000s. However, in other cases, it has resulted in a more radical and violent ideology such as in Algeria in 
the 1990s. 
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of institutional factors as well as cultural/ideational aspects in manufacturing collective 
identity. It considers the importance of structures such as mobilization, networking and 
protesting, as well as the symbols, values and norms of collective action. Finally, and 
most importantly, this model should be perceived as an analytical method that can 
deconstruct the process of identity construction as it happens within social movements. 
Its main task, as Melucci puts it, is “to dismantle the ‘reified’ appearance of those 
empirical dimensions of a social movement and to attain the constructive process behind 
them” (Melucci, 1996, p.75). By doing so, this study seeks to deconstruct the collective 
identity of the MB. 
 
3.5. CONCLUSION 
To conclude, this chapter has discussed the theoretical framework of this study. 
It has been argued that social constructivism can explain how Islamist movements 
construct their collective identity. By producing cognitive codes, rituals, symbols and 
norms, Islamist movements tend to reshape individuals’ identity and enhance their sense 
of distinctiveness. Also, this chapter contends that Islamist movements are not merely 
power seekers but also meaning producers who tend to extend their collective identity to 
encompass the entire society. 
To deconstruct and unpack the MB identity, this chapter has proposed an 
analytical model that could explain the process of Islamic identity construction. This 
model originates from a movement’s aims and objectives, internal system, and 
opportunity and constraints that exist in the environment whereby the MB is operating. 
It seeks to unveil the underlying components of collective identity of the MB. The next 
chapters will show how the MB constructs its identity in everyday life. 
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Chapter Four 
THE POWER OF THE JAMA‘A: 
THE ROLE OF HASAN AL-BANNA IN ARTICULATING THE MUSLIM 
BROTHERHOOD IDENTITY 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter explores the role of Hasan al-Banna in articulating the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s (MB) identity. It traces the roots and sources of MB identity as 
constructed by al-Banna during the 1930s and 1940s. The purpose of this chapter is to 
reveal how al-Banna interweaved a distinctive framework of identity for the MB which 
is still dominant and vibrant. Like many other ideologues with unrivalled organizational 
skills, al-Banna left a significant legacy on his movement and followers. This chapter 
argues that al-Banna crafted the frameworks of the MB. He formulated the movement’s 
ultimate aims, norms, by-laws, and manufactured the internal structure which continues 
to steer the movement. However, this does not imply that the MB is static and stagnant, 
nor does it mean that al-Banna left no room for those who came after. It, however, 
denotes the lasting legacy of al-Banna’s thoughts and formulations. 
In addition, this chapter argues that the MB is an identity-created movement that 
targets both state and society. The MB seeks not only to take power but also to reshape 
society’s norms, values, and identity. It aims to transform everyday life into Islamic 
practices which should coincide with the MB’s comprehension of Islam.  
 
4.2. CONTEXULIZING AL-BANNA 
Identity is a process of social construction. Hence to grasp how al-Banna 
articulated the framework of the MB’s identity, one needs to explore the historical, 
political, and intellectual context that forged his own thoughts and views. Al-Banna was 
born one year after the death of the renowned Islamic reformer Mohamed Abduh, on 14 
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October 1906, in the small town of Mahmudiyya in the province of Buhayra, 90 miles 
north east of Cairo (al-Husayni, 1955; Mitchell, 1969).10 
Growing up in a traditional Muslim family in which his father, Shaykh Ahmed 
Abdelrahman al-Banna, was an Islamic scholar and the local imam (prayer leader) of the 
mosque in Mahmudiyya (Mitchell, 1969), al-Banna received his basic education and 
religious knowledge from his father and from the rural community in which he grew up. 
From the early years of his life, al-Banna was an active member of his small community. 
In primary school, al-Banna was profoundly influenced by the moral and spiritual 
atmosphere brought to the school by Shaykh Mohamed Zahran, the head of al-Rashad 
School (al-Husayni, 1955; Ghanim, 1992; al-Banna, n.d). After al-Banna finished his 
primary school education, the 1919 revolution erupted. He joined in the demonstrations 
against the British occupation, an incident that fostered al-Banna’s nationalist sentiment 
against foreign occupation and a feature of the MB’s identity (Ghanim, 1992). Ironically, 
despite his religious tendencies, al-Banna did not join the al-Azhar, as many of his peers, 
preferring instead to pursue his education in modern schools.11 Thus, he joined Dar al-
Mua‘lmin (Primary Teaching School) in Damanhur, the capital city of Buhayara, where 
he was exposed to the Sufi Hasafiyya order (Mitchell, 1969; Ghanim, 1992; Ismail, 
2010; al-Banna, n.d).12 
However, the most significant impact on al-Banna came when he moved to 
Cairo in 1923 to pursue his higher education at Dar-al-Ulum (House of Sciences). Not 
only was al-Banna shocked by the substantial gap between his previous life in rural 
Mahmudiyya and the new life in Cairo where he was surrounded by all manifestations 
of modernity, but he was also exposed to the cultural and political ferment that was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 This chapter does not trace the personal journey of al-Banna as other studies (al-Husayni, 1955: 
Mitchell, 1969; Lia, 1998: Ghanim, 1992) have already covered this ground but rather the chapter will 
explore the impact of this journey on al-Banna’s upbringing, thoughts, and identity. It re-visits al-Banna’s 
literature to look at his formulations of the MB’s identity and sheds light on the enduring impact of these 
formulations on the movement. 
11 Ghanim explains this desire by al-Banna to avoid the strict regulations in the traditional religious 
education exemplified in the kuttab and his aspiration to gain modern education (Ghanim, 1992, p.143). 
12 Although al-Banna embraced Sufism in his early years leaving a significant impact on his personality 
and religious construction (Mitchell, 1969, p.5; Ghanim, 1992, p.171; Ismail, 2010, p.36), after 
establishing the MB, al-Banna criticized Sufi groups for their passive approach to changes in society. 
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taking place in the wake of the 1919 revolution. For al-Banna, Cairo was not just a place 
for obtaining an educational degree, but rather a symbolic battleground over values, 
morals and, most importantly, identity. 
During his stay in Cairo, three major factors occurred which left a significant 
impact on al-Banna’s religious, intellectual, and political views. The first factor was the 
new political structure established in the wake of the 1919 revolution which lasted until 
1952. The second was the removal of the Ottoman Caliphate in Turkey in March 1924. 
The third was the intensive and enduring debate that arose between the liberal-secular 
camp and the Islamic camp. 
In 1922, Britain granted Egypt formal independence, but without devolving to 
the state genuine powers. Nevertheless, Egypt’s first modern constitution in 1923 was a 
hallmark in its political evolution as it gave considerable powers to the parliament vis-à-
vis the palace, King Ahmed Fu’ad and the British authorities. However, the political 
architecture that resulted from the constitution which lasted until 1952, created a bitter 
conflict between the Egyptian political factions over the relationship amongst the King, 
the government, and the British.13 It led to a profound divide between the Wafd and the 
Liberal Constitutional (al-Ahrar al-Ddsturiyyin) over the formation of the governments 
and negotiating with the British. Not surprisingly, al-Banna criticized the on-going 
political partisanship and viewed political parties as a sign of disunity and a division of 
the nation.14 
The end of the Ottoman Empire in March 1924 created an ordeal for many 
Muslims around the world. After more than four centuries of dominance, Mustafa 
Kemal Atatürk, the Turkish nationalist leader, abolished the Islamic Caliphate in 
Istanbul. In doing so, Atatürk forcefully ended the institution that linked Muslims 
spiritually and politically since the death of Prophet Muhammad. Although, the Ottoman 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 The main actors in the political scene during that period were: the palace, the British, the Wafd, and the 
minority parties, e.g. the Liberal Constitutionalists Party, Sa’adist Party, the People’s Party (Hizb al-
Sha‘b), and the Unity (Ittihad) Party (Daly, 1998, pp.286-287). 
14 Although al-Banna disdained political parties for their political corruption and divisions over the 
relationship with the British authorities, the MB now adopts a different view from its founder. Since the 
beginning of the 1980s the MB has recognized political pluralism and built an alliance with liberal and 
leftist parties in both the 1984 and 1987 elections. 
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Caliphate was weak and its power had waned, hence it was dubbed “the sick man of 
Europe”, the symbolic impact of its end was enormous for Muslims. 
The debate that followed the end of the Ottoman Empire was crucial in the 
articulation of al-Banna’s thoughts and worldview. In 1926 Shaykh Ali Abdel Raziq, an 
Azharite scholar and judge, published his controversial book, al-Islam wausul al-hukm 
(Islam and the Foundations of Governance), in which he asserted that Islam does not 
impose a certain type of government including the khilafa (Caliphate). Abdel Raziq 
stated that khilafa is not a religious duty that Muslims need to fulfil but rather a 
mundane choice. Abdel Raziq’s insights triggered an extraordinary political and 
intellectual debate over the future of the Caliphate and the shape of political systems that 
should prevail in the Muslim world. According to the Islamic camp, the removal of the 
Ottoman Caliphate was a sign of the weakness and decadence of Muslims, who should 
exert all efforts to restore it (al-Banna, 2002). However, for liberal and modernists, who 
celebrated Abdel Raziq’s views, it was seen as a positive development as it paved the 
way for dissolving the relationship between Egypt and the Ottoman Empire (Gershoni 
and Jankowski, 1986). However, al-Banna, was extremely shocked to see liberals and 
secularists celebrating the removal of the Islamic Caliphate. Not surprisingly, he held 
that reviving the Caliphate was an Islamic duty Muslims needed to fulfil, with the result 
that he established this as one of the MB’s ultimate goals (al-Banna, 2002). In other 
words, the notion of pan-Islamism in al-Banna’s ideology was born with the demise of 
the Islamic Caliphate in Istanbul (Ikhwanweb 7 July 2011). 
The third factor that affected al-Banna was the profound schism between so-
called liberals and Islamic scholars over the reshaping of Egypt’s identity.15 Al-Banna 
believed that liberals sought to impose secularism and apply a separation between 
religion and politics in Egypt (Ghanim, 1992). More significantly, al-Banna was one of 
those who personally was touched by this identity debate and encountered its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 The liberal current included Taha Hussein, Salama Mussa and Ahmed Lotfy Elsayed, while the Islamic 
trend included Rashid Rida, Shaykh Tantawi Gohar, and Shaykh Mohamed Farid Wagdy. (Ghanim, 1992, 
pp.76-84).   
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repercussions.16 He stated, “I spent days and nights watching the two camps and found 
the atheist camp is rising whereas the Islamic camp was shrinking” (al-Banna, n.d, p.55). 
He believed there was a grave danger in permitting secular and liberal currents to shape 
the public sphere, dominate public institutions such as schools, universities, and 
newspapers, and propagate their ideas which, according to him, were endangering social 
morality and subverting people’s beliefs (al-Banna, n.d, p.46). Therefore, after al-Banna 
completed his the final year at Dar-al-Ulum he became extensively involved in Islamic, 
spiritual, and preaching activities. He sought to preserve his Islamic identity from what 
he perceived as the threat of secularism and atheism. 
These factors defined al-Banna’s life. As a result, he was preoccupied by the 
question of how to eliminate the consequences of such factors. He always believed that 
establishing a movement that embraced Islamic principles and sought to reshape 
Muslims’ identity was the only way to preserve Islamic unity, the umma. 
 
4.2.1. The Conflict over Egypt’s Identity 
This study contends that the creation of the MB was in part a response to the 
identity dilemma that Egypt faced at the outset of the 20th century. However, this does 
not imply that the MB exemplified a peculiar and reactionary movement that sought to 
reverse the course of history (Dekmejian, 1995).17 Rather it represents a conscious and 
modern collective action based on strategic and rational calculations. 
The crisis of identity in Egypt can be traced to the last quarter of the 19th century. 
After roughly eight decades under Mohamed Ali and his dynastic rule, Egypt was 
occupied by the British. However, the social and economic changes brought to Egypt 
during Mohamed Ali’s reign, and which continued under his successors, had created a 
new political and intellectual elite (Gershoni and Jankowski, 1986; Daly 1998). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 In his memoirs, al-Banna expressed his dissatisfaction with the Dar al-Ulum regulations which 
compelled him to abandon his traditional uniform—jalabiya and imamah—and wear the ‘modern’ 
uniform of trousers, shirt, and fez (al-Banna, n.d.). 
17 Although this study concurs with Dekmejian on the revivalist character of Islamic movements, it rejects 
his historical determinism as it treats history as an inevitable trajectory of a cyclical pattern of challenge 
and response. 
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However, the elite was heterogeneous and fragmented by the binary educational system 
that prevailed in Egypt during that era: Egyptian schools were divided into western-style 
and traditional-religious schools (Hourani, 1983). 18  This elite was involved in a 
contentious debate over two correlated issues: attaining independence and achieving 
nahda (renaissance) (Hourani, 1983). It was divided into two main factions: modernists 
or westernizers, those who had a western-style education; and Islamic reformists or 
revivalists who received a classical religious education at al-Azhar and other traditional 
schools. Modernists contended that achieving nahda would not be possible without 
emulating the west and benefiting from its social, cultural, and political institutions. For 
them, modernization was essential to enable Egypt to obtain independence. Therefore, 
they believed that national sentiment should be based on law and modern values, not on 
centuries-old Islamic conventions (Hourani, 1983, p.242). However, Islamic reformists 
believed that modernization should not happen at the expense of indigenous Islamic 
values and morals. They argued that Egyptians, as well as Muslims, could benefit from 
western scientific and technological advancements without embracing their values and 
lifestyle. For them, reinforcing Islamic sentiment was the main tool with which to 
liberate Egypt, as well as the Muslim world, from foreign occupation.19 
The debate over Egypt’s identity became more intense over the first quarter of 
the 20th century (Gershoni and Jankowski, 1986). 20 The modernists, represented by 
Taha Hussien, Qasim Amin, and Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid, advocated an Egyptian 
nationalism and patriotism (wataniyya), while the new revivalists, represented by Rashid 
Rida and Shaykh Muhib al-Din al-Khatib, espoused a pan-Islamic orientation and 
advocated the notion of an Islamic League.21 The new political developments in Egypt, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Hourani states that this binary system led to what he calls “the division of spirits” (Hourani, 1983, 
p.138). 
19 The proponents of the modernism trend were Rifa’a al-Tahtawi and Shaykh Ali Youssef, and the 
leaders of the Islamic current were Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Mohamed Abduh.   
20 Gershoni and Jankowski extensively discuss the division and political polarization over recasting 
Egypt’s national identity. According to them, the era that starts from 1870s until the World War 1 was 
marked by a conflict between proponents of Egyptian national patriotism or “Egyptianization” and those 
who were pro-Ottoman (Greshoni & Jankowski, 1986, p.4). 
21 The notion of Islamic League was created by Jamal al-Din al-Afghani in the late 19th century and 
embraced by the National Party (Hizb al-Watani) founded in 1907, a year after the birth of al-Banna, by 
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including the constitution of 1923, the western-style political settings and political 
pluralism, shaped the debate over Egypt’s identity. More significantly, these 
developments were interpreted differently by both camps. For liberals and secularists, 
the new political settings were a victorious sign of the supremacy of modernity over 
traditionalism. However, for the new revivalists, they were a sign of western cultural 
and political invasion (al-ghazw al-thaqafi) which according to them would endanger 
Egypt’s authentic identity as a Muslim country. According to Ghanim, the 
westernization of public institutions, education, the media, and universities had 
fragmented the intellectual elite in Egypt and created sense of alienation among many 
Egyptians (Ghanim, 1992, p,71).22 As noted by Botman, this era was marked by what is 
dubbed “the liberal age” which lasted until 1952 (Botman, 1998, p.286). 
Importantly, the debate over Egypt’s identity was not confined to political and 
intellectual realms but extended to religious circles. Advocating an Egyptian identity 
based on patriotism and nationalism meant for Islamic scholars, revivalists as well as 
traditionalists, the beginning of the secularization of Egypt. They believed that the 
liberal-secular camp aimed to replicate Atatürk’s national model in Egypt and separate 
Islam and politics (Ghanim, 1992). They perceived the secularist celebration of the new 
Turkish Republic was a threat to the Islamic character of the Egyptian state (Gershoni 
and Jankowski, 1986).23 Therefore, it was not a surprise that many al-Azhar scholars, 
the ulama, and other Islamic scholars sought to restore the Caliphate (Kramer, 1986). 
Hence, they convened a Muslim conference in May 1926 to discuss the future of the 
Caliphate. However, the delegates failed to elaborate a consensus on what should be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
two prominent Egyptian leaders: Mustafa Kamil and Mohamed Farid (Ghanim, 1992, p.88). On the other 
hand, those who espoused Egyptian nationalism, or Egyptianization, represented by the Umma party, 
founded and led by Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid, rejected any political connection between Egypt and the 
Muslim world (Daly, 1998). 
22 Ghanim highlights different data that show the struggle over reshaping the Egyptian identity, e.g. the 
number of public schools compared to foreign language schools. However, the significant indicator was 
the increasing number of missionary schools which sought to propagate Christianity in poor and rural 
areas (Ghanim, 1992, pp.73-74)  
23 Gershoni and Jankowski aptly describe the reaction to the abolishing of the Ottoman Caliphate as a 
“shock at the abrupt termination of such a hallowed Muslim institution. Egyptians of a traditionalist 
orientation, in particular, seem to have felt a personal sense of loss and dismay over the end of the 
Caliphate” (Gershoni & Jankowski, 1986, p.56). 
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done to preserve the Caliphate. Furthermore, other Islamic scholars and politicians 
campaigned to move the Caliphate to Egypt with King Fu’ad as the Caliph; an idea that 
created controversy not only in Egypt but also across the Arab and Muslim worlds 
(Gershoni and Jankowski, 1986; Kramer, 1986). 
Accordingly, by the end of the 1920s it was clear that identity issues lay at the 
heart of political, intellectual, and religious debate in Egypt. Furthermore, it 
characterized the battleground between the liberal and Islamic trends for the next two 
decades. 
 
4.2.2. Beyond Religiosity… Unpacking al-Banna’s Identity 
In contrast to accounts that over-emphasize the religious aspect of al-Banna’s 
identity (Dunne, 1950; Mitchell, 1969; Aly and Wenner, 1982), this study argues that al-
Banna was also a social activist and intellectual, gifted, charismatic leader. In 
Dekmejian’s words, al-Banna was “the embodiment of Sufi spiritualist, Islamic scholar, 
and activist leader who possessed a rare ability to evoke mass support by translating 
doctrinal complexities into social action” (Dekmejian, 1995, p.75). However, it is 
important to note that al-Banna’s religiosity was remarkably progressive. He was not a 
traditional Shaykh seeking to hold to a religious profession but was a modern activist 
who sought to change society. As Dekmejian succinctly points, al-Banna was “the 
avatar of Islamism” (Dekmejian, 1980, p.74). 
Clearly, al-Banna’s identity reflects a conjuncture of influences that shaped his 
views and thoughts. As Yavuz points out, “Identities are very much constructed as a 
result of dynamic interactions between agents of the state and society” (Yavuz 2003: 38). 
The making of al-Banna’s identity reveals a significant mixture of factors and 
experiences that shaped his life in rural and urban Egypt. Hence, deconstructing al-
Banna’s identity is crucial to grasp how he articulated the MB identity. 
This study highlights three main sources that shaped al-Banna’s identity. The 
first was the close relationship with his father Shaykh Ahmed al-Banna, who made a 
tremendous impact on his son personally and religiously. The second was al-Banna’s 
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affiliations with the many religious, moral, and social associations in Buhayra and Cairo. 
The third was al-Banna’s contacts with many well-known Islamic scholars in Cairo, 
among them Shaykh Muhib al-Din al-Khatib, Rashid Rida and Mohamed Farid Wajdi. 
Talking about the role of his father, al-Banna reveals in his memoirs how his 
father took care of his education and religious construction.24  In addition to his 
profession as a watch repairman, Shaykh al-Banna was a classical Islamic scholar who 
was involved in reading and writing on Islamic issues (Krämer, 2010). His contribution 
to the realm of Islamic knowledge is undeniable. For instance, he classified over 30,000 
of Ahmed Ibn Hanbal’s hadith (traditions), publishing them in 24 volumes under the 
name Musnad al-fath al-rabbani. This work had not been accomplished since the death 
of ibn Hanbal in the 9th century (al-Banna, 1990).25 He also authored and edited several 
books on Islamic traditions (Taylor and Whittier, 1995). This extraordinary effort by 
Shaykh al-Banna created a sense of piety and disciplined norms in his life and towards 
his family (al-Banna, 1990). For instance, Shaykh Ahmed insisted that his elder son, 
Hasan, should memorize the Qur’an; something he achieved at the age of 14 (Krämer, 
2010; al-Banna, n.d). 
Another important impact of Shaykh Ahmed on his son lay in his tendency to 
teach Hasan al-Banna the Islamic sciences and introduce him to a wide library of 
Islamic literature and classics in linguistics, poetry, fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence), and 
Islamic philosophy (al-Banna, 1990; Taylor and Whittier, 1995, p.25). Thus, al-Banna 
was exposed to Islamic books from a very early age. For instance, al-Banna mentioned 
in his memoirs his acquaintance with the standard book of Imam Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, 
Ihya’ Ulum al-Din, which fostered his Sufi and spiritual inclinations (Ghanim, 1992; al-
Banna, 2002). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 This notion has been recently revealed by Jamal al-Banna, the youngest brother of Hasan al-Banna, who 
collected the letters and correspondence between al-Banna and his father during the 1920s and 1930s. The 
collection were published in the beginning of 1990 by Jamal al-Banna under the title, Khitabat Hasan al-
Banna ila abihi (the Letters of the Young Hasan al-Banna to His Father) (al-Banna, 1990).  
25 Jamal al-Banna explained extensively how Shaykh Ahmed al-Banna struggled to achieve his great work 
on Ibn Hanbal. He reveals the impacts of financial difficulties that postponed publishing Shaykh Ahmed’s 
work. 
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However, the most significant impact of Shaykh Ahmed lay in introducing his 
son to an extensive network of contacts of prominent Islamic scholars in Cairo who 
would play a significant role in reshaping al-Banna’s identity and thoughts. As a result 
of his outstanding work on Ibn Hanbal’s traditions, Shaykh Ahmed al-Banna gained a 
respected reputation in Islamic circles (al-Banna, 1990; Krämer, 2010). Hence he built 
strong connections with Shaykh Rashid Rida, Muhib al-Din al-Khatib, Shaykh Youssif 
al-Dijwi and Mohamed Farid Wajdi (al-Banna, 1990). For a rural young student, like 
Hassan, it would have been extremely difficult to penetrate the Islamic circles in Cairo 
without the access gained by his father. 
Nevertheless, unlike accounts that limit the influence of Shaykh Ahmed on 
Hasan al-Banna’s identity to his childhood, this study argues that the father’s patronage 
of his son continued even after the MB was established and lasted until al-Banna’s 
assassination in February 1949. For instance, Jamal, the younger brother of Hassan, 
revealed how their father helped him after establishing the MB. Jamal mentions that the 
family house in Cairo was used to host the MB branch (shu‘ba) after its foundation in 
Ismailia in 1928. Even after the MB moved from Ismailia to Cairo in 1932, the family 
house became the headquarters of the MB al-markaz al-‘am until 1934 (al-Banna, 1990, 
p.45). More significantly, Shaykh Ahmed al-Banna was the editor-in-chief of the MB 
Islamic monthly magazine, al-Shihab, which was published for five months from 
November 1947 to March 1948 before it was suspended after the banning of the MB in 
1948 (Shua'yr, 1985, p.323). 
The second influence on al-Banna’s identity relates to his tendency to join 
religious and social associations. Invoking Stryker’s notion on identity salience, which 
refers to the interplay between personal identity and social roles (Stryker, Owens et al. 
2000), it can be assumed that al-Banna was keen to place himself within one of the 
Islamic associations since an early age. According to Mitchell (1969), al-Banna always 
viewed himself as a responsible person who should have a mission in life (Mitchell, 
1969). For instance, in the primary school when al-Banna was twelve, he joined the 
Society of Moral Behaviour (Jami‘yyat al-Akhlaq al-Adabiya) and was selected to be its 
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leader (al-Banna, n.d, p.16). The purpose of that society was “to sensitize its members to 
moral offences” (Mitchell, 1969, p.2). In Damanhur, al-Banna was also involved in two 
other Islamic groups: the Order of Hasafiyya Brothers and then later the Hasafiyya 
Benevolent Society (al-Jam’iyya al-Khayriyya al-Hasafiyya) which he established with 
his lifelong friend Ahmed al-Sukkari in order to resist the prevalent Christian 
missionaries activities in the rural area of Damanhur (Mitchell, 1969; Taylor and 
Whittier, 1995; al-Banna, n.d). 
After he moved to Cairo in 1923, al-Banna was involved in many other Islamic 
societies. In addition to his commitment to the Hasafiyya order, where he attended its 
weekly meeting (hadra) for dhikr (ritual recitation), al-Banna joined the Society of 
Notable Islamic Morals (Jamiyyat Makarim al-Akhlaq al-Islamiyya) which was led by 
Shaykh Mohamed Mahmoud (al-Banna, n.d, p.49). In addition, al-Banna joined the 
Young Men Muslims Association (Jamiyyat al-Shuban al-Muslimin, hereafter YMMA) 
which was established in 1927 (al-Banna, n.d, p.74). 
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Fig. 2 Al-Banna’s links with religious, social, and moral associations 
The relationship of al-Banna with Islamic, moral, and social associations reveals 
three aspects of his identity: the first was his religious zeal. al-Banna has been described 
by many of his disciples as a “unique personality, religious zealot, talented orator and 
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great writer” (al-Gendy, 1978, p.285). The second aspect was al-Banna’s inclination to 
take practical actions to prove his convictions. Unlike many of his peers, al-Banna was 
passionate in voicing his opinion and challenging the status quo. Among the many 
Islamic associations that flourished in Egypt during the 1920s, al-Banna was inclined to 
join those who adopted actions, not just mystical orientations. For instance, the main 
task of Jamiyaat Man‘ al-Muhramat (Society for the Prevention of the Forbidden) was 
to charge and rebuke those who violate Islamic values and public morality. The third 
aspect was al-Banna’s charismatic and talented leadership. In most of the associations 
he joined, al-Banna showed an innovative mind-set and strong organizational skills. 
The third factor that shaped al-Banna’s identity was his acquaintance with many 
eminent Islamic scholars in Cairo. In his memoirs, al-Banna expressed his admiration 
and respect for Shaykh Muhib al-Din al-Khatib,26 Shaykh Youssif al-Dijwi,27, and 
Rashid Rida. All belonged to the Islamic camp (al-mu‘askar al-islami) which sought to 
counter the secular and atheistic camp (al-mu‘askr al-almani wa al-ilhadi) (al-Banna, 
n.d). They were a continuation of the Islamic trend that emerged in the late 19th century 
led by al-Afghani and Abduh (Hourani, 1983; Ghanim, 1992). 
In his memoirs, al-Banna succinctly reveals how his identity was shaped by his 
life in Cairo. He states:  
My life was a peculiar mixture of activities; attending the Sufi gathering 
(hadra) at the Hasafi Shaykh house or at the house of Ali Effendi Ghalib, 
going to the Salafiyya bookshop [al-Maktaba al-Salafiyya] of Muhib al-Din 
al-Khatib, visiting Shakykh Rashid Rida and his Islamic journal al-Manar, 
going to the house of Shaykh al-Dijwi and then to Farid Bey Wajdi house. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Muhib al-Din al-Khatib (1886-1969) was a prominent Islamic journalist and political activist of Syrian 
origins. He came to Egypt after the French occupation of Syria in 1920, where he published many Islamic 
journals including al-Zahraa and Majallat al-Fath (The Conquest) which sought to resist atheism and 
missionaries’ activities in Egypt. 
27 Shaykh Youssif al-Dijwi (1870-1948) was an eminent Islamic scholar who graduated from al-Azhar and 
was a member of the “Commission of al-Azhar Senior Scholars”. The close relationship between al-Dijwi 
and al-Banna originates from their Sufi tendencies and the personal relationship between al-Dijwi and 
Shaykh Ahmed al-Banna. It was in al-Dijwi’s house, which used to host discussions on different religious 
and political issues among the Islamic elite every night, that al-Banna urged al-Azhar scholars to take 
action to “stop the missionary and atheist wave in Egypt” (al-Banna, n.d., p.56). In addition, Shaykh al-
Dijwi established the Society of Nahdat al-Islam (the Islamic Renaissance), which sought to reinforce 
Islamic identity among Egyptians. 
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Sometimes, I go to the library of Dar al-Kutub and to Shaykhun mosque (al-
Banna, n.d, p.62). 
 
However, the crucial question is: what impact did these Islamic scholars have on 
al-Banna’s identity? According to Ghanim, al-Banna was significantly influenced by his 
relationship with Islamic scholars, in particular by Shaykh Muhib al-Din al-Khatib who 
was a political activist, Islamic journalist, and prominent writer. Ghanim goes further 
when he asserts al-Khatib personality fostered al-Banna’s political and organizational 
capabilities (Ghanim, 1992). Clearly, the impact of al-Khatib on al-Banna was profound. 
For instance, after he moved to Cairo, al-Banna spent most of his time in al-Khatib’s 
Salafi Bookshop (al-Maktaba al-Salafiyaah) where he met many Islamic scholars and 
Shaykhs (al-Banna, n.d., p.62). Moreover, al-Khatib gave al-Banna the opportunity to 
publish some of his early writings in al-Fath journal (Shua‘yr, 1985, p.98). In addition, 
al-Khatib was among those who founded YMMA, which facilitated al-Banna’s 
involvement in its activities and enabled him to judge its feasibility (Lia, 1998, p.30). As 
a political dissent from Syria, al-Khatib had political and organizational experience in 
building secret networks and organizations to resist the French occupation to Syria 
during the 1920s. Al-Banna was able to benefit from this experience in building the 
MB’s organizations and social network (Ghanim, 1992, p.166). Moreover, in his 
memoirs, al-Banna celebrated his relationship with al-Khatib which continued after al-
Banna established the MB. For instance, al-Banna refers to using al-Khatib’s bookshop 
to print and publish the MB’s first leaflets and pamphlets. Not surprisingly, al-Banna 
appointed Shaykh al-Khatib the Editor-in-Chief of the first MB weekly newspaper, 
Jaridit al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin, in 1933 (Shua’yr, 1985, p.98). 
In contrast to accounts that label al-Banna a traditionalist Islamist, Ghanim 
stresses that he was open to all Islamic trends ranging from conservatism to reformism, 
all which enhanced his identity. He states: “al-Banna was a mixture of experiences: he 
acquired organizational and secrecy skills from al-Khatib, authenticity of thought 
(asalat al-fikr) from Rida, political and religious reformism (mua‘sarh) from Abduh, 
etc.” (Ghanim, interview on 24 December 2010). A similar analysis can be found in Aly 
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and Wenner’s work on al-Banna. They point out that al-Banna was a combination of 
Abduh’s reformism, Rida’s conservatism, and al-Afghani’s political activism (Aly and 
Wenner, 1982, p.339).  
Nevertheless, some accounts contend that al-Banna’s ideology and views were 
characterized by Salafi narratives (Dunne, 1950; Aly and Wenner, 1982). They attribute 
this to two main reasons: first, the immense impact of Shaykh Ahmed al-Banna, who 
used to belong to the classical Salafi trend, on his son (Dunne, 1950; al-Sa'id, 1977; 
Ramadan, 1982); and, second, the close relationship between al-Banna and Salafi 
scholars (Aly and Wenner, 1982). For instance, Aly and Wenner contend that al-
Banna’s tendency to embrace Salafism was inevitable due to the westernization and 
modernization wave that overwhelmed Egypt during the first quarter of the 20th century. 
This notion stems from Aly and Wenner’s classification of Islamic political thought 
during the 1920s. They divide it into three schools: traditionalists of al-Azhar who failed 
to adjust to modernization and secularization; modernizers or Abduh’s students who 
sought to adapt the tenets of Islam with modernity norms; and conservative reformers or 
Rida’s students who stressed the need for ijtihad (renewing Islamic thought through 
reinterpreting the Islamic texts) while rejecting the adoption of Western values (Aly and 
Wenner, 1982, p.338). According to Aly and Wenner, al-Banna was a zealous adherent 
of the third trend. Nevertheless, they acknowledge al-Banna’s ability to construct a 
distinctive ideology based on a comprehensive vision of Islam (Aly and Wenner, 1982, 
p.339). 
However, Lia challenges the notion that al-Banna was a traditional scholar in 
terms of his ideas and appearance. He contends that al-Banna and the MB were against 
traditionalism and backwardness (Taylor and Whittier, 1995). More vigorously, Lia 
claims that the MB was a bridge between traditionalism and modernism (Taylor and 
Whittier, 1995, p.74). Similarly to Lia, Ghanim asserts that labelling al-Banna as a 
Salafi is “unfair and inaccurate” (Ghanim, 1992, p.146). 
Regardless of the controversy over al-Banna's identity, his interaction with 
Islamic scholars fostered his ideas and thoughts. Moreover, his involvement in various 
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political, religious, and intellectual debates shaped his identity and enabled him to 
elaborate a clear vision for his plans and mission. 
 
4.3. FROM VISION TO ACTION: THE FOUNDING OF THE MUSLIM 
BROTHERHOOD 
Founding the MB was a crucial trajectory for Hasan al-Banna, not only because 
of his self-perception as a man-with-a-mission but also because of his self-confidence 
that he could achieve this mission. This sense of assertiveness was profound in al-
Banna’s decision to establish the MB. Interestingly, al-Banna sought to infuse this sense 
in the MB’s ideology in which the movement would act as the guardian of the Islamic 
identity. However, given the fact that al-Banna was a member of many Islamic societies, 
the question of why he chose to establish the MB is vital to understand the rational of 
the MB and for what it stood. 
After a vibrant life in Cairo, al-Banna moved to Ismailia, northeast Cairo, to 
undertake his job as a schoolteacher. As the headquarters for Suez Canal Company, 
which was fully under British and French administration, Isma‘iliyya was marked by a 
heavy western presence. Al-Banna was struck by the pervasive manifestations of 
western life in Ismailia and acknowledged how it fuelled his national sentiment against 
foreign domination. He states “The English Camp located in the west neighbourhood of 
Isma‘iliyya with its arrogance and power, had incited all Egyptians… and those streets 
with foreign names was a sign of humiliation and occupation” (al-Banna, n.d, p.65). 
Clearly, al-Banna employed the popular disenchantment from the foreign presence in 
Isma‘iliyya to induce Egyptians and gain support for the MB. Building on his 
proselytizing experience in Cairo, al-Banna started to give brief talks in coffee houses 
and small mosques. His discourse, language, and appearance were new to those who 
were attracted by his preaching. He astutely avoided confrontation with important 
Shaykhs in Isma‘iliyya who might discredit his preaching style and de-legitimize his 
nascent movement. After spending few months disseminating his ideas, al-Banna’s 
audience had increased significantly and his name became familiar to the public in 
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Isma‘iliyya. In March 1928 a few months after his arrival, al-Banna took allegiance 
from six Egyptian workers to establish the MB. 
 
4.3.1 From theory to practicality, al-Banna’s elaboration of the MB’s ideology 
The answer to why al-Banna established the MB despite his membership of 
many other Islamic societies lies in the way he perceived those societies and how he 
treated them. By the beginning of the 20th century, many Islamic societies were 
established in Egypt as a reaction to pervasive secular and atheist activities.28 However, 
these Islamic associations were mainly concerned with welfare, charity, and moral 
issues, e.g. purifying ethics, helping needy people, rehabilitation of mosques, etc. with 
little and sometimes no interest in political and intellectual subjects29. It is true that a 
small number of these associations, such as the Islamic Renaissance Society (Jami‘at al-
Nahda al-Islamiyya) were inclined to tackle the issue of Egyptian identity issue. 
However, their position was mainly defensive and apologetic rather than elaborating a 
coherent ideology that could counter-balance the liberal and secular trends. Not 
surprisingly, Egyptian and British authorities allowed them to flourish and propagate 
their ideas as they did not threaten the existing political system. 
Thus, although al-Banna was keen to attach himself to some of these 
associations, he was disenchanted by their lack of zeal towards Muslims’ political, 
social, and economic problems. Moreover, al-Banna held these associations responsible 
for the degradation and decadence of Muslims which according to him led to “the 
contraction of the Islamic camp in the face of the secular camp” (al-Banna, n.d, p.55). 
Furthermore, al-Banna believed that the main task of these associations should be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Zakariyya Sulayman Bayumi states that Egypt witnessed a growing number of Islamic associations and 
societies after WWI. He estimates that there were 135 moral, social, and religious societies. Their main 
foci were religious and social activities. Bayumi highlights that some of these associations called for 
applying shari’a. However, he argues the organizations were not politicized (1981, pp.67-68). 
29 Lia’s work on the MB provides an extensive analysis on al-Banna’s dissatisfaction with Islamic 
associations during his time. For instance, Lia contends that the prime reasons that lay behind the 
dissatisfaction was the limited scope and role of these associations in terms of political targets and the 
social groups they represented. Moreover, Lia states, despite YMMA being “indirectly” involved in 
politics, al-Banna was not satisfied by its approach in tackling Egyptian youth and leading them away 
from “infatuation with western culture and habits” (1998, p.55). 
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confronting the escalating wave of missionaries and atheist organizations; something he 
believed that could not be achieved without a coherent and zealous ideology (Taylor and 
Whittier, 1995). 
Accordingly, al-Banna’s affiliation with many Islamic associations enabled him 
not only to scrutinize their weakness and problems but also to elaborate a different 
vision for the MB which avoided these flaws. He states: 
Some people view Islam as only worship, while others view it as inherited 
traditions and thus reject Islam because of its irrelevance to modernity… 
accordingly some have perceived the MB as a worship and preaching 
association, while others view it as a Sufi order that cares only about 
asceticism… To all those, we assert that Islamic teachings encompass all life 
aspects… this how the MB understands Islam (al-Banna, 2002, p.75). 
 
Meanwhile, the expansion of the Islamic associations coincided with the steady 
decline of the Islamic reformist trend after the departure of al-Afghani and Abduh. It is 
true that Rida, who was a disciple of and mouthpiece for Abduh’s ideas, alongside with 
other Islamic scholars such as Shaykh al-Khatib, attempted to revive this trend. 
However, the vacuum was enormous.30 Rida’s attempts to resist the western hegemony 
focused mainly on raising the intellectual and religious awareness rather than using 
political activity. He was preoccupied by two main issues: social morality, which 
according to him should stem from Islamic teachings; and Islamic unity (Hourani, 1983). 
However, the focal point of al-Banna’s decision to establish the MB lay in his 
profound shock at al-Azhar's response to what he perceived as the westernization of 
Egypt. By the end of his studies in Cairo, al-Banna was fully convinced that the only 
way to stop the “atheism and pornography that swept Egyptian society” was to restore 
Islamic identity (al-Banna, n.d, p.46). He believed that al-Azhar’s leaders and scholars 
should undertake the historic task of defending Islam in the face of western materialism 
(al-Banna, n.d, p.55). Accordingly, al-Banna appealed to one of the most eminent and 
respected Islamic scholars, Shaykh Yusuf al-Dijiwi, “to take action in the face of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Hourani asserts that the writings and formulations of Rida, who claimed to be Abduh’s spiritual heir, 
were ambiguous. While Hourani acknowledges the intellectual capacity of Rida, compared to Abduh, he 
criticizes Rida’s intellectual attraction to the Hanbali school of thought (Hourani, 1983, p.230-231). 
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atheist trend” (al-Banna n.d: 48). However, al-Banna has disenchanted by al-Dijiwi’s 
response which, although sympathetic to al-Banna’s cause, was not translated into 
action. Thus, al-Banna felt that al-Azhar scholars, Azharites, betrayed the umma by 
taking no action to preserve it from the external threats (Mitchell, 1969). Not 
surprisingly, the relationship between the MB and al-Azhar was hostile during 1930s 
and 1940s. Nevertheless, al-Banna maintained a good personal relationship with Shaykh 
Mustafa al-Maraghi, the rector of al-Azhar during 1940s (Mitchell, 1969). 
Clearly, al-Banna’s disillusionment with al-Azhar prompted him to re-think his 
role and mission. He was able to persuade some independent Islamic scholars such as al-
Khatib and Ahmed Timor to take practical actions to challenge the missionary and 
atheist activities. This resulted in two significant developments: first, the publication of 
Majallat al-Fath (the Conquest Journal) which was the first Islamic journal to address 
missionary and atheist activities in Cairo and rural areas; and second, the establishment 
of YMMA, which sought to protect Egyptian youth from western influence. 
Thus, one could argue that the first seeds of the MB were sown when al-Banna 
was in Cairo. In 1926, al-Banna urged some of his young fellows in Dar-al-Ulum and al-
Azhar to start a preaching campaign to disseminate Islamic knowledge among ordinary 
people. He believed that the first step to restore Islamic identity was to educate people 
about their religion (al-Banna, n.d). To achieve this goal and instead of using mosques, 
the conventional venues for preaching (da‘wa), al-Banna created a new approach for 
da‘wa by targeting people in cafes and parks; an approach that marks the MB style of 
da‘wa. More significantly, this new way of proselytizing achieved unrivalled success 
and enhanced al-Banna’s sense of self-confidence (al-Banna, n.d, pp.50-51). 
However, the notion of producing compelling and skilled preachers (du‘ah) was 
not new. Abduh had the idea to create preachers and scholars independent of al-Azhar 
and the government-controlled education system (Hourani, 1983; Taylor and Whittier, 
1995). Rida, the adherent of Abduh, implemented this idea when, in 1912, he 
established the short-lived School of Preaching and Guidance (Dar al-Da‘wa wa’l-Irshad) 
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which aimed to educate Muslim youth and train them to become competent preachers to 
disseminate Islamic knowledge (Ghanim, 1992; Taylor and Whittier, 1995).31 
Although al-Banna did not make it clear whether or not the notion of founding 
the MB had originated from the Dar al-Da’wa wa’l-Irshad experiment he acknowledged 
the inspiring role of Rida in establishing the MB (Ghanim, 1992, p.163). 
 
 
Fig. 3 The factors behind establishing the MB 
Nevertheless, as Figure 3 highlights, the founding of the MB reflects a 
convergence of many factors: the irrelevance of Islamic associations, the decline of al-
Azhar, the absence of Islamic political activism, the upsurge of westernization which 
created many alienated and disillusioned young Egyptians, the attractive style of Dar al-
Da’wa wa’l-Iirshad, and the personal identity of Hasan al-Banna.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Mohamed Shu‘ayr argues that the rationale behind establishing Dar al-Da’wa wa’l-Irshad was not only 
to propagate Islamic knowledge but also to resist atheist and missionary arguments which attacked Islam 
(1985, p.112). Shu‘ayr argues that because of financial hardship and what he regards as missionaries' 
conspiracies, the school had to close after the outbreak of the First World War. 
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4.3.2. Weaving Identity through a Movement 
The creation of the MB can be viewed as a response to the identity predicament 
that wrecked Egypt during the first half of the twentieth century. For al-Banna, it was 
essential to create an identity-movement that could embody Islamic values and ideals in 
everyday life. He was not concerned with establishing an organization that would 
compete with other Islamic associations. Rather he sought to found a movement that 
could reformulate societal norms, values, and practices to be more Islamic; to weave a 
new identity for Egyptian society. He stated: 
We call people to have a principle in their lives, to believe in it….Our 
movement has a principle; our principle is calling for Islam. Islam in our 
understanding encompasses every aspect in our life… our call (da’utna) 
stems from the Qur’an and Sunna (al-Banna, 2002, p.23). 
 
To pave the way to gain acceptance for his new identity-based model, al-Banna 
always believed that reviving Islamic identity would not only preserve Muslims from 
western subversion but would also provide them with an alternate system—socially, 
politically, economically, and culturally- that can challenge western civilization. 
However, the question was: how to transform this symbolic system into a reality? The 
answer for al-Banna was through a mass movement that could reshape individuals and 
society’s norms from bottom to top. Thus, to legitimize the MB’s cause and internalize 
its ideology in the public perception, al-Banna addressed the political and social 
problems that faced Egypt during the 1920s and 1930s. He strove to present himself and 
his movement as the saviour of Islam and Muslims. He bluntly stated, “our call is a call 
of reviving and rescuing the humanity” (al-Banna, 2002, p.159). 
However, it should be noted that al-Banna was preoccupied with producing an 
attractive, compelling model of identity that could encompass many Egyptians who had 
been alienated and uprooted by westernization (Kandil 2008). As noted by Pinto, al-
Banna was struck by the corruption and degradation of Muslims especially the youth 
(Pinto 1999). More significantly, al-Banna harnessed the energy and aspirations of the 
middle and lower middle class who had been marginalized by economic hardships and 
social and class divisions that prevailed Egypt during the 1930s and 1940s (Lia, 1998).  
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However, in contrast to accounts that contend that the founding of MB was a 
mere reaction to westernization and modernization in Egypt (Dunne, 1950; Mitchell, 
1969; Aly and Wenner, 1982; Kandil, 2008), this study argues that the reasons are 
deeper. It is true that al-Banna paid significant attention to the influences of 
westernization and colonialization on Egypt; however, he elaborated a wider vision and 
ideology that tackled many other important issues, including achieving renaissance 
(nahda), disseminating Islamic principles and ethics among the populace, and 
addressing the issue of Islamic unity.  
More importantly, Ghanim and Lia refute that al-Banna was totally anti-western. 
Although both agree about al-Banna’s antagonism towards the west, they stress his 
awareness of the distinction between the west as a colonial power and western 
civilization which was based on modern sciences and technological advancements 
(Ghanim, 1992; Lia, 1998). For instance, Ghanim asserts that al-Banna was only against 
the devastating effects of the west on the Egyptian society. Accordingly, Ghanim 
highlights four positions held by al-Banna regarding the west. First, he disagreed with 
the western style of life, e.g. values, traditions, behaviours, etc., which he saw as a sign 
of cultural invasion (al-ghazw al-thaqafi). Second, al-Banna objected to western 
colonialization and its attempts to divide and occupy Muslim lands. Third, he rejected 
the missionaries’ activities because he saw it as resembling a new ‘crusade’. Fourth, he 
accepted western technologies and called for benefiting from its innovations and 
inventions (Ghanim, 1992, pp.221-226). Lia affirms that the MB used a wide range of 
western technologies in media and propaganda industry (Lia, 1998, p.78) . Moreover, he 
contends that al-Banna borrowed ideas such as nationalism from European political 
thought (Lia, 1998). 
In addition, if the sole concern of al-Banna was to attack the west, he could have 
joined any of the existing nationalist movements and parties that prevailed in Egypt 
during that time instead of establishing a new movement. More importantly, if al-Banna 
was blindly against western civilization, he would not have praised its scientific 
development. For instance, al-Banna stated, “western nations have reached to a high 
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degree of knowledge and science because they respect human reason…. They aptly and 
smartly take care of mind and organize public life, which should be copied… These are  
the facts that no one should ignore” (al-Banna, 1945). Moreover, al-Banna expressed his 
admiration of the 1923 constitution, which had been created by liberals and modernists 
under the British mandate. Lia points out al-Banna accepted western political 
institutions such as representative government, parliament, and elections (Lia 1998). 
According to Ghanim, al-Banna vigorously opposed what he called “the blind emulation” 
(taqlid) of the west (Ghanim, 1992).  
In addition, al-Banna sought to fill the vacuum left by the absence of Islamic 
activism in the public sphere. As one of his disciples puts it: 
The main concern of the existing Islamic groups was just to fill a part of the 
vacuum. Their aim was only to return people to Islam, however, it’s the 
superficial Islam; the formal Islam not the real one. However, al-Banna 
sought to revive Islamic existence and present Islam in a persuasive and new 
form. He sought to incite Islamic issues and defend Muslim nations through 
faith and thought, system and heritage, inside and outside (al-Simman, 1977, 
p.23). 
 
Al-Banna believed that it would be difficult to revive the Islamic identity in 
everyday life without engaging the ordinary people in the debate over the dangers that 
face their identity. Thus, in contrast to Abduh and Rida who limited the debate over 
Egypt’s identity to the elitist and intellectual circles, al-Banna sought to spread it in the 
public sphere. In other words, while Abduh and Rida focused on reforming religious 
institutions, al-Banna was preoccupied with reforming the entire society in a more 
Islamic direction. According to Ghanim, al-Banna diagnosed that the weakness of the 
reformists, al-Afghani, Abduh, and Rida, was that they did not elaborate a coherent 
ideology that could transform the idealised image of Islam into a reality. Ghanim 
stresses that al-Banna succeeded where other Islamic scholars failed (Ghanim, 1992). 
He brought the plight of the degradation of Islam and Muslims to the ordinary public. 
Al-Banna believed that the only way to overcome this plight was to guide Muslims 
towards the true Islam. He stated “our duty is to show people the precise aspects of 
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Islam without any augmentation or diminution and then to ask them to implement these 
aspects and to act in accordance to them in everyday life” (al-Banna, 2002). However, in 
order to achieve this goal, al-Banna had to construct an ideological and religious 
framework that could permeate the public consciousness. He believed that this could be 
achieved within the framework of the MB. 
It has been noted that al-Banna was the first Islamic leader who raised the 
identity question across the whole population. He incited people’s mind by re-asking the 
basic questions of identity: who are you? what are the aims of your life? do you truly 
understand Islam? do you follow the Islamic teachings in everyday life? etc. (al-Banna, 
2002, p.42). Neither al-Afghani nor Abduh raised such focal questions. Their concerns 
focused on how to reconcile Islam with modernity. However, although some accounts 
argue that al-Banna reversed the progress of Islamic political thought (Mitchell, 1969; 
Aly and Wenner, 1982), he re-conceptualized the Islamic discourse to make it more 
attractive to the public. As noted by Commins, al-Banna contributed to a significant 
change in Islamic political thought. He states, “al-Banna’s writings on religion and 
politics represent a transition from earlier Islamic reformers’ insistence on their 
inseparability to a more detailed elaboration of an Islamic polity’s functions and 
underlying principles (Commins, 1994, p.135). Al-Banna believed that Islamic 
teachings should be transformed into a political, economic, and social programme, 
thereby distancing himself from other Islamic reformists. Hence, he held that the Islamic 
identity would not be preserved without revitalizing its ethos in everyday life.  
It is important to highlight that al-Banna also employed Islamic ideology to 
mobilize the masses and generate collective action. In other words, al-Banna’s main 
concerns were how to activate the submissive masses and how to revive the Islamic 
activism. As noted by Smith, the MB aims to “transform Islam into an operative force 
actively at work on modern problems” (Smith, 1959, p.156). As Commins puts it, “al-
Banna broke new ground when he made economic and social issues part of the Islamic 
reform programme” (Commins, 1994, p.138). Al-Banna sought to reconnect the links 
between the past and the present, structure and agency, text and context. 
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4.4. AL-BANNA’S ARITUCLATION OF ISLAMIC IDENTITY: REVIVING AL-
FIKRA AL-ISLAMIYYA 
It was difficult for al-Banna to construct the MB’s identity without carving out 
the concept of ‘Islamic identity’, which he called al-fikra al-islamiyya.32 Al-Banna 
envisioned Islamic identity as an inclusive normative system of meanings, symbols, and 
practices that Muslims should abide by in everyday life. Indeed, al-Banna was keen to 
distinct himself from the prevailing Islamic discourse. Thus, the concept of al-fikra al-
islamiyya was by then a new and attractive one which gave al-Banna a significant 
influence within the Islamic milieu. It was a gesture for the birth of the Islamist ideology. 
As noted by Pinto, the emergence of Islamist ideology should be understood as an 
attempt to forge a genuine and autonomous identity. Further, al-Banna was the first 
Islamic leader to raise the identity issue among the ordinary public. In many of 
occasions he tended to provoke the audience by asking the basic yet meaningful 
questions, e.g. who are you? What are the aims of your life? Do you truly understand 
Islam? Do you follow the Islamic teachings in everyday life? etc.	  As noted by Pinto, the 
emergence of Islamist ideology should be understood as an attempt to forge a genuine 
and autochthonous identity (Pinto, 1999, p.17).	  
According to al-Banna, Islamic identity is the frame of reference by which 
Muslims should abide in everyday life. It constitutes the code of norms, values, symbols, 
and idioms that Muslims should adhere in their everyday life practices. Hence, al-Banna 
articulated three chief aspects of Islamic identity: comprehensiveness; adaptability and 
flexibility; and applicability (see Figure 3). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	  Al-fikra al-Islamiyya is a central concept in the MB’s ideology. Al-Banna was the first Islamic scholar 
to produce and use this concept in the Islamic rhetoric. To internalize it within the mindset of the MB’s 
members, al-Banna published the seven principles of al-fikra al-Islamiyya on the cover of the MB’s 
weekly magazine during the 1930s. For more see Mudhakkirat al-da‘wa wa-l-da‘iyaa (Cairo: Dar al-
Shihab, n.d).	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Fig. 4 Al-Banna’s vision of Islamic identity 
 
a) Inclusiveness and Comprehensiveness 
Al-Banna perceived Islamic identity to be an inclusive system of norms, values, 
and regulations that could transform Islamic teachings and principles into everyday life 
practices. He believed that Islam as a comprehensive creed should encompass all aspects 
of human life. In one of his most stunning and enduring statements, al-Banna 
emphasized: 
We believe that Islam is an inclusive system; it is a faith and worship, a state, 
nationality and religion, a spirit and deed, a holy text and a sword… the 
Glorious Qur’an considers these things to be the core of Islam (al-Banna, 
2002, p.171). 
 
Obviously, al-Banna’s notion of inclusiveness (shumuliyyat al-Islam) derived 
from his perception of Islam as a way of life rather than a sacred text. Thus, he sought to 
transform this perception into a programme of daily life. Not surprisingly, the solution 
al-Banna proposed to Egypt’s political, economic, and social ills was dependent on the 
return to Islam as a comprehensive order for human existence (Commins, 1994, p.134). 
Islamic	  
Identity	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Building on his concept of comprehensiveness of Islam, al-Banna was able to 
incorporate the ideational and ontological frame of reference in everyday life. He 
connected the mundane with the sacred, not through a dogmatic and theological 
approach, but by articulating a pragmatic and solid platform for everyday life. Although 
Abduh and Rida had provided al-Banna’s intellectual and methodological underpinnings, 
they never considered creating collective action that could espouse and endorse their 
ideas (Commins, 1994). More significantly, Lia illustrates that al-Banna held that the 
other reformers were concerned exclusively with achieving political reform (i.e. 
independence from Britain) and ignored the need for a comprehensive programme for 
reform (Lia, 1998) . 
More importantly, al-Banna imparted and consolidated comprehensiveness in the 
minds and hearts of his followers by using stunning yet simple words. In one of his most 
succinct and influential statements, al-Banna described himself as the following: 
I am a traveller seeking the truth, a human searching for the meaning of 
humanity and a citizen seeking dignity, freedom, stability and welfare under 
the shade of Islam. I am a free man who is aware of the purpose of his 
existence and who proclaims: “Truly, my prayer and my sacrifice, my living 
and my dying are all for Allah, the Lord of the worlds; no partner has He. 
This I am commanded and I am of the Muslims (who submit to Him)!” 
[Quran 6:162-163]. This is who I am…who are you? (al-Banna, 2002, p,13). 
 
In addition to its theoretical appeal, al-Banna employed the notion of 
inclusiveness to recruit many people to join his nascent movement. He sought to 
persuade his followers that the comprehensiveness of Islam could not only lead them to 
the eternal life but, more importantly, provide them with a practical ‘Islamic’ guide in 
their everyday life (al-Banna, 2002). Not surprisingly, many of al-Banna’s disciples and 
subordinates already understood Islam in such an inclusive way. One of them has 
described Islam as: 
A comprehensive system that encompasses all aspects of life, it’s a state and 
home, government and nation, ethics and power, mercy and justice, culture, 
law, science, judiciary, material and fortune, jihad and call, army and idea, 
true faith and correct worship, all are equal (al-Hajjaji, 1981, p.3). 
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To legitimize and disseminate his notion of comprehensiveness, al-Banna 
vigorously connected it with people’s daily life problems and difficulties. For instance, 
he asserted that Muslims’ weakness and subordination to the west resulted from their 
lack of commitment towards Islamic teachings and principles. He stated that the Muslim 
needs to return to the ‘true Islam’ as exemplified by the first generation of Muslims 
(Commins, 1994). 
In addition, al-Banna used the notion of Islamic inclusiveness to de-legitimize 
western ideologies such as communism and capitalism. He stated that Islam includes all 
the benefits of other ideologies. According to him, Islam overrides socialism, capitalism, 
east and the west, nationalism and universalism (al-Banna, 2002). Al-Banna always 
stressed the supremacy of Islamic identity over other ideologies. According to al-
Husayni, al-Banna presented the MB as a holistic movement that contained all the 
righteous components of other ideologies (al-Husayni, 1955, p.78). 
 
b) Elasticity and Adaptability 
The second key element of Islamic identity as envisioned by al-Banna lies in its 
elasticity and adaptability. Al-Banna held that Islam transcends time and space and that 
it accommodates all other ideologies and philosophies. He highlighted that Islam, the 
last revealed message, is compatible with all ages and nations. He stated, “the Muslim 
Brotherhood believes that Islam as a comprehensive religion that encompasses all 
nations and valid for every age and every country” (al-Banna, 2002, p.173). He added 
that it is the perfection of Islam, the last revealed message, that is compatible with all 
ages and nations. To prove his argument, al-Banna affirmed that Islam is consistent with 
science. He pointed out that Islamic civilization contributed to great advancements and 
provided humanity with many original ideas in science and technology (al-Banna, 2002). 
Furthermore, al-Banna’s belief in the elasticity of Islamic identity is highlighted 
in his attempts to fit it into the existing Egyptian political system (Commins, 1994). It is 
widely accepted that al-Banna did not endeavour to overthrow the political regime in 
Egypt during the 1930s and 1940s. Moreover, he praised the constitutional type of 
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government which, according to him, was the closest version of other political systems 
to Islam as it held people accountable. Despite the bitter dispute between al-Banna and 
the Egyptian governments, he did not attempt to de-legitimize King Farouk. Conversely, 
he had a good relationship with the palace and acknowledged the legitimacy of Farouk 
despite the latter’s relationship with the British (al-Banna, 2002). This flexibility, as will 
be shown later, was one of the underlying factors behind the MB’s durability. Ironically, 
the MB has always been accused for its ambiguous and opportunistic disposition.  
 
c) Applicability and Practicality 
The third aspect of Islamic identity as perceived by al-Banna concerns its 
applicability. Unlike many Islamic ideologues, al-Banna was tremendously practical. He 
endeavoured to turn the MB’s ideology into plans and a clear platform. He criticized 
other Islamic scholars and associations for their lack of practicality. Thus, he entitled 
one of his tracts “Are We Practical People?” (hal nahnu qawmun 'amaliyyun), in which 
he stressed the importance of having an incremental and persistent programme for 
reform. Clearly, al-Banna was keen to present himself not as a traditional theoretician 
but as a mere social activist. Drawing on the notion of inclusiveness, al-Banna stressed 
the comprehensiveness of Islamic methodology (shumuliyyat al-manhaj al-islami) 
which implied that Islamic identity cannot prevail without being applied in a detailed 
programme for everyday life. He stated, “if you study the Islamic teachings, you will 
find that Islam has set all proper rules and laws for human life; for men and women, for 
the family and nations” (al-Banna, 2002, p.56). Therefore, al-Banna provided a detailed 
programme for reform ranging from political and social issues to health, science, and 
ethics of everyday life.33 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Al-Banna’s epistles reveal a clear and sophisticated platform for reform that covers a variety of topics. 
In a well-known tract called, “Our Internal Problems in the Light of the Islamic System”, he detailed and 
advocated his programme for reform. He addressed the political, economic, social and moral issues that 
concerned Egyptian society during 1930s and 1940s. Moreover, al-Banna sent a petition to King Farouk 
and Egypt Prime Minister Mustafa al-Nahas calling for the application of the Islamic system in Egypt (al-
Banna, 2002, p.209). 
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At a glance, these characteristics embody the core elements of the MB ideology. 
As will be shown later, al-Banna was keen to build these elements into the foundations 
of the MB’s identity. More significantly, the relationship between these aspects is 
crucial. For al-Banna, the practicality of Islamic identity does not negate its 
comprehensiveness. Individuals can be good Muslims only if they can abide by Islamic 
teachings, which are inclusive, in everyday life. On the other hand, he believed any 
platform for change, politically or socially, should comply with the inclusive nature of 
Islam. The power of this platform does not stem from social appeal but rather from the 
Islamic ‘character’ it entails. In other words, al-Banna elaborated a comprehensive 
vision for Islam that should go hand in hand with a road map for how society, 
individuals, and the state should act in accordance with the tenets of Islam as he 
perceived them.  
 
4.4.1. Al-Banna and the Configuration of the MB’s Identity 
This study contends that the MB is an identity-oriented movement that seeks to 
reformulate state and society values and norms to more Islamic ones. As mentioned, al-
Banna was not only preoccupied by resisting the western cultural and political 
domination in Egypt but also by creating an alternative identity system that could 
encompass all Egyptians, if not all Muslims. According to Commins, by founding the 
MB, al-Banna created a model that Muslim revivalists could replicate throughout the 
Arab and Muslim worlds (Commins, 1994, p.149). However, al-Banna’s search for an 
authentic identity was accompanied by a rational assessment of the risks and difficulties 
his movement would face in the long term. Therefore, in many of his tracts, al-Banna 
stressed the need for patience and gradualism in achieving the movement’s goals. 
As a leader of a social movement, al-Banna crafted the framework of the MB’s 
identity. He identified the movement’s aims, objectives, and system of values and norms. 
More importantly, al-Banna integrated the ideational factors—Islamic idioms, rituals, 
and values—with the institutional aspects of the MB. As will be discussed, he attempted 
to align the MB’s aims and objectives with those of Islamic teachings. More importantly, 
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al-Banna was keen to align the MB members with the movement’s aims and objectives. 
Thus, he set the rules, codes, and mechanisms of the MB’s internal structure which still 
exist in 2012. Moving from theory to action, al-Banna constructed a sophisticated and 
coherent organization that could embody his vision and ideology and become a 
mouthpiece for his ideas. 
However, one cannot overlook the charismatic nature of al-Banna which was 
crucial in consolidating the MB’s identity in its early stages. Hence, the organizational 
and social expansion of the MB during the 1930s and 1940s reflected the appeal of the 
new identity that al-Banna created. For a nascent movement, which lacked reliable 
financial resources and proper organizational structure, it was immensely difficult to 
enlarge its activities without a coherent ideology, distinctive identity, and compelling 
leadership. Accordingly, the articulation of MB’s identity was a cornerstone in al-
Banna’s thought and strategy. Not surprisingly, it took a decade before al-Banna 
formulated the MB’s aims, objectives, strategies, and norms, i.e. to create the MB’s 
collective identity. Remarkably, al-Banna constructed a distinctive and unique collective 
identity for the MB. The key question is: how did he did achieve this? 
As discussed in chapter three, this study treats collective identity as an 
integrative process of ideational and institutional factors that formulates individuals’ 
self-perception, constitutes their worldviews, and nurtures their collective action. It 
argues that collective identity is the outcome of the interplay of a movement’s four 
components: aims; objectives; internal structure; and external environment. This notion 
is derived from the insights of Melucci, and Polletta and Jasper on collective identity 
which infuse the ideational and operative aspects of collective identity. Melucci treats 
collective identity as “an interactive process through which several individuals or groups 
define the meaning of their action and the field of opportunities and constraints of such 
an action” (Melucci, 1996, p.67). However, Polletta and Jasper perceive collective 
identity as “an individual’s cognitive, moral, and emotional connection with a broader 
community, category, practice, or institution” (Polletta and Jasper, 2001, p.285). They 
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treat it as a combination of various components: values and interests; structure and 
agency; and emotions and rational calculations.  
 
4.4.1.1 The Jama‘a paradigm 
To infuse his vision and conception of Islamic identity into the MB’s ideology 
and structure, al-Banna created what this study calls the “jama‘a” paradigm. It refers to 
the cognitive system of aims and objectives, duties and means, phases and norms, that 
encompasses and guides MB members in everyday life. It contains material, moral, and 
expressive aims, tools, and strategies of the MB. Moreover, this paradigm creates a 
pattern of identity for the MB based on a sense of commitment and solidarity among 
MB members who act not as individuals but as a collective unity as brothers. 
 The jama‘a paradigm defines the MB’s raison d’être, self-perception, and 
worldview. It constitutes the underpinnings of social agents’ identity. Thus, al-Banna 
carved out the MB’s cognitive map that still guides and directs the MB’s members in 
everyday life. However, this does not imply the MB’s paradigm is rigid or constant. 
Conversely, it has worked for decades as a generator that transfers ideas into action, 
ideology into identity, and aims into reality. In addition, it provided MB members with a 
cognitive map for everyday life. 
In this section, the study will de-construct the Jama’a paradigm that was created 
by al-Banna. It is composed of seven integral and connected parts: aims (al-ghayat), 
objectives (al-ahdaf), mission (al-muhima), duties (al-wajibat), method (al-manhaj), 
means (al-wasa‘il), and phases (al-marahil) (al-Banna, 2002). 
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Fig. 5 The Jama‘a paradigm 
 
a) Aims And Objectives 
Al-Banna formulated a set of broad yet vague aims for the MB. According to 
Melucci, the aims and objectives of collective actors are identified by a movement’s 
leaders (Melucci, 1996). It is the leader’s task to set a system of priorities that can 
respond to the changing conditions (Melucci, 1996, p.339). Thus, al-Banna articulated 
three broad aims (ghayat) for the MB: to lead humanity towards the well-being under 
the banner of Islam; to reinforce the Islamic identity among Muslims; and, to create a 
movement that can embody Islam in everyday life. He stated, “I devoted myself for one 
aim; to guide people to Islam by words and deeds and that is why I founded the MB to 
exemplify Islam in its aims and means” (al-Banna, 2002, p.168). On another occasion, 
al-Banna asserted that the main aim of the MB was “to create a new generation of 
Muslim believers based on tenets of Islam and who seek to reformulate the umma 
identity to become Islamic in all aspects of life” (al-Banna, 2002, p.188). 
By setting these aims, al-Banna constructed a vibrant and influential master 
frame for the MB. As noted by Benford and Snow, master frames link the beliefs and 
ideas of a protest group to political opportunity structures which allow the social 
movement to spread its ideas and gain adherents (Snow and McAdam, 2000, p.614). It 
was al-Banna’s task to create this link and infuse it within the MB’s structures. Thus, he 
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formulated the lasting slogan of the MB which delineates its ultimate goals (al-Banna, 
2002, p.65). 
 
Allah ghayatuna, al-rasul za’imuna  
Al-Qur’an dusturuna, al-jihad sabiluna 
Al-mawt  fi sabil Allah asma amanina 
Allah akbar wa lillah al-hamdu 
God is our aim, the Prophet is our leader 
The Qur’an is our constitution, Jihad is our way 
Death in service of God is the loftiest of our wishes 
God is great, thanks to God. 
 
Clearly, the MB’s enduring slogan reflects the extraordinary ability of al-Banna 
in producing symbolic meanings and connotations that encompass members and foster 
their commitment to the movement. This slogan became the MB’s mantra that attracted 
and galvanized many of members over decades. In addition, it reflects al-Banna’s 
populist and rhetoric skills which resonated with many Egyptians. 
To make these expressive aims viable, al-Banna introduced a cluster of 
instrumental objectives (al-ahdaf). These objectives can be divided into two groups: the 
tentative objectives and the permanent ones. The former are: a) to liberate Islamic 
countries from foreign occupation; b) to resist the materialistic and atheist wave that 
dominates Muslim nations; c) to reformulate the political, social, economic, educational, 
and judiciary systems to be based on Islamic principles. Meanwhile, the permanent 
objectives are: a) to establish an Islamic state that implements Islamic teachings in 
everyday life; b) to unite all Muslim countries under the banner of Islam; and c) to 
disseminate the Islamic call (al-da‘wa al-islamiyya) around the world and invite other 
nations to Islam (al-Banna, 2002, pp.145-160). 
At a glance, these aims and objectives are profoundly interconnected. They also 
play an important role in aligning the movement’s members with its ideology and 
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leadership. Regardless of the viability of the MB’s aims and objectives and to what 
extent they can be achieved, they are nevertheless essential for creating the movement’s 
claims. They construct what Hunt, Benford, and Snow call “the protagonist identity field” 
which helps social movements to advocate, propagate, and justify their cause (Hunt, 
1994). Hence, al-Banna, as well as his successors, employed these aims and objectives 
not only to recruit and attract individuals to the MB but also more importantly to 
reformulate their identities and connect them with that of the movement. As noted by 
Melucci, a social movement’s leader has to work hard to maintain and reinforce the 
identity of the group. In Melucci’s words, “the expressive function of the leader is 
her/his ability to offer symbolic objects for identification, around which the solidarity if 
the members and their individual identities coagulate” (Melucci, 1996, p.320).  
Several points can be made from al-Banna’s setting of the generic aims of the 
MB. First, the aims reflect al-Banna’s capability in attracting new members for his 
nascent movement. By setting general, yet simple, Islamic aims and objectives, al-
Banna was able to persuade many Egyptians to join the MB. Second, these aims and 
objectives enhanced the MB’s symbolic capability as they resonate with many 
Egyptians, as well as Muslims, who believe that Islam should retain its domination and 
supremacy. Third, they ensured the MB’s credibility within the religious environment 
which flourished during the 1920s and 1930s. As al-Banna was keen to avoid conflict 
with the extant Islamic associations, these aims had to endorse his cause while 
precluding attempts to discredit the MB. Fourth, these broad aims preserved the internal 
congruence of the MB. Due to the high degree of abstraction and symbolism, these aims 
served to underpin cohesion and solidarity among members. Melucci points out that one 
of the major tasks of the movement’s leader is to “guarantee the interaction and 
cohesion among members” (Melucci, 1996, p.339). By aligning MB members with 
these aims, the possibility of disagreement and division was contained. Hence, priority 
was given to achieving these aims rather than focusing on any internal problems. Fifth, 
these aims could not, practically speaking, be evaluated by the MB’s members. The 
aims were sufficiently broad to ensure that the movement’s leaders could manipulate 
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members who were unable to evaluate their success or failure in achieving the 
movement’s aims. Finally, and most importantly, the aims ensured the movement’s 
survival and strategies. That is, the vague and long-term nature of these objectives 
enabled the MB leaders to maintain solidarity and loyalty of members. 
 
b) Mission 
In relation to the MB’s mission, al-Banna posited different meanings and 
connotations. For instance, he stated, “our mission [muhimatuna] is to stand in the face 
of the prevalent wave of materialism” (al-Banna, 2002, p.114). In a more detailed 
statement, al-Banna stressed that the MB’s mission was to reform Egypt and to enable it 
to lead the Muslim world. He emphasized this could happen through: a) an efficient 
political system; b) a new system of international relations; c) a practical judiciary 
system; d) an efficient economic system that could ensure the independence of 
individuals, society, and the state; e) a cultural and educational system that could 
overcome illiteracy and darkness; f) a family system that could re-build the private and 
intimate relationship between Muslims; g) a disciplined system that could reform 
individuals’ behaviours; and h) a holistic spirit based on Islam that could encompass the 
ruled and the rulers (al-Banna, 2002, p.116). 
Clearly, the MB’s mission is intertwined with its aims and objectives. Thus, al-
Banna abandoned broad language associated with the aims and objectives when he 
defined the mission. By determining and clarifying the mission, al-Banna succeeded in 
generating a sense of responsibility and solidarity among MB members. In addition, he 
employed the mission to mobilize adherents and construct meaning for their action. 
Moreover, the mission served as a vehicle to link the aims and duties (al-wajibat) that 
the MB’s members should undertake. 
c) Duties 
In relation to the MB’s duties (al-wajibat), al-Banna became even more specific. 
He delineated six tasks and responsibilities for the MB members: a) to be ready to make 
sacrifices for the sake of the mission; b) to demarcate the real boundaries of Islam; c) to 
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help people follow and respect these boundaries; d) to strive to achieve the MB’s aims 
and objectives; e) to adopt the MB’s credo in everyday life; and f) to believe that these 
duties derived from the teachings of Islam (al-Banna, 2002). The duties, as the study 
will explain in the next chapter, are an integral part of the socialization process that 
helps in building commitment within the MB. Each member should strive to achieve 
these duties which make him/her loyal and committed to the movement.  
d) Method 
The method of the MB (al-manhaj) refers to the disciplined way in which the 
strategy should be adopted to reach the movement’s ultimate goals. Al-Banna asserted 
that this methodology should be based on three key principles: a) faith in Islamic values 
and principles as the foundation for everyday life; b) faith in incremental and 
comprehensive change which starts with individuals and then encompasses society; and 
c) faith in practicality and linking words with good actions (al-Banna, 2002). Al-Banna 
considered that the MB should adopt a comprehensive strategy with which to achieve its 
goals. Clearly, this inclusiveness echoes with the broadness of the MB’s goals. In 
addition, al-Banna asserted that the Islamic approach for change should include all 
aspects of life: political, economic, social, and moral (al-Banna, 2002). 
e) Means 
In relation to the MB’s means (al-wasa‘il), al-Banna stressed the peaceful and 
gradual nature of the MB. Hence, he infused gradualism into the MB’s structure and 
strategy. Ironically, although al-Banna wanted to achieve radical change in the norms 
and values of society, he stressed that this change should happen through gradual and 
peaceful ways. Moreover, he repudiated the use of violence by the Special Apparatus’s 
members (al-Tanzim al-Khas), the military arm of the MB, during the 1940s. Al-
Banna’s desire to adopt a peaceful and gradual approach for change coincides with his 
‘bottom-up’ policy. This policy treats individuals as the core element of any reform plan. 
Al-Banna believed that without recasting an individual’s identity, any attempt to pursue 
change would be superficial and ineffective (al-Banna, 2002, p.189). He stated that “the 
MB does not believe in revolution, and does not rely on it in achieving its goals and if it 
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happened, we will not adopt it... our task is to create a new generation of believers who 
can reformulate the Islamic umma in its all aspects of life” (al-Banna, 2002, p.188). 
Moreover, al-Banna identified several generic tools for the MB: deep faith; precise 
organization; and uninterrupted work (al-Banna, 2002, p.161). Specifically, al-Banna set 
three explicit tools for the MB to achieve its goals: first, to propagate the Islamic call 
(daw’a) among people through persuasion; second, to select those who are willing to 
embrace and advocate the MB’s ideology and ideas; and third, to adopt a political and 
constitutional struggle as the legitimate form to represent the MB’s aims and goals in the 
political arena (al-Banna, 2002, p.336). 
f) Phases 
To put the preceding elements into action, al-Banna set a disciplined and vibrant 
order of phases (marahil). He asserted that in order for the MB to achieve its objectives, 
a sequence of stages should be followed. He outlined three main stages: first, to preach 
and disseminate the MB’s ideology and reach out to all people; second, to recruit 
supporters, build the movement, and mobilizes the followers; and third, to implement, 
work, and produce actions (al-Banna, 2002, p.178). However, al-Banna asserted that 
these stages should not be segregated but should run concurrently in order to ensure the 
MB’s survival and sustain its dynamism.  
These stages reflect the gradualism that marked the MB’s approach and echoes 
the bottom-up policy adopted by al-Banna. The gradualism is based on the ripple effect 
of making da‘wa, the task of reformulating individuals’ identities to comply with the 
Islamic values. This was to happen by propagating and spreading the ideas of the MB 
across the country, which would enable the movement to recruit new members. 
Meanwhile, the latter are engaged in grassroots activities through education and social 
welfare to recruit more members, and so on. Based on this gradualist and elastic 
approach, al-Banna was able to expand the social network and membership base of the 
MB substantially (Munson, 2001).34 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Munson points out the MB had over 2,000 branches throughout Egypt with an active membership of  
300,000-600,000 by 1949 (Munson, 2001, p.489). 
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More significantly, the gradualist approach operated as a link between the 
expressive and instrumental goals of the MB. Thus, al-Banna introduced a hierarchical 
structure of ‘mediating’ steps to connect the tentative and ultimate objectives of the MB. 
This structure is based on seven steps: 1) educating and forming the Muslim individual; 
2) the Muslim individual will coalesce into the Muslim family; 3) the Muslim family 
will form the Muslim society; 4) the Muslim society will form the Muslim government; 
5) the Muslim government will ensure the state is ruled by Islam precepts and thus 
become an Islamic state; 6) the emerging Islamic state will work to reunify Muslim 
nations; and 7) the new Muslim unity should lead the world and retain Muslims’ 
supremacy (al-Banna, 2002, p.101). 
Regardless of the viability of these steps, they entail significant symbolic power 
which enables the MB’s leadership to preserve the movement’s coherence and 
dynamism. First, they underscore the bottom-up approach of pursuing change: re-
formulating individuals’ identities is a fundamental step in reshaping societal norms and 
values from below. Second, they serve as a roadmap for the MB’s collective action. The 
MB members strive to meet this hierarchical order despite the long-term nature of the 
goals. Third, they foster a sense of commitment and obligation among members who 
remain keen to achieve these goals. Fourth, they give the MB’s leadership room for 
manoeuvre and manipulation as the temporal link between the stages is blurred. Hence, 
the MB’s subordinates cannot gauge the success or otherwise of the movement’s 
performance or question its leadership as to what stage the movement is at. Accordingly, 
neither al-Banna nor any of his successors acknowledged how much time each stage 
would take to be fulfilled. 
Nevertheless, four crucial points require to be stressed regarding the jama’a 
paradigm. First, this paradigm is a social construct that has been developed over time. 
Hence, it took al-Banna a decade to elaborate a set of coherent aims, objectives, and 
strategies for the MB. It was not until the fifth annual conference of the MB held in 
1938 that al-Banna decided to trigger the paradigm publicly and to become heavily 
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involved in everyday politics.35 Second, the paradigm is amenable and elastic rather than 
a rigid structure. True, al-Banna sought to make this paradigm as vigorous as possible to 
enable the building of the organization; however, he constructed it in a general and 
broad sense in order to meet different contexts. It would have been difficult for the MB 
to survive under the degree of repression it faced without having a coherent and solid 
identity. Third, this paradigm is the outcome of different social interactions that took 
place within the MB. Al-Banna was keen to listen to the views of his followers while 
taking decisions through the shura (consultation) mechanism, which is why many MB 
members accepted and advocated the paradigm. Fourth, the concepts and terms of the 
Jama’a paradigm are broad and sometimes elusive as al-Banna was inclined to use them 
interchangeably. For instance, he mixed between aims and objectives, between mission 
and aims, and between methodology and means. Although al-Banna may have been 
unconscious of this vagueness, it marked the construction of the MB’s identity. 
 
4.4.2. Activating the MB’s Identity in Everyday Life 
Over the course of the 1930s and the 1940s, al-Banna consolidated the identity 
of the MB. The rapid growth of the movement can be attributed not only to its 
sophisticated and potent social and organizational network but also to its distinctive 
identity created and imbued by al-Banna. One of the main goals of al-Banna was how to 
activate the MB’s identity in the public sphere. According to Melucci, collective identity 
defines the capacity of collective actor to act autonomously (Melucci, 1996). This 
autonomous propensity is drawn from two related dimensions: the movement’s self-
identification; and the recognition of this identification by other actors. Moreover, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 The fifth annual conference was a turning point in the MB’s history for many reasons. First, it was the 
first inclusive conference for the MB’s members following four regional conferences held during the 
1930s in Ismailia, Port Said, El-Mansoura, and Assuit. Second, the conference came after the remarkable 
growth of the MB as its branch offices jumped from five in 1930, 15 in 1931, to 300 in 1938 (Munson 
2001). Third, the conference accentuated the transnational character of the MB as it stressed the 
relationship between the MB and the Palestinian cause. Fourth, it highlighted the MB’s stance on many 
critical issues, e.g. the constitution, the shape of political system, Arab and Islamic nationalism, political 
parties, the Islamic associations, and the relationship with the west (al-Banna, 2002, p.165). More 
importantly, al-Banna revealed the political ambitious and aspirations of the MB and how they would be 
accomplished (Bayumi, 1981, p. 146). 
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Taylor and Whittier point out that collective identity consists of three interrelated 
processes: the construction of group boundaries that establish differences with the 
dominant groups; consciousness or interpretive frameworks that emerge out of 
challenging the group’s struggle to define and realize its interests; and the politicization 
of everyday life through use of symbols and everyday actions to restructure the existing 
system of domination (Taylor and Whittier, 1995, p.173). 
The jama’a paradigm provides the MB with the essential patterns of self-
identification and draws its boundaries with other political and social agents. As 
discussed previously, al-Banna sought to distinguish the MB from other Islamic 
associations not only through a strong organizational and social base but also by 
creating a new competitive model for identity that could encompass all Egyptians. 
However, al-Banna was also keen not to provoke tensions with other Islamic and 
political forces. Thus, he highlighted a set of recommendations that the MB members 
should embrace in order to avoid any confrontation with potential adversaries. These 
rules revolved around seven guidelines: 1) avoid the jurisprudence (fiqhi) differences 
with other Islamic groups; 2) keep away from the influence of the elites and celebrities; 
3) keep away from political parties and religious associations; 4) take gradual steps and 
emphasis the education of members; 5) stress the practical aspect of the Islamic Call and 
employ propaganda and publicity; 6) recruit and focus on the youth; and 7) expand the 
organizational and social network of the MB in rural and urban areas (al-Banna, 2002, 
p.176). 
These regulations demarcated the boundaries between the MB and other groups 
that challenged the status quo. It kept the movement away from debilitating conflicts 
that would deflect it from achieving its main goals. In addition, al-Banna’s tracts and 
speeches had a profound impact, creating a sense of distinctiveness based on the ‘we’ 
against the ‘them’. More importantly, this process of differentiation was impossible 
without al-Banna’s ability to politicize everyday life. Therefore, by the end of the 1930s, 
the MB overshadowed other Islamic societies inside and outside Egypt and had become 
the leading political force in the Islamic arena. Politics was a vital arena in which to 
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manifest its emerging identity. However, its involvement in politics alarmed political 
opponents who sought to undermine or contain its increasing influence (Daly, 1998). 
However, to maintain the vibrancy of MB’s identity, al-Banna sought to infuse it 
with the notion of Islamic identity: al-fikra al-islamiyya. Indeed, al-Banna regularly 
used the MB and Islamic identity interchangeably. More significantly, he was inclined 
to invoke Islamic history to strengthen his claims. For instance, al-Banna compared the 
founding of the MB with the emergence of Islam in the 7th century. By invoking Islamic 
history, al-Banna created a sense of religious and emotional commitment among 
adherents. He stressed that the MB should follow in the footsteps of the Prophet’s era by 
propagating the Islamic call secretly before advocating it publically. Thus, the basic 
level through which to disseminate the MB ideology is what al-Banna termed the 
individualistic call (al-da‘wa al-faridiyya) (al-Banna, 2002). Moreover, in his tract, “To 
Youth”, al-Banna dubbed the MB as the “call of Islam in the 14th Hijri century” (al-
Banna, 2002, p.99). He constantly amalgamated the Islamic call with the MB’s ideology. 
For instance, in the epistle “Our Call in a New Phase”, al-Banna claimed that the MB 
has two unique characters, a divine and a universal call (da‘wa rabaniyya wa ‘alamiyya) 
(al-Banna, 2002, p.125). In an utter tone, al-Banna stated, “Our idea is purely Islamic; 
its basis is Islam from which it derives its entity and identity and for which it strives; it’s 
main concern is to raise its word high. It only accepts its system and leadership and only 
obeys its instructions” (al-Banna, 2002, p.99).  
However, al-Banna was aware that he should not make the alignment of two 
identities unique to the MB. He recognized the attempts by other Islamic associations to 
employ a similar approach to attract individuals and legitimize their cause. Therefore, he 
emphasised that the MB was not creating a new version of Islam, but it was a different 
comprehension of Islam as an inclusive and total system for everyday life (al-Banna, 
2002). The move to avoid any potential disputes with Islamic associations over the 
exclusive use of Islamic reference was an intelligent one by al-Banna. Therefore, unlike 
later radical Islamist movements, al-Banna and the MB never questioned people’s 
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beliefs and faith. He recognized that anyone was a Muslim if he/she confessed belief in 
God and his Prophets and performed the religious duties (Commins, 1994, p.135). 
In order to make that alignment possible and plausible, al-Banna had to 
internalize the notion of Islamic identity into the MB’s construction and ideology. Thus 
he implanted the triangle of Islamic identity—comprehensiveness, adaptability, and 
flexibility—into the MB’s aims, structures, programmes, and strategies. Accordingly, 
each aspect added a distinctive characteristic to the MB identity to become multifaceted, 
resilient, and pragmatic (see Figure 5). 
 
 
Fig. 6 the characteristics of the MB’s identity 
Thus, the emphasis on the entirety of Islam translated into the MB’s vibrant and 
multi-faceted character. The result of this inclusiveness was a broad and generic 
definition of the MB espoused by al-Banna. He defined the MB as “a Salafi call, a Sunni 
way, a Sufi truth, a political organization, an athletic group, an intellectual and scientific 
association, an economic company, and a social idea” (al-Banna, 2002, p.174). At a 
glance, this multi-faceted definition reveals the persistent tendency of al-Banna to 
portray the MB as an inclusive movement appropriate for all purposes; a one size fits all 
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organization. He described the MB as “a comprehensive movement that contains all 
reform meanings” (al-Banna, 2002, p.174). This broad and inclusive definition provides 
MB’s leaders with a profound symbolic and religious power that could be used to 
generate collective action and expand the organizational and social network across 
different strata of society. It resonates with Egyptians who seek to join the MB for 
different reasons. In addition, it differentiates the MB from other Islamic organizations 
that confine their ideology and activities to one dimension of everyday life. 
More significantly, the notion of comprehensiveness has been overwhelmingly 
employed by al-Banna’s successors. For instance, Mohamed Badie, the current General 
Guide of the MB, asserts that the MB views Islam as a comprehensive system 
encompassing all aspects of life (Badie, 2011). He states, “The MB does not 
differentiate between religion and politics, it views Islam as an inclusive system that 
extends to all life’s spheres, it encompasses politics, economics, society, culture, etc. 
“We worship Allah by politics and da‘wa together and don’t separate between them” 
(Badie, 2011). More importantly, this inclusiveness is embedded in the internal structure 
of the MB, which has many sections that combines religious, political, social, and 
economic affairs together. 
On the notion of adaptability, the MB has a flexible and resilient code of identity. 
It is clear that al-Banna recognized the obstacles that would face the MB. Thus, he 
stressed the need for true believers and strong defenders of the MB’s cause. Hence, al-
Banna set four conditions for those who sought to be qualified to spread the MB’s call 
(da‘wa): 1) to be good educators (du‘at); 2) to be well educated and well equipped 
(materially, spiritually, and financially); 3) to be properly trained; and 4) to be a 
specialist in a specific field of da‘wa (El-Ghazali, 2000, p.217).  
The gradualism of al-Banna’s approach enabled the MB to adapt to different 
political settings and to survive in the face of severe authoritarian conditions. Since its 
foundation in 1928, the MB has experienced different types of exclusion and repression; 
however, it managed to sustain its structure and develop strategies in each era. 
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Furthermore, this sense of adaptability enabled the MB to expand its ideology and 
organizational network across different social strata and different urban and rural areas. 
Regarding the applicability of the MB identity, al-Banna set out a pragmatic 
platform for change. This platform, which encompassed all aspects of social and 
political change, seeks to rebuild society and the state on the basis of Islam as perceived 
by the MB. More importantly, al-Banna asserted that the practicality of da‘wa is crucial 
to achieve the MB’s goals. Thus, the MB established many economic and charity 
organizations during the 1930s and 1940s (al-Banna, 2002). 
Nevertheless, the pragmatic aspect of the MB has been perceived by its 
adversaries as opportunistic and deceptive. Many Islamic societies and political forces in 
Egypt criticize the MB’s ambiguous and vague character. However, this pragmatism has 
played a vital role in attracting many sympathizers and supporters to the MB. For 
instance, some MB members attribute their membership to its practical nature. As one 
interviewee put it, “I joined the MB because, in addition to its Islamic character, it 
provides me with guidelines I need in my daily life” (Ghorab, interview, 2011). 
The characteristics imbued by al-Banna have given the MB a remarkably 
resilient identity that can help it counter different political contexts. Furthermore, in 
order to maintain its vibrant and coherent identity, al-Banna articulated an intensive and 
gradual process of socialization and education (tarbiyya) which each member of the MB 
has to go through to become an ikhwani. 
 
4.5. CONCLUSION 
This chapter reveals the role of Hasan al-Banna in articulating the master frames 
of the MB’s identity. It traces the genesis of al-Banna’s identity and how this influenced 
the MB. It notes that al-Banna’s decision to establish the MB was driven by different 
factors. However, the salient factor was al-Banna’s desire to revive and activate the 
Islamic identity in everyday life. Hence, al-Banna envisioned the Islamic identity as a 
set of values and norms that should prevail in everyday life.  
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In addition, this chapter examines how al-Banna formulated the MB’s (the 
jama‘a) paradigm, which was infused with the movement’s structure and ideology. It 
explains how the jama‘a paradigm produced the underpinnings of the MB’s identity and 
how al-Banna developed a pattern of identity for the MB based on different dimensions. 
Al-Banna aptly synthesized these dimensions to weave a distinctive and resilient 
identity for the MB. However, in order to activate the MB’s identity in the public sphere, 
al-Banna sought to amalgamate it with the Islamic identity and to differentiate it from 
that of other Islamic associations. The next chapter will show how the MB could benefit 
from the sense of collectivity that was created by al-Banna in maintaining members’ 
commitment and loyalty. 
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Chapter Five 
IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION IN EVERYDAY LIFE: 
HOW TO BE AN IKHWANI AND WHAT DOES IT MEAN? 
 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter explores the process of identity construction within the Muslim 
Brotherhood (MB) in everyday life. It tackles the inner processes of identity formation 
of MB members. It seeks to answer two key questions: how does the MB select and 
recruit its members or how does one become an ikhwani? And how does the MB 
consolidate and strengthen the identity of its members, or what does it mean to be an 
ikhwani? The aim of this chapter is to reveal the impact of the recruitment and selection 
processes of MB members on the construction of their identity. It is argued that 
affiliation and membership in the MB is a complex, yet meaningful, process that plays a 
profound role in creating and consolidating the MB identity. As a social movement, the 
MB always seeks to internalize its ideology, norms, and code of values within a 
member’s mind-set and personality. This internalization process starts once the 
individual opts to join the movement and continues until they become fully-fledged 
members.  
Furthermore, this chapter contends that the socialization process (tarbiyya) that 
takes place within the MB has a significant impact on the content and the strength of the 
MB identity. It spurs the identification process within the movement and creates 
cohesiveness and solidarity among members. The more the individuals align themselves 
with the MB’s ideology, objectives, and norms, the more their identity becomes 
coherent and solid. In addition, the socialization process stimulates members’ 
willingness to become more deeply involved in the MB’s collective action regardless of 
any risks it might entail.  
The MB’s multi-tiered system of membership plays a pivotal role in reinforcing 
members’ identity. It is through this system that the MB selects, scrutinizes, and 
consolidates the member’s identity. Moreover, since the MB operates within an 
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authoritarian environment, this membership system safeguards the movement from 
infiltration and enables it to sustain its political and social activism.  
Furthermore, the recruitment and promotion process within the MB enhances its 
ability to generate solidarity and commitment among members. It creates a sense of self-
commitment (iltizam) among individuals who become keen to sacrifice their time, effort, 
money, and sometimes lives, to achieve the MB’s objectives. More importantly, it 
enables the movement to create a set of norms and codes that should be followed and 
respected by members. Through setting standards and norms for membership and 
promotion with the MB, the leaders can control and reconstruct adherents’ identity. 
Hence the movement can preserve its internal coherence and ensure its survival. 
Since this study contends that the MB identity is not an abstract or a given but 
rather a fluid and dynamic social construct, the MB tends to encourage individuals’ 
motivation in the recruitment process. MB leaders and cadres are heavily involved in 
social interactions with different social strata to expand the social base of the movement. 
They seek to reach out to individuals from diverse social and economic backgrounds in 
rural and urban areas. Hence recruitment and membership is dependent on the MB’s 
communication and interaction with individuals in everyday life. The epicentre of these 
interactions is social networks, such as kinship, friends, neighbourhoods, universities, 
and mosques. The more intensively MB cadres reach out into society, the more the 
MB’s social presence is entrenched. Moreover, the process of recruitment and 
manufacturing the MB’s identity is contingent upon the alignment with Islamic identity. 
The more the MB internalizes Islamic norms and values within its structure, the more its 
members become keen to participate in any collective action regardless of the 
consequences.  
However, before we proceed in explaining the mechanisms and tools of 
recruitment within the MB, it should be noted that this study demonstrates how 
‘institutional identity’ is ‘infused’ to membership cadres in order to sustain and 
consolidating. In other words, participants do not determine the identity but the 
institutional identity determines their identity formation. Therefore, the study will 
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examine how the MB could reshape individuals’ identity in order to be part of the jam‘a 
paradigm that was explained in chapters three and four. 
 
5.2. RECRUITMENT, IDENTITY, AND PARTICIPATION IN SOCIAL 
MOVEMENTS 
The abundant literature on social movements enhances the understanding of the 
relationship between identity and collective action. Many studies focus on the 
relationship between: culture and collective action (Tilly, 1978; Calhoun, 1994; Hunt, 
1994; Johnston and Klandermans, 1995; Benford and Snow, 2000); identity and modes 
of mobilization and participation (Snow and Benford, 1986; Tarrow, 1994; McAdam 
and Snow, 1997); interests and the incentives of individuals (their rational calculations) 
and participation in collective action (Gamson, 1975; Tilly, 1978; McAdam, 1982; 
Cohen, 1985); and between grievances and collective identity (Hunt 1994; Laraña, 
Johnston et al., 1994). 
However, despite the contributions of this literature, it is mainly concerned with 
investigating the impact of identity on collective action but not the other way around. 
Theorists of social movements sought to answer the question: to what extent can 
collective identity stimulate and foster collective action? However, they disregard the 
impact of participation in collective action on an individual’s identity. It was social 
psychologists who focused attention on the impact of participation in collective action 
on the construction of individuals’ identity (Drury and Reicher, 2000; Huddy, 2001; 
Klandermans, Sabucedo et al. 2002; Drury, Reicher et al. 2003; Stürmer, Simon et al. 
2003). The seminal works of Strümer, Reicher, Drury, and Klandermans provide ample 
empirical evidences on the pivotal relationship between an individual’s participation and 
collective identity construction and vice versa. For example, Strümer’s data show that 
participation and collective action shapes collective identity (cited in Klandermans, 
Sabucedo et al., 2002, p.239). Moreover, Klandermans and his colleagues point out that 
membership in identity organizations has a profound impact on an individual’s 
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participation in the movement’s activities (Klandermans, Sabucedo et al. 2002, p.238).36 
They assert that protest participation is more likely among people with a ‘strong’ 
collective identity (Klandermans, Sabucedo et al. 2002, p.235). Their assumption is 
based on the self-identification process that occurs within social movements. The more 
participants identify themselves with the movement’s aims and norms, the more likely 
they are to participate in its collective activities (Klandermans, Sabucedo et al. 2002, 
p.240). More significantly, Klandermans’ work suggests that the relationship between 
both variables (willingness to participation and identification process) is causal. 
According to their findings, “identity processes stimulate action preparedness and that 
action preparedness generates action participation. Action participation, in turn, fosters 
someone's sense of identity” (Klandermans, Sabucedo et al., 2002, p.248). 
Building on these insights, Simon, Stürmer, Loewy, and Jörger took 
Klandermans’ findings a step further to probe individual motivation and willingness to 
participate in social movements (Stürmer, Simon et al., 2003). Based on Klandermans’ 
Expectancy-value model,37 Simon and his colleagues have developed a Dual-Pathway 
model which postulates that participation in social movements is driven by two 
interlinked factors: an individual’s rational calculation of participation (costs and 
benefits); and an individual’s identification with others in the social movement (Stürmer, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Klandermans and his colleagues have built their insights on the standard work of Tajfel and Turner 
(1979) on social identity. According to the latter, collective identity has three components: a cognitive 
component that refers to the process of categorization; an evaluative component that refers to the 
assessment of the group’s position relative to that of other groups; and an affective component that refers 
to the degree of attachment to the group or category. Klandermans and colleagues added a fourth 
component: the behavioural or the participation in identity organizations (Klandermans, Sabucedo et al. 
2002, 238). 
37 Klandermans derives his ‘Expectancy-value’ model from psychology theories about motivations, 
attitudes, choices, and decisions. Embedded in social psychology, this model refers to the relationship 
between individuals’ behaviours and expectations. It argues that individuals decide to participate in social 
movements according to their expectations. Klandermans asserts that, based on their expectations about 
the behaviour of others, people assess the probability of success and their own contribution to it 
(Klandermans, 1984, p.585). According to Klandermans, this assumption is derived from the 
psychological notion that the motivation for a certain behaviour is a function of the expectation that it will 
yield certain outcomes and the values of those outcomes (Klandermans, 1984, p.584). 
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Simon et al. 2003, p.71). 38 They point out that calculation and collective identification 
processes can make unique contribution to the willingness to participate in social 
movements’ activities (Stürmer, Simon et al., 2003, pp.79-80). However, the main 
shortcoming of the Dual-Pathway model, which is recognized by its proponents, lies in 
the scope of its validity. The model can work effectively in the case of small and in-
groups (e.g., groups concerning equal rights, antidiscrimination laws) but not with large 
and more diverse ones (Stürmer, Simon et al., 2003, p.80). 
In an attempt to overcome these drawbacks, Simon has extended the scope of the 
Dual-Pathway model by moving it from social psychology to the political realm (Simon, 
2011). He also reveals the operational role that collective identity can play in stimulating 
participation. Building on his previous work with Klandermans on the Politicized 
Collective Identity (PCI) (Simon and Klandermans, 2001) 39, Simon examines the 
political tendency of minorities to be engaged in social movements to pursue social 
change. He points out that collective identity is functioning as a mediator (the meso-
level) between social structures (the macro-level) that affect individuals and individuals’ 
perceptions, feelings, and motivations that affect their participation in social movements 
(the micro-level). According to Simon, collective identity connects the individual and 
the social (Simon, 2011, p.139). Furthermore, Simon contends that participation in the 
activities of social movements strengthens collective identity which in turn empowers 
and fosters the willingness to generate collective action (Simon, 2011, p.143). However, 
despite its promising insights, Simon’s work is limited to particular movements 
(minority and in-groups). In addition, its findings cannot be generalized out of its 
European context. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Stürmer and his colleagues have attempted to incorporate rational-choice models (collective and 
selective incentives, costs and benefits, interests and risks, etc.) and ideational models (framing, emotions, 
collective identity, etc.) to understand the reasons for participation in social movements.  
39 Simon and Klandermans have developed a theoretical model for the politicization of collective identity 
(Simon & Klandermans, 2001). It suggests that “people evince politicized collective identity to the extent 
they engage as self-conscious group members in a power struggle on behalf of their group knowing that it 
is the wider, more inclusive societal context in which this struggle has to be fought out” (Simon & 
Klandermans, 2001, p.319). Simon and Klandermans hold that for people to become involved in political 
protest on behalf of a group, the collective identity of that group must be politicized (Klandermans, 
Sabucedo et al., 2002, p.239). 
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Notwithstanding the significant contributions of Klandermans, Stürmer, Simon 
and others in enhancing understanding of the impact of collective identity on 
participation in social movements, they disregard the impact of recruitment mechanisms 
and strategies on the process of identity construction. Thus, to fill this scholarly gap, 
Reicher and Drury sought to illuminate the process of creating new identities through 
collective participation (Drury and Reicher, 2000; Drury, Reicher et al. 2003; Reicher 
and Drury, 2011). The seminal work of Drury and Reicher draws attention to the 
transformational dynamics that occur within crowds and social movements and lead to 
reconstructing an individual’s identity (Drury, Reicher et al., 2003).40 Moreover, in their 
recent work, Reicher and Drury (2011) extend the notion of transformational dynamics 
to examine the depth and strength of collective identity. Their starting point can be 
summed up in answering the question: why do people invest so much in the groups to 
which they belong and why do they respond so passionately to the fate of the group? 
According to Reicher and Drury, the changes that occur in an individual’s identity as 
s/he becomes a part of a collective identity (the identification process) happens through 
three types of psychological transformations: 1) A cognitive transformation which 
occurs when people become members of a crowd and their thinking shifts from personal 
identity to social (collective) identity; 2) A relational transformation which results from 
the cognitive transformation when people stop redefining themselves as being the ‘other’ 
to become a part of the one’s collective-self. This leads to a significant shift in social 
relations which can take two shapes: social validation and social solidarity; 3) An 
affective transformation which refers to the content and the meaning people give to their 
action and which is fundamentally derived from the previous two transformations 
(Reicher and Drury, 2011, pp.162-165). However, these transformation processes do not 
occur in a vacuum. They are usually affected by external factors and the context in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Drury and Reicher’s study was a hallmark in crowd studies. They refuted the conventional notion about 
crowds’ actions and behaviours as meaningless and irrational. In their work, Drury and Reicher use the 
term ‘identity boundaries’ which refers to the extent small groups or crowds can attract others to join their 
collective action. According to Drury and Reicher, this could happen through the transformation processes 
that occur intra- and inter-groups and lead to reformulating the sense of self-definition ((Drury, Reicher et 
al., 2003, p.32).  
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which the social movement operates. Hence, social networks play a pivotal role in 
facilitating the cognitive and perspective transformations. This happens through the 
socialization process that gradually reshapes an individual’s orientation and 
consciousness (Passy, 2001). 
This chapter contends that the socialization process that occurs within social 
movements plays a crucial role in identity construction. Hence, it seeks to explore the 
socialization process that happens in the MB, not from a psychological perspective such 
as Reicher, Drury, and Passy have done, but primarily from the social movements’ 
perspective. Whereas Drury and Reicher focus most of their analysis on crowds and 
small groups, this study examines a mass, more organized and politicized movement. 
Whilst Drury and Reicher, along with other social psychologists, treat socialization as a 
spontaneous, and sometimes unconscious process, this study argues that this process is a 
deliberate social construct by MB leaders and cadres. By scrutinizing recruitment 
strategies, mechanisms, and targets, this study seeks to reveal the underpinnings of the 
identification process that takes place within Islamist movements. 
 
5.2.1 Integrating Structural and Ideational Factors 
Several scholars have sought to integrate social psychologists’ insights with 
those of sociologists of social movements in order to understand the process of identity 
construction in social movements (Gamson, 1992; Goodwin, Jasper et al. 2001; 
Klandermans, Sabucedo et al. 2002; Goodwin and Jasper, 2004; Azzi, 2011). This study 
aims to add to these efforts in two ways: 1) revealing the role of the recruitment and 
selection processes in fostering the identification process within social movements; and 
2) examining the impact of this process on the content and strength of collective identity. 
The research thus seeks to go beyond the two predominant arguments on identity 
construction—the rational calculations of individuals and the identification within social 
movements—to investigate the underlying factors underpinning these two processes. 
Hence, the validity of these arguments is not discussed but rather how both processes of 
identity construction come to the fore are examined. 
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The best way to do this is to incorporate recruitment and participation 
mechanisms (the structural factors) with the identification process (ideational and 
transformational factors) that occur within social movements. The starting point is that 
the recruitment and mobilization dynamics enable the movement to identify its targeted 
audience, simulate an individual’s motivation for participation, and expand its network. 
On the other hand, the socialization process reformulates an individual’s ideas and 
perceptions, enhances their identification with the movement’s norms and goals, and 
fosters and consolidates collective identity. Thereby, it creates meanings for an 
individual’s participation. It is through both processes that a movement can promote its 
mobilization capabilities and consolidate its identity. 
To achieve its objectives, this chapter will draw upon Klandermans and 
Oegema’s participation model (Klandermans and Oegema, 1987) and on Passy’s 
findings on the role of the socialization process and social networks in fostering an 
individual’s participation (Passy, 2001). Klandermans and Oegema’s model provides 
one of the most sophisticated syntheses on how social movements recruit and mobilize 
individuals. They suggest four steps or aspects of mobilization: 1) forming mobilization 
potential, which refers to people in society who could be mobilized by a social 
movement; 2) forming and activating recruitment networks, which refers to the target 
audience of the movement; 3) encouraging the motivation to participate, which entails 
identifying the costs and benefits of participation; and 4) removing barriers to 
participation, which means the ability of social movement to overcome and remove any 
obstacles to participation in the movement’s activities (Klandermans & Oegema, 1987, 
pp.519-520). Importantly, these steps do not operate separately but rather combine in an 
interactive and intertwined manner.  
This chapter will extend the participation model in order to examine the 
recruitment and participation processes in the MB and their impact on identity 
construction. Accordingly, a number of changes will be made. First, although 
Klandermans and Oegema’s model focuses on the structural factors of participation 
(incentives, motivations, barriers, etc.), this study will accentuate the role of ideational 
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influences that underlie an individual’s participation in social movements. Second, 
whereas Klandermans and Oegema apply their model to a relatively small group (the 
Dutch Peace Movement), this study will extend the model to examine mass movements 
that contain various social, educational, and cultural backgrounds. Finally, while 
Klandermans and Oegema, as well as many other sociologists examine the 
mobilizational capacity of social movements at specific events (demonstrations, protests, 
campaigns, etc.), this study will examine the ‘state’ of this capacity over a long span. 
 
 
Fig. 7 Klandermans and Oegema’s participation model 
As for the socialization and identification process, Passy and Giugni’s seminal 
work on social networks provides instructive insights on how social networks facilitate 
and enhance an individual’s participation. According to Passy social networks perform 
three fundamental functions in the process of participation: 1) A structural-connection 
function which refers to opportunities that can be created by social networks for 
recruitment and participation in a movement; 2) A socialization function which refers to 
the process of re-configuring an individual’s identity; and 3) A decision-shaping 
function which refers to preferences and incentives that help individuals to decide to 
join the movement (Passy, 2001, p.173). However, this study will extend Passy’s 
findings in order to examine the impact of the socialization process on identity 
consolidation and intensity.  
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Fig. 8 Passy’s social networks model 
By incorporating Klandermans and Oegema’s model with Passy’s model, this 
study develops what can be dubbed the incubation model in which incubation is a higher 
and more intensive degree of socialization that aims to intensify and consolidate an 
individual’s identity. It is through this process that social movements can infuse and 
place new members within its structures. In large and highly ideological movements, it 
is significantly difficult to align new members with a movement’s ideology and norms 
without articulating a rigorous and disciplined process of identification. Whereas 
socialization focuses on changing an individual’s perceptions and views, incubation 
aims to activate the new perceptions and identities in everyday life.  
The incubation model fosters the identification process within social movements 
through three main functions: 1) align members with movement’s ideology, objectives, 
and norms; 2) foster their commitment and loyalty to the movement’s leadership; and 3) 
preserve the movement’s cohesion and consistency. This can happen through adopting a 
rigorous and disciplined system of membership. 
Many Islamist movements tend to incubate their members for a period of time 
before permitting them to become full-fledged cadres. Hence, these movements adopt a 
multi-level system of membership. The rationale behind this is system is four-fold. First, 
it accustoms new members to the movement’s rules and norms. For new members to 
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become committed to Islamist movements’ ideology and cause, their perspectives and 
views need to be reshaped. Second, it creates cohesiveness and consistency between old 
and new members. Hence for members to move from one level to another, they have to 
meet a specific set of conditions and criteria. Third, it enables a movement to generate a 
sense of solidarity and commonality among members. As highly ideological movements, 
Islamist movements tend to act as a solid entity rather than a fragmented movement. 
Finally, this system safeguards Islamist movements from regime repression. Operating 
in a repressive and authoritarian environment, Islamist movements tend to be cautious in 
selecting their members.  
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Fig. 9 Incubation model and identity consolidation 
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This study will apply the incubation model to the MB. It will examine how the 
MB selects and incubates its members. It is through the incubation process that the MB 
can recruit members, reshape their mind-set, and consolidate their identity. The more 
members are exposed to this process, the more their identity become intensified and 
strengthened. This model explains how the MB’s recruitment and mobilization strategy 
encounters its socialization and identification process which results in consolidating the 
MB identity. 
 
5.3. PARTICIPATION IN ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS 
Unlike most other social movements, membership and affiliation in Islamist 
movements is a complex, yet meaningful, process. Since re-shaping societal norms and 
values is a key objective for these movements, reformulating an individual’s perceptions 
and ideas is of profound importance to the success of the movement. Hence the process 
of recruiting and attracting individuals to join Islamist movements constitutes an integral 
component of the process of reshaping their identity. It is in this process that Islamists 
strive to produce meaning constructions, create symbolic solidarity, and internalize their 
ideology and objectives within an individual’s identity. 
For Islamist movements, preaching (da‘wa) is the main tool in recruiting and 
mobilizing members. Hence throughout the recruiting and mobilization process, the 
movements’ leaders and cadres tend to align their practices and activities with Islamic 
norms and values. In addition, since reviving Islamic identity is a key objective of 
Islamist movements, selecting and recruiting new members is deemed to be a religious 
duty per se rather than only a mobilization tactic. 
More importantly, Islamist movements allocate resources, mobilize individuals, 
and generate collective action not only to challenge or protest against the state or the 
political regime, as many of other social movements tend to do, but also, and more 
importantly, to disseminate its ideology and expand its social and religious network 
among a wider audience. For these movements, reshaping an individual’s identity is a 
target per se. It is true that Islamist movements tend to employ social and economic 
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grievances to serve their mobilizational purposes; however, they do so not primarily to 
gain political power but more importantly to alter the existing system of values, norms 
and morality to one that is more Islamic. As Wickham points out, “the Islamist da‘wa 
tapped into [these] grievances and portrayed Islam as the means to fundamentally 
transform the conditions in which they were rooted” (Wickham, 2002, p.160). Hence, 
regardless of the reasons underlying an individual’s participation (interests, morals, 
motivations, emotions, etc.), the mode and the process whereby they are selected and 
socialized is crucial in re-formulating their identity. 
In addition, operating within an authoritarian and repressive context, it is 
fundamentally important for Islamist movements to control the membership and 
recruitment process in order to prevent any penetration by security forces. Thus, they 
tend to pick their members carefully and cautiously. Hence the strategies and 
mechanisms of selecting, recruiting, and instilling individuals within the movement’s 
structures are profoundly vital for its survival strategy. Therefore, unlike other social 
movements, membership in Islamist movements is not available to all individuals. 
Those who seek to join the movement need to become highly committed and loyal to the 
movement’s ideology and leadership. Anyone who seeks to attain such a degree of 
commitment has to undergo an intensive and rigorous process of re-configuration to 
his/her mindset and behaviour in order to comply with the movement’s norms and codes 
of action. Moreover, those who decide to join Islamist movements tend to show 
willingness and readiness to pay the cost of affiliation to an opposition and, sometimes, 
illegal movements.  
The influence of Islamist movements is pervasive among lower and middle 
classes. Hence, the mobilizational and recruitment capabilities target those who live in 
rural areas and in the impoverished suburban areas and outskirts of cities.41 The 
movements rely heavily upon social networks of friends, kinship, and neighbours to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Despite the long-standing validity of this argument, it does not negate the ability of Islamists to 
penetrate the upper classes. The new Islamist rhetoric, particularly that which utilizes new technology, 
(e.g. the ‘televisionist’ Islam), has attracted many young Muslims who are western-educated and openly 
accept democratic values.  
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recruit new members (Munson, 2001, Wickham, 2002, Al-Awadi, 2004). The 
conventional venues to attract those members are mosques, schools, universities, and 
social gatherings. However, the ability of Islamists to capitalize in these social networks 
is contingent upon two factors. The first is to accompany their outreach strategy by 
preaching da‘wa activities. Many of those who tend to join Islamists acknowledge their 
commitment and adherence to Islamic values. The second is to synthesize their activities 
with individual grievances and needs. Hence, one of the basic arguments that Islamists 
use is their advocacy for social justice. They tend to link their religious and social 
activities to the broader crisis of unfairness and corruption in society at large (Wickham, 
2002). 
Importantly, membership and affiliation in Islamist movements does not require 
individuals to break their previous social ties (Wickham, 2002). Rather, Islamists draw 
upon these ties to attract and recruit new members. They employ social interactions 
among friends, relatives, and peers to reshape an individual’s perceptions and ideas. The 
appeal of Islamist movements stems from the fact that they are a part of the social fabric. 
They do not seek to fragment this fabric but rather to re-weave it into an Islamic mode. 
Hence, the impact of Islamist movements increases in cases of ethnic and socially 
divided communities as they provide a link that transcends local loyalties. 
 
5.4. THE ART OF RECRUITING: HOW THE MB SELECTS ITS MEMBERS  
Despite its populist character, membership and affiliation of the MB is not an 
easy task. The recruitment and mobilization process in the MB has diverse, disciplined, 
and complex steps and procedures. Since the MB is a cross-cutting movement that 
targets different individuals from a wide spectrum of social, educational, and economic 
backgrounds, the movement is keen to integrate its individuals within its organizational 
network. Hence to ensure congruence and cohesiveness among its members, the MB 
adopts an inclusive process of recruitment and membership. This process provides a 
code of values and norms by which all members have to abide. In addition, it generates a 
sense of solidarity and commitment among members.  
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One of the significant differences between the MB and other social movements 
lies in its membership pattern. Whereas membership in most social movements is open 
to all individuals, it is highly selective in the MB. Those who seek to join the movement 
need to align their behaviours and actions with the movement’s rules and standards. 
Therefore, individuals do not join the MB but rather are selected by the movement. As 
one MB cadre puts it, “the movement selects its sons”.42 
The MB tends to scrutinize its members before they officially join the 
movement. This tendency reflects not only the religious character of the MB, which 
requires certain personal characteristics, but also reveals the cautious and vigilant 
character of the MB. The authoritarian environment in which it operates puts its 
members under relentless surveillance. Thus, the MB maintains a tight grip on its 
recruitment and selection process in order to avoid penetration by the security forces. 
The recruitment and mobilization process of the MB can be dubbed as ’chasing 
the prey’, which refers to its attempt to capitalize on the religious and cultural tendency 
of individuals. The movement’s leaders and cadres strive to persuade individuals to join 
the movement through different means, such as religious propaganda, social services, 
educational leaflets, etc. However, the most fertile ground for recruiting members is 
through social networks, such as kinship, friendship, universities, and neighborhoods. 
MB cadres tend to permeate the private sphere of an individual and surround them with 
Islamic idioms and symbols in everyday life. With time, the targeted individual (the 
prey) comes under intense emotional, religious, and psychological influence which 
facilitates his/her attachment with the movement. More importantly, when they reach 
out into society, MB recruiters and cadres do not initially espouse their ideological and 
political affiliation. Their message revolves mainly around fostering Islamic teachings 
and principles in everyday life. However, this should not be taken as an implication that 
the MB deceives members, but rather that it shows its considerable ability to employ 
Islamic symbolism in attracting and recruiting new members. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Interview with Salah Abdelhalim, a 35-year-old middle-rank cadre in the MB, on 26 December 2011. 
	  
	  
	  
	  
141	  
For example, at the inception of the outreach process, MB recruiters tend to 
focus on propagating broad Islamic values and principles in society. After a short period 
of time, they gradually infuse the MB ideology alongside their proselytizing message. 
Those who show a salient religiosity and sympathy with the MB’s cause become 
potential members. Once those potential members have been identified, MB cadres and 
recruiters chase them remorselessly until they officially join the movement; thereafter, a 
new course of recruitment starts. It should be noted that these mechanisms of 
recruitment and attracting new members would be discussed extensively later in this 
chapter.  
Clearly, the chasing the prey tactic reflects the MB’s tendency to select its 
members carefully. It enables the movement to detect and scrutinize an individual’s 
religiosity before they are recruited. However, it is worth mentioning that not all MB 
members are targeted through this tactic. The tactic functions effectively with young 
people particularly school pupils and university students. However, adults are targeted 
with different tactics. Thus, the MB’s recruitment process varies according to the 
targeted group. More importantly, this process is gradual and can last for years until 
individuals obtain fully-fledged membership of the MB.  
The following section probes the recruitment process within the MB and how it 
works in everyday life.  
 
5. 4.1 How to be an Ikhwani: The Ripple Effect 
Proselytization or making da‘wa is an integral activity of the MB and other 
Islamist movements. As Shaykh Abduelkhaliq Al-Sherif, Head of Disseminating the 
Call Section (Nashr al-Da‘wa) in the MB, puts it, “the MB has been created for nothing 
except da‘wa’”. 43 However, da’wa also is a fundamental tool for recruiting new 
members. Individuals join the MB not only because of its social character but also as a 
result of its preaching and outreach activities. Hence the recruitment strategy of the MB 
can take the shape of proselytization.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Interview with Abduelkhaliq Al-Sherif on 5 April 2012. 
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The preachers (du‘at)44 act as recruiters who seek to propagate and disseminate 
the MB’s ideology. More importantly, with repression and brutal security surveillance, 
making da‘wa becomes the only way for the MB to communicate and reach out to its 
constituency. According to Al-Sherif, the MB has 140 preaching schools with at least 
45,000 preachers from al-Azhar and other educational institutions.45 
It should be noted that recruiters or du‘at tend to align their preaching activity 
with Islamic values. As mentioned previously, al-Banna was keen to combine Islamic 
identity with the MB’s ideology. Therefore, through reaching out into society, du‘at 
tend to operate under the banner of Islam, not ikhwan. Hence, they tend to merge 
propagation with the MB’s ideas, albeit in a subtle way. For instance, du‘at tend to 
downplay their link with the MB while they are making da‘wa. Hence, new members in 
the early stages can not distinguish if the preaching is promoting Islam or the MB’s 
ideology. 
Moreover, making da‘wa is considered to be a religious duty that should be 
fulfilled by all members. According to Al-Sherif, each member in the MB should act as 
a preacher (da‘i) in his family, among his friends, and with his work fellows.46  
The MB’s preaching activity has a ripple effect that helps to expand the 
movement’s social and organizational boundaries. By capitalizing on individual 
connections and social networks, the MB can enlarge its umbrella to encompass various 
audiences. It seeks subtlety to influence the public’s perception of its image. Therefore, 
recruiters tend to back up rhetoric with good deeds and act as true Muslims who are 
willing to sacrifice their time and efforts for the sake of the Islamic Call (al-da’wa al-
Islamiyya). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Du’at (preachers) refers to religious activists who seek to proselytize and encourage Islamic faith 
among ordinary Muslims in everyday life. Traditionally, du‘ah should acquire religious knowledge or 
education. However, most du’at in Islamist movements are not religiously educated but rather have a 
professional or secular education. Since the objective of Islamists’ preaching is to attract and recruit new 
members to their movements, they tend to focus on the way and means of preaching or how to preach 
rather than on the content of their preaching.   
45 Interview with Abduelkhaliq Al-Sherif on 5 April 2012. 
46 Interview with Abduelkhaliq Al-Sherif on 5 April 2012. 
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More importantly, the recruitment process within the MB follows the 
proselytization model established by its founder, al-Banna, who highlighted three main 
phases for recruiting and attracting new members. The first is to disseminate and 
proselytize the MB’s ideology amongst all people. The second is to select and recruit 
adherents among those people. The third is to implement the MB’s ideas and goals (al-
Banna, 2002, p.178). According to al-Banna, these stages should be followed strictly. 
Thus the recruitment process of the MB goes through three interlinked stages or circles. 
The first is the dissemination stage, termed Disseminating the Call (nashr al-da’wa), 
which aims to reach the entire society. The second is the Generic Connectedness circle 
(arrabt al-‘am) that targets the narrow circle in which each recruiter operates. The third 
is the Individual Call (al-da‘wa al-fardiyya) which targets those who can be potential 
members of the MB.  
These stages constitute the beginning of the full-fledged membership in the MB, 
highlighting the complexity and multi-facetedness of the MB’s recruitment mechanism. 
However, it is worth mentioning that these stages or recruitment circles are not rigidly 
applied. While recruiters should respect the sequence, actual recruitment relies on an 
individual’s ability to comprehend the MB’s ideology. For instance, some du‘at might 
start their recruitment activity in stage two, Generic Connectedness; however, they 
cannot jump from stage one nashr al- da‘wa to the third al-da‘wa al-fardiyya. 
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Fig. 10 Circles of recruitment in the MB: the ripple effect 
 
5.4.1.1 Disseminating the call (nashr al-da‘wa) 
The key objective of the MB in this stage is to diffuse its ideology among the 
public in general. This stage launches the first level of communication between the MB 
and society. It also aims to reshape the image of the MB among ordinary people. Eslam 
Ramadan, a 28-year-old member, points out, “at this stage, we seek to improve the 
image of the MB among people and not to ask them to join the movement. It is our very 
basic job.”47 The benefits of this step are twofold: to establish the initial connection 
between MB recruiters and the public; and to change any negative stereotypes 
formulated by the regime or other political and religious adversaries against the MB. 
According to Mustafa Mashhur (d. 2002), the fifth General Guide (al-murshid al-‘am) 
of the MB, this stage is essential as it is the first step on the MB’s path and any 
deviation in achieving its objectives can lead to negative consequences (Mashhur, 1989, 
p.22). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Interview with Eslam Ramadan on 11 January 2012. 
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The tools to achieve the objective of dissemination are through media campaigns, 
mosques, and public lectures. However, throughout this stage, MB recruiters tend to 
keep their affiliation to the MB hidden. Hence they are seen to operate as individuals 
rather than as members of the MB. They give talks, lectures, and endorse social 
activities not in the name of the MB but rather for the sake of Islam. Moreover, this 
stage invokes al-Banna’s notion of the importance of spreading the MB’s ideas in both 
rural and urban areas.48 
 
5.4.1.2 The Generic Connectedness (arrabt al-‘am) 
The second stage or circle in the MB’s recruitment strategy is called the Generic 
Connectedness (arrabt al-‘am). In this stage, recruiters seek to convey the movement’s 
message and ideas to a more specific audience. Recruiters move from the broader 
society to specific networks and segments of society. This circle includes potential 
members who can with a degree of effort join the MB. According to Klandermans and 
Oegema potential participants of a social movement are “those who take a positive stand 
toward a particular social movement” (Klandermans and Oegema, 1987, p.519). In this 
case, among those who were targeted in the first stage any who show significant 
inclinations towards the MB’s ideology and cause become the focus of recruiters. Once 
they have been identified by the recruiters, new tactics to attract them are applied. 
This stage detects the potential members of the MB. Recruiters try to infiltrate 
the private sphere of individuals with a specific message on the MB’s ideology and 
objectives. However, the aim of this stage is not to recruit new members but rather to 
foster a relationship with potential members. This can happen by using different means, 
such as organizing soccer competitions, giving gifts, distributing leaflets, picnics, etc. 
According to Sherif Ayman, a 26-year-old member, these means create an intimate 
relationship between new members and MB cadres. 49 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 In the Fifth Conference tract, al-Banna stressed the importance of spreading the MB’s ideology 
throughout the country in villages and cities (al-Banna, 2002, p.120). 
49 Interview with Sherif Ayman on 12 January 2012.  
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The fertile ground for this stage is social networks, such as family, relatives, 
friends, neighbours, and work colleagues. These informal networks facilitate the 
recruitment and mobilization process of the MB. Klandermans and Oegema point out, 
“networks condition whether people become targets of mobilization attempts. The more 
a movement’s reach-out networks are woven into other organizations, the more people 
are reached by mobilization attempts” (Klandermans and Oegema, 1987, 520). Thus, 
MB recruiters strive to stretch this circle to its maximum through kinship and friendship 
relationships. Eslam Ramadan points out, “this circle is the closest to each akh (brother). 
We do not seek to recruit new members but rather to create sympathizers to the Islamic 
idea (al-fikra al-Islamiyya). This circle consists of our relatives and friends.”50 For MB 
members, it is a duty at this stage to avow the MB’s character and ideas in everyday life 
to those who are not familiar with it. This mirrors al-Banna’s notion of nashr al-fikra or 
spreading the word of the MB among the public (al-Banna, 2002, p.178). 
 
5.4.1.3 The individual call (al-da‘wa al-fardiyya) 
The third stage of the MB’s mobilization and recruitment strategy is termed the 
Individual Call (al-da‘wa al-fardiyya) and is the most important stage in the MB’s 
strategy to recruit new members. It aims directly to encourage individuals to join the 
MB. Thus it constitutes the core of al-Banna’s mobilization strategy. He stated, “at this 
stage we should select protagonists, prepare the soldiers, and mobilize supporters from 
those who have been reached out to” (al-Banna 2002: 178). Unlike the preceding stages, 
the MB tends to make its ideology and objectives visible to potential members. In short, 
this stage is deemed the threshold of the real membership in the MB. 
According to Islamists, the Individual Call51 refers to the process of reaching out 
to ordinary Muslims to alter and transform their perceptions, ideas, and behavior to 
become more Islamic. Abd al-Halim al-Kinani, one of the MB middle-rank leaders, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Interview with Eslam Ramadan on 11 January 2012.  
51 Another use of this term is the Special Call (da‘wa khasa) which refers to a personal connection 
between the recruiter and a potential member; the former aims to change the latter’s ideas and 
perceptions. 
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defines the Individual Call as, “the direct and personal communication between two 
individuals: the preacher who seeks to make a significant transformation in others and 
the person or ‘the target’ who should be transformed to become more committed to 
Islam” (al-Kinani, 2007, p.15).  
Clearly, al-Kinani’s definition of the Individual Call encompasses three key 
elements: first, it is a face-to-face connection between the MB recruiter and potential 
members. Second, the aim of this connection is primarily to alter an individual’s 
perceptions and views. Third, this connection happens under the banner of Islam which 
gives it a significant symbolic power. Moreover, for recruiters, Individual Call activities 
are considered a religious duty that should be fulfilled. Alaa Moharm, one of the MB’s 
recruitment leaders, points out that Individual Call is a tool to disseminate Islamic 
principles, not the MB’s ideology (Moharm, 2010, p.1).  
In addition, members who seek to be involved in Individual Call activities 
should exhibit certain skills and characteristics. According Moharm, the recruiters 
should meet three main conditions: desire, ability, and understanding. Each of these 
elements is divided into two aspects. In terms of desire, the preacher (da‘i) should have 
the enthusiasm and the motivation to proselytize the Islamic call, while for ability, he 
also should also have the knowledge and skills to do so. The understanding aspect 
means that he should comprehend the internal and external environment that can affect 
his preaching activity (Moharm, 2010).  
In terms of personal characteristics, Al-Sherif points out that du‘at should be: 1) 
passionate, 2) knowledgeable, 3) truthful, 4) patient, 5) rational and wise, and 6) 
outspoken and know how to reach out to people.52 
 
5.4.1.3.1 Stages of the individual call: chasing the prey 
Because of its pivotal importance, the Individual Call attracts considerable 
attention within the MB. In this stage, the MB’s recruiters seek to reshape and alter the 
perceptions and mind-set of potential members. Hence they are heavily involved in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Interview with Abduelkhaliq Al-Sherif on 5 April 2012. 
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meaning and symbolic production processes to convince individuals to join the MB. 
This process can be dubbed ‘chasing the prey’. It is a dynamic and intensive interaction 
process between two parties: the recruiter (the hunter) and the potential member (the 
prey). During this interaction, the former attempts to infiltrate the latter’s private sphere 
and to put him under persistent, but gradual, process of psychological and ideological 
change that should subsequently convince potential members to join the MB. The time 
involved in the intensive processes differs across individuals.  
Throughout this process, the hunter surrounds the prey, with Islamic idioms, 
symbols, and norms in their everyday life. However, it is worth mentioning that this 
tactic does not require that a potential member break with his existing social 
relationships. Rather, it seeks to reshape the relationship between the potential member 
and the MB.  
According to Mashhur, the Individual Call should go through six stages. The 
first is to detect the potential member. At this stage, the MB cadre (da‘i) builds a 
personal relationship with a potential member by using different means, such as gifts, 
home visits, frequent phone calls, etc. It is the job of the da‘i to detect and identify those 
individuals who might be inclined to embrace the MB’s ideology. Once detected, the 
MB cadre seeks to permeate the individual’s private sphere. According to Mashhur, this 
stage can take between three to four weeks. 
The second stage is to stimulate and reinforce the Islamic faith within potential 
members. At this stage, recruiters move from individuals’ personal to the religious 
realm. Hence recruiters focus on leading potential members to fulfil their religious 
duties, i.e. rituals, prayers, reciting Quran, etc. They can use different tools to achieve 
this goal, such as video tapes, cassettes, Islamic books, etc. The prime aim of this stage 
is to trigger the transformation process within a potential member’s perceptions and 
behaviours. As Sherif Ayman describes how he has been touched at this stage, “I felt as 
if I started a new life or I am born again.”53 According to Mashhur, this stage should last 
for around one month or six weeks. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Interview with Sherif Ayman on 12 January 2012. 
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The third stage of the Individual Call aims to instill the idea of Islamic 
comprehensiveness within a potential member’s mind-set. Recruiters seek to interweave 
ideas with practices. Hence they focus on how a potential member acts as a true Muslim 
in his/her everyday life. To help the du‘at to accomplish the goals of this phase, 
Mashhur recommends a list of readings that can help them, such as Yusuf al-Qaradawi’s 
book, The Comprehensiveness of Islam (Shumuliyyat al-Islam), and Abul Hasan Ali 
Nadawi’s book, What Has the World Lost with the Degradation of Muslims? (Madha 
Khasr al-‘lam Binhitat al-Muslimin). Mashhur suggests a month for this stage which 
should end when a potential member entirely succumbs to Islam in their everyday life. 
The fourth stage is called ‘the duty to work for Islam’ and focuses on activating 
the political identity of a potential member. According to Mashhur, this can happen by 
connecting them with the state of Muslims around the world. The main task of recruiters 
at this stage is to spur the Islamic sentiment of potential members. Mashhur states, “the 
targeted person should become sympathetic with Muslims around the world, in 
Palestine, in Chechnya, in Kashmir, etc. and become eager to help and support them” 
(Mashhur 2004). The means to achieve this is through newspapers, Islamic conferences, 
and giving a potential member books that explain difficulties that face Muslims across 
the globe.  
Thus, this stage seeks to create a sense of commitment and solidarity among 
towards the MB’s cause. More importantly, it prepares a potential member to move 
from passivity to action. Hence Mashhur defines four main stages to be achieved before 
recruiters move to the next step. These are: 1) when the potential member becomes 
passionate and sympathetic with other fellow Muslims; 2) when he donates money to 
Muslim causes; 3) when he becomes active among his family, friends, and community; 
and 4) when he himself starts to preach and recruit others. In addition, Mashhur 
recommends a number of al-Banna tracts to help new members, such as A Message to 
Youth and To What We Call People?. This stage should last a month. 
The fifth stage of the Individual Call is collective action. At this stage recruiters 
stress the fundamental role of collective action in achieving the MB’s objectives. Hence 
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the main task is to spur individuals’ motivation to take part in collective action. 
According to Mashhur, du‘at should emphasize the importance of establishing the 
Islamic State as an ultimate goal for all Muslims and to persuade individuals to take part 
in achieving this vital goal. However, Mashhur draws a subtle link between achieving 
this goal and joining the MB. He states, “since establishing the Islamic state is the duty 
of all Muslims, the only way to achieve it is through joining a collective movement or 
“jama’a” (Mashhur, 2004, p.1). He also highlights five standards to which MB members 
should commit: obedience; brotherhood; vigilance; sacrifice; and integrity. 
The main objective at this stage is to create a self-disciplined member who will 
devote his life and time to the MB’s cause. According to Mashhur, by the end of this 
stage, potential members should become fully committed and devoted to the MB’s 
leadership and ideology. The reading list suggested by Mashhur at this stage is, Fathi 
Yakan’s books, such as What Does it Mean My Belonging to Islam?, Between 
Individuality and Collectiveness and The Path to the MB. This phase should last for a 
month. 
The last stage of the Individual Call is to encourage potential members to join 
the MB. Mashhur points out that the main goal of this stage is to make a potential 
member ask: which movement or group should I affiliate with to serve Islam? Mashhur 
stresses that the answer should direct a potential member to join the MB. To achieve 
this, Mashhur highlights six features of the movement: 1) it should be an Islamic 
movement that follows the path of the Prophet and seeks to establish the Islamic state; 
2) the movement should believe in the comprehensiveness of Islam; 3) the movement 
should have branches around the world; 4) the movement should have a global 
experience in dealing with major issues; 5) the movement should be moderate and 
peaceful; and 6) the movement should have a well-established organization. Clearly, the 
movement that encompasses such features is the MB. Moreover, to help potential 
members to make their decision, Mashhur recommends more of al-Banna’s tracts, such 
as The Horizons of the Teachings, The Fifth Conference Tract and Brothers under the 
Banner of the Qur’an. 
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Clearly, the Individual Call plays a vital role in enabling the MB to attract and 
recruit new members. Moreover, it creates an emotional and personal connection 
between a potential member and the movement. Many interviewees stress the role of the 
Individual Call in shaping their decision to join the MB. For instance, Sherif Ayman 
points out that he was recruited after he attended some activities in the neighbourhood. 
He states, “The Individual Call fosters human and faithful connection between members 
who act as Brothers.”54  	  
Table 1 Mashhur’s Blueprint of the Individual Call 
Stage Goal Tools Time scale The targeted outcome 
1. Selection  and 
acquaintance 
To select 
carefully a 
potential member 
Personal 
connection, gifts, 
home visits, sports, 
phone calls, 
brotherhood 
Three 
weeks 
To familiarize a 
potential member with 
the MB 
2. Stimulating religious 
faith 
To create 
religious 
commitment and 
stimulate ethical 
and moral 
behaviour in 
everyday life 
Islamic video 
tapes, cassettes, 
Islamic books, etc. 
One month To transform the 
behaviour and customs 
of a potential member 
3. Imbue the notion of 
Islamic 
comprehensiveness 
Infusing Islamic 
ideology in the 
mindset of 
potential member 
Islamic books 
about the 
comprehensiveness 
of Islam and gifts 
One month  A potential member 
should entirely succumb 
to Islam in everyday life 
4. The duty to work for 
Islam 
To politicize an 
individual’s 
identity 
Attending 
conferences, 
participating in 
religious and 
public activities, 
etc. 
6 weeks at 
least 
To stimulate the Islamic 
sentiment within the 
potential member and 
connecting with the 
Islamic cause 
5. Collective Action To create a sense 
of responsibility 
and commitment 
within a potential 
Involve more in 
organizational 
activities and test 
his obedience and 
commitment to the 
A month To reformulate the 
personality of a 
potential member to 
become more 
disciplined and oriented 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Interview with Sherif Ayman on 12 January 2012. 
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member movement  by the movement’s 
norms and standards 
6. Affiliating with the MB To encourage the 
potential member 
to join an Islamic 
movement 
Participating in 
organizational 
activities and meet 
with senior leaders 
of the movement 
A month To become a member in 
the MB 
Source: Mashhur, (2004, pp. 3-4) 
Importantly, three aspects require to be taken into account regarding the stages 
of the Individual Call. First, since the Individual Call aims to alter and transform an 
individual’s perceptions and behaviour, the time scale of the stages differs amongst 
potential recruits as it depends on the ability and the skills of the recruiter and the 
response of the potential member. Second, since it deals with human beings, the stages 
of the Individual Call are conducted in a gradual and subtle way. Hence the sequence is 
important. Third, and most important, in many cases potential members do not know or 
realize the significance of these stages. They move from one stage to another without 
realizing the difference between them. The symbolic power of the notion of the Islamic 
Call (al-da‘wa al-Islamiyya) inspires potential members and spurs their religious 
commitment. They decide to join the MB for no other reason than to serve Islam. Thus, 
the more the recruiters align their activities with Islamic norms and principles, the more 
strongly potential members will become attracted to the MB and be involved in its 
activities regardless of the potential costs or risks it might entail.  
In short, the Individual Call works as a ‘laboratory’ preparation for potential 
members before they become fully ready to join the MB. It internalizes the movement’s 
ideology and norms within potential members. After selecting them to join the MB, 
potential members go through another intensive process of identification to consolidate 
their identity. 
 
5.4.2 Social Networks and the MB: Ikhwanizing the Private Sphere 
The importance of social networks in mobilizing and generating collective action 
is indisputable. Social networks embody the reservoir that social movements employ to 
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allocate resources, recruit new members, and create collective action. However, the 
most important function of social networks lies in its impact on an individual’s identity. 
According to Passy, social networks have three key functions: networks offer 
participation opportunities to individuals (structural function); they shape individual 
preferences before an individual decides to join a movement (decision-shaping function); 
and they socialize and build individual identities (cultural function) (Passy, 2001, p.173). 
For the MB, social networks are fundamental to achieve these three functions. 
The MB heavily capitalizes on different types of social networks, such as kinship, 
friendship, neighbourhoods, schools, universities, and mosques. As a cross-cutting 
movement, the MB always seeks to extend its network in both rural and urban areas. 
Hence it has different types of recruiters who can adapt to the different type of networks.  
In addition, the organizational structure of the MB contains different outreach 
committees depending on the targeted individuals and their age. For instance, in each 
district office there is a ‘children’ committee (bara‘m) that is responsible for attracting 
and recruiting young members. Ayyash highlights that he was recruited at the age of 
eight by what he calls ‘cub entertaining activities’ conducted by the MB’s committee in 
his neighbourhood.55 The main venues of recruiting children are mosques and schools. 
The MB tends to target children by organizing different activities, e.g. Quran lessons, 
educational quizzes, fun ceremonies, etc. They interweave their ideology within the 
materials provided in such occasions. They also employs their cadres who work as 
teachers in recruiting students in early age to embrace the MB norms and ideas.  
Moreover, the MB has an active division responsible for attracting and recruiting 
students called Maktab al-Talaba (Students Office). It aims to reach out and recruit 
students at schools and universities. For example, Sherif Ayman emphasized that he was 
recruited through the activities of the Students Committee at the university.56 Many of 
those interviewed for this research affirmed the important role of the Student Office in 
recruiting new members. Historically, the MB expanded its network through this office 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Interview with Abdurrahman Ayyash on 12 January 2012. 
56 Interview with Sherif Ayman on 12 January 2012. 
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during the 1930s and 1940s, particularly in Cairo and Alexandria. At the time, 
universities were one of the most active centres for protest against British authorities 
and the Egyptian government. However, the role of the MB at universities waned during 
1950s and 1960s as a result of the confrontation between the MB and President Nasser’s 
regime. During the 1970s and 1980s, the MB restored its strong presence at universities. 
Since then, schools and universities have become the main source of MB recruitment 
and mobilization. Not surprisingly, many of the MB’s current leaders were recruited 
during the 1970s and 1980s, including Abdelmoniem Abuelfotuh,57 Essam Al-Eryan, 
Mohamed Morsi and Helmi El-Gazar. 
The main tools to spread the MB’s ideology among students are by distributing 
flyers and leaflets, providing subsidies to poor students who come from rural areas to 
settle in urban cities, and contesting student union elections. Moreover, the movement 
has strong activities in universities’ residences and accommodation (El-Melegie, 1994). 
The MB also capitalizes on family connections to recruit new members. Ammar 
El-Beltagi, a 23-year-old and the son of the prominent MB leader Mohamed El-Beltagi, 
mentioned that he was born ‘Ikhwan’ as are all his family.58 More significantly, the MB 
tends to expand its family and kinship network through marriage and personal links. 
Ibrahim Hassan, a 25-year-old member, states, “I was born Ikhwan and will remain so 
for the rest my life.”59 The MB created an extensive network of relatives and friends 
who build their relationships not only on ideology but also on personal links. For 
example, many MB members choose their spouse from Ikhwani families.60 Getting 
married to a member of an Ikhwani family can also serve the MB’s ultimate goal of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Abdelmoniem Abuelfotuh is considered to be one of the MB leaders who rebuilt the MB in the 1970s 
after the imprisoning of its first-line leaders during the 1950s and 1960s. However, he was expelled from 
the MB in 2011 when he decided to run for the Egyptian presidency. For more about the role of 
Abuelfotouh in reviving the MB see: Hossam Tammam, Abuelfotoh, A Witness on the Islamist Movement 
from 1970 to 1984, (Cairo: Shorouk Press), 2010. 
58 Interview with Ammar El-Beltagi on 28 March 2012. 
59 Interview with Ibrahim Hasan on 25 December 2010. 
60 Marriage from within the MB ranks is a key feature of the movement’s social base. Since its foundation 
in the early 1930s, the Sisters Section (Qism al-Akhawat) has played an important role in facilitating and 
maintaining marriage and kinship relationships within the MB. Fatima Abdelhady, the First Secretary of 
the Sisters Section, points out her role in facilitating the marriage of many MB leaders (Abdelhady, 2011, 
p.38). 
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creating an Islamic society. It reflects the ripple effect which helps the MB to expand its 
boundaries and widen its organizational and social networks. Ironically, one prominent 
MB leader argues that members should not married to those from outside the MB. He 
stresses that Brothers should get married to Sisters (al-akhawat), otherwise the MB’s 
societal domination will be delayed.61 According to Husam Tamamm, a prominent 
expert on the MB, the MB creates its own community within society. He points out that 
the MB is a sub-society within the society. He states, “the group gradually evolved into 
a parallel society.”62 He adds, “the brother lives, gets educated, makes friends, gets 
married, finds a job, gets politically engaged in a fully Muslim Brotherhood-based 
environment.”63 
In addition, recruitment within the MB can also happen through kinship and 
family networks. Based on the notion of da‘wa, relatives are the first target for du‘at. 
Mohamed Sha’ban, a 32-year-old member points out that he joined the MB through his 
uncle who was an active member in the movement. He describes this as “a family 
business whereby my uncle used to accompany me to the mosque and introduce me to 
peers in my age group” when he was 12 years old.64 
However, the flip side of the strength of relative and family connections is that 
these can create problems for the leadership, as it can raise questions and concerns over 
transparency over issues such as promotion. In other words, the MB tends to adopt a 
sense of nepotism that plays out in favour of certain individuals, families or groups 
within the movement.  For instance, some MB members use family ties to enhance their 
position within the movement. This pattern of promotion has provoked many questions 
among members and led some to leave the movement. Mohamed Yussif, a 26-year-old 
former member of the MB, points out that he left the movement after he discovered the 
lack of transparency. He states, “my leader was not so transparent when he sided with 
some members who were not as committed to the movement as I was, hence I decided 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Sobhi Saleh, a MB MP, asserts that the closer members get together, the more the MB takes power (Al-
Masry Al-Youm, 24/5/2011). 
62 Interview with Husam Tammam conducted by Noha El-Hennawy, Egypt Independent, 17/4/2011. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Interview with Mohamed Sha’an on 3 April 2012. 
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to leave the movement.”65 Clearly, this type of criticism hits the credibility of the MB, 
as well as creating feuds and tensions among members. For instance, some members 
consider that the family connection between Khairat Al-Shater, the former Deputy to the 
MB General Guide, who is the brother-in-law of the spokesperson of the movement, 
Mahmoud Ghozlan, allowed the latter to gain quick promotion within the MB.  
Overall, affiliation with the MB can be attributed not only to its ideology but 
also to the incentives it can provide to its members. For instance, 36-year-old Salah 
Abdelhalim, points out that some individuals join the MB for social purposes. “There 
are those who seek to be socially promoted, and others who need to improve their life 
conditions Both can fulfil their needs in the MB”, he stresses.66 
Clearly, social networks create opportunities for many to join the MB. However, 
they also help in reshaping an individual’s perceptions and identity. This happens in part 
through the socialization process. The intensive interactions of members in everyday life 
reformulate their personality and character and enhance their commitment to the MB. 
These interactions create a sort of subculture that facilitates the socialization process 
within the movement. This subculture, as Wickham points out, is the springboard of 
Islamists’ activism (Wickham, 2002, p.247). 
 
5.5. CONSOLIDATING IDENTITY: WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO BE AN 
IKHWANI? 
Consolidating a member’s identity is a matter of great importance in social 
movements. Movements always seek to internalize their ideology, norms, and codes of 
values within a member’s identity and mind-set. One of the main ways to achieve this 
internalization is through the socialization process. However, consolidating identity 
depends, among other factors, upon the extent social movement can intensify 
interactions among its members in everyday life. The more these interactions are 
intensified, the stronger a member’s identity is reinforced and consolidated. Intensifying 
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the socialization process within social movements can happen through what this study 
terms the incubation process. It refers to an intensive degree of socialization that 
transforms an individual’s perceptions and views to match the movement’s norms, 
values, and objectives. Incubation is the vehicle that connects an individual with the 
movement, ideas with practices, and norms with values.   
In addition, the incubation process reinforces the content and strength of an 
individual’s identity. For instance, in the MB it is not sufficient just to be affiliated with 
the movement in order to become a full-fledged member but rather it requires a person 
to act as an Ikhwani in their everyday life. Hence, incubation creates a sense of 
commitment and solidarity among members within the movement.  
The incubation process within the MB happens through two main mechanisms: 
education (tarbiyya); and the membership system. Both play a pivotal role in 
consolidating the MB identity. Education is one of the main tools the MB employs to 
reshape an individual’s perceptions and views. It is an integral component of the MB’s 
ideology. al-Banna viewed taribyya as the “rope that binds brothers together” (al-Banna 
2002: 44). It is through the tarbiyya process that the MB can intensify its members’ 
identities. Hence, it fosters the identification process with the MB.  
However, the education process cannot happen without the rigours and 
disciplined system of membership. While many studies stress the impact of participation 
on an individual’s identity, this study contends that in certain movements it is the pattern 
of membership, the underpinning unit of participation which is the main mechanism in 
consolidating an individual’s identity. In highly ideological and disciplined movements, 
membership procedures, norms, and levels are crucial for consolidating an individual’s 
identity. Hence members are required to meet a certain set of conditions and procedures 
before they become full members.  
The MB has a disciplined and rigorous system of membership, which has a 
significant impact on the strength and content of the MB’s identity. It is designed to spur 
an individual’s commitment, devotion, and solidarity with the MB. Thus the MB has a 
multi-level system of membership that plays a vital role in reformulating an individual’s 
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identity. For instance, under this membership system members are always subject to 
being monitored by their leadership. They have to abide by the MB’s rules and norms to 
be promoted. The more they abide by the MB’s codes of values and regulations, the 
greater chance they have of being promoted. Overall, moving from one stage of 
membership to another is a matter of great significance within the MB. 
However, the most important function of this membership system lies in 
enhancing the MB’s ability to reinforce a member’s identity. The education process is 
rooted in the membership system. Members have to meet their tarbiyya obligations to be 
able to move from one stage to another. The multi-tiered membership system enables 
the MB leadership to entrench tarbiyya concepts and values within a member’s identity. 
It is through this system that members strive to align themselves with the MB’s norms, 
values, and objectives. Hence it fosters the identification process between a member and 
the movement. Moreover, members have to apply the MB’s codes of values in their 
everyday life. The more members abide by this code, the more their identity is 
intensified. Therefore, for the identification process to succeed, members have to spend 
a period of time in each level before they become fully-fledged members in the MB. As 
they spend this time in each level, they tend to adapt their perceptions and views to 
coincide with the movement’s ideology and code of values. Hence their identity is 
reshaped and deepened. 
Moreover, the membership system tightens the MB leaders’ grip on the 
movement and enables them to avoid penetration by the security forces. Since an 
individual’s membership and promotion depends on their record of commitment to the 
movement’s ideology and leadership, those who do not follow the rules and standards of 
the MB have to leave the movement or at least be marginalized. 
To grasp how the MB consolidates its members’ identity, the next section 
sketches out both the tarbiyya and membership system of the MB. 
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5.5.1 The Education Process (tarbiyya) within the MB 
Education (tarbiyya) is a central concept in the MB’s ideology and structure. It 
refers to the process of reshaping an individual’s identity through practice. As one of the 
MB’s well-known leaders succinctly puts it, “the most important product which is 
expected from tarbiyya is that it provides us with individuals who adopt certain values 
in everyday life” (El-Ghazali, 2000, p.218). That is, tarbiyya exemplifies the underlying 
process that alters an individual’s views, perceptions, and behaviour to match with the 
MB’s norms, standards, and ideology. It is through the tarbiyya process the MB can 
reformulate a member’s mind-set and actions in everyday life.  
According to El-Ghazali, the main objective of tarbiyya is “to develop, mobilize, 
and prepare men who are able to shoulder the responsibility of spreading and informing 
the Call and establishing the project of the revival to achieve an honourable life based 
on Islam” (El-Ghazali, 2000, p.218). Clearly, tarbiyya is a cornerstone in accomplishing 
the MB’s mission and objectives. It was for this reason that al-Banna was keen to create 
a separate division for tarbiyya (Qism al-Tarbiyya) within the movement’s structure. 
A prominent MB figure defines tarbiyya as “the proper way to influence 
individuals and direct them through specific tools to change them for the better” 
(Mahmoud, 1997, p.11). Hence tarbiyya is about how the MB directs and guides an 
individual in their everyday life. All MB members and cadres have to go through the 
tarbiyya process in order to comprehend and get accustomed to the MB’s norms and 
ideology. Mohamed Yussif, a 28-year-old member, points out that “tarbiyya is the main 
tool that binds Brothers together.”67 According to Mohamed Badie, the current General 
Guide of the MB and the former head of the tarbiyya section, tarbiyya is the main tool 
used to reshape a member’s ethics and values to become Islamic. He states, “tarbiyya is 
central to our project and the main goal of it is to rebuild individuals’ personality.”.68 
Tarbiyya has different dimensions and applications. Atef Shahin, a middle-rank 
leader, highlights five types of tarbiyya: religious; preaching; social; political; and active 
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68 Interview with Mohamed Badie by Abdelgalil Al-Sharnoubi on 7 March 2010 at: 
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(Shahin 2011). The multi-task character of tarbiyya coincides with the 
comprehensiveness notion of the MB’s ideology as discussed in the previous chapter. 
Thus, the formation of an individual’s identity should match the all-inclusive character 
of the MB’s ideology. Amer Shemakh, a MB historian, asserts that tarbiyya should be 
based on five pillars: the oneness of God (rabbaniyya); integration and 
comprehensiveness (al-takamul wa’l-shumul); positive constructivism (ijabiyya wa’l-
bina); moderation and balance (i‘itidal and tawazun); and collective action (jam‘iyya) 
(Shemakh, 2011). 
Clearly, the key goal of tarbiyya in the MB is twofold: religious self-purification 
and organizational attachment and commitment which equate with the spiritual and 
physical construction of individuals. As this study shows, tarbiyya sessions foster an 
individual’s religiosity and piety. al-Banna stressed the role of tarbiyya in “purifying 
individuals’ ethics and practices to be sincere and truthful” (al-Banna, 2002, p.392) . He 
states, ”each member should be physically strong, ethically committed, intellectual, self-
sufficient, faithfully purified, organized, and keen to get the maximum benefit from his 
time” (al-Banna, 2002, p.394). Moreover, al-Banna wrote an important tract, The 
Teachings (Risalat al-Ta‘lim), that includes the norms and values that active members 
should follow and embrace in their everyday life (al-Banna, 2002).  
In addition, tarbiyya aims to connect members with the movement and the 
leadership. Mohamed Abdurrhaman, a member of the Guidance Bureau, highlights two 
aspects of tarbiyya: the individual and the collective. He states, ”tarbiyya is based on 
individuals’ self-education and the collective education through the movement’s 
programmes” (Abdurrahman, 2006, p.107). Al-Banna synthesized these two dimensions 
in a succinct and inspiring statement, “reform yourself and call the others” (al-Banna, 
2002, p.399). 
Furthermore, tarbiyya is a gradual, on-going process that continues as long as 
members are affiliated with the MB. As Sherif Ayman argues, ‘‘tarbiyya lives with us 
from birth to death.”69 Tarbiyya is a fundamental part of an individual’s identity 
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formation. Therefore, in each stage members have to embrace a certain set of norms and 
values in their everyday life, such as obedience, confidence in leadership, loyalty, 
sincerity, sacrifice and commitment. In other words, tarbiyya is a key mechanism that 
helps the MB to instil its norms and code of values within an individual’s identity. 
In addition, the tarbiyya process works in conjunction with the membership 
system in the MB. Each level of membership has its own tarbiyya platform and 
techniques. For instance, those who are newcomers have to follow a gradual platform 
that focuses on ethical and moral reform. However, those who have spent more time in 
the MB are subject to stricter standards and duties. By the end of the recruitment process, 
each member of the MB is supposed to embrace the movement’s ideology and aims.  
Moreover, tarbiyya in the MB is not confined to a particular line of leadership. 
Cadres, as well as members, in the lower levels are subject to tarbiyya sessions that are 
suited to their rank. Abdurrahman Mansour, a 24-year-old, points out that even the 
General Guide of the MB has to follow a certain tarbiyya programme and attend 
tarbiyya sessions.70 
Because of its fundamental role in consolidating a member’s identity, the MB 
has embedded tarbiyya in its structure. From the main tarbiyya section in the Guidance 
Bureau (Maktb al-Irshad) through to the usra (family), the basic unit in the MB, there 
are tarbiyya officers. 
 
5.5.1.1 Tarbiyya tools and incubating identity 
From the creation of the MB, al-Banna was keen to articulate a lucid and gradual 
system for educating MB members. He stressed the role of tarbiyya in reshaping an 
individual’s behaviour and perceptions. For instance, he highlighted seven principles 
that should be followed by MB members in their everyday life: 1) to believe in God and 
His Prophet Muhammad; 2) to abandon bad ethics and perform daily prayers; 3) to work 
hard and become a good citizen; 4) to be a responsible Muslim and apply Islam in 
personal and public life; 5) to work hard to revive Islamic glory and advocate Islam 
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wherever one is; 6) to believe that all Muslims are one nation bound by the Islamic faith; 
and 7) to understand that embracing Islam in everyday life is the only way to empower 
Muslims and to believe that the MB is founded to achieve such a goal (al-Banna 2002: 
16).71 
Tarbiyya is achieved through what is termed mhaden al-tarbiyya (educational 
incubators), which refers to the places and venues where members meet, communicate 
and interact within the MB. Indeed, mhaden al-tarbiyya is a common terminology 
among MB members and cadres. Sometime, it takes the shape of a social gathering that 
deliberately brings MB members together to strengthen their relationships. According to 
one MB cadres, mhaden (singular of mahdin) is the main tool for members to reach out 
and get to know each other. He states, the mhaden is the primary means for members to 
deepening their relationship and unify their vision on different issues” (Shehab 2007: 
12). It aims to create an intimate environment in which members from various 
educational, social, and cultural backgrounds can come together, communicate and 
exchange thoughts. 
In addition, mhaden provide venues for members for religious purification and 
spiritual revitalization. Hence the platform of mhaden includes religious rituals, such as 
reciting the Quran and Sunnah, and performing prayers as well as organizational 
activities. For instance, in an usra meeting each member should be prepared to give a 
short religious talk based on his research and understanding of the scripture. The 
meeting of usra takes place on a weekly basis; hence it fosters personal and 
organizational ties between members. As Ibrahim Saleh, a 24-year-old puts it, “usra 
meetings reinforce the brethren’s connection and creates intimate atmosphere within the 
movement.”72 
However, the most important role of mhaden lies in fostering the sense of 
commitment and solidarity among members. The regular meetings on mhaden help 
members to interact and communicate personally and ideologically. It provides a free 
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72 Interview with Ibrahim Saleh on 30 March 2012. 
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space for them to discuss, debate, and build their views about the movement and the 
external world. Mohamed Mustafa, a 42-year-old, stresses the vital role of mhaden in 
consolidating collective identity. He describes his relationship with the movement as 
fundamental to his life. He states, “I can’t feel myself except within the movement. The 
MB to me is my family, home, and nation.”73  
Moreover, for some members, the MB is more than a social movement. 
According to Mohamed al-Qassas, who was first exposed to the MB as a middle-school 
student and left the movement after the 25th of January Uprising, the relationship 
between the MB and members can be eternal. He states, ”The Muslim Brotherhood is 
more of an educational incubator for a Brother. You get introduced to the group at an 
early age and ultimately your formative years become tied to it.”74 
The main tools and mechanisms of tarbiyya in the MB are helpful in reshaping 
individuals’ identity. They are divided into seven: 1) usra (family); 2) katiba (battalion); 
3) journey (rihla); 4) camp (mu‘askar); 5) workshop (dawra); 6) seminar (nadwa); and 
7) conference (mu’tamar). These are discussed in the following section. 
 
5.5.1.1.1 Usra (family) 
Usra is the basic unit in the MB organizational structure. It consists of five or six 
members who meet once a week for religious, personal, and organizational purposes. 
The leader of usra is called naqib (captain) and is responsible for monitoring the 
religious and ideological adherence of members. Each member in the MB has his own 
usra including high leaders. Usually, the meeting takes place in the naqib’s house and if 
not then in another member’s house. Tarbiyya within usra is based on three main 
tasks—acquaintance (ta‘arruf); understanding (tafahum); and solidarity (takaful)— 
which each usra aims to imbue in a member’s identity. 
Furthermore, usra plays an important role in linking new members with the 
movement. It aims to accommodate them within the movement’s structure and to 
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accustom them with its ideology and standards. It also gives novices an opportunity to 
explore the MB from within and to build new relationship with leaders and cadres. 
Hence, the main tasks of the usra are twofold: to spur the religious and ideological 
commitment of members; and to facilitate the organizational communications and 
activities of the movement. According to Abdurrahman, usra is “the main incubator of 
tarbiyya as it binds members together through education and guiding” (Abdurrahman, 
2006, p.117). 
 
5.5.1.1.2 Katiba (battalion)75 
The katiba is a flock of seven to eight usra who gather once monthly to spend a 
number of days together (usually three or four days). It aims to strengthen the religious 
and ideological commitment to the MB through an intensive programme of education. 
According to Abdelhalim, katiba is the most important incubator of tarbiyya because it 
relies on direct communication between the educator and the educated (Abdelhalim, 
1979, p.150). He points out that al-Banna was keen to educate and direct MB members 
through the use of kata’ib (the plural of katiba) meetings. Hence al-Banna founded a 
section within the MB structure, the Battalions Unit (Nizam al-Kkata’ib), to supervise 
the activities of battalions. 
The katiba has two main goals: the first is to reinforce the spiritual and religious 
preparation of members; and the second is to imbue the norms of obedience and 
confidence in members. It consists of a strict programme of physical and mental training 
over a number of days. According to Abdelhalim (1979), kata’ib are designed mainly to 
increase the spiritual preparation of members and to raise their capabilities (Abdelhalim 
1979). This can be through night prayers, rituals, or reciting Quran. He states, “kata’ib 
help members to have a high degree of spiritual purification and keep their hearts 
connected to God” (Abdelhalim, 1979, p.152).  
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Additionally, katiba aims to prepare members physically and mentally. This 
happens through a tough programme of activities, such as running and exercise. 
According to Ibrahim Saleh, kata’ib help members to learn patience, tolerance, and self-
control.76 In addition, they give an opportunity to the MB leaders and cadres to evaluate 
and gauge an individual’s adherence and commitment to the rules and standards of the 
movement. During the full course of the katiba each member has to fulfil a certain set of 
duties and activities, such as memorizing some Quranic chapters, or abstain from food 
and sleep for many hours.  
Each katiba has a leader (amir) and assistant and members should comply with 
the rules and duties set by the leader. The amir is supposed to be the oldest and the most 
religiously knowledgeable of the members. The duties of members towards the amir are 
to: listen and show obedience, respect and love, help, be polite when talking and acting 
(Mahmoud 1997).  
 
5.5.1.1.3 Rihla (journey) 
Rihla refers to a collective journey for a number of MB members who march 
together in the countryside or desert area. It is supposed to be for active members but 
sometimes can include new members in order to explore their perceptions and 
commitment to the movement. It also include families; however, it should avoid mixing 
men and women (Shemakh, 2011). According to Shehab, the platform of rihla can 
include exercise, training, and patience to learn to face up to hunger and thirst (Shehab, 
2007). Hence, rihla seeks to foster a sense of solidarity and brotherhood among 
members. Rihla takes place once a month and usually lasts from dawn until sunset.  
The main objective of the rihla is to instil a certain set of values in a member’s 
personality and mind-set; for example, commitment and obligation, secrecy, passion and 
collective action. Like katiba, each rihla has a leader (amir) and aides; again the amir 
should be the oldest member in the group and he is responsible for supervising and 
directing members who should listen and obey him (Mahmoud, 1997).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Interview with Ibrahim Saleh on 30 March 2012. 
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5.5.1.1.4 Mu‘askar (the camp) 
The camp (mu’askar) is a continuation of the Rover Scouts (Jawwala) system 
that was founded by al-Banna in the 1930s. The main purpose of the camp is to 
strengthen the physical and mental capabilities of MB members though exercise and 
training. It seeks to supplement the spiritual and intellectual activities of the movement 
(Lia, 1998)77. 
According to Mahmoud, camps or mu‘skarat (the plural of mu‘skar) has three 
chief objectives: aggregation (tajmi‘); education (tarbiyya); and exercise (tadrib) 
(Mahmoud, 1997, p.282). As for the first objective, tajmi‘, camp is a place where 
members can gather to be involved in religious and physical activities. Those who 
gather are usually members but can include non-members who might join to become 
more acquainted with the MB. The number involved is upwards of two hundred and the 
camp lasts between two and three weeks. 
However, to ensure effectiveness and differentiation within the MB, aggregation 
is based on four levels. The first level is for the public which includes all Muslims “who 
are eager to serve Islam and help other fellow Muslims” (Mahmoud, 1997, p.282). The 
second level is for ordinary members and includes active members who belong to a 
particular district and come together to strengthen their relationship and to work for 
Islam. The third level is designed for senior members of the MB or leaders who gather 
to discuss different organizational duties and responsibilities. The final level is for 
members and leaders who come from different MB branches around the world. They 
gather to coordinate and discuss MB affairs in their countries and to develop policies on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 According to Lia, al-Banna established Rover Scout units by mid-1930s and they officially registered in 
the Egyptian National Scout Movement in 1938-1939. The functions of Rover Scouts were threefold: to 
recruit new members through sporting activities; to maintain order and security in large meetings and 
conferences; and to prepare MB members to resist British imperialism and Zionism (Lia, 1998, pp.170-
172). However, Lia points out that Rover Scouts were rarely involved in militant activities. He states, 
‘The Rover Scout served as a reservoir of trained youth who could easily rallied to social welfare and 
services and public health projects which became a preoccupation of the Society [MB] during the war 
[WW II]” (Lia, 1998, p.172). According to Abdelhalim, by the end of 1930s, the MB had many scout 
teams when it became mandatory for all members to join Rover Scout branches including al-Banna 
himself who lead Rover Scouts in national ceremonies and celebrations (Mahmoud, 1997, p.280). 
Moreover, the MB bylaw of 1944 outlined the organization, membership, and structure of Rovers Scouts. 
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how to deal with problems and counterbalance other ideological and antagonistic 
currents (Mahmoud, 1997, pp.282-284).   
The second goal of the camps is education (tarbiyya). According to Mahmoud, 
camps provide a pure Islamic life of worship, exercise and brotherhood (Mahmoud, 
1997). Clearly, camps are structured so as to underpin a sense of commitment and 
solidarity among members. Salah Abdelhalim emphasized the vital role of camps as a 
tool for self-education. He states, ”in camps members learn three rules: to have self-
restraint; to become accustomed to life’s hardships; and to obey and be committed to 
leadership.”78 Furthermore, during the camp, members are exposed to an intensive 
tarbiyya programme. This happens through different readings and discussions. 
Mahmoud highlights many issues that should be discussed during camps, including 
collective action, commitment and loyalty (Mahmoud, 1997). 
The third objective of camps is exercise (tadrib). For the MB, this aspect of 
mu‘skarat is crucial. Not only because of the physical and mental training to which 
individuals are exposed but also because it imbues many of the MB’s chief norms and 
standards, such as secrecy, commitment and obedience, within their identity. In other 
words, these camps aim to embed the MB sub-culture in a member’s identity. As Sherif 
Ayman puts it, “camps transform your entire life and reformulate your personality.”79 In 
camps, each member has to behave and act in a responsible manner and comply with the 
MB rules and standards.  
In addition, camps help the MB to build the physical and athletic capacity of its 
members. According to Mahmoud, during camps members get solidarity, athletic, 
sporting and security training. He also stresses that camps have rules and conditions to 
which members should be abide (Mahmoud, 1997).   
Each mu‘skar has a leader (amir) and assistants. The amir should have 
leadership skills and a wide religious knowledge in order to set an example for other 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Interview with Salah Abdelhalim on 28 December 2010. 
79 Interview with Sherif Ayman on 12 January 2012. 
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members. He is responsible for supervising the camp and ensuring that members follow 
the rules of the MB. 
 
5.5.1.1.5 Dawra (workshop) 
The dawra is a study group for MB members who gather for a day or two to 
acquire more in-depth knowledge and understanding on specific issues. This study 
group is organized periodically and a selected number of individuals and leaders join. 
According to Mahmoud, the main goal of the dawra is to create leaders and well-
informed cadres who can be subject to more duties and responsibilities. The topics that 
are covered during the session can be political, social, or economic. Those who can take 
part in sessions can be students, workers, peasants, or professionals (Mahmoud, 1997, 
pp.306-310). 
In addition, these sessions cover a variety of activities, such as management, 
sports, and preaching (da‘wa). The programme of each session is articulated by MB 
leaders who direct and lead members during the session. Salah Abdelhalim highlighted 
that he went on an intensive course in preaching and recruiting new members.80   
 
5.5.1.1.6 Nadwa (seminar) 
The nadwa is a weekly symposium in which members can meet with experts to 
discuss different topics or to resolve a problem. It is not exclusive to MB members. 
Topics, such as politics, religion, women, and the veil, can be discussed at the nadwa. 
According to Mahmoud, nadwa aims to enhance the intellectual and cultural skills of 
Muslims. It has a leader or manager who organizes the seminar, selects its topic, and 
invites the speakers. He also should have a strong religious background with oratory 
skills. The nadwa manager can have assistants to help in organizational and logistics 
matters.  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Interview with Salah Abdelhalim on 28 December 2010. 
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5.5.1.1.7 Mu’tamar (conference) 
The mu’tamar is a meeting for large numbers (exceeding hundreds) of MB 
members. It aims to gather members from different parts of the country in one place to 
discuss and debate topics and issue decisions. It also includes the general assembly of 
the MB. The educational role of the conference lies in enhancing solidarity and 
commitment among brothers. It provides members with an opportunity to get to know 
each other and to exchange thoughts and views on specific topics.  
There are different types of conferences. They can be regional which are 
assigned for a set of MB districts or national covering all MB members. They also can 
be held to discuss private matters, including organizational changes and bylaws or to 
raise public issues, such as Palestine, development and Muslim affairs.  
Since its foundation, the MB held many general conferences. However, since the 
1950s the movement has been prohibited from convening any public conferences. It was 
not until after the Egyptian revolution of 2011 that the MB restarted holding public 
conferences. 
 
5.5.2 Consolidating Identity through Membership 
This section contends that there is a causal relationship between the membership 
system and the identity consolidation of the member. The more members are exposed to 
the different levels of membership, the more their identity is strengthened and 
consolidated. The MB has a disciplined and rigorous multi-tiered system of membership 
that reformulates an individual’s identity. It also defines the level, type, and rank of each 
individual in the movement. Furthermore, it acts as a laboratory that constructs and 
articulates identity.  
One of the chief distinctions between the MB and the other social movements 
lies in its membership system. While membership in other social movements does not 
require any prerequisites to become a fully-fledged member, except through 
participating in a movement’s activities, it is essential for those who want to join the MB 
to meet a specific set of conditions and standards. 
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Furthermore, the multi-tiered system of membership helps the MB in a number 
ways. First, it enables new members to become accustomed to the rules and norms of 
the MB. Since the MB is a cross-cutting movement that encompasses individuals from 
different social and economic backgrounds, it is essential to accommodate them within 
its structure. Second, a gradually deepening membership reinforces an individual’s 
commitment to the movement’s ideology and objectives, as climbing from one level of 
membership to another is based on the degree of commitment and loyalty shown. 
Therefore, it is a merit-based system. The more you adhere to the movement, the higher 
you will be promoted. Third, the membership system safeguards the MB from regime 
penetration. Since the MB operates in an oppressive and hostile environment, it is 
fundamental to ensure the security of its leadership and members. The multi-tiered 
system prevents attempts by the security forces from penetrating the MB’s structure. 
Hence the commitment and loyalty of members are regularly monitored. 
More importantly, the membership system works as a barometer for promotion. 
Thus, if a member wants promotion s/he has to attain specific standards and duties. The 
more they comply with these standards and duties, the higher they can be promoted. 
Moreover, the membership system gives MB leaders greater control over members. As 
promotion and member evaluation rests in hands of movement’s leaders and cadres, 
these are able to maintain control over members. 
Overall, the result of the MB’s membership system is to intensify an individual’s 
identity. It reformulates their views, perceptions and aligns them with movement’s 
ideology and standards. 
 
5.5.3 Levels and Types of Membership in the MB 
Since its inception, al-Banna was keen to formulate a disciplined and well-
controlled system of membership in the MB. He also created explicit criteria for 
membership that should be followed by all members. For instance, the first internal 
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bylaw (al-la’iha al-dakhiliyya) of the MB 81  outlined four types or degrees of 
membership: assistant member (musa‘id) which was open to any Muslim who declared 
an intention to join the movement, signed a membership card, and accepted the payment 
of membership dues. He became an associate member (muntasib) if he proved to be able 
to master the principles of the movement, attended regular meetings, and committed 
himself to obedience. In addition, the associate member had to be older than fifteen, 
recommended by three members, and the membership ratified by the movement’s chief 
bureau. The third level of membership, the active member (‘amil), was achieved when, 
in addition to the previous duties, the individual became totally involved in the 
movement’s activities, received physical training, fulfilled his Islamic obligations, and 
memorized a certain number of the Quran’s chapters and the Prophetic Sayings 
(ahadith). Accordingly, he gave the oath of allegiance (bay‘a)82 to the movement and 
received a full membership which entailed different responsibilities, including attending 
all required meetings, paying the monthly subscription fees and executing specific 
missions. (Mitchell, 1969). The fourth and the highest degree of membership is 
mujahid.83 This level was not open to all active members but was confined only to those 
who met all their duties and were strictly selected by the Guidance Bureau (Maktab al-
Irshad al-Amm). However, members at this stage would have to follow a stricter 
programme of education (tarbiyya) and become ready to sacrifice their wealth and life 
for the sake of the movement (al-Banna n.d). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 The first version of the General Law of the MB (al-Qanun al-Assasi) was issued in 1930. However, its 
Internal Bylaws (al-la’iha al-dakhliyya) have been amended in 1932, 1935, 1944, 1945, 1948, 1951, 
1982, 1994 and 2009. The amendments were a recognition of the need for the MB to adapt to the 
changing internal or external circumstances. In terms of membership categories, three main changes have 
occurred. At the outset, there were four degrees of membership, but in 1945 these were reduced to only 
two levels, tentative (taht al-ikhtibar) and active (‘amil) (Mitchell, 1969; Lia, 1998). However, since the 
return of the MB in the 1970s it has increased to five levels (muhib, muay’id, muntasib, muntazim, and 
‘amil). For security reasons, these membership levels have been removed from the MB’s bylaws. 
Ironically, these rules remain in place following the political recognition of the MB in the wake of the 25th 
of January Revolution. 
82 Bay‘a is an Islamic terminology that derives from the Qur’an and was practiced by the Prophet 
Muhammad. It refers to an oath given by a subordinate to his leader as token of allegiance. For more, see 
Landau-Tasseron (2010). 
83 This degree was added to the MB’s bylaw in 1935 and it sown the seeds of the Special Apparatus (al-
Tanzim al-Khas), the military arm of the MB which became operationally active since the beginning of 
the 1940s. 
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However, after the violent clashes between the MB and the Egyptian government 
at the end of the 1940s which culminated with the assassination of Hasan al-Banna on 
12 February 1949 and the dissolution of the MB, the movement changed its membership 
system to become broader and more ambiguous. Instead of being based on the four 
degrees, the levels were reduced to only two: tentative (taht al-ikhtibar); and active 
(‘amil). The former refers to those who had only recently joined the MB and embraced 
its ideas. They were monitored for a minimum of six months until they fulfilled their 
membership’s duties. The individual then gave allegiance (bay‘a) to the General Office 
which ratified the membership. However, he did not have the right to vote in the 
Society’s elections. ‘Amil refers to those who abided by the movement’s regulations, 
fulfilled all the requisite membership’s duties and responsibilities and gave bay‘a to the 
General Guidance (Mitchell 1969).84 Moreover, a Brother who did not meet his duties or 
abide by the regulations of the Society was subject to disciplinary action by the branch 
head, which could be a warning, fine, suspension, or even expulsion from the movement 
(Mitchell, 1969, pp.183-184). 
 
5.5.4 Intensifying Identity in Everyday Life 
The consolidation of the MB identity in everyday life happens through two 
mechanisms: increasing scrutiny of members and using membership as a promotion 
incentive. To spur the identification process, the MB re-structured its membership 
system to be based on five different levels. Despite the similarities between previous 
membership systems and the present one, membership and promotion procedures have 
become stricter.  
In addition, as mentioned, tarbiyya and membership are closely interlinked. 
Tarbiyya is the main vehicle of membership promotion. This tarbiyya process takes 
places in different venues, e.g. family, mosque, school, etc. The intensity of members’ 
identity depends upon the requirements and duties of their membership level. Moreover, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 According to the Article 7 of the 1951 Bylaw, the conditions for MB’s membership were: 1) the 
candidate should be eighteen years of age, 2) honourable and upright, 3) able to comprehend the ideas of 
the MB, 4) willing to pay the dues, and 5) willing to give oath to the MB (Mitchell, 1969, p.183). 
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each level has its own tarbiyya programme. The more members comply with the MB’s 
rules and norms, the greater the chance they can be promoted. The result of this is an 
intensification of members’ identity and an increasing commitment to the MB’s 
ideology.  
The current membership system can be divided into five levels: 1) muhib 
(sympathetic or lover); 2) mu’ayyid (supporter); 3) muntasib (associated); 4) muntazim 
(regular or registered); and 5) ‘amil (active or operating brother). These levels reflect 
how the MB intensifies and consolidates a member’s identity. Hence each member has 
to meet a set of duties and responsibilities to move from one level to another.  
 
Fig. 11 the multi-tiered system of membership in the MB 
 
5.5.4.1 Muhib (sympathetic or lover) 
Muhib is the first level in the MB’s membership system. In that level, members 
are exposed to the MB’s world. According to Eslam Ramadan, new members start to 
become acquainted with other members and are gradually involved in the MB’s 
activities.85 The main goal of the level is to accustom new members to the MB’s rules 
and codes of values. At this level, the muhib joins the usra (family) in the weekly 
meetings. The main goal of usra at this stage is to gradually internalize the MB’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Interview with Eslam Ramadan on 11 January 2012. 
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ideology and norms into the new member’s mind-set86. According to Ramadan, the 
muhib level is the primary phase that enables new members to get to know existing 
members.87  
In addition, members at this level are not required to be involved heavily in 
organizational activities. According to Abdurrahman Ayyash, the main objective of the 
MB at the muhib level is to alter an individual’s morals and behaviours.88 Also, 
Ramadan highlights that the MB does not set hard conditions for members to fulfil at 
this level. He states, “the MB facilitates membership at this level and new members are 
not required to fulfil any organizational responsibilities.”89 
This stage can last for between six months and one year and members are closely 
monitored by the leader of the usra the naqib.  The tarbiyya programme at this level is 
simple and encouraging. Each muhib should study some Islamic textbooks and readings 
as a part of his education process. According to Abdurrahman Ayyash, books at this 
level are designed to meet the requirements of beginners.90  
 
5.5.4.2 Mu’ayyid (supporter) 
Mu’ayyid is the second stage of membership in the MB, during which members 
become more committed to the MB’s norms and standards. Those who have spent 
between six months and one year at the previous level are eligible to become supporters 
(mu’ayyidun) if they have successfully fulfilled their duties and commitments. Despite 
the higher level, members remain unofficially registered in the MB. Hence, they do not 
have voting rights or to hold any organizational position. According to Abdurrahman 
Mansour, mu’ayyid can not join a shu‘ba (division) or attend its meetings.91  
The tarbiyya process at the mu’ayyid stage is more intense than at the previous 
level. Members spent at least one year at this stage and they are required to fulfil many 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 The usra and the organizational structure of the MB will be explained in-depth in chapter six.  
87 Interview with Eslam Ramadan on 11 January 2012. 
88 Interview with Abdurrahman Ayyash on 11 January 2012. 
89 Interview with Eslam Ramadan on 11 January 2012. 
90 Interview with Abdurrahman Ayyash on 12 January 2012. 
91 Interview with Abdurrahman Mansour on 26 March 2012. 
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duties, such as memorizing chapters of the Quran, reading some of the MB’s literature, 
and being involved in local activities. According to the interviewees, the main book at 
this stage is Fi Rihab al-Islam (In the Spaces of Islam), which is written by one of the 
MB leaders, Ali Labn. 
At this stage, members are closely monitored by their leaders who evaluate and 
gauge their commitment and devotion to the MB. At the end of the stage, leaders have to 
write a report about the mu’ayyid and send it to the District Office which convenes a 
committee to evaluate the mu’ayyidun (plural of mu’ayyid) members. After evaluation, 
the committee sends its report to the Governorate Administrative Office, which confirms 
whether or not the members should be promoted to the next level. 
  
5.5.4.3 Muntasib (affiliated) 
At this level, members become officially registered with the MB, but it is not a 
full membership. According to Eslam Ramadan, this level is on the threshold of real 
membership in the MB. He states, “at muntasib level members become real Brothers.”92 
At this stage, members spend at least two years before moving to the next level. 
Abdurrahman Ayyash highlights that some members can stay at this level for the rest of 
their time in the MB93. Hence, if wishing to be promoted, members have to fulfil their 
duties and make greater efforts to comply with the MB’s norms and standards. 
The programme of tarbiyya at the muntasib level is rigid. Members have to 
strengthen their commitment and adherence not only to the movement’s ideology but 
also to its leadership. Sherif Ayman emphasizes the importance of loyalty and allegiance 
of the muntasib to his leader. He states, ”this level verifies members’ devotion to leaders 
and the movement.”94 Moreover, members at this level are required to increase their 
religious knowledge in order that they can lead religious sermons and talks. They are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Interview with Eslam Ramadan on 11 January 2012.  
93 Interview with Abdurrahman Ayyash 12 January 2012. 
94 Interview with Sherif Ayman on 26 March 2012. 
	  
	  
	  
	  
176	  
also asked to undertake organizational responsibilities and duties. According to Ayyash, 
muntasib can attend shu‘ba (division) meetings95.  
The promotion from muntasib goes through same process as that from mu’ayyid. 
A committee of five members evaluates the member’s performance, commitment, and 
adherence to the MB and its leadership and sends a report to the Governorate 
Administrative Office which decides whether or not the member should be promoted. 
However, it is worth mentioning that many MB members are not aware of which stage 
they are in until they are told by their leaders. According to Ammar El-Beltagi, leaders 
tend to obscure a member’s rank within the movement until they verify and ensure their 
commitment and loyalty to the movement.96 
 
5.5.4.4 Muntazim (associated)  
If the muntasib evaluation report was positive the member can be promoted to 
become a muntazim. This is the penultimate stage before an individual obtains full 
membership in the MB. Hence the duties and responsibilities of members at this level 
are more rigorous. For instance, members are becoming subject to closer monitoring of 
their behaviour, ethics, and organizational performance. They have to follow the code of 
values and norms in their relationship with leaders. They should also show a high degree 
of obedience and loyalty to the movement’s ideology and leadership. 
The time span of this stage is at least five years. However, some members can 
stay at this level for their entire life within the MB. Abdurrahman Mansour accentuates 
that some MB’s members might get stuck at muntazim for years.97 For many reasons, 
including an obsession with security and the evaluation of devotion, members can not 
leave this stage without undergoing an intensive process of tarbiyya. 
The tarbiyya programme for this level contains religious and organizational 
duties. For example, muntazim should memorize large sections of scriptures such as the 
Qur’an and the Prophet sayings. He also should be able to give a khutba (religious 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 Interview with Abdurrahman Ayyash 12 January 2012. 
96 Interview with Ammar El-Beltagi on 28 March 2012. 
97 Interview with Abdurrahman Mansour on 26 March 2012. 
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sermon) and guide people in prayers. The curriculum at this stage includes the book by 
Mahmud Abu Ra’ia, Anwar al-Islam (Lights of Islam), some of al-Banna’s epistles, and 
some of Sayyid Qutb’s writings. 
In relation to the organizational duties, all muntazimin (plural of muntazim) are 
eligible to join a division. They also can be elected to the executive board but not as 
head or the deputy of shu‘ba. Members also are asked to donate and contribute to 
movement’s local activities. However, these are not dues but are voluntary payments. 
Moreover, muntazim can join any of the committees in usra and shu‘ba, such as the 
political, media or da‘wa. 
After a period of time, depending on the leaders’ subjective evaluation, 
muntazimin attend a workshop that prepares them for promotion to the final stage. It is a 
promotion workshop in which each candidate has to fulfil certain duties and pass 
religious and psychological tests to gauge his capabilities. If he succeeds, he is promoted 
and becomes an active member (‘amil) or a real Brother. 
 
5.5.4.5 Active (‘amil) 
‘Amil is the final stage in the membership hierarchy in the MB. Members reach 
this point after fulfilling numerous and disciplined duties and responsibilities. According 
to Eslam Ramadan, active membership means that members are entitled to attain 
positions and responsibilities in the MB. He states, ”all active members are equals in 
rights and duties.” 98  
Because of the significance of their role in the MB, al-Banna wrote an exclusive 
epistle for active members, Risalat al-Ta‘alim which outlines their duties. It also 
identifies the importance of allegiance (bay‘a). The epistle stipulates that all active 
members should give the oath to the MB’s leadership. The oath should be based on ten 
principles: understanding (fahm); sincerity (ikhlas); action (‘amal); jihad; sacrifice 
(tadhiyya); obedience (ta‘ah); perseverance (thabat); devotion (tajarud); brotherhood 
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(akhwa); and trust (thiqa) (al-Banna 2002).99 This code of values should be internalized 
in an active member’s identity and reflected in their manners and actions. Hence they 
are subject to monitoring and evaluation to gauge their commitment to the movement. In 
other words, active members should fully adopt the MB’s ideology and act as devoted 
Brothers in everyday life. They also have to pay all dues and subscription fees based on 
a proportion of their income.  
The tarbiyya programme of active members is extensive and rigid. Members at 
this stage are fully exposed to al-Banna’s literature. They are also required to widen 
their religious knowledge by reading on the history of Islam and about other issues 
related to fellow Muslims around the world. In addition, active members are asked to 
intensify their religious commitment through worship, night prayers, fasting, etc. They 
also should have a daily recitation of and memorize the Qu’ran and the sayings of the 
Prophet. According to Risalat al-Ta‘alim, ‘ members should carry out more intensive 
obligations, such as having a strong and healthy body, having a good character, raising 
their intellectual capacity, and working hard to earn their living (al-Banna, 2002, p.212)  
The multi-tiered membership system reflects two key features of the MB: the 
MB’s vigilant and cautious character; and the intensity of its members’ identity. 
Operating in a repressive environment, the best method by which to maintain coherence 
and solidarity in the MB is through the close control of the membership system. Thus, 
for decades the Egyptian security apparatus has failed to infiltrate the MB as it did with 
other political forces. In addition, the membership system enables the MB to reinforce 
and consolidate a member’s identity. Members who seek promotion have to exhibit a 
high degree of commitment to the MB’s ideology and leadership. This is how the MB 
maintains its internal coherence and has preserved its existence over the decades. 
 
5.6. CONCLUSION  
This chapter explores the process of identity formation within the MB. It reveals 
the underlying processes of identity construction within the movement. It examines the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 A more detailed explanation to these principles will be given in the next chapter. 
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selection, recruitment, and mobilization methods that the MB employs to expand its 
social network and organizational structure. It argues that an MB member’s identity is 
the outcome of two interlinked processes: membership and education. The MB adopts a 
complex yet meaningful pattern of membership that reshapes an individual’s perceptions 
and views. It also has an intensive process of education that consolidates and reinforces 
an individual’s identity. 
The chapter draws upon the scholarly work on social movements. However, it 
extends this work to examine how massive movements can recruit and mobilize 
members. It has been shown that the MB uses different mechanisms to attract and 
recruit members. One of these mechanisms is what this study dubs the ‘ripple effect’. It 
refers to the tendency of the MB to expand its social and political constituency 
throughout the social strata. The MB capitalizes significantly in social networks to 
recruit new members and enlarge its audience. Moreover, the MB creates its own social 
network or community that encompasses families, friends, and kinship.  
In addition, this chapter contends that there is a visible link between membership 
patterns and identity consolidation within social movements. The MB has a disciplined 
and well-controlled system of membership that seeks to reshape members’ identity. This 
system is based on multi-tiered categories of membership. The more members follow 
this system, the stronger their identity can be consolidated. 
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Chapter Six 
ORGANIZATION, STRUCTURE AND HIERARCHY: 
THE IMPACT OF IKHWANISM ON THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD’S 
IDENTITY 
 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter explores the impact of the organization and hierarchy of the Muslim 
Brotherhood (MB) on its identity formation process. It examines how structure, 
organization, and internal dynamics affect the process of identity configuration. The aim 
of this chapter is to probe the interplay between structure and norms, members and 
leadership, and organization and identity. 
The primary argument in this chapter is that organization of a social movement 
has a significant impact on the construction of its identity. Organizational norms and 
values, patterns of leadership, hierarchy, and social interactions affect individuals’ 
identity and reshape their perceptions and behaviours. The interplay between these 
elements creates a sub-culture that dominates and guides individuals in everyday life. 
This sub-culture, more precisely the code of norms and values, plays a crucial role in 
shaping individuals’ perceptions, worldview and more importantly identity. It defines 
power relations, organizational roles, membership and affiliation rules, and the structure 
of incentives that foster collective action. The MB, as a socio-religious movement, 
constructs its own sub-culture, which this study calls ‘ikhwanism’. It refers to the 
cognitive code of norms, values, attitudes, standards, and regulations that encompasses 
and guides the MB members in everyday life. Put differently, ikhwanism embodies the 
code of identity that signifies the uniqueness and distinctiveness of the MB as a social 
movement and maintains its organization and structure over time. 
In addition, it is argued that the MB organization plays a vital role in preserving 
the movement’s survival and nurturing its activism. Operating in a semi-authoritarian 
environment that entails systematic repression and exclusion, the MB has developed a 
certain pattern of hierarchy, structure and tactics that can work within such an 
	  
	  
	  
	  
181	  
environment. The semi-clandestine character of the MB is a direct outcome of this 
environment which has imposed upon the MB an austerely strict and disciplined 
organization. For instance, to protect its members from security repression and 
surveillance, the MB follows a firm system of membership and promotion which counts 
not only on individuals’ competency or skills but also more importantly on their 
commitment and loyalty to the movement’s ideology and its leadership. This vigilant 
system protected the MB from regime penetration and preserved its internal unity for 
decades.  
Further, the argument contends that the internal structure of the MB and the 
pattern of organizational norms create a certain type of identity that tends to be obedient 
and submissive. The norms of allegiance, obedience, commitment, and loyalty that are 
prevalent within the MB organization affect individuals’ identities. Abiding by these 
norms in everyday life can result in creating a subservient identity that succumbs to and 
follows the leadership. The MB organization does not encourage protest or discontent 
against leadership and members do not have the power to criticize or challenge their 
leaders. Thus, the MB tends to employ organizational norms and tenets to solidify its 
internal coherence and maintain its control over individuals. The MB adopts two main 
mechanisms in order to contain internal criticism. First is marginalizing the dissents and 
exclude them from high positions or taking decisions within the movement structure. 
Second is to push them to become more self-isolated. These two mechanisms were 
significantly effective in enabling the MB to avoid critical schism or fissures under 
Mubarak. Moreover, the MB ideologues and leaders tend to demonize and discredit the 
internal opposition among rank-and-file. Moahmed Hamza states that “the movement 
tends to exclude reformist figures by discredit not only their ideas but also their religious 
commitment”.100 
This chapter proposes a crucial link between the MB’s organization and its 
identity. It accounts for the impact of internal dynamics, structure, and norms on 
individuals’ identities. As a highly ideologically-committed movement, the MB tends to 
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follow a tightly knit structure in order to pursue its objectives. Moreover, the internal 
dynamics of the MB, e.g. social interactions, communication system, promotion 
procedures, file and rank order, etc., reflect a strong and disciplined order of 
organization. However, before this is discussed, it is worth mentioning that this chapter 
does not aim to trace the hierarchal structure of the MB, i.e. organizational levels, 
division of labour, leadership order and command, etc. since this is covered by other 
studies.101 Instead, it will unpack the underlying norms, rules, culture that govern this 
structure and lead to certain actions and behaviour. 
 
6.2. ORGANIZATION, STRUCTURE AND IDENTITY 
The bourgeoning literature on social movements enhances the understanding of 
the relationship between ideology and movements’ organizations and structures (Zald & 
McCarthy, 1979; Zald & McCarthy, 1987, p.711; McAdam, McCarthy, et al. 1996; 
Della Porta and Diani, 2006). However, the literature does not reveal much about the 
impact of the organizational structure and dynamics on identity pattern and formation. 
The seminal work of Della Porta and Diani (2006) accentuates the importance of 
organization in social movements. According to the authors organization helps 
movements to achieve a number of functions, e.g. encouraging participants, defining 
organizational aims, managing and coordinating contributions, collecting resources from 
the environment, etc. (Della Porta and Diani 2006, p.137). While Della Porta and Diani 
recognize the role of organization as a source of a movement’s identity, they confine 
this role to the extent of generating collective action and ignore identity construction. 
They point out: ”For people committed to a certain cause, organizations are an important 
source of continuity, not only in terms of identity, but also in terms of action” (Della 
Porta & Diani, 2006, p.138). However, in a highly ideological movement, such as the 
MB, organization plays a vital role in fostering identity and enhancing internal 
cohesiveness. 
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Another body of the scholarly work focuses on the role of organization in 
maintaining organization unity and accommodating internal rifts and factionalism (Zald 
& McCarthy, 1987; Gamson, 1992; Meyer, Whittier, et al. 2002; Reger, 2002). Zalad 
and McCarthy, for example, highlight the role of heterogeneity in creating splits and 
factions within social movements (Reger, 2002). They also attribute schism within the 
movement to the concern of ideological and doctrinal purity (Reger, 2002, p.134). 
Melucci also stresses the impact of organizational dynamics on movement coherence. 
He points out that the complexity of organization can generate tensions and conflicts 
among members (Melucci, 1996, p.320). He weighs the role of organizational norms 
and regulations in maintaining movement integration (Melucci, 1996, p.316).  
However, the work of Reger provides a valuable and lucid contribution to the 
impact of organizational dynamics on a movement’s identity. In her study about the 
American National Organization for Women (NOW), Reger highlights the crucial link 
between a movement’s structure and identity. She stresses the vital role of interactions 
between “the individual, the group, and the larger political and cultural environment’ in 
constructing collective identity” (2002, p.711). Reger points out that organization 
functioning as a ‘facilitating’ level that mediates between individuals, movement, and 
environment to produce and construct collective identity (2002, p.711). Moreover, she 
underscores the role of leadership in shaping the strategy, tactics, and goals of the 
movement and most importantly its identity. According to Reger, collective identity is 
affected by three organizational dynamics: the socio-political environment, diversity of 
membership, and leadership (2002, p.712). Nevertheless, despite its significance, 
Reger’s work is mainly concerned by the role of organization in maintaining a 
movement’s unity and integration. It disregards the impact of a movement’s norms, 
symbols, and regulations on identity manufacturing. In other words, while Reger’s study 
highlights the integral role of organization in consolidating the internal unity of the 
movement by resolving conflictual identities that might occur, it does not explain the 
underlying factors that shape those identities. It overlooks the impact of a movement’s 
culture and code of values on identity construction. 
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6.2.1. Which Organization Are We Talking About? A Typology of Organizations 
The type of organization is a matter of importance in analyzing social 
movements. It reflects not only the movement’s objectives and ideology but also its 
complexity, elasticity, and cohesiveness. Many studies stress the importance of an 
organization’s typology in identifying its strategies, tactics, and internal structure (Zald 
& McCarthy, 1987; Melucci, 1996; Della Porta & Diani, 2006). Zalad and McCarthy, 
for instance, highlight the relationship between the type of organization and its activism. 
They point out that Social Movement Organization (SMO) is a ”complex, or formal, 
organization which identifies its goals with the preference of social movement or 
countermovement and attempts to achieve those goals” (Zald & McCarthy, 1987, p.20). 
The organizational structure of social movements has different forms based on a 
variety of criteria. For instance, building on Scott’s classic typology of organizations 
(1981), Dell Porta and Diani highlight the heterogeneity of organizational forms within 
social movements.102 They refer to three types of organizations based on different 
factors. First, the professional movement organizations are characterized by clear 
leadership with a non-existent membership base. Second, mass protest organizations 
combine internal democracy with certain levels of formalization and organizational 
structure. The third are the grassroots organizations which combine strong participatory 
orientations with low levels of formal structuration (Della Porta & Diani, 2006, pp.145-
149). However, Melucci points out that ”instead of thinking in types of organizations, 
one should use the dimensions relevant to the classification as analytical tools to make 
distinctions, to ‘deconstruct’ empirical unities, and to account for their complexity” 
(1996, p.326). Thus, Melucci provides vital criteria that are useful in analysing 
organizations’ forms. For example, in terms of an organization’s objectives, Melucci 
refers to two types of goals: expressive and instrumental. The former refers to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 Scott (1981) proposed three basic types of organizational forms: rational, natural, and open system.  
The first sees organizations as collectivities oriented to achieving specific goals with a relatively 
formalized structure. The second maintains that organizations are collectivities whose 
members/participants are little influenced by formal structure or official goals but share interests in the 
survival of the system and are engaged in activities. The third approach conceives of organizations mainly 
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satisfaction of the social and psychological needs of members through participation and 
solidarity and the latter are achieved in the attainment of specific goods external to the 
organization. Also, organizational structure can be articulated based on the requirements 
of affiliations and membership as imposed by the organization which can be divided 
into inclusive and exclusive organizations. According to Melucci, the inclusive 
organizations do not apply rigid mechanisms for selecting members, and they expect a 
relatively low degree of commitment. However, the exclusive forms of affiliation 
exercise a rigid control over the process of affiliation and require intense ideological 
identification, a high level of commitment, and total discipline. However, the most 
important criteria of an organization’s forms are pertinent to the distribution of power 
within the movement or the level of internal democracy in the decision-making process. 
Melucci highlights two forms of organizations: authoritarian and participatory. The 
former reflects a high level of monopoly of power within the movement and the latter 
assumes more power and access for many members to the decision-making process 
(1996, pp.326-327). 
As a social movement, the MB has a complex organizational structure that 
exhibits many of Melucci’s analytical criteria. For instance, as mentioned in chapter four, 
the MB has two groups of objectives: expressive and instrumental. The former reflects 
the key objective as set by al-Banna “to lead the humanity towards the well-being under 
the banner of Islam” (al-Banna, 2002, p.168). The latter include: liberating Islamic 
countries from foreign occupation, resisting the materialistic and atheist wave that 
dominates Muslim societies, and reformulating the political, social, economic, 
educational, and judiciary systems to be based on Islamic principles (al-Banna, 2002, 
p.169). In terms of affiliation, as shown in chapter five, the MB has an exclusive system 
of membership and affiliation that requires a high degree of indoctrination and 
ideological education. The accessibility of individuals to the MB organization is limited 
and restricted by ideological and religious pre-requisites. As for internal democracy, the 
MB has a significantly centralized decision-making process that does not allow all 
members to participate in articulating the policies and decisions of the movement. 
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However, this can be partially explained by the authoritarian and oppressive 
environment in which the MB operates, meaning that leaders and members cannot meet 
and discuss issues freely. Nevertheless, as will become apparent, many members in the 
low levels of the MB hint at the tendency of leaders to employ authoritarian constraints 
in order to avoid internal criticism and disagreement.  
 
6.2.2. The internal system of the organization 
Identity within the MB is not a product of the religious or theological 
convictions of members. Rather, it is a socially constructed outcome of the movement’s 
organizational dynamics, symbolic production, and ideational framework set by its 
leaders. Accordingly, identity is contested in everyday life not only with the similar or 
rival identities but also more importantly within the movement itself. Each organization, 
as a social entity, encounters different views and conflictual interests of members, 
leaders, and stakeholders. 
Melucci’s seminal work on collective identity (1996) provides a persuasive 
analysis as to the impact of the organization’s internal systems on a movement’s 
activism. Melucci defines social movement as “an actor engaged in a conflict directly or 
indirectly affecting the distribution of power within a society” (1996, p.314). This 
definition illustrates the extent of complexity a movement seeks to build its organization. 
The more the movement is involved in social and political conflict, contests power and 
defies the existing regime and other dominant groups, the more solid and well-knit its 
organization should be. Melucci maintains “the organization of a movement must take 
shape in very specific conditions, both internal and external. It must maintain a high 
level of unity and integration within itself, at the same time facing the challenge of a 
hostile environment” (1996, p.315).  
In addition, the internal structure of a social movement is subject to various 
influences depending on its objectives, activities, size and ideology. Thus, the crucial 
question is not how a movement can craft its organizational structure but more 
importantly how it can ensure its vibrancy and efficiency. Melucci highlights three 
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important and interrelated components of a movement’s organizational system: the first 
is the internal system of allocating resources and production of symbols. The second is 
the formation of norms. The third is the recruitment and succession of leadership. As for 
the internal system, Melucci points out that an internal system should include a) a 
system of roles and the division of labour, b) mechanisms and criteria for the 
distribution of costs and benefits, and c) a structure of incentives. Thus, the key 
objective of that internal system is to pursue a movement’s goals, adapt to the 
environment, and maintain the unity and self-preservation of the movement (Melucci, 
1996, p.317). 
As for the internal system of allocating resources, Melucci points out that each 
organization should have a system that defines roles and division of labour, mechanisms 
and criteria for distributing the costs and benefits among members, and a structure of 
incentives Melucci, 1996, p.315). These elements have a significant impact on the 
organizational structure of the social movement. In order to realise its objectives, social 
movement has to have a clear order of leadership and a disciplined system of rewards 
and sanctions that can be used in generation collective action. More importantly, the 
internal system identifies the flexibility and rigidity of the organization. It determines 
the diffusion of power, the distribution of resources within the organization, and rewards 
and sanctions that motivate individuals to perform their organizational roles (Melucci, 
1996, p. 315).  
As to the formation of norms, Melucci defines norms as “the point at which 
operational needs (the allocation of resources) come together with the needs of 
integration and control (power)” (1996, p.317). Norms ensure the institutionalization of 
the movement in terms of the relationship between the leadership and its members, the 
flexibility or rigidity of movement’s regulations, and the distribution of power within 
the movement. However, the degree or level of institutionalization depends on the 
complexity of the movement and the importance of its organizational structure. 
Obviously, the elasticity and rigidity of these norms vary from one organization to 
another (Melucci, 1996, pp.317-318). The third important element in a movement’s 
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organizational structure is the recruitment and succession of leadership. This deals with 
the normative bases and mechanisms of selecting and promoting leaders within the 
organization and is vitally important in a secretive and highly ideological movement. 
Thus, the procedures and norms of leadership can affect the internal dynamics of the 
movement. 
The research will extend Melucci’s analysis of organizational structure in order 
to unpack the MB organization and understand its impact on the identity formation 
process. It will be argued that the MB’s organizational structure is deliberately tailored 
to create a certain pattern of identity. That is, the organizational norms and regulations 
of the MB lead to a sub-culture, code of norms and values that dominate and orient 
individuals in their everyday life. This sub-culture, which is termed ikhwanism, 
internalizes the movement’s objectives and ideology, governs its internal dynamics, and 
shapes members’ identities. Put differently, this chapter investigates the interplay 
between the MB’s organizational structure and its identity construction. 
However, two important points need to be mentioned. The first is that the MB is 
not a mere social movement but is also a religious society. It blends religious preaching 
with political and social activism which has a significant impact on the level of 
commitment and obedience within the movement. Thus, the religious and devotional 
character of the MB affects the construction of its organizational norms and regulations. 
The second is that the semi-clandestine character of the MB imposes a specific pattern 
of organization. Operating in a hostile and repressive environment, the MB has to adopt 
certain norms and standards to ensure members’ loyalty and commitment. 
 
6.3. THE ORGANIZATION OF THE MB 
The organizational structure of the MB is one of its enduring and potent features. 
Al-Banna was keen on erect a complex yet efficient and well-knit structure for the MB 
that dominated the movement and would be able to run its multiple activities for decades. 
The valuable work of Nathan Brown (2012) on the MB and its offshoots in the Arab 
world underscores this reality. Brown stresses that formality is ”the most notable future 
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of the Muslim Brotherhood model” (2012, p.66). Furthermore, he points out that 
movements that follow the MB model strive to have ”bylaws, clear criteria for various 
gradations of membership, regular arrangements, established procedures for selecting 
officers and determining policies and positions, collegial and consultative decision-
making organs, and specialized bodies with clear function tasks” (Brown, 2012, p.67). 
Since many leading studies have extensively discussed the organization and 
hierarchy of the MB (Mitchell, 1969; Lia, 1998)103, this chapter focuses primarily on the 
impact of the MB’s organizational structure on its identity formation. It probes the 
interplay between organizational structure and the identity construction process. Thus, 
the objective is to connect the ideational factors with the operational and organizational 
ones in order to grasp the identity formation process of the MB. In this regard, three key 
dimensions of the MB organizational structure are highlighted: 1) the impact of ideology 
on the movement’s organizational structure; 2) how organization and structure shape 
norms and regulations of the MB; and 3) the impact of institutionalization and the 
routinization process on members’ identities.  
 
6.3.1. Ideology and Organization: How They Interplay 
The role of ideology in modelling a movement’s organization and structure is 
evident. The form of the organization, whether tight/loose, centralized/decentralized, 
democratic/ authoritarian, reflects the movement’s ideology and worldview.104 Unlike 
scholars who undervalue the role of ideology in shaping social movements’ actions or 
decisions (Kalyvas 1996), this study argues that ideology does matter when it comes to 
the organizational structure and crafting a movement’s norms and standards that govern 
its members in everyday life. Furthermore, the interplay between the ideology and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 The standard work of Mitchell (1969) provides a detailed explanation of the MB hierarchy. The 
hierarchy of the MB that was set by al-Banna in 1930s still operates today with a few amendments. For 
instance, the categories and levels of membership have been slightly altered (see Chapter 5). In addition, 
the selection and promotion of the middle and low rank leaders has become a subject for greater scrutiny.	  
104 To avoid the conceptualization polemic of ideology, this study treats ideology as an operational 
concept or as Snow highlights as a “cover term for relatively stable and coherent set of values, beliefs, and 
goals associated with a movement or a broader, encompassing social entity, and is assumed to provide the 
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organizational structure of the MB is significant. Whereas the ideology determines the 
breadth and complexity of the organization, the latter internalizes the ideology and 
movement’s objectives within members’ identities. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the ideology of the MB is broad, comprehensive, and 
to some extent vague. However, its impact on a movement’s structure, organization, and 
internal dynamics and interactions is considerable. From the highest level of the MB, 
where the General Guide (al-murshid al-‘am) presides at the top of the organization, to 
the lowest level of ordinary members, all members are connected by an inclusive 
ideology and broad objectives. However, the real impact of ideology on the MB’s 
organizational structure stems from formulating the movement’s norms and code of 
values, e.g. allegiance, obedience, commitment, solidarity, loyalty etc. Ironically, al-
Banna established the MB organizational structure before he fully elaborated its 
ideology and mandate. He astutely blended the organizational structure (tanzim) with its 
ideology (al-fikra al-Islamiyya) in a strong but loose formula. 
Furthermore, the religious character of the MB has a significant impact on its 
organizational structure. For many of the MB’s ideologues and leaders, the 
organizational structure is not only an important tool with which to propagate the 
movement’s ideology and attain its objectives but is also a religious duty.105 Moreover, 
some of the MB’s leaders treat organizational structure as an essential vehicle with 
which to spread the message of Islam (Yakan, 1981; Hawwa, 2004). For example, Said 
Hawwa,106 an eminent Islamist ideologue, points out that Islamists should establish a 
strong organizational structure in order to realize da‘wa objectives. He states, “building 
an organization is a necessity in order to reach Islamic objectives and deepening Islam 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 This is a common feature among Islamist movements, even those that are not heavily politicized, e.g. 
Salafis and Sufis maintain a minimum organizational structure that run their social and ritual activities. 	  
106 Said Hawwa (1935-1989) was a prominent figure in the Syrian offshoot of the MB. He is regarded as 
one of the most influential theorists in the MB’s history. He joined the MB while he was in high school 
and became one of its eminent leaders during the 1970s and 1980s. He published more than 15 books 
which are used widely among many MB’s branches around the world. He is regarded among the MB’s 
members as a strategist and organizational theorist. However, Hawwa’s most important books are his 
three volume series Jund Allah (Soldiers of God). For more about Hawwa see his website: 
http://www.saedhawwa.com/	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
191	  
among people” (Hawwa, 2004, p.15). 107  Furthermore, Fathi Yakan 108 , another 
prominent Islamist leader and ideologue, highlights the need for Islamist movements to 
build a vigorous organizational structure. For him, it is in fact a religious duty (Yakan 
1981). He states, “Islamic manhaj should be based on an organizational system that can 
guide Muslims in everyday life” (Yakan, 1981, p.14). 
The relationship between the MB ideology and organizational structure is 
reciprocal. While ideology identifies the type of objectives (expressive/instrumental), 
worldview (rigid/plastic), and normative reference of the movement, organizational 
structure is the vehicle that can turn these abstract elements into reality. 
The impact of the MB ideology on its organizational structure is twofold: first, it 
helps the movement to expand its social network in order to disseminate its message and 
ideas; and second, it shapes programmes of the MB in everyday life. However, ideology 
does not result in an organisational structure that has a rigid and fixed character; rather, 
conversely, it gives the movement more flexibility and astuteness to manage its 
organization. Thus, in contrast to its broad and vague ideology, the MB has a disciplined 
and will-knit organisational structure. As a multifaceted movement, the MB cannot 
manage its multiple activities without a complex organizational structure. In order to 
spread its ideology, the MB has an extensive structure and wide-range network that 
encompasses the whole of society. Thus, the lowest levels to the highest executive board 
of leadership are strongly inter-connected. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 Hawa claims that Islamists need to articulate an ‘Islamic organizational theory’ that could save the 
Muslim umma from the ‘intellectual disarray’. According to Hawa, the Islamic organizational theory 
should be based on Islamic ethics, good manners, and clarity of objectives. Furthermore, Hawa stresses 
the necessity for Islamist movements to have by-laws, an hierarchal structure, and a specific system for 
membership (2004, pp. 51-52). 	  
108 Fathi Yakan (1933-2009) was one of the most influential ideologues of Islamist movements modelled 
on the MB. He was born in Tripoli, Lebanon and was one of the founders of the Islamic Action Front in 
Lebanon in the 1950s and the leader of the Islamic Community (al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya) movement. 
According to Elsasser, “Yakan is regarded as one of the most important contemporary protagonists of 
Muslim Brotherhood-style moderate Islamism in the Arab world, and the most influential Sunni Islamist 
leader in Lebanon” (2007, p.377). Furthermore, many Islamists regard Yakan as the mastermind of 
Islamic activism and pragmatism. His books focus primarily on Islamic activism, organization, and 
factionalism within Islamist movements. For a leading study on Yakan see Elssasser, 2007.	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The organizational structure of the MB can be divided into two principal axes: 
vertical and horizontal. The vertical axis is the hierarchical structure which starts from 
the family usra, the basic organizational unit of the MB, to the Guidance Bureau 
(maktab al-irshad). In between these two come branches (shu‘ba), districts (manatiq), 
and governorates offices (muhafazat). The chain of command and the flow of orders, 
decisions, and instructions from one level to another are governed by general by-laws 
and explicit procedures that are respected and followed by all members. As Brown aptly 
puts it, “the [MB] movements not only work hard to follow formal procedures; they take 
great pride in doing so” (2012, p.67). 
On the horizontal axis are committees (lijan), sections (aqsam), and units 
(wahdat).109 The communication and interaction on the horizontal axis are defined and 
articulated by internal by-laws and regulations. Importantly, they are set in a way that 
serves the chief objectives of the MB. Mohamed Mustafa, a middle-rank leader in the 
rural province of Sharqia, highlights that the organizational machinery of the MB is 
designed to realize its objectives. He stresses that all members including leaders and 
rank and file have to follow and abide by the regulations.110 
The MB tends to instrumentalize its ideology in order to achieve social change. 
Munson (2001) illustrates the significant impact of the MB’s organization on 
disseminating and spreading its ideology. He underscores the importance of the 
organizational structure of the MB in expanding its social network. According to 
Munson, the structure of the MB helps not only in allocating resources and expanding 
its social network but also in diffusing its ideology among different social strata. He 
points out that the federated structure of the MB facilitated its penetration to urban and 
suburban areas in Egypt during the 1930s and 1940s (Munson, 2001, p.498). He states, 
“This kind of [MB] ideological nimbleness was facilitated by its federated structure” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 Mitchell called this axis the ‘technical’ or operational level which is mainly responsible for executing 
and implementing the plans and programmes of the MB. Mitchell divided this level into two aspects; the 
administrative machinery of the movement which consists of different committees (lijan), e.g. financial, 
policy, legal, statistics, services, etc; and the sections (aqsam) which are concerned with ideology and 
indoctrination, e.g. propagation section (nashr al-da‘wa), family (usra), students, etc. (Mitchell, 1969, 
p.170).	  
110 Interview with Mohamed Mustafa on 1 April 2012.	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(Munson, 2001, p.498). Furthermore, the broadness of the MB ideology helps its 
organization to survive regime repression. According to Munson, the MB structure was 
key to maintaining the movement against the attempts by the state to eliminate its 
activities (2001, p.499). Therefore, one of the salient features of the MB lies in its 
mobilization efficiency. The MB has a significant capacity to mobilize thousands of 
members during elections and protests. The movement’s ideology galvanizes members 
and spurs their willingness to devote time and effort in order to realize the movement’s 
goals. 
In addition, ideology is a key source for the MB’s political programmes, 
statements, and actions.111 Brown (2012) underlines the significance of the MB’s 
worldview in shaping its programmes and ideological stance. Ironically, despite the 
distinctiveness of the MB’s ideology, it is fairly broad and vague, or in Brown’s words, 
characterised by “stickiness…and hardly codified” (2012, p.52). The MB leaders and 
strategists always claim to align their plans and decisions with the movement’s ideology. 
They employ the vagueness and stickiness of the MB ideology to articulate certain 
policies. Therefore, despite the broadness of the MB ideology, its plans and platforms 
are more clearly defined. As Brown precisely puts it, “movements based on the Muslim 
Brotherhood model have only vague ideology texts, and their leaders are generally 
highly practical people rather than ideologues or intellectuals” (2012, p.72). Moreover, 
while Brown acknowledges the vagueness and stickiness of the MB’s ideology, he 
underlines how this can work for the movement’s flexibility. He states, 
Islamist movements modelled on the Muslim Brotherhood are indeed highly 
ideological. And their ideologies do inform their actions. But their ideologies 
are also fairly general and allow considerable flexibility not on merely tactics 
but also on strategy and especially on the question of elections and even on 
democracy (Brown, 2012, p.73) 
 
Additionally, the broader and vaguer the ideology of a movement, the more its 
organizational structure can be elastic and adaptable. For instance, the broad and vague 
slogan of the MB, “Islam is the solution”, is a visible example of the MB’s ideological 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 This part draws heavily upon Brown’s findings on the MB.	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elasticity. When they are asked about the slogan, leaders of the MB give various and 
loose answers that are still meaningful. For Mahmoud Ghozlan, a senior member in the 
MB, the slogan reflects the MB comprehensive ideology. He states, “Islam is the 
solution is not a mere slogan but rather it is our firm belief that Islam should encompass 
all aspects of life” (Ghozlan, 2007, accessed on 25 July 2012). However, Essam al-Erian, 
Deputy of the MB’s Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), views that the slogan is reflected 
in the platform of the party. He states, “we adhere to the slogan of Islam because it 
reflects our party program” (al-Erian, 2011, accessed on 25 July 2012). The differences 
among MB leaders reflect how ideology is perceived and implemented in everyday life. 
On the one hand, it implies that the MB should have multiple activities in order to 
transfer this slogan into reality, but, on the other hand, it gives more room for the leaders 
to manipulate both members and the public. Therefore, the MB tends to employ this 
slogan on different political occasions, e.g. elections, protests, etc. in order to mobilize 
members and legitimize its cause in the face of political adversaries. 
Furthermore, ideology has a significant impact on the decision-making process 
within the MB. Leaders and cadres have to align their decisions with the movement’s 
objectives and ideological commitment. This legitimizes the leaders’ decisions and 
actions and grants the leaders significant symbolic and executive power. As al-Erian 
puts it, “our decisions are made for the sake of da‘wa, not the organization.”112 
Therefore, any opposition to leaders’ decision is perceived not only as violating the 
organization’s rules but also as disobeying the ideological mandate of the MB. Thus, 
those who challenge or disagree with the leadership are subject to rebuke and 
punishment and any violation of the movement’s regulations and rules can be met with 
different degrees of penalties. For instance, when Al-Wasat group disagreed with the 
MB’s leadership they were rebuked and expelled out of the movement in 1996. It was 
clear that the leadership would sacrifice those who don’t follow the MB rules and 
regulations. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 Interview on 24 December 2010.	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6.3.2. Ikhwanization through Structure: The Construction of MB Norms and 
Regulations 
Melucci defines norms as ”the point at which operational needs (the allocation of 
resources) come together with the needs of integration and control (power)” (1996, 
p.317). Moreover, norms and regulations articulate the relationship between leadership 
and members, identify membership rules and procedures, distribute power within the 
movement, and the structure of incentives. Melucci (1996) considers the role of an 
organization’s norms on shaping the internal dynamics of social movements. He 
highlights four roles that norms can play within the organization: 1) governing the 
relationship between the organization and members; 2) regulating the relationship 
between different components of the organization; 3) articulating the relationship 
between movement and society; and 4) specifying the objectives and means of collective 
action (Melucci, 1996, p.318). 
To ensure connectedness, integration, and competence of the organizational 
structure, social movements construct a set of norms and regulations that control 
structure and dominate members. These norms reflect the code of values and standards 
that members abide by in everyday life. Furthermore, the norms of the organizational 
structure solidify a movement’s coherence and unity. They generate a sense of loyalty 
and commitment among members towards the movement’s objectives, leadership, and 
ideology. 
When individuals join the MB, they are educated as to how to follow the rules 
and regulations of the organization. However, the enforcement of these rules is part of 
individuals’ duty towards the movement. Individuals freely match their behaviour and 
practices with the code of norms and standards of the MB. Nevertheless, one should 
stress that the MB’s norms and rules are not static or rigid but constitute a dynamic code 
of conduct that reflects social interactions within the organization.  
Furthermore, norms and regulations help the MB not only to run its activities but 
also to maintain an internal coherence and unity. Given the fact that the MB is 
composed of different members who belong to a variety of social and educational 
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backgrounds, organizational norms can guarantee the movement’s cohesiveness. 
Leaders and members alike have to follow and abide by rules and regulations of the MB. 
Internal divisions or disagreements are treated strictly. The hierarchal order of the MB 
adopts a top-down approach that does not allow much space for splits or cleavages in 
the structure. Those who have different views can express their disagreement, but softly. 
Apparently, the MB’s norms have played a significant role in preserving organizational 
coherence, despite the brutal and recurrent repression of different regimes. Moreover, 
the MB astutely employs these norms and values in order to control members and 
reinforce their commitment and loyalty to the movement. 
 
6.3.2.1. Ikhwanism as a sub-culture 
The MB has a strict set of norms, regulations, and rules that govern its members 
and leadership in everyday life. From its foundation, al-Banna was keen to create a 
distinctive culture that could preserve the MB and differentiate it from the plethora of 
other societies. In many of his tracts, al-Banna stressed the necessity of setting clear 
rules and regulations that could connect members with the movement. Over the past 
eight decades, and with the increasing politicization of the MB, its organizational 
structure has become one of its main features. The foundation of the MB organizational 
structure lies in its sub-culture which this study dubs ‘ikhwanism’. It refers to the 
cognitive code of norms, standards, and regulations that encompasses and guides MB 
members in their everyday life. It embodies the code of identity that signifies the 
uniqueness and distinctiveness of the MB which could preserve its organization over 
time. When individuals join the MB, they abide by its rules and regulations. After a 
while, members start to act not as individuals but rather as Brothers: ikhwan. 
Furthermore, ikhwanism reflects the development of the MB’s organizational 
structure over time. Therefore, if al-Banna was the leader who sowed the seeds of 
ikhwanism in the MB ideology, it was his successors who implanted it within the MB 
organizational structure. Al-Banna wrote a specific tract, Risalat al-Ta‘alim, which 
identified the norms and code of values of the MB. This epistle is of prime importance 
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in the MB indoctrination process; all fully-fledged members have to memorize it and act 
upon in everyday life.113 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that ikhwanism is not a rigid set of sacred or 
spiritual ideas but a constellation of social norms and values that spring from the internal 
dynamics and interactions within the MB. It represents the underlying factors that 
explain why a certain action or behaviour of the MB or its members comes to the fore. 
Put differently, it is the culture that articulates the MB’s behaviour, views, and modes of 
action in everyday life. In summary, ikhwanism is the main mechanism for generating 
symbolism and creating meaning constructions that shape the MB identity in everyday 
life. Moreover, ikhwanism as an identity does not negate the fact that MB’s members 
can have other personal identities. In other words, to be and to act as an ikhwani does 
not contradict of being a lawyer, a doctor, or a teacher. Indeed, the uniqueness of the 
MB among other Islamist movements that its members have multiple layers of identity 
that facilitate the dissemination of the MB’s ideology in the wider society. 
The next section unpacks ikhwanism and illustrates how it interacts with 
members, leaders, and the organizational structure of the MB. The MB’s code of norms 
and regulations is revolved around a certain set of values which constitute the core of 
ikhwanism. These norms are allegiance (bay‘a), obedience (ta‘ah), trust (thiqa), 
commitment (iltizam), and loyalty (intima). However, before explaining these norms, 
two important points should be mentioned. The first is that the MB tends to blend these 
norms with Islamic teachings and principles to ensure its symbolic power and influence. 
Second, these norms are imbued and instilled within the MB organization, structure, and 
members’ mind-set through the intensive socialization and incubation process 
highlighted in Chapter 5. It is part of the identity construction process of the MB.  
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 It is widely known that al-Banna wrote Risalat al-Ta‘alim to the devoted and committed members who 
reached the level of mujahidin on the membership scale. However, after al-Banna’s death all members 
have adopted the epistle as a part of their commitment to the MB.	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a) Allegiance (bay‘a) 
Allegiance is a central norm and procedure in the MB.114 It has its roots in the 
Islamic traditions.115 According to Landau-Tasseron, bay‘a is commonly interpreted as 
“an oath given by a subordinate to a leader as a token of allegiance” (2010, p.1).  
From the MB’s inception, al-Banna was keen to stress the religious character of 
bay‘a by invoking Qur’anic verses and emulating the Prophet Muhammad who took the 
oath from new converts to Islam in the early years of his message.116 When al-Banna 
established the MB, he took the bay‘a from the first six members who, along with him, 
created the MB in 1928. He states in his memories: 
One evening of March 1928, six brothers came to my house and asked to 
work together for the sake of Islam and the interests of the nation (watan). I 
said; let us exchange pledges with Allah (fa-l-nubayi‛ allah ‛ala…) that we 
shall be soldiers in the service of the Call to Islam (or, the Cause of Islam, 
da‛wa), for the life of the homeland and the glory of the [Islamic] community 
depend upon [this call/cause].117 (cited in Landau-Tasseron, 2010, p.1).  
 
Furthermore, al-Banna linked bay‘a not only to himself as a leader but more 
importantly to the MB’s cause and ideology (Landau-Tasseron, 2010, .p.2).118 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 This part draws heavily upon the leading study of Landau-Tasseron on leadership and bay‘a in the MB 
(Landau-Tasseron 2010). Landau-Tasseron provides a sophisticated historical account of the role of bay‘a 
in the MB, particularly during al-Banna’s era in the 1930s and 1940s.  	  
115 The term bay‘a is cited repeatedly in the Qur’an in different contexts. However, the most common 
understanding of bay’a is that it is a contract or pledge between the ruler and the ruled to obey Allah and 
to serve the Islamic message. Historically, bay‘a was a traditional Islamic institution that used to refer to 
“a pledge exchanged with a leader, entailing obligations of leaders and led, towards one another” 
(Landau-Tasseron, 2010, p.2). The caliphs were given bay‘a by ‘ulama (ahl al-hal wa’l-aqd) and then the 
umma.	  
116 It is stated in the Quran that Prophet Muhammad took bay’a from those who converted to Islam in the 
verse “Those who exchange pledges with you (i.e. Muhammad), it is with Allah that they exchange them” 
(Quran, 48:10). Landau-Tasserson highlights that al-Banna was smart enough to deliberately invoke and 
emulate the Prophet when he established the MB. She states, ‘like the Prophet in his time al-Bannā 
created an enclave, that is, a new society that consolidated around an ideology and a way of life and 
separated itself as far as it could from the society in which it lived” (2010, p.5).	  
117 Some scholars contest al-Banna’s story portraying it as myth (Jansen, 1997; Landau-Tasseron, 2010).	  
118 Landau-Tasseron highlights the link between the emergence of the concept of bay’a and the Sufi 
character of al-Banna. Based on historical investigation, she points out that the submissive relationship 
between al-Banna and his followers resembles the spiritual relationship between the Sufi shaykh and his 
novices. Hence al-Banna chose his title to be the General Guide (al-murshid al-‘am), similar to a Sufi 
shaykh being called murshid (Landau-Tasseron, 2010, pp.3-4).	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In addition, al-Banna was keen to internalize the concept of bay‘a within the MB 
structure. He enforced bay’a as an integral procedure for joining the MB. Ever since, 
bay‘a has become one of the central concepts of the MB organization. More importantly, 
al-Banna linked bay‘a with other values and norms of the MB, e.g. obedience, 
commitment, etc. In Risalat al-Ta’alim, al-Banna identified ten pillars of bay‘a that 
should be adopted by members in order to become full and active members in the MB. 
These pillars are: understanding, sincerity, action, Jihad, sacrifice, obedience, 
perseverance, devotion, brotherhood, and trust (al-Banna, 2002, p.185). Al-Banna 
provided a detailed explanation for each element of these pillars and asked all members 
to memorise and act upon them. Among the many tracts written by al-Banna, Risalat al-
Ta‘alim stands as one of the most influential in relation to the MB organization. The 20 
tenets of al-Usul al-‘Ishrin, which explain the meaning of understanding as a pillar of 
bay‘a, are highly valued and respected by the MB members. They represent a normative 
reference for the adherence and commitment of the leaders and members.119  
The implications of bay‘a on the MB organizational structure are 
considerable.120 First, on the procedural level, members cannot have their membership 
activated without giving bay‘a. As discussed in Chapter 5, the MB’s multi-tiered system 
of membership identifies several requirements and conditions that individuals have to 
attain to become fully-fledged members. Once these conditions are met, individuals are 
allowed to give bay‘a. Thus, bay‘a is an instrument of access to the MB. Despite the 
fact that there is no fixed statement or formula for bay‘a, the most common one 
stipulates that each member should give the following oath: 
I pledge with God to abide by the rules of Islam and jihad for Allah’s sake, 
and to fulfil and commit myself to the conditions and obligations of the 
Muslim Brothers, and to listen and obey its leadership whether willingly or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 The pillar of understanding is considered to be the most important pillar of bay‘a in the MB. Al-Banna 
explained this pillar in 20 points which delineate the MB’s worldview and orientates members in 
everyday life (al-Banna, 2002, p. 219).	  
120 Indeed, many of the MB ideologues consider bay’a as the most important norm in the MB. For 
instance, Hawwa treats bay‘a as the core value and norm of the MB in order to achieve its goals. Despite 
that Hawwa views bay‘a as not binding, he believes that it is the only way to solidify and strengthen the 
MB organization (Hawwa 1980: 101). 	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not (fi’l-manshat wa’l-makrah) as long as he succumbs to Allah. I swear by 
God on that and he is the witness on my pledge (Mitchell, 1969, p.165). 
 
According to the MB by-law,121 the oath of bay‘a should be given to the General 
Guide (al-murshid al-‘am); however, because of practical difficulties and due to security 
surveillance, the oath is given to the middle-level leaders in branches and the provinces 
who subsequently give it to the General Guide.122 
Nevertheless, members perceive bay‘a in different ways. While some stress the 
importance of giving bay‘a in connecting them to the organization, others view it as 
merely a symbolic procedure. For example, Ammar El-Beltagi highlights the role of 
bay‘a in ensuring members’ commitment and loyalty to the MB,123 while Abdurrahman 
Ayyash plays down the importance of the oath. He points out that “giving bay‘a is a 
symbolic act rather than an actual procedure; therefore I didn’t give bay‘a literally.”124 
However, both assert that each member should embrace the ten pillars of bay‘a and act 
upon them to become a full member of the MB.  
Second, on the practical level, bay‘a reveals the pattern of relationship between 
members and leaders which tends to be based on submission and adherence. Bay‘a 
implies that members should obey and follow the leadership. Members are required to 
respect and abide by leaders’ orders and decisions even if they disagree with them. 
Giving bay‘a means that members should succumb and devote themselves for the sake 
of the movement. Thus, leaders’ decisions are perceived as orders that seek to realize 
movement’s objectives.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 The MB had seven bylaws since its foundation (1930, 1944, 1948, 1951, 1982, 1994, and 2009). 
Although there is a slight difference between these bylaws, one of the main distinctions between them is 
in the oath of bay‘a and the membership criteria. For instance, the first bylaw in 1930 did not mention the 
bay‘a. However, in 1944 bay‘a was added to the MB’s bylaws. However, in the 1990s the bay‘a was 
removed from the MB’s bylaw as along with the degrees of membership. While Landau-Tasseron 
explains this notion as result of the familiarity of the MB’s members with movement’s regulations and 
norms, this study contends that the main reason behind this change was in the obsession of the MB with 
security. Revealing the MB’s degrees of membership can imperil members and leaders as it could allow 
security forces to monitor and arrest them.	  
122 Over the past three decades, the MB was under tough and continuous repression and surveillance under 
the Mubarak regime. It was impossible for members to meet without endangering their life and freedom. 
Thus, it was difficult for members to give bay‘a to al-murshid al-‘am in a public meeting or ceremony. 	  
123 Interview with Ammar El-Beltagi on 26 March 2012.	  
124 Interview with Abdurrahman Ayyash on 26 March 2012.	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However, while members justify their submission and subordination to leaders 
by organizational discipline and necessity, the religious foundations of bay‘a are 
unavoidable. Members perceive bay‘a as a religious duty not just an organizational 
norm. According to Mohamed Mustafa, bay‘a reflects a member’s religious devotion. 
He states, “bay’a is a contract between me and God who will hold me accountable for 
this in the afterlife.”125 He ardently defends the importance of bay‘a in maintaining the 
links between members and the MB. Thus, some members believe that violation of 
bay‘a can be religiously prohibited (haram).  
Furthermore, bay‘a fosters a sense of commitment among members. As Landau-
Tasseron puts it, “By choosing the term bay‘a, al-Banna expressed all at once the 
ideology, the modes of its implementation, and the commitment to both” (2010, p.12). 
Landau-Tasseron maintains that “for al-Banna bay‘a was not merely an expression of 
loyalty to the leadership, but an articulation of the ideology to which the Brothers 
committed themselves” (2010, p.12). 
Third, bay‘a is a fundamental tool for internal promotion. According to the MB’s 
by-laws and structure, members cannot attain the highest level of membership in the MB, 
which is active members, ‘amil, without giving bay‘a. Thus, to give bay‘a, members 
have to become strongly dedicated to the MB’s ideology and leadership. They have to 
grasp the ten pillars of bay‘a and act accordingly in everyday life. Thus, bay‘a reflects a 
high degree of commitment and loyalty towards the movement and its leadership. 
Moreover, bay‘a is the vehicle for promotion within the MB. Members cannot get 
promoted and move from one rank to another without aligning their behaviours and 
manners with the pillars of bay‘a. Thus, the relationship between bay‘a and the multi-
tiered system of membership is vital. Bay‘a functions as a fundamental instrument by 
which to securitize the commitment and loyalty of members towards the MB’s 
objectives and rules. 
Fourth, bay‘a includes certain duties and responsibilities that should be carried 
out by members. Thus, any violation or abuse of bay‘a rules can result in organizational 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 Interview with Mohamed Mustafa on 1 April 2012.	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and ideational punishment, e.g. suspending the membership, marginalization, etc. 
According to Karim Radawan, a member of the MB’s Shura (Consultative) Council, any 
violation of bay‘a rules makes members subject to penalties (Al-Wazeri, 2012, accessed 
on 15 July 2012). In a crude manner, bay‘a implies that members are fully responsible 
for their actions and practices not only to the leadership but also to God,126 and that it is 
both symbolic and practical exposition of power.   
Nevertheless, it should be stressed that beyond its sacred character, bay‘a has 
organizational face. It is a sort of contract that entails mutual duties and responsibilities 
between two parties: the ruler and the ruled. Thus, the MB leadership is also responsible 
in the face of members, albeit indirectly. This became clearer after the significant 
amendments in the MB General By-laws (al-la’iha al-‘ama) introduced in 1982. It has 
been made clear that the General Guide (al-mursihd al-‘am) is responsible to members 
and is entitled to give bay‘a as well. According to the current by-law, al-murshid al-‘am 
is obliged to give the oath to the General Consultative Council (Majlis al-Shura al-‘Am), 
the legislative body of the MB which is responsible of electing al-murshid al-am and 
Maktab al-Irshad (the Guidance Bureau). According to the by-law, al-murshid al-‘am 
should give the following pledge, “I give my word to Allah and the Sunna of His 
messenger as far as I am able and to abide by the programme of the MB and its basic 
law, thereby performing the resolution of the Society regarding myself even if they 
differ from my opinion, Allah is witness” (The Basic Law of the MB, accessed on 20 
July 2012). Moreover, according to the by-law, al-murshid al-‘am can be held 
accountable for his decisions and actions if he violates the rules and regulations of the 
MB or cannot perform his job. Thus, the relationship between members and leadership 
became more balanced. 
However, to avoid criticism over the unlimited powers bay‘a grants the 
leadership, the MB ideologues differentiate between two types of bay‘a: the general (al-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 Despite the religious and symbolic character of bay‘a, members who oppose the leadership or reject its 
decisions can still abandon the movement without breaking their oath. The multiple interpretations of 
bay‘a enable members to contest and challenge the leadership. Hence, one of these interpretations is that 
the oath or bay‘a is not given to individuals or persons but rather to the ideology and principles of the 
movement which members can embrace even if they leave the MB. 	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
203	  
bay‘a al-ama) and the special (al-bay‘a al-khasa) (al-Barr, 2012, accessed on 15 July 
2012). According to Abdurrahman al-Barr, a member of the Guidance Bureau and jurist 
(mufti) of the MB, the general bay‘a is the one that should be given to the leader of the 
nation (the imam) who rules the country according to Islamic teachings and principles. 
Hence, all citizens are required to give bay‘a to the imam and obey him as long as he 
obeys Allah. The special bay‘a is a pledge or oath between a group of people who agree 
to work for the sake of Islam. In this case, the leader can take bay‘a from the group and 
this bay‘a is only binding on the group not the entire society. The MB, according to al-
Barr, adopts the special version of bay‘a, not the general one (al-Barr, 2012).127  
Over time, bay‘a has become a mutable and flexible norm. According to 
Landau-Tasseron, members still can contest and reject the leadership’s decisions 
without annulling their bay‘a (Landau-Tasseron, 2010, p.17). Since bay‘a is not given to 
an individual but in order to apply Islamic teachings in their daily life, members can 
oppose their leaders without committing a sin.128  
Moreover, bay‘a is a subject of contestation within the MB. Some members, 
particularly those who embrace a reformist agenda, object to the political use of bay‘a to 
suppress opponents. 129 Furthermore, members have different choices by which to 
oppose the movement’s leadership without breaking their bay‘a. For instance, they can 
abandon the weekly meetings or freeze their membership for a period of time to protest 
certain decisions. More importantly, members can use bay‘a to de-legitimize the 
leadership. For example, some MB senior leaders, such as Mohamed Habib, the former 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127  Al-Barr was defending Mohamed Morsi, the newly elected Egyptian president, following the 
controversy over his relationship with the MB after the elections. As all members, Morsi gave bay‘a to the 
General Guide Mohamed Badie. However, after the elections he had to break his bay‘a and Badei has 
publically released Morsi from his pledges and commitment to the MB.  See the video of Badie at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TfoyRRmKKus	  
128 According to Landau-Tasseron, the changing position of bay‘a in the MB organizational structure was 
due to the changing circumstances whether internally, i.e. the demands for more democracy within the 
MB, or externally, i.e. the relationship with the branches of the MB outside Egypt (2010, p.16). The 
changes have made bay‘a more loose and subject to progressive interpretations. For instance, according to 
Landau-Tasseron, the words such as  ‘I swear’ (uqsimu) and the clause stipulating complete trust in the 
leadership have been removed (Landau-Tasseron, 2010, p.15).	  
129 For a historical review of the old procedures and circumstances of giving bay‘a from the 1950s to the 
1990s see (Landau-Tasseron, 2010, pp.13-22).	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deputy of the previous General Guide Mahdi Akef, Abdelmoniem Abulfotouh and 
Ibrahim al-Za’farani, did not give bay‘a to Badie as a protest against the way in which 
he was elected.130 
In summary, bay‘a can be best described as an agreement between members and 
the leadership of the MB based on mutual commitments and responsibilities. As 
Landau-Tarreson puts it, “bay‘a is both a concept and practice… As such it has always 
been broad and flexible” (2010, p.24). 
 
b) Obedience (ta‘a) 
Obedience or ta‘a is a fundamental norm in the MB’s organizational structure. It 
is the flip side of bay‘a whereby members should submit to regulations and the 
leadership. After giving bay‘a members become fully committed and responsible for 
their own actions and behaviour. They are obliged to follow the movement’s rules and 
leadership. Like bay‘a, ta‘a is derived from the Islamic traditions.131 Thus, the religious 
and symbolic effect of ta‘a is significant. It enables the MB leaders to maintain 
influence and control over the organization. Not surprisingly, al-Banna was keen to 
make ta‘a one of the main pillars of bay‘a in Risalat al-Ta‘alim. Al-Banna persistently 
stressed the vital role of ta‘a in achieving the MB’s objectives (al-Banna, 2002). 
Moreover, the oath of bay‘a states that members should ‘listen and obey whether 
willingly or not’, which embeds the concept of obedience and subordination within the 
MB organization. As Lanadau-Tasseron notes, al-Banna aptly blended allegiance bay‘a 
and ta‘ah together to create the credo for the MB (2010, p.7). Some MB leaders view 
the link between bay‘a and ta‘a as inseparable. Thus, the motto ‘Listen and Obey’ has 
become one of the most repeated slogans of the MB. However, this slogan provokes 
much criticism and harms the image of the MB as an authoritarian organization. 
Therefore, the MB’s leaders and ideologues started to differentiate between two types of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130  Chapter seven will extensively discuss the crisis caused by electing Mohamed Badie and its 
consequences. 	  
131 Many Qur’anic versus and prophetic traditions induce Muslims to obey the rulers. Historically, the 
caliphs and sultans abused the principle of ta’a to prolong their rule and suppress any opposition.	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ta‘ah: blind obedience (ta‘a ‘am’ya) and sighted obedience (ta‘a mubsra). According to 
Amer Shemakh, a cadre in the MB, the blind ta‘a is to follow leaders blindly without 
questioning their decision or actions, which, according to him, does not exist in the MB 
(Shemakh, 2012, accessed on 10 July 2012). However, the sighted ta‘a allows members 
and cadres to voice their opinion and express their views, even if these disagree with 
leaders. Furthermore, some members state that ta‘a is contingent upon the leaders’ 
commitment to the movement’s objectives and as long as they work for the sake of 
Islam. 
Nevertheless, the differentiation between the blind and sighted ta‘a remains 
vague and tactical. Many of the MB’s youth have repeatedly criticised the application of 
ta‘a. They accuse leaders of abusing the norm to impose certain decisions or justify the 
stance of the MB on certain issues. Thus, over the past decade, the MB has witnessed a 
growing trend of dissent among the youth who have been infuriated by the political 
stance and internal decisions of the MB leadership.132 Moreover, some of these youth 
claim that the MB exhibits an ‘absolute’ pattern of ta’a that does not allow real 
discussion or criticism within the movement. Ahmed Samir al-Koumi, a former member 
of the MB, asserts that the MB does not allow members to voice their opinion freely 
(interview by Naguib, 2012, accessed on 10 July 2012). According to him, members 
have to obey orders and commands of leadership blindly and without discussion. 
The impact of ta‘a on the MB’s identity is considerable. First, it reinforces the 
pattern of subordination and submission within the MB. The hierarchy of the MB adopts 
a top-down approach that makes it difficult for members at low levels to influence the 
decisions and policies of the MB. The relationship between members and leaders is 
more subservient than equal. Furthermore, members in branches and districts cannot 
hold their leaders accountable, not only because of the movement’s rules but also of the 
symbolic power of ta‘a which impedes accountability within the MB. 
Second, ta‘a is employed by the MB’s leadership to accommodate, and 
sometimes suppress, internal calls for reform and change. Mustafa al-Naggar, an ex-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 The phenomenon of youth dissent in the MB is discussed in more detail in Chapter 7.	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member in the MB and political activist, points out that the MB always manipulates 
members’ calls for change. He repeatedly criticizes the MB leaders and code of norms 
which according to him made the MB an “autocratic” organization (al-Naggar 2009, 
accessed on 10 July 2012). In one of his blogs, al-Naggar states, “when people hear 
words like obedience, allegiance, battalion, trust, etc. they start to believe that the MB 
has a secret and quasi-militant organization” (al-Naggar 2009, accessed on 10 July 
2012). 
Third, ta‘a is utilized to maintain the internal coherence of the MB and avoid 
any rifts. Islamist movements, particularly the MB, used to be accused of internal 
stagnation and inertia. According to critics, ta‘a is responsible for this state of inertia. 
Furthermore, those who oppose or disobey the commands and decisions of the MB’s 
leadership are usually marginalized and sometimes demonized. Mohamed Hamza, a 
mid-level member and prominent blogger, asserts that the MB does not tolerate 
troublemakers or dissenters who challenge the leadership. He points out, ”the listen and 
obey motto is a mere weapon used by leaders to maintain unity of the organization and 
avoid cleavages.”133 Moreover, the MB employs the religious and symbolic character of 
ta‘ah to de-legitimize and discredit dissent. The MB tends to treat dissenters as 
“deviants” (munharifin) from the MB path. Ayyash points out, ”if you confront your 
leader, he will, indirectly, demonize and discredit you among members.”134  
More importantly, operating in a hostile and repressive environment makes the 
MB very sensitive to criticism and firm in its response. It always endeavours to contain 
internal disputes in order to maintain its image as a unified movement. Therefore, 
instead of expelling or questioning dissent, the MB isolates and marginalizes them. 
Those who persist are marginalized. Not surprisingly, the MB has seen many dissenters 
leave the movement without fuss.135 
Fourth, like allegiance, ta‘a is an influential instrument for promotion. Those 
who obey and follow the rules are likely to be promoted and obtain higher positions. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 Interview with Mohamed Hamza on 11 January 2012.	  
134 Interview with Abdurrahman Ayyash on 26 March 2012.	  
135 The internal rifts are discussed in detail in Chapter 7.	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Leaders use it as an indicator of devotion and loyalty. As Abdurrhman Ayyash puts 
it, ”the more you ‘listen and obey’, the higher your chances in promotion will be.”136 
Indeed, the procedures for promoting members are a matter of a great 
importance but also controversy. On the one hand, it ensures the movement’s ability to 
maintain control over members. The merits of promotion originate mainly from 
members’ loyalty and commitment. The more they obey and follow the leaders, the 
more they will be trusted and promoted. According to Ayman Ashraf, the only way to 
become a naqib (captain), a leader of an usra, is to “listen and obey.”137 On the other 
hand, according to many of the interviewees the standards and measurements for 
promoting members are fairly subjective. They express dissatisfaction with the rigidity 
and personification of the promotion process within the MB. and highlight that the 
promotion criteria focus mainly on members’ religious and personal traits, i.e. obedience 
and devotion, rather than on their competencies or skills. Anwar Hamed, a mid-rank 
member of the MB, highlights the subjectivity of the promotion process, pointing out 
that the lack of objectivity and clear measurements cost the MB many of its qualified 
members who left because they were less ”submissive to the leadership” (Hamed 2008, 
accessed on 12 July 2012). One of the main criticisms of the MB’s membership system is the 
lack of transparency and democracy in promoting members. The critics refer to the excessive 
power and control of middle-rank cadres and leaders over promotion procedures and tactics 
which according to some young members are subjective and based on an individual’s listening 
and obedience (asam‘ wa ta‘ah) to the leadership rather than their qualifications and merits. 
 
c) Trust (thiqa) 
Trust (thiqa) is the third norm of the MB organizational structure. It is an 
integral pillar of bay‘a as articulated by al-Banna in Risalat al-Ta‘alim. Al-Banna treats 
thiqa as an essential element for helping the MB to reach its objectives. He called upon 
members to be fully trusting in their leaders. Furthermore, al-Banna asserted that 
relations between leaders and members should be as that between the soldiers and their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 Interview with Abdurrahman Ayyash on 26 March 2012.	  
137 Interview with Ayman Ashraf on 27 March 2012.	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leader. Indeed, that is how the MB leaders treat members as obedient soldiers. In order 
to strengthen the position of the leadership in the face of members, al-Banna connected 
thiqa with da‘wa. He stated, ”the leader is part of the da‘wa and latter cannot be 
possible without the former and the more leadership and members have mutual trust, the 
stronger our movement will be” (al-Banna, 2002, p.24). Clearly, al-Banna sought to give 
symbolic power to thiqa as a norm by linking it to the chief objective of the MB: to 
disseminate al-fikra al-Islamiyya. 
The concept of thiqa is prevalent within MB literature and among members. The 
degree of trust reflects not only individual submission to the leadership but more 
importantly their devotion and commitment to the movement’s ideology and message. 
As with the other norms, the MB tends to blend thiqa with religious symbolism. 
According to Mohamed Hamed Eliwa, a mid-rank member of the MB, thiqa is a matter 
of belief and faith. He points out, “thiqa is part of our inner belief that connects 
members with Allah” (Eliwa, 2011, accesed on 12 July 2012). Eliwa asserts that 
members should have a firm belief in the leadership based on “obedience, respect, and 
love” (Eliwa, 2011, accesed on 12 July 2012). 
Moreover, the MB treats thiqa as a fundamental instrument with which to 
solidify and enhance its internal structure. In his explanation of thiqa, Emad Ghanim, a 
Brotherhood member, highlights five aspects. The first is trust in the movement’s 
approach (manhaj) which is derived from the Islamic teachings. The second is trust in 
the organization and the collective action which, according to Ghanim, should be for the 
sake of Islam and da‘wa. Ghanim ardently urges members to believe that the MB is the 
only “trustful” organization that should be followed. The third is trust in the MB’s 
decisions, which according to him, should be followed and implemented by members. 
The fourth is trust in leadership and submission to its decisions, which Ghanim links to 
leaders’ piety and their willingness to follow shura (consultation in making decisions). 
The fifth aspect is trust in God’s help. Ghanim calls upon members to believe and trust 
that Allah will support the MB and its endeavours to revive Islam (Ghanim, 2011, 
accessed on 14 July 2012). Moreover, the vast majority of MB members perceive thiqa 
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as a duty and part of their commitment to the MB and its leadership. It is embedded in 
their mind-set that trust in the leadership can save the movement and enable it to realize 
its objectives. Therefore, some MB leaders defend trust as a fundamental tool by which 
to enhance the movement’s coherence. According to Mohamed Mustafa, trust is the only 
way to measure members’ commitment and loyalty. He points out, “the more members 
succumb to the leaders and follow the regulations, the more solid and cohesive our 
organization will be.”138 
In addition, thiqa, like other norms, has a significant impact on social 
interactions and dynamics within the MB organizational structure. The pattern of 
relationship between leaders and members is shaped by trust, confidence, and loyalty. 
The procedures of membership, promotion, etc. are primarily built on trust rather than 
members’ competencies. The more members trust and succumb to leaders, the higher 
they can be promoted within the movement. Not surprisingly, the rigid and dogmatic 
application of trust creates criticism and discontent among members, particularly 
younger members. According to Mohamed Hamza, some MB leaders advocate a ‘blind 
trust’ that enforces members to follow leaders without questioning their decisions or 
actions. 139 Moreover, some MB youth contest the concept of trust with the leadership. 
Al-Komi, for instance, points out that leaders tend to misuse trust to avoid any 
discussion or critique of their decisions and behaviour (interviewed by Naguib, 2012, 
accessed on 10 July 2012). Like ta‘a, the prejudicial application of thiqa irritates many 
members. Promotion is based on the degree of trust in the leadership, not the 
qualifications of members. Abdurrahman Mansour, for instance, highlights that 
members can only be promoted if they obey and trust leaders.140 Furthermore, such 
application of trust eliminates the accountability and responsibility of the MB leadership. 
Leaders tend to use members’ trust to manipulate them and avoid accountability 
(Melucci, 1996). According to Amr Soliman, a young member in the MB, some leaders 
use trust not to make rational decisions but rather to suppress opponents. He explains, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 Interview with Mohamed Mustafa on 1 April 2012.	  
139 Interview with Mohamed Hamza on 11 January 2012.	  
140 Interview with Abdurrahman Mansour on 26 March 2012.	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“trust is a double-edged sword; on the one hand it strengthens the relationship between 
leaders and members, but on the other hand it undermines responsibility and 
accountability of the leadership.”141  
 
d) Commitment (iltizam) 
Commitment is a crucial component of social organizations. Thus, it is 
considered to be a central concept in the social movements literature. Social movements 
persistently seek to create a sense of commitment among their members in order to 
sustain their collective action (Burke & Reitzes 1991; Gamson 1991; Burke & Stets 
1999). Burke and Stets define commitment as ”a binding tie between an individual and 
some other social entity, whether an identity, another individual, a group or organization, 
or an exchange relationship” (1999, p.384). Social movements constantly tend to 
construct and reinforce this ‘tie’ to generate collective action and ensure internal 
coherence and unity.  
Nevertheless, commitment in socio-religious movements is unique. Its 
importance goes beyond the instrumental use to the essence of commitment itself as one 
of the movement’s chief objectives. Islamist movements endeavour to transform and 
reshape individual identities to become religiously committed. The ritualization and 
habituation process in these movements aims to internalize and imbue certain types of 
norms and values that can be perceived as Islamic. Thus, Islamists passionately seek to 
Islamise social norms and practices of members’ everyday lives. 
The concept of commitment (iltizam) is one of great importance within the MB. 
It is treated as a tool and an outcome. On the one hand, as a social movement, the MB 
utilizes commitment to strengthen its internal organization. The movement invests in 
individuals’ religious inclinations and adherence to generate a sense of commitment that 
goes beyond the self. On the other hand, as a proselytization society, the MB seeks to 
reshape individuals’ views and manners to align with Islamic values and principles to 
make them pious and religiously committed (multazimin). For some leaders, the MB’s 
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organizational structure is mainly aimed at realizing this goal (Yakan, 1983; Hawa, 
2004). 
As Melucci points out, commitment to a movement is based on solidarity and 
strong identification with the goals of the organization (1996, p.318). Thus, the intensive 
incubation and socialization process of the MB discussed in Chapter 5 plays a crucial 
role in fostering members’ commitment. Throughout their membership, members are 
subject to a contentious process of re-formulating their identity. The MB members tend 
to accept this process fervently as an expression of their religious devotion. Furthermore, 
they become committed not to the movement’s ideology but also to its leadership. 
The process of constructing commitment within the MB is worthwhile. It is an 
on-going process of reconfiguration and reshaping members’ views and perceptions. It 
starts when individuals join the movement and continues until they leave it. According 
to Mohamed Mustafa, the main goal of usra, the basic unit in the MB, is to create and 
maintain the sense of commitment among members.142 He asserts that members are 
constantly connected with the MB’s objectives, cause, and ideology throughout their 
membership life.  
However, sustaining commitment requires a movement to intensify its 
socialization and habituation process (Polletta & Jasper, 2001, p.292). Thus, the 
incubation process of MB members provides different venues for participation and 
interaction in everyday life. Camps, seminars and weekly meetings all play an 
influential role in nurturing and enhancing individuals’ commitment and facilitating 
their integration within the movement. Moreover, the MB tends to surround members 
with different types of symbolic and meaning constructions through different social 
networks at home, work, neighbourhoods, etc.  
The impact of iltizam on the MB organizational structure is significant. 
According to many interviewees, there are four types or levels of commitment within 
the MB. The first is members’ commitment to the movement’s objectives and cause. 
The second is commitment towards the movement’s rules and regulations. The third is 
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commitment towards leaders. The fourth is the commitment towards other fellow 
members.  
At the outset, MB members are educated to become committed to the 
movement’s objectives and cause. The MB tends to keep members connected with its 
ideology through the notion of al-fikra al-Islamiyya. According to Salah Ghorab, 
members’ commitment can be enhanced keeping them fully attached and connected 
with al-fikra al-Islamiyya. He emphasizes, “commitment is not mere words but rather 
actions and deeds for the sake of Islam and the jama‘a.”143 Moreover, the oath of bay’a 
underpins individual commitment. Once they give the oath, members are expected to 
become self-committed and work hard to pursue the MB’s objectives. Mohamed al-
Naggar, a young MB member, views commitment as a fundamental component of his 
membership. He states, ”my commitment to the MB’s cause is unshakable; it is part of 
my identity.”144 
The second manifestation of commitment in the MB is pertinent to the 
movement’s rules and regulations. Members express their commitment by respecting the 
rules and following the movement’s canons. The MB has a clear and firm by-law by 
which members should abide. Indeed, members tend to follow the by-law as a part of 
their initial commitment towards the movement. According to Sherif Ayman, following 
the rules of the movement is an essential part of “my commitment”. He points out: “to 
be a real brother, akh multazim, one should devoutly follow the movement’s rules and 
regulations and act upon them.”145 
Commitment and respect for leaders’ decisions is an important norm in the MB 
organization. Members keenly obey and follow leaders’ orders as a sign of commitment 
and dedication to the movement. According to Mohamed Abduh, a mid-rank member, 
trust and obedience in the leadership are important emblems of members’ commitment 
(Abduh, 2012, accessed on 20 July 2012). Indeed, members’ commitment is measured 
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by the degree of their submission and obedience to the leadership. For some, it reflects 
their religious devotion and organizational loyalty. 
Finally, members’ commitment is related to their relationship with how members 
perceive and deal with each other. They adopt the notion of brethren (ikhwa) as a 
mechanism for communication and interaction. As Mohamed Sarahn puts it, “I do not 
feel my belonging to the MB without interacting with my fellow brothers.”146  
 
e) Loyalty (intima) 
Loyalty (intima) is one of the most enduring features of the MB identity. It 
denotes the adherence and devotion of members to the MB’s ideology and leadership. 
From the early years of the MB, al-Banna was keen for loyalty to permeate throughout 
the MB’s ideology and structure. In one of his tracts, Da‘watuna (Our Call), al-Banna 
called upon members to become loyal to the da‘wa and al-fikra al-Islamiyya (al-Banna, 
2002, p.35). He identified seven ways for members to foster their loyalty to the MB: 1) 
to have belief in the movement’s objectives and cause; 2) to become a good believer and 
preacher of the MB ideology; 3) to have a strong willingness to work for the movement; 
4) to be a good example for others; 5) to adopt secrecy in their activities; 6) to have a 
firm belief and trust in the leadership; and 7) to abide by the laws and regulations of the 
MB. 
Loyalty is closely related to individual commitment. Indeed, commitment is 
considered to be the most visible manifestation of a member’s loyalty. Members tend to 
show and stress their loyalty by aligning their manners and practices with the 
movement’s code of norms and values. Moreover, the religious grounds for loyalty are 
undeniable. The movement’s ideologues and leaders tend to link loyalty to a member’s 
religious adherence. Yakan, for instance, has written a tract, What Does My Belonging 
to Islam Mean?, that stresses the meaning and importance of loyalty. Yakan urges that 
members should become firmly committed and loyal to the Islamist movement. He 
identifies two types of loyalty: loyalty to the movement’s ideology and cause; and 
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loyalty to its leadership. He asserts that those who seek to work for Islam should have a 
firm belief in the movement and its objectives (Yakan, 1983, pp.137-140). 
Moreover, MB members perceive loyalty to be part of their religious 
commitment. According to Sayyid Sho‘iyb, a mid-rank member, members’ loyalty to 
the MB reflects their belief that Islam should be a part of their daily life. He points 
out, ”belonging to the MB is belonging to Islam as understood by the movement” 
(Sho‘iyb, 2011, accessed on 22 July 2012). 
The creation of loyalty is an integral goal of the socialization and indoctrination 
process in the MB. Religious lessons, rituals and weekly meetings aim to reinforce their 
sense of belonging and loyalty to the MB. According to Mohamed Sarhan, loyalty is a 
duty for members to fulfil. He points out, ”loyalty to the MB is not something to know 
but to practice in everyday life.”147  
The impact of loyalty as a norm on the MB organizational structure is significant. 
Through loyalty, the MB ensures domination and control over its organization. First, 
members’ loyalty helps the MB to uphold its coherence and unity. Since the loyalty of 
members is measured by adherence and commitment to the movement’s ideology and 
leadership, differences are marginalized. Abdurrahman Ayyash highlights that 
committed members tend to obey their leaders even if they disagree with them. He states, 
“loyalty is above personal opinions.”148 
Second, loyalty helps the MB to maintain control over members. As mentioned, 
members tend to stress their loyalty to the leadership by following decisions and acting 
accordingly. They proudly obey and follow their leaders not only because the rules and 
regulations should be respected but as a part of their religious commitment. As 
Mohamed al-Naggar puts it, ‘obeying my leader is part of my commitment towards the 
movement and the da‘wa.’149 
Third, the MB employs loyalty to stretch its organizational umbrella. One aspect 
that demonstrates members’ loyalty is their willingness to disseminate the MB ideology. 
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By doing so, they recruit new members widening the movement’s reach. As Ashraf 
Ayman puts it, “attracting new members is part of our loyalty as a duty.”150 The circles 
of da‘wa are considered as influential avenues for recruiting new members. Cadres and 
leaders employ social networks (e.g. friends, kinship, neighbourhood, etc.) to expand the 
organizational umbrella of the MB.  
Finally, loyalty operates as a shield for the MB from regime repression and 
security penetration. As we will discuss in the next chapter, the brutal policy of the 
regime forced the MB to adopt a relatively strict and semi-clandestine structure that is 
based on the loyalty and adherence of members. Without ensuring a strong loyalty and 
commitment, the MB could have become more vulnerable to security suppression and, 
importantly, disintegration.  
 
6.3.3. The Impact of Institutionalization on Ikhwan’s Identity 
The organization of social movements is complex. One way to deal with this 
complexity is through institutionalizing, or routinizing, the norms, values, and practices 
of members. Melucci points out that each movement constructs its constitutional system 
of norms in order to foster a certain degree of institutionalization (1996, p.315). He 
maintains, “the norms of the organization guarantee integration, regulate the criteria for 
the distribution of rewards, and provide the critical point of reference for every process 
of transformation of the organizational structure” (Melucci, 1996, p.316). The 
organizational norms and regulations provide the MB with a cognitive map that can 
preserve the movement from internal cleavages and external infiltration. However, as 
Melucci points out, the degree of institutionalization relies upon the complexity of the 
organization and the relationship among members and with the leadership (Melucci, 
1996). The more levels, tasks, ideational and operational objectives the organization has, 
the more the institutionalization process needs to be durable. The MB operates in a 
hostile environment which places significant pressure on its organizational structure. 
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Without institutionalizing the norms of allegiance, loyalty, commitment and obedience, 
it would become significantly more difficult to maintain the movement.  
The MB organizational structure has different mechanisms through which to 
institutionalize and routinize its norms and standards, including crafting by-laws and 
regulations, setting regular meetings and assemblies of members, and intensifying the 
socialization process. The movement also has a set structure of moral and material 
incentives that foster a sense of commitment and loyalty among members (Wickham, 
2002). However, the most important mechanism is through imbuing and embedding the 
notion of ikhwanism within the MB structure and members’ mind-set. According to 
many interviewees, members have to embody MB norms and values in their practices 
and actions. They should act not as individuals but rather as committed members: as 
ikhwan. Salah Ghorab, for instance, highlights that individuals start to act as fully 
committed and responsible members as soon as they join the movement.151 
The ikhwanization of social norms, values, and practices is a strategic goal of the 
MB, not only to ensure the Islamisation of members’ morals and practices but more 
importantly to guarantee their commitment and loyalty towards the organization. Hence, 
members are constantly surrounded by symbolic images and meanings that shape their 
worldview and attitudes. It is the organizational structure rather than just the ideology 
that keeps members connected with their leadership and other fellow members. With 
time, ikhwanization has become a social reality that members take for granted in their 
everyday life. 
Unlike other social movements in which members can have a temporary or 
transient identity (Klandermans, 1994), the MB norms and values tend to create a 
resilient and permanent identity for members. Husam Tammam, a renowned Egyptian 
expert on the MB, highlights that the MB creates a parallel community for its members 
that reinforces their commitment and loyalty to the movement. He points out, ”the 
Brother, al-akh, lives, educates, make friends, finds a job, gets married, all through the 
ikhwan community” (Tammam, 2012, p.48). Indeed, this collective sense is one of the 
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enduring features of the MB. With time, ikhwanism becomes the foundation of the MB 
identity. According to Melucci, collective identity provides actors with the “common 
cognitive framework that able them to asses their environment and to calculate the costs 
and benefits of their actions“ (1988, p.35). Clearly, the organization of the MB plays a 
prime role in crafting this cognitive framework of identity. The continuous processes of 
indoctrination, ritualization and routinization reshape individuals’ identities and foster 
the sense of self-identification. At some point, members start to merge between their 
identities and that of their movement. As Sheikh Abduelkhaliq Al-Sherif, a 60-year-old 
MB member, puts it, “after sometime within the MB, members start to feel that they not 
only live within the MB but also the MB lives within them.”152 
In addition, the organizational structure of the MB reinforces the relationship 
among members. The regularity of internal activities (i.e. seminars, battalions, camps, 
etc.) helps members to interact, communicate, and most importantly to homogenize. 
Mohamed Mustafa stresses the importance of weekly and monthly meetings and 
assemblies in fostering collective identity, particularly in rural and suburban areas. He 
points out, “camps (mu‘askarat) help members to interact and socialize with other 
fellow members and to generate a sense of brethren among themselves.”153 Such a 
collective sense of brotherhood (ikhwwa) is an outcome of the MB organizational 
structure. 
Furthermore, the organization allows leaders to orchestrate, and sometimes 
manipulate, individuals’ identities. The chain of command, hierarchy, and the multi-
tiered membership system of the MB enables leaders to dominate and reshape 
individuals’ perceptions and behaviours. According to Haitham Abu Khalil, a former 
leader, the leadership has a strong influence on members’ identity that thwarts their 
independence (Abu Khalil, accessed on 12 July 2012). Moreover, the top-down style of 
the MB affirms the impact of leadership on each individual’s identity. It creates a certain 
type of submissive and obedient identity. As mentioned, members are required to abide 
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not only by the rules and by-laws of the organization but also by its norms and standards. 
They do that mostly voluntarily as a part of their religious devotion and moral 
commitment.  
 
6.4. CONCLUSION 
The analysing of the MB organizational structure demystifies its identity 
construction process. This chapter examines how ideology, organization, and identity 
interplay. It reveals how the MB employs structure, hierarchy, and norms in reshaping 
members’ identities. It highlights the role of MB organizational structure and its internal 
dynamics in generating the movement’s norms and regulations.  
It is argued that the MB develops a certain type of sub-culture, ikhwanism, which 
dominates and guides members in everyday life. Ikhwanism provides members with the 
symbolic code of norms and standards that reinforce their sense of loyalty and 
commitment towards the MB.  
Furthermore, the MB organizational structure operates as a mechanism that 
merges norms, values, and members’ practices. It interweaves key religious values—
allegiance (bay‘a) and obedience (ta‘a)—with mundane ones—trust, commitment, and 
loyalty—to strengthen and articulate members’ identity. The MB leadership employs 
organizational strucutre to dominate members and control the movement’s structure. 
Hence, it could maintain internal unity and avert fracturing. 
In addition, the chapter examines the relationship between institutionalization 
and members’ identity. The processes of indoctrination and routinization of the MB’s 
norms and regulations impact on the individuals’ identity. They produce meaning 
constructions and symbolic imageries about the MB’s ideology, cause, and objectives. 
Thus, they underpin the members’ sense of belonging and loyalty to the MB. 
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Chapter Seven 
THE ENFORCED COHERENCE: 
THE MB IDENTITY UNDER REGIME REPRESSION 
 
7.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter explores the ability of the Muslim Brotherhood to maintain its 
identity and coherence under regime repression. It examines the effects of the 
environment on the identity formation process within the MB. Under the Mubarak 
regime, the MB was a constant target for regime repression which consistently sought to 
undermine its leaders and eliminate its social and political activism. Thus, its members 
were systematically arrested, imprisoned and tortured. Nevertheless, the MB only 
survived but also maintained its activism, unity and organizational coherence. Contrary 
to conventional wisdom which assumes that political actors have little space to operate 
within an authoritarian environment, the MB flourished and became more politically and 
socially visible under the repression of the Mubarak regime. 
This chapter aims to answer two key questions: first, how did the MB maintain 
its identity and coherence under regime repression? and, second, how did the 
movement’s leaders employed repression to solidify their grip on power and control the 
organization? In other words, this chapter attempts to understand why the MB did not 
split under Mubarak’s attempts to eliminate it. Hence it explores the effects of the 
repressive environment on MB unity and integration. Political environment is the place 
where resources, potential members, adversaries, and targeted audience can exist. It 
contains opportunities, as well as threats and constraints, that affect social movements. 
Therefore, a repressive environment limits a movement’s ability to allocate resources, 
recruit new members, and generate collective action. However, the most important 
effect of a repressive environment lies in its impact on a movement’s unity and 
coherence. Operating in a hostile and aggressive environment places significant pressure 
on the movement and its members who become subject to regime oppression, 
surveillance, and harassment.  
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Nevertheless, some movements tend to accommodate and tolerate regime 
repression. They alter their strategy and structures in order to adapt and operate within 
the repressive environment. Furthermore, certain movements tend to use regime 
repression to maintain internal unity and coherence. They employ repression as a tool 
that binds members and fosters their commitment and solidarity. Moreover, during 
repression, a movement’s survival becomes the chief priority of the leadership and 
members. A movement’s sense of self-preservation overrides internal divisions or 
disputes. Thus, the greater the regime repression, the more solid a movement’s structure 
and identity become. This chapter contends that the MB has shrewdly capitalized on 
regime repression to preserve its unity and consolidate members’ identity. Contrary to 
the desires of the Mubarak regime, the relentless waves of repression bestowed on the 
MB a resilient sense of self-preservation that enhanced the movement’s integration and 
coherence.  
In addition, this chapter investigates the impact of regime repression on the 
balance of power within the MB. It argues that repression helped factions, such as the 
conservatives, to dominate and control the MB. It contends that the conservative current 
employed regime repression in order to deflect calls for reform of the movement. The 
MB is an umbrella that includes different currents, factions, and generations who 
compete and debate over ideology, discourse, strategy, and tactics. However, the 
movement’s leadership was able to accommodate and contain internal differences. They 
safeguarded the MB’s organization from fissuring under Mubarak. Furthermore, the 
attempts to divide or split were mainly by individuals and did not hamper the MB from 
operating as a solid and united movement.  
The resilience of the MB poses serious questions for scholars and observers who 
endeavour to fathom the essence of the MB’s identity. For instance, how could the MB 
operate for decades under regime repression? How could the movement survive 
different waves of repression without fissuring? What are the strategies and tactics that 
the MB used in order to maintain its coherence and unity over years? And more 
importantly, how could the MB accommodate and defuse internal calls for change and 
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reform? In other words, what are the effects and consequences of regime repression on 
the MB’s ideology, organizational structure, and coherence? 
This chapter seeks to provide plausible answers to these questions, which on the 
one hand can enhance the understanding of the relationship between repressive regimes 
and social movements, and on the other hand, explain the resilience of certain of these 
movements. Therefore, the argument is that repression is not necessarily a hurdle for 
social and political agents. Conversely, it can become a viable tool by which a 
movement can strengthen its unity and consolidate members’ identities. More 
importantly, the greater the repression, the more resilient and solid a movement can 
become. That is, movement’s leaders use repression in order to justify certain decisions, 
adopt specific political or ideological behaviour, and, most importantly, de-legitimize 
and undermine internal opponents. 
 
7.2. SEMI-AUTHORITARIANISM, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, AND POLITICAL 
CHANGE 
The focus of this chapter is concerned with the controversial relationship 
between semi-authoritarian regimes and opposition movements. The literature on semi-
authoritarianism suggests that autocratic regimes tend to manipulate the opposition 
through different mechanisms, such as competitive yet meaningless elections (Schedler, 
2002; Brownlee, 2007; Blaydes, 2011), decorative representation in parliament and 
government, and restricted access to the media (Levitsky & Way, 2002; Magaloni, 2006; 
Brown, 2012).154 As Schedler puts it, “Electoral authoritarian regimes neither practice 
democracy nor resort regularly to naked repression. By organizing periodic elections 
they try to obtain at least a semblance of democratic legitimacy, hoping to satisfy 
external as well as internal actors” (2002, p.36). Moreover, elections can strengthen 
autocratic regimes’ legitimacy and justify its actions. As Blaydes argues, these regimes 
endure because of conducting frequent and competitive elections (2011, p.1). 
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In addition, the relationship between the political environment and social 
movements is one of great importance. As noted by Melucci, “the environment of an 
organization is made up of the wider society in which the movement is situated and 
from which it draws its support base” (1996, p.323). Hence, social movements always 
seek to adapt with the changing environment in order to avoid regime repression and 
maintain their identity and unity. The environment is composed of the state, or the 
political regime, and other social actors, supporters as well as adversaries. An influential 
body of scholarship has argued that social movements operate within the structures and 
frames that are outlined and created by the state (Jenkins & Klandermans, 1995; 
Melucci, 1996; Kriesi, 2004). As Kriesi argues, “the configuration of political actors at 
any given point in time is partly determined by the structures of the political context” 
(2004, p.74). Moreover, many scholars contend that social movements can be viewed, in 
a sense, as product of their ‘structural’ environment (Tarrow, 1998; McAdam, McCarthy 
& Zalad, 1996). According to the political opportunity structures (POS) thesis, social 
movements emerge, act, and interact (McAdam, 1982; Kriesi, 2004). 
Since the end of the 1970s, political process theory (PPT) and the POS model 
have dominated the terrain of social movements (Tarrow, 1998; McAdam, McCarthy & 
Zalad, 1996). These provide a distinctive contribution to the understanding of the 
relationship between the state, or more precisely the political system, and social 
movements (McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly, 2001). According to social movement theorists, 
political opportunities shape a movement’s ability to allocate resources, mobilize 
members, frame identity, and generate collective action (McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly, 
2001, pp.16-17). As noted by Kitschelt, POS are composed of “specific configurations 
of resources, institutional arrangements and historical precedents for social mobilization, 
which facilitate the development of protest movements in some instances and constrain 
them in others” (1986, p.58). 
However, other scholars contest the assumptions of PPT by questioning the 
hegemonic nature of the POS model in analyzing and understanding the activism of 
social movements (Gamson & Meyer, 1996; Goodwin & Jasper, 2004). For instance, 
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Goodwin and Jasper (2004) provide a robust critique of the PPT based on its structural 
bias. In their seminal volume, Rethinking Social Movements: Structure, Meaning, and 
Emotion, Goodwin and Jasper vigorously assert that PPT “remains conceptually 
muddled insofar as political process theorists have been unable to reach agreement about 
the definition of its basic concepts” (2004, p.4).  
Moreover, Gamson and Meyer highlight the risks of relying on POS as a 
dominant analytical paradigm in explaining the emergence and dynamism of social 
movements. They state: 
The concept of political opportunity is in trouble, in danger of becoming a 
sponge that soaks up virtually every aspect of the social movement 
environment—political institutions and culture, crises of various sorts, 
political alliances, and policy shifts… It threatens to become an all-
encompassing fudge factor for all the conditions and circumstances that form 
the context for collective action (1996, p.275). 
 
By identifying the ‘trouble in paradigms’, Goodwin and Jasper dismantle the 
structural bias of the PPT and advocate for a more incorporative and constructive 
approach that can adequately address the multi and micro dominions of social 
movements (2004, pp.75-93). Interestingly, the founding fathers of the PPT have 
acknowledged some of the problematic and elusive pitfalls of PPT (McAdam, 1996, 
p.24). Moreover, they recognize the defects of PPT as an analytical model that can 
explain contentious politics (McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly, 2001).155  
Nevertheless, regardless of the debate between the proponents and opponents of 
PPT, the need to comprehend the logic and rationale behind collective action persists. 
As Jasper states; “If we ignore theory in social movement research, we will make more 
conceptual mistakes. But the most productive way to do theory today may be to avoid 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155 McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly highlight four main defects: “(1) It [PPT] focuses on static, rather than 
dynamic relationships. (2) It works best when centered on individual social movements and less well for 
broader episodes of contention. (3) Its genesis in the relatively open politics of the American “sixties” led 
to more emphasis on opportunities than on threats, more confidence in the expansion of organizational 
resources than on the organizational deficits that many challengers suffer. (4) It focused inordinately on 
the origins of contention rather than on its later phases.’ (McAdam et al., 2001, p.42).	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big theories and concentrate on small ones. An explicit but realistic theory of action may 
help us get the little things right” (2010, p.974). Therefore, to preserve the interpretive 
power of PPT, Kriesi (2004) confines the usage of the POS model to the structural 
characteristics of state-variables (Jasper, 2010). She differentiates between the open and 
the closed structures, which determine the accessibility of social movements into the 
political system (Kriesi, 2004, p.69). This openness or closure gives social movements 
signals as to whether to participate or not. It helps the movement to assess the rewards 
and risks of its participation (Melucci, 1996; Brown, 2012). Likewise, Melucci asserts 
that the degree of the closure or openness of the political system has a significant impact 
on the characteristics of the organization and whether it can be inclusive or exclusive 
(Melucci, 1996, p.317). 
 
7.2.1. Regime Repression and Identity Formation 
Despite the critique of the PPT as an analytical model, it still has validity in 
examining the relationship between political regimes and social movements. However, 
instead of claiming a causal or linear relationship between both variables, albeit in a 
structural fashion, it is important to investigate how social movements can employ the 
regime actions and behaviour internally. In other words, instead of looking at the 
reaction of a certain movement towards the regime actions such as repression or 
exclusion, it is more important to grasp how repression interplays with the internal 
dynamics of the movement. Therefore, this chapter seeks to unravel the interaction 
between regime repression and a movement’s identity and coherence. It suggests that 
there is a crucial link between repression and the identity formation process within the 
movement. Under relentless waves of oppression and exclusion, some movements, 
particularly those that are highly ideological and ideational, tend to focus inward in 
order to preserve their unity and integration. Over time, a sense of resistant or defensive 
identity is generated which comes to dominate members. As noted by Castells, 
defensive or resistance identity is the product of regime hegemony and repression 
(Castells, 2010, p.9). Moreover, Castells maintains that the identity of resistance leads to 
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the formation of communes or communities. Hence, it constructs “forms of collective 
resistance against otherwise unbearable oppression, usually on the basis of identities that 
were, apparently, clearly defined by history, geography, or biology, making it easier to 
essentialize the boundaries of resistance” (Castells, 2010, p.9). Furthermore, in highly 
ideological movements, such as the MB, regime repression heightens the indoctrination 
and socialization process. Therefore, the greater the repression, the more intense the 
identification process becomes. Under regime repression the main goal of the movement 
becomes focused on how to survive rather than how to participate. Over time, the sense 
of self-perseverance becomes more visible and influential among members who seek to 
avoid divisions within the movement. As Melucci highlights: “During a conflict the 
internal solidarity of the group reinforces identity and guarantees it” (1996, p.74). 
Under the Mubarak regime, the MB has shown an unusual degree of unity and 
resilience, compared with other political forces in Egypt which experienced different 
degrees of factionalism and fragmentation. Despite the brutal repression and humiliation 
under Mubarak, the MB was able to remain a solid resilient movement. True, the MB 
may have witnessed a number of quarrels, divisions, and sometimes splits over the past 
decade particularly between the old and young generations; however, they did not result 
in a significant disintegration or disunity within the organization. 
Therefore, the crucial question is: why did the MB not fissure? This study 
contends that regime repression played an important role in maintaining the MB as a 
united movement. Moreover, it argues that the resilience of the MB’s identity can be 
attributed, in a sense, to the hostile and oppressive environment in which the movement 
was operating. Contrary to the aims of Mubarak, the MB was able to protect its 
organization and maintain individual solidarity. 
As discussed in the previous chapters, to ensure commitment and adherence of 
its members, the MB established a complex system of and criteria for membership. 
Those who seek to join the movement have to undergo an intensified process of 
identification and indoctrination that can reshape their views and mindset.  
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Furthermore, the continuous repression influenced the movement’s system of 
norms and values. As a result of repression, the MB developed a sub-culture of 
victimization that dominated members and impacted on their identity. This sub-culture 
helped the MB to connect members as victims of Mubarak’s regime and enhanced their 
sense of common identity. Hence the victimization culture became a significant tool that 
was able to preserve the MB’s integration and unity. Moreover, the MB’s leaders 
employed this culture in order to maintain members’ commitment to the leadership. 
Members perceived regime repression as an ordeal (mihna), albeit psychological, that 
could only be faced by solidarity and unity. Therefore, the MB leaders have repeatedly 
utilized the ordeal narrative to preserve the movement’s integration. More importantly, 
certain MB leaders, particularly the conservative faction, used regime repression in 
order to exclude, and sometimes suppress, those who held different views. Thus, since 
the middle of the 1990s, many reformists were alienated and marginalized. While some 
of them left the MB, others remain silent and alienated. 
In summary, whereas the ordinary members of the MB perceived regime 
repression as a threat to their existence, the MB’s leaders viewed it as an opportunity 
that enhanced their control over the movement. The next section sketches how the MB 
employed regime repression in order to maintain unity and consolidate members’ 
identity.  
 
7.3. MUBARAK REGIME AND THE MB: THE UNAVOIDABLE 
CONFRONTATION  
Until his downfall in February 2011, Hosni Mubarak presided over one of the 
most durable and aggressive semi-authoritarian regimes in the third world (Kassem, 
2004; Bwonelee, 2006; Nicola, 2007; King, 2009; Shehata, 2009).156 Since he took 
power following the assassination of his predecessor, Anwar Sadat, in October 1981, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156 Ironically, before the uprising of 2011, no one would have predicted that Mubarak’s resilient regime 
would have fallen in less than three weeks. Nevertheless, the downfall of Mubarak can, in a sense, be 
interpreted by its durability not the opposite. The unrelenting closure of political space that preceded the 
uprising accelerated the collapse of the Mubarak regime.	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Mubarak sought to dominate and control the political scene. After a very short 
honeymoon period with the opposition (Tripp & Owen, 1989; Amin 2011), during 
which he launched a series of limited and cosmetic reforms in pursuit of legitimacy (Al-
Awadi, 2004), Mubarak turned against the opposition and attempted to undermine its 
leaders. By empowering his party, the National Democratic Party (NDP), Mubarak 
solidified his grip on power and secured his rule since the 1980s and until his downfall 
in 2011. 
After taking power, the chief challenge to Mubarak was Islamist movements, 
particularly those that espoused a radical and violent ideology. While he attempted to 
eradicate extremists who belonged to al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya and the Jihad Movement, 
he adopted a softer and more tactical approach with the MB. Mubarak realized that it 
would be highly risky to fight on two Islamist fronts at the same time (Tawfiq, 1996). 
Hence, he deliberately ignored the MB during the 1980s.  
On its side, the MB astutely seized the new atmosphere created by Mubarak to 
entrench its social network and maximize its political gains (Ibrahim, 1996; Wickham, 
2002; Al-Awadi, 2004; El-Ghobashy, 2005). The POS that opened during the 1980s 
gave the MB a chance to rebuild its organization and expand its social network after 
decades of dysfunctionalism under Nasser and Sadat (Al-Awadi, 2004, p.55). The 
movement plunged into electoral politics and achieved major success in the 
parliamentary elections of 1984 and 1987. Because it was banned, MB members 
competed as independent candidates. However, due to the extant Electoral Law 
114/1983, which followed the absolute list system that required political parties to reach 
a threshold of 8% of the votes before seats could be gained in parliament, the MB was 
forced to build electoral alliances with other political forces. Hence, in the 1984 and 
1987 elections, the MB allied with al-Wafd Party and Labour Parties (Hizb al-‘amal al-
Islami and al-Ahrar Party) respectively (Ibrahim, 1998; Wickham, 2002; El-Ghobashy, 
2005) and achieved surprising results. 157  Moreover, the MB dominated several 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157 In 1984 the MB received eight seats out of 58 gained in its alliance with al-Wafd Party and in 1987 it 
received 36 seats out of the 56 gained by the Islamic Alliance (El-Ghobashy, 2005).	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professional syndicates. Dissatisfied with the corruption and poor socio-economic 
performance of the syndicates (Al-Awadi, 2004: Zahid, 2010), many doctors, lawyers, 
and engineers have sought to change the executive boards. Emboldened by its emerging 
political clout, the MB fielded many candidates in the professional syndicate and 
associations elections. The movement won the majority of seats in medicine, pharmacy 
and engineering (Wickham, 2002; El-Ghobashy, 2005). Therefore, by the end of 1980s, 
the MB had become the major opposition movement in Egypt. The movement 
consolidated its presence in the political arena and expanded its social network across 
the country (Ibrahim, 1996; Wickham, 2002; El-Ghobashy, 2005). Moreover, the 
movement witnessed the birth of a new political generation that would lead the 
movement for the ensuing two decades (Al-Awadi, 2004; El-Ghobashy, 2005).  
Clearly, the rewards associated with political participation encouraged the MB to 
invest heavily in politics during the 1980s. However, Mubarak came to realize that the 
expansion of the MB was undermining his growing legitimacy and threatening his rule. 
Therefore, by the beginning of the 1990s, confrontation between Mubarak and the MB 
was unavoidable. During the 1990s, the Mubarak regime carried out the heaviest 
crackdown by the state against the MB since the 1950s and 1960s (El-Ghobashy, 2005). 
Mubarak employed the surge of violence in Egypt during the first half of the 1990s to 
suppress all Islamists regardless if they were violent or non-violent. The MB, in turn, 
sought to de-legitimize the regime and discredit its party, NDP. Hence, it boycotted the 
parliamentary election in 1990 and sought to renew its alliance with other political 
forces. The MB also sought to replace its political activism by expanding its social 
activities and network in the public sphere. Its candidates swept many syndicate and 
university elections (Ibrahim, 1998; Al-Awady, 2004; El-Ghobashy, 2005).  
By the mid-1990s, the relationship between Mubarak and the MB reached an 
impasse. As noted by Wickham: “After more than a decade of toleration, the 
government launched a major counteroffensive against the Muslim Brotherhood, 
arresting many of its most dynamic leaders and hammering away at its reputation by 
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condemning it as an ‘illegal organization with ties to extremist groups’” (2002, p.3).158 
In addition, the regime resorted to the military trials to jettison the MB’s active leaders. 
Thus, many were persecuted and imprisoned for periods of more than five years 
(Ibrahim, 1998). As Al-Awadi points out, the period from the 1995 to 2000 witnessed 
the regime’s strongest dependence on coercion as a response to the growing political 
and social influence of the MB (Al-Awadi, 2004, p.189). 
 
7.3.1. Mubarak and the MB… From an Utter to a Subtle Conflict  
If the 1990s were dubbed by a noted MB leader as the ordeal decade,159 the new 
decade in the second millennium can be best described as a subtle confrontation 
between Mubarak and the MB or, as Brown (2012) puts it, the cat-and-mouse game. 
After a decade of outright confrontation, Mubarak and the MB became more attuned to 
the rules of the game and they unconsciously shifted positions during the 2000s. During 
the first half of the decade, while the MB became more offensive and bold, Mubarak, for 
many reasons related to regional changes and international pressure, became more 
defensive.  
This era can be divided into two phases. The first is 2000-2005 and the second is 
2005-2010. During the first phase, the MB sought to reposition itself within the 
boundaries set by the regime; however, with a more offensive and bold strategy than 
previously. Not only did the movement participate in the 2000 elections in spite of the 
legal restrictions and security harassment against its candidates, it also nominated for the 
first time, a woman, Jihane al-Halafawi, to run in the elections; a step that took many by 
surprise but further provoked the regime that had been responding brutally (El-
Ghobashy, 2005).160 Moreover, the MB sought to re-build its relations with other 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
158 More details about Mubarak’s harsh campaign against the MB during the 1990s can be found in 
Tawfiq (1996), Wickham (2002) and El-Ghobashy (2005). However, it should be noted that Mubarak, for 
the first time since Nasser, used the military courts against the MB leaders, many of whom were detained 
and sentenced in the 1990s (Wickham, 2002).  	  
159 Interview with Essam al-Eryan on 25 December 2010.	  
160 Al-Halafawi was nominated in Alexandria’s al-Raml district. The nomination reflected a significant 
change in the MB ideology and religious thinking. Although the MB issued a statement in 1994 that 
allowed women to participate in public life, it was the first time in the MB’s history that the organisation 
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political parties after a decade of isolation. Senior leaders, such as Essam al-Eryan and 
Abduelmoniem Abulfotouh, attempted to improve MB relations with secular, leftist, and 
liberal forces (El-Ghobashy, 2005, p.398). Nevertheless, the boldest and provocative 
move by the MB came when the newly elected General Guide, Mohamed Mahdi Akef, 
issued the Political Reform Initiative in March 2004 which unequivocally advocated a 
civil and democratic state (Essam El-Din, 2004), while the initiative was another 
indication that the MB was determined to adopt political reform including democratic 
values. Furthermore, it was an attempt to embarrass the regime that previously described 
the MB as a regressive movement. For many, the MB’s initiative was a hallmark in the 
ideological and political development of the MB (El-Ghobasy, 2005). It reaffirmed the 
MB’s commitment to democracy and the Initiative addressed, in detail, the social, 
political, and economic problems that faced Egypt. It also provided a comprehensive 
vision of the MB on how to deal with these issues.161 By the close of 2004, the MB had 
developed a good relationship with Nasserists and liberals particularly after the launch 
of the Kifaya (Enough) movement162 which became an umbrella for many of the 
political opposition leaders.  
After the re-election of George W. Bush in the 2004 US presidential election, the 
relationship between the US and Egypt entered a critical era. The Bush administration 
adopted a freedom agenda to promote democracy and political reform throughout the 
Middle East. However, it complicated the relationship between the US and its long-
standing authoritarian allies in the region, including Mubarak. Hence, Mubarak, for the 
first time in three decades, became under severe pressure from the US administration to 
adopt politically liberal policies. The first change, albeit cosmetic, happened when 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
nominated woman in the elections despite the harsh repression of the security forces against the MB’s 
candidates. Hence, the security forces harassed al-Halafawi and her family and the election in its district 
was suspended for two years before being rigged in favour of the NDP’s candidate (El-Ghobashy 2005: 
373).	  
161 The initiative can be found at this link (Arabic): 
http://www.aljazeera.net/specialfiles/pages/a7d9e130-0f09-4b77-bbb0-ee07dd61afd3 
162 Kifaya movement was established in 2004 by various political activists and forces including the MB 
who opposed Mubarak and rejected what they perceived as attempts to give power to his son, Gamal 
Mubarak. For more see, Oweidat, 2008.	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Mubarak amended Article 76 in the constitution in order to allow competitive 
presidential elections for the first time in Egypt’s modern history. While the official 
media celebrated Mubarak’s step as a significant step towards real democracy, the 
opposition leaders, particularly the MB, viewed it as a sign of the weakness of Mubarak 
regime. Hence, they pressed for more political gains. Over 2005, many political 
groupings demonstrated against Mubarak, including judges, university activists, workers, 
and, most importantly, the Kifaya movement. The MB shrewdly capitalized on the 
momentum and joined, for the first time since its return to politics in the 1970s, in 
protests against Mubarak. It was clear that the MB continued its offensive strategy 
against the Mubarak regime as it organized more than 15 demonstrations across the 
country and developed its relationship with judges, Kifaya, and other political parties 
(al-Anani, 2007, p.222). The persistent pressure of the MB against Mubarak resulted in 
the startling success of its candidates in the November and December 2005 elections. 
For the first time in its history, the MB garnered 88 seats (20% of total seats) despite 
brutal repression from the security forces.  
However, the second half of the 2000s witnessed a tough confrontation between 
the MB and Mubarak regime. The relationship between both parties reversed once again 
the regime become more offensive and attacked the MB harshly which retreated and 
became more defensive. The success of the MB after 2005 elections threatened Mubarak 
and jeopardized the NDP’s domination. Thus Mubarak considered that only elimination 
and suppression could stop the MB and undermine its electoral success. Hence, the 
regime unleashed a harsh campaign against the MB leaders and undermined its social 
activities. In addition, the startling success of Hamas, the Palestinian offshoot of the MB, 
in the Palestinian parliamentary elections in 2006, and the easing of international 
pressure for democracy in the Middle East, encouraged Mubarak to repress the MB 
more brutally. In 2007, around 40 senior leaders of the MB were sentenced to between 
three and ten years in a military court including Khairat al-Shater, the Deputy of the 
General Guide, and Hasan Malek, the business tycoon. Between 2008 and 2010, the 
Mubarak regime tightened the pressure on the MB and undermined its social and 
	  
	  
	  
	  
232	  
economic activities. Moreover, the security forces arrested many middle-rank members 
across the country, shut down the MPs offices, confiscated their belongings, and banned 
them from leaving the country. 
 
7.4. THE RESPONSE OF THE MB TO REGIME REPRESSION 
Islamist movements respond differently to regime repression. While some 
movements can be radicalized and react violently, others respond peacefully and attempt 
to accommodate and tolerate regime repression. An influential body of literature 
suggests that regime repression leads to significant changes in a movement’s ideology, 
behaviour and organization (Wickham, 2004; El-Ghobashy, 2005; Schwedler, 2006; 
Tezcur, 2010; Wegner, 2011). This strand of scholarship belongs to what has become 
known as the ‘inclusion-moderation’ thesis. The main premise of this thesis is that the 
anti-system movements tend to shift their position and discourse once they are 
integrated into the political game (Wickham, 2004; El-Ghobashy, 2005; Tezcur, 2010). 
The change in a movement’s ideology and behaviour is usually conducive to their 
participation in the political process. Hence the greater the political opportunities and 
rewards, the more moderate movements will become. However, many scholars contest 
the basic assumptions of the ‘inclusion-moderation’ thesis (Tezcur, 2010; Schwelder, 
2011; Brown, 2012). Not only is moderation as a concept by its very nature vague, 
controversial, and elusive but most importantly the response of Islamist movements’ to 
inclusion is not identical (Eva & Pellicer, 2009). While some movements can become 
more moderate when they participate in the political process, for example, the MB and 
the Moroccan Party of Justice and Development (PJD), others do not, for example, 
Hizbullah and Hamas. Moreover, some movements never radicalized despite regime 
repression and exclusion, for example, al-Nahda Party in Tunisia, and the MB in Syria.  
While this study concurs with the broad criticism of the ‘inclusion-moderation’ 
thesis, it is not concerned with the impact of inclusion/exclusion on a movements’ 
behaviour or ideology. Rather the thesis is mainly preoccupied by the effects of 
repression on a movement’s internal dynamics. In other words, instead of focusing on 
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the external outcome of the regime repression, such as moderation or radicalization, this 
chapter probes the internal effect of repression on the movement. It reveals how 
repression interplays with the MB’s internal power structures and how it affects the 
movement’s unity and coherence. Therefore, instead of looking at the response of an 
Islamist movement to regime repression, the research focuses on the utilization of this 
repression within the movement.  
This study argues that repression, among other factors, can explain the MB’s 
coherence and unity. As is explained, the MB invests in regime oppression in order to 
foster solidarity and ensure unity among members. This utilization manifests itself in 
two main forms: identity consolidation or the enforced coherence between the MB 
members; and the balance of power within the movement between different factions. 
The next section sketches these two effects of repression on the MB. 
 
7.4.1. Mechanisms of Enforced Coherence 
For many years, the MB capitalized on regime repression to enhance its internal 
coherence and unity. Despite the high cost of repression, the movement was able to turn 
it into a source of solidarity that bound members and maintained their loyalty to the 
movement and its leadership. This happens through developing a sense of victimization 
among members. The social and physiological impact of repression gave the MB an 
image of underdog. The movement’s leaders have cleverly employed this image to 
ensure solidarity and gain public approval. This sense of tribulation became prevalent 
among the MB members and leaders and was rooted in the movement’s literature and 
socialization process. Accordingly, the greater the repression, the more the coherence 
could be enforced. 
In addition, regime repression plays a crucial role in shaping the relationship 
between different factions within the MB. The relationship between the conservatives, 
or hard-liners, and the reformers has always been shaped by regime repression. The 
conservatives shrewdly utilized oppression to maintain their power and control over the 
organization. Moreover, they employed regime repression in order to undermine and de-
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legitimize the internal calls for reform. Those who oppose the MB leadership or seek to 
reform the internal systems and structure to become more transparent and democratic 
are regularly marginalized and excluded from the movement, not only because of their 
ideological or religious views that can be different from the leadership but also as a 
result of power conflict within the movement. Over the past two decades, the 
conservatives have crushed the reformists and defused their call for change. In turn, the 
reformers have been caught between leaving the MB and abandoning their reformist 
agenda. 
 
7.4.1.1. The construction of the ‘Victimization Narrative’  
The question of why the MB did not fissure is significant. The ability of the MB 
to survive and recover from attempts which could have cracked it reveals its resilient 
and self-disciplined nature. The regime repression played an important role in this 
regard. This happens through what can be called the ‘ordeal narrative’ or mihna. It refers 
to the sense of tribulation that prevailed among the MB members as a result of regime 
oppression. It originated primarily from the memories and images of torture and 
execution of many of MB leaders under Nasser’s regime in the 1950s and 1960s. The 
brutal attempt of Nasser to eliminate the MB affected the spirit and the mindset of its 
leaders and cadres. Over time, these memories, images, and emotions became an 
integral part of the MB’s organizational culture. Therefore, many MB leaders repeatedly 
recall them in order to create solidarity among members and ensure the movement’s 
unity. 
Furthermore, this sense of tribulation is frequently constructed and reproduced 
within the MB structure and discourse. For instance, the rhetoric and literature of the 
MB are overwhelmed by ordeal meanings and stories. Notions like patience (sabr), test 
(ibtila), sacrifice (tadhiyya) are prevalent in the MB’s everyday discourse and 
statements. They are regularly invoked in times of oppression and always accompanied 
by religious connotations. For instance, Mohei Hamed, a member of the MB’s Guidance 
Bureau, points out that tribulation is a test of members’ faith and beliefs. He asserts that 
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prisons are venues where members can be tested and he calls upon members to be ready 
for sacrifice in order to save the movement and the da‘wa (Hamed, 2008, accessed on 
16 October 2012).  
Furthermore, the tribulation and sufferance of members can enhance their 
position within the movement. Those who are frequently arrested or tortured tend to 
employ their oppression as a means to strengthen their position within the MB. Some 
are able to achieve material interests, such as promotion and economic compensation. 
However, this does not imply that the MB members are keen to be arrested or tortured. 
Rather it means that regime repression can sometimes benefit certain members 
materially and organizationally. Hence, it is widely known in the MB that those who 
oppose the regime are likely to be promoted and become highly respected among the 
rank and file of the movement. Furthermore, imprisonment and torture can become a 
source of credibility and trust. Thus, those who were tried and persecuted became 
symbols in the MB. 
More noticeably, repression plays an important role in increasing the MB’s 
popularity and appeal. The movement tends to portray itself as the regime’s victim. Not 
only do the MB’s leaders and cadres strengthen this image among their networks but 
also they utilize it to attract and recruit new members. According to Mahmoud Ezzat, 
the Deputy of the MB General Guide, the MB gains from repression and torture more 
than it loses. He states, “It is remarkable that after each tribulation supporters and 
members of the MB increase. People always show sympathy and support with the 
families of those who are arrested” (Ezzat interview with Zahraa Bassam on 
Ikhwanonline on 24 March 2008). 
In addition, the indoctrination and socialization process within the MB plays a 
crucial role in maintaining and embedding the culture of oppression. For instance, many 
of the MB leaders and members view regime repression as a sign for their just cause. As 
Mahmoud Ezzat puts it, “regime repression is the glue that binds us together and reflects 
that we are on the right path” (Ezzat interview with Zahraa Bassam on 24 March 2008). 
This sense of acceptance of regime repression is employed by leaders to spur members’ 
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commitment and adherence to the movement’s ideology and leadership. Islam Lotfi, a 
former young member of the MB, expressed his astonishment at the reaction of some 
members towards the trials of the MB leaders. He states in one of his blogs, “I received 
many comments and messages from young members who seemed thrilled by the verdict 
of their leaders as they view it a sign of the MB’s success” (Lotfi, 2008). 
Furthermore, during times of repression the MB tends to focus inwardly in order 
to maintain internal unity and integration. As Melucci (1996, p.319) highlighted, with 
regime repression, self-preservation and group solidarity become the sole goal of the 
movement. According to Mohamed Mostafa, a middle rank member of the MB, the 
main goal of the movement during repression is to keep members connected and ensure 
their solidarity and loyalty and this can only happen through intensifying the 
identification and socialization process.163 In addition, repression prompts the MB to 
change its organizational rules. For instance, to protect members from security 
surveillance and arrest, the MB changed its membership system and procedures. From 
the beginning of 1990s, joining the MB became more disciplined and members’ 
backgrounds were scrutinized more closely. Moreover, the MB omitted the levels and 
procedures of membership in its bylaw in 1994 in order to outmanoeuvre the security 
forces. It was the first time since the foundation of the movement that the section on 
membership levels and duties was not included. Moreover, the new bylaw was not made 
available to ordinary members or to the general public until recently. 164 Only leaders 
and high-rank cadres were able to access the bylaw. 
Another factor that could explain the unity and coherence of the MB is the 
absence of political and organizational alternatives. The political closure in Egypt under 
Mubarak discouraged many members from abandoning the MB. Hence, those who 
might adopt different political and ideological views are caught between the choice of 
regime repression and the MB. As Abdurrahman Ayyash states: “They are stuck 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163 Interview with Mohamed Mostafa in Zagazig on 3 April 2012.	  
164 It was not until the Egyptian Revolution in 2011 that the MB revealed its bylaw on its official website 
www.ikhwanonline.com. While there is no significant difference between the old and news bylaws in 
many instances, the section pertinent to membership levels and procedures remains omitted.	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between the ugly and the bad” 165 . Moreover, the case of the Al-Wasat Party 
overshadowed many of members in the MB. As is discussed in the next section, Al-
Wasat members had to struggle with the Mubarak regime for more than 15 years in 
order to secure a political license. Hence, many reformers were caught between 
remaining in the MB and confronting regime repression alone. In other words, the MB 
benefited from regime repression as dissenting members remained in the movement.  
Finally, the last factor that can explain the MB’s coherence and resilience is the 
ability of the MB to marginalize and exclude members without creating major internal 
rifts. One of the main features of the MB as a social organization lies in its ability to 
isolate dissenters. The movement rarely dismisses members who criticize the movement 
or defy its leadership. Neither does it materially or physically punish them if they violate 
its rules. It merely marginalizes them and demonizes their cause. The movement has 
developed a sub-culture that de-legitimizes any calls for reform. Hence, dissenting 
members are frequently confronted by two unpalatable options: to leave the MB without 
the ability to reform it or to remain in the movement but abandoning their views and 
following the leadership. Given the degree of political closure and the lack of other 
political alternatives in Egypt under Mubarak, it was immensely difficult for dissenters 
to leave the MB. Thus, many of them remained in the MB but became self-
marginalized.166 For instance, reformist figures such as Abdelmoniem Abuelfotouh, 
Mohamed Habib, Ibrahim El-Za‘farani and Khaled Daw‘ud could not leave the MB 
under Mubarak despite their progressive and reformist views. On the other hand, the 
MB could not allow them to disseminate their views among the rank-and-file which led 
them to abandon the movement after the revolution. 
 
7.4.2. Many Quarrels, Rare Splits 
 It is important to stress that the MB’s unity and integration does not mean that it 
is a monolithic or unbreakable organization. By contrast, it means that the movement’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165	  Interview with Abdurrahman Ayyash in Cairo on 26 March 2012.	  
166 Interview with Abdurrahman Ayash on 26 March 2012.	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leadership can manipulate and employ internal divisions in order to control and maintain 
power in the organization. The MB is an umbrella of different factions, currents, and 
generations who compete and debate over ideology, discourse, and the political stance 
of the leadership. Its leaders contest many ideological and political issues, for example, 
participating in the election, how to react to regime repression, and whether or not to 
participate in the government. However, they are rarely split. As Brown points out, the 
MB’s followers and leaders can quarrel endlessly; however, it is usually over short-term 
tactical and organizational issues, not the ideological or religious ones (2012, p.130). He 
asserts that Islamists rarely split, and if they do, it is over how to organize or act, not 
over what to say or think (Brown, 2012, p.130). However, although this study agrees 
with Brown’s notion of ideological resilience of the MB, it contends that internal 
divisions and tensions within the MB go beyond organizational and tactical questions to 
reach ideological and religious questions. More importantly, the dividing lines between 
conservatives and reformers are always triggered over the ideological and religious 
stance of the MB which sometimes can result in serious clashes and rifts within the 
movement. Moreover, organizational and tactical questions, such as promotion 
procedures, generational relationship and accountability, can lead to serious divisions 
within the MB. Al-Wasat members did not leave the MB just because of ideological and 
political differences with the leadership but also because they perceived an 
organizational inertia in the movement’s structures (Wickham, 2002; El- Ghobashy, 
2005). 
Therefore, this chapter contends that the MB’s leaders and members do have 
ideological, political, and organizational differences; however, these differences rarely 
result in creating a substantive schism. Divisions within the MB are marginal and not in 
the core of the organization. Over the past three decades, the MB has shown a 
remarkable ability in controlling and accommodating members’ differences. Moreover, 
the movement used regime repression to mitigate these differences and reconnect 
members with its ideology.  
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However, before the management of splits within the MB are analyzed, two 
important points need to be mentioned. First, the tendency of members to split becomes 
greater during times of political openness, which proves the argument about regime 
repression and the MB’s ‘enforced’ coherence. The politicization of the MB makes it 
more prone to changes and transformation. The second point is that regime repression 
increases when the MB takes bold and progressive ideological or political initiatives.  
 
7.4.2.1. Managing the splits 
Since its foundation, the MB witnessed different types of divisions. However, 
these have not weakened the movement. In contrast, each time the movement encounters 
an attempt to split it, it becomes stronger and more solid. The history of divisions within 
the MB dates back to its early days under Hasan al-Banna.167 Rifts continued after the 
death of al-Banna when a significant division occurred under the leadership of Hasan al- 
Hudaybi, the second General Guide of the MB. Some of the Special Apparatus (al-
Tanzim al-Khas) cadres led by Abdurrahman al-Sanadi, the head of the Special 
Apparatus, sought to take over the movement and isolate al-Houdabiy because of what 
they perceived as his unfriendly attitude towards Nasser regime.168  
Despite the relative openness under Sadat, the MB maintained the tribulation 
culture as an effective tool to rebuild the organization and ensure members’ solidarity. 
However, under Mubarak, the MB faced different critical periods for maintaining its 
organizational unity. However, the movement was able to survive different attempts to 
split it. With the increase of its politicization, the MB started to witness different 
opinions regarding its ideological and political stance. For instance, by the end of 1980s 
the MB witnessed the first attempt to divide it under the Mubarak regime. A group of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167 Two serious attempts occurred under al-Banna’s leadership during the 1930s and 1940s. The first was 
led by Ahmed al-Sokkary, a close friend of al-Banna and the first Secretary General of the MB. The 
second was by a group of zealous members who wanted to use force against the British occupation and 
were called Mohamed’s Youth Group (Lia, 1998).	  
168 This division was more serious than the previous ones. Not only because of the organizational 
influence of al-Sanadi but also because it came at a time when the MB was struggling to recover from al-
Banna’s death and the attempt of the new regime under Nasser to capitalize on this division (Tamam, 
2012).	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ikhwan at al-Azhar University led by the Azharite Mohamed Rushdi decided to leave 
the MB in protest against “its deviation from the righteous Islamic path” (Tamam, 2012, 
p.46).169 However, this attempt to create splits within the MB was useless. 
By the beginning of 1990s, and after a decade of political success and social 
expansion, the MB started to witness an increase in internal tensions and discontent (El-
Ghobashy, 2005). Emboldened by its political success, the young generation that 
emerged during the 1970 and 1980s pressed the MB’s leadership to become more 
decisive on certain controversial issues, such as establishing a political party, rights for 
women and Christians, and political pluralism. Thus, in 1994 the MB made its first 
ideological revision when it issued a bold initiative that defined clearly the position of 
the movement on these issues. The statement, which was called “Shura and Party 
Pluralism in Muslim Society”, stresses the political rights of women and Christians to 
hold public office (Ibrahim, 1998; El-Ghobasy, 2005). The statement was a significant 
development in the MB’s ideological and religious thinking. It was the first time that the 
MB accepted party pluralism and recognized democracy as the only viable political 
system. Clearly, the Shura statement was the outcome of the intensive debate between 
the old and young generations. It aimed to make a clear break from the ambiguous 
stance of the old guards on the issues raised by the statement (El-Ghobashy, 2005, 
pp.382-383). More significantly, the statement came under a harsh campaign of regime 
repression. As mentioned, the political success of the MB and its growing influence in 
professional syndicates provoked the regime to respond strongly.  
By the mid-1990s, the MB faced its most critical organizational crisis during the 
Mubarak era when a group of young members led by Abu Ela Madi and Essam Sultan 
decided to establish a political party. Emboldened by the political success of the MB and 
disappointed by its organizational inertia, this group took the initiative to end the 
outlawed and ambiguous status of the MB. They created the Al-Wasat Party and 
attempted to obtain a political licence. Initially, Al-Wasat Party was perceived by the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
169 According to Tamam, this group embraced extreme ideas that were derived from Sayyid Qutb’s 
ideology (Tamam, 2012, p.46).	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regime and the international media as a front for the MB (Wickham, 2002, p.218). 
Hence, the regime arrested Madi and his fellows, in addition to many MB leaders. 
However, according to Madi, Al-Wasat Party was entirely an independent attempt to 
break the frozen relationship between the MB and Mubarak regime (Madi. 2005). 170 
Clearly, the movement’s leadership under Mustafa Mashhur, the fifth General Guide of 
the MB and his deputy and strong man Ma’mun al-Hudaybi, did not tolerate the Al-
Wasat bid and forced Abu Ela Madi and his colleagues to resign from the MB (Tawfiq, 
1996; Wickham, 2002; El-Ghobashy, 2005). Moreover, Mashhur and al-Hudaybi, 
ordered all members who joined Al-Wasat Party to withdraw or they would also face 
expulsion (Wickham, 2002, p.218). 
Clearly, the crisis of Al-Wasat reveals how the MB treats those who defy its 
leadership. Despite the organizational consequences of Al-Wasat crisis, the MB 
remained united. The movement’s leadership were able to exploit regime repression in 
gaining support in the face of the Al-Wasat dissenters. Moreover, the subsequent dispute 
between the Mubarak regime and Al-Wasat leaders over obtaining official recognition 
strengthened the MB position and discouraged others from leaving the movement. Not 
surprisingly, since the Al-Wasat crisis, the MB has not witnessed any further significant 
attempt to divide the movement.  
 
7.5. THE ELUSIVE GAME BETWEEN THE CONSERVATIVES AND THE 
REOFRMISTS 
Scholars of Islamist politics tend to divide Islamists into two main currents: the 
conservatives or the hawks, and the reformers or doves (Brown, 2006; Abu Ruman, 
2009; Tamam, 2012). Regardless of the precision of such a classification, factions 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170 The establishment of Al-Wasat Party is still highly contested between the MB and Madi. While many 
of the MB senior leaders insist that the Guidance Bureau supported the idea of establishing Al-Wasat, 
Madi ascertains that it was his original idea. For instance, Mahdi Akef, the former General Guide of the 
MB, affirms that he was responsible for the new party when he was a member in the Guidance Bureau. 
Likewise, Mahmoud Ezzat and Essam Al-Eryan stress the role of the Guidance Bureau in allowing Madi 
and his fellow members to proceed in establishing Al-Wasat Party. Ezzat, for instance, underscores this 
claim by referring to the arrest and trials of many MB leaders in reaction to the attempt to establish the 
party. 	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within Islamist movements are evident. These movements have ideological, religious, 
and political differences. Members and leaders can adopt different and conflictual views. 
The very social and political nature of Islamist movements renders them prone to 
internal conflicts and disputes. The power structure, generational gap, and 
organizational roles are crucial factors in shaping the dynamics and interactions within 
Islamist movements. However, regime repression remains one of the most important 
factors that affect the internal dynamics of Islamist movements, particularly the 
relationship between the conservatives and reformers. This chapter argues that the 
relentless waves of repression, detention and torture against the MB played out in favour 
of the conservatives. It empowered them at the expense of the reformers. The 
conservatives, in this regard, refer to those leaders who adopt strict ideological and 
religious beliefs and concentrate on how to preserve the movement’s survival even at 
the expense of political participation. In the MB they used to be called ‘The 
Organizational Current’ (al-taiyyar al-tanzimi). They are primarily concerned with 
preaching, making da‘wa, and expanding the social base of the MB. In contrast, the 
reformers are those who adopt a progressive religious and political ideology and seek to 
integrate the MB into the political process. They concentrate on political activities and 
building coalitions and alliances with liberal and secular forces. They also call for 
fundamental reform within the MB structure in order that it becomes a more transparent 
and democratic organization. The Reformers were dubbed ’The Public Affair Current’ 
(taiyyar al-al-‘amal al-‘am) (al-Anani, 2007; Tamam, 2010).  
Since the return of the MB in the 1970s, these two currents co-existed, disputed 
and confronted in the MB. The relationship between them was usually one of ebb and 
flow. However, regime repression was crucial in shaping the dynamics of this 
relationship. It played well in favour of the conservatives who dominated the MB since 
the mid of 1990s. It was apparent that the greater the repression, the powerful the 
conservatives became. Moreover, the reformers were usually squeezed between the 
regime and the hardliners. On the one hand, it was in the Mubarak regime’s interest to 
portray the MB as a regressive and reactionary movement with no democratic 
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credentials in order to suppress it and stop any internal or external support. Therefore, 
the reformist current was the main obstacle to Mubarak in achieving this goal, not only 
because of their progressive ideology, such as accepting democratic values, religious 
tolerance, and contesting politics, but also because of their ability and skills in building 
alliances and forming coalitions with non-Islamist groupings. On the other hand, it was 
in the hardliners’ interest to weaken and marginalize the reformers in order to solidify 
their grip on power in the MB and enforce their religious and ideological views. Thus, 
they utilized regime repression to marginalize reformers and de-legitimize their 
demands for change. Hence, reformers were perceived of as a threat by both the regime 
and the MB’s conservatives. They were always caught in the crossfire between both 
groups. The result was the gradual erosion and elimination of the reformers over the past 
two decades.  
The crucial question is: how could the conservatives employ regime repression 
in order to exclude and marginalize the reformists? In other words, how did regime 
repression interplay with the internal power balance between the two factions? This 
question can be answered by examining the balance of power within the MB since 
1970s and how it shifted in the favour of the conservatives. The next section probes this 
issue.  
 
7.5.1. The Balance of Power in the MB: The Shift towards the Conservatives 
During the 1970s and the 1980s, the reformist current was influential in the MB. 
After Nasser’s ordeal, a new generation emerged in the MB by the mid-1970s. People 
such as Abduelmomiem Abulfotouh, Esaam al-Eriyan, Abuelela Madi, Helmi al-Gazar, 
Ibrahim al-Za’farani and others sought to rebuild the MB after two decades of 
fragmentation and inertia. They benefited from the relative political openness under 
Sadat who sought to manipulate Islamists in order to counterbalance his adversaries: the 
leftists and Nasserists. This generation rebuilt the institutional and organizational 
structure of the MB across the country. It was that generation that pulled the MB out of 
its political isolation and apathy to become more integrated and politicized. Moreover, 
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they pushed the MB towards electoral politics and pressed its leadership to develop their 
ideological and religious views (Wickham, 2002; Al-Awadi, 2004: El-Ghobashy, 2005; 
Abulfotouh, 2010). This generation flourished in Cairo and other urban centres such as 
Alexandria, Assuit and El-Menia and expanded the social and organizational network of 
the MB into new areas. It was backed and supported by a senior line of leadership 
particularly the third General Guide, Umar al-Tilmissani, who embraced moderate views 
and was keen to politicize the MB (Abulfotouh, 2010). This generation embodied the 
core of the reformist current that would become very influential in the MB for the 
subsequent two decades. If the 1970s witnessed the birth of this current, the years of the 
1980s were the heyday of those who represented the MB in the 1984 and 1987 elections. 
They also strengthened the presence of the MB in syndicates and universities across 
Egypt. Moreover, they reshaped the MB ideology and discourse to become moderate 
and pragmatic. Thus, under al-Telmsani tenure, the MB renounced violence, accepted 
political participation, and built historical coalitions with liberal, leftist, and secular 
forces (Wickham, 2002).  
The death of al-Tilmissani in 1986 was a major blow to the reformist current. 
Many of its leaders felt alienated and traumatized by the departure of their mentor (Madi, 
2009). As Abulfotouh argues, “the departure of al-Tilmissani was a big loss to the 
movement and the reformist wing” (2010, p.42). Tilmissani was not only a genuine 
supporter of the reformers but also a bulwark that protected reformists from the 
domination of the conservative old guard (Madi, 2009). According to Essam Sultan, a 
former MB leader and the co-founder of Al-Wasat Party with Madi, Tilmissani was the 
pivot that maintained a balance between the conservatives and the reformists. He points 
out, “By the death of Tilmissani, the balance between the generation of the Special 
Apparatus (al-Tanzim al-Khas) and the reformers ended in favor of the old guards” 
(cited in Sultan, 2009, accessed on 22 October 2012).  
The death of al-Tilmissani was a turning point in the relationship between the 
conservatives and the reformists. Since then the balance of power shifted incrementally 
in favour of the former as many of the MB’s old leaders who left the country under 
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Nasser and Sadat returned and sought to have an influential role in the MB. 171 Three of 
them, Mustafa Mashhur,172 Ma’mun al-Hudaybi173 and Mahdi Akef,174 would become 
later the fifth, the sixth, and the seventh General Guides of the MB respectively. 
Moreover, another group of conservatives leaders emerged and sought counter-balance 
with the reformers, among them Mohamed Badie, who would become later the eighth 
General Guide of the MB, Mahmoud Ezzat, who would become the Secretary General 
of the MB, and Khairat al-Shater, the business tycoon and most powerful leader in the 
MB since 2000s. 
 The shift in the power balance between the conservatives and the reformers 
became more visible under the tenure of the fourth General Guide of the MB, Mohamed 
Hamed Abu al-Nasr (1986-1996). A veteran member who spent more than 20 years in 
prison under Nasser, Abu al-Nasr was a conservative but weak leader. He was certainly 
less progressive than his predecessor, al-Tilmissani, and his feeble tenure encouraged 
the conservatives to become powerful and dominate the organization at the expense of 
the reformers (Habib, 2012).175 
During the first half of the 1990s, the conservatives sought to solidify their 
position in the MB. They dominated the Guidance Bureau and the administrative offices 
of the MB. Moreover, the regime repression during that time was, partially, a response 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171 In September 1981, Sadat had unleashed a harsh security campaign against his opponents from all 
ideological currents. Many of the MB leaders fled and did not return until the second half of the 1980s.	  
172 Mashhur left the country in 1981 and was based between Kuwait and Germany. He returned in 1986 
and became the Deputy of the General Guide. He became the MB’s fifth General Guide from 1996 to 
2002 after a fierce debate over his competency.	  
173 He left Egypt in 1981 for Saudi Arabia where he worked at the Ministry of Interior before returning in 
1986. He had run in the 1987 elections and became the head and the spokesperson of the MB’s 
parliamentary bloc. He became the sixth General Guide from 2002 to 2004. 	  
174 He fled Egypt in 1981 to Germany where he established the Islamic Centre in Munich. After his return 
in 1986, he was selected as a member of the MB’s Guidance Bureau. He became the seventh General 
Guide from 2004 to 2010.	  
175 Habib points out that the selection of Abu al-Nasr was a surprise for many MB members, particularly 
the outsiders. Ironically, he refers to how he along with Mashhur and Ma’mun al-Hudaybi orchestrated 
the selection process of Abu al-Nasr which reveals how much the latter was weak in the face of those who 
propelled him into the leadership. Furthermore, Sultan points out that the selection of Abu al-Nasr to be 
the General Guide of the MB after al-Tilmissani was because he was weak and unaware of the internal 
dynamics of the MB which, according to Sultan, were controlled and directed by the conservatives 
(Sultan, 2009, accessed on 22 October 2012). 
	  
	  
	  
	  
246	  
to the power shift in the MB towards the conservatives. That is, in 1992 the security 
forces arrested many of the MB conservative leaders through what was known as the 
case of Salsabil Company. At the end of 1986, Khairat al-Shater and Hasan Malek 
established a company for electronics and computer devices called Salsabil. Within a 
few years, the company expanded and brought on-board a new partner, Taher 
Abdelmoniem. In February 1992, the security forces raided Salsabil Company and 
confiscated the computers and many secret documents. The regime claimed that the 
security forces found documents under the rubric of ‘The Empowerment’ (al-tamkin), 
which, according to the regime, contained a detailed plan on how the MB could take 
over the country and establish an Islamic state (Al-Awadi, 2004, p.162). Al-Shater, 
Malek, and Taher were arrested along with other prominent leaders in the MB, among 
them Mahmoud Ezzat and Gomma Amin, a member of the Guidance Bureau. The 
Salsabil case revealed the tireless attempts of the conservatives to control the MB after 
the death of al-Tilmissani. Many MB leaders have asserted that al-Shater and Ezzat were 
planning to control the MB and marginalize the reformists after the death of al-
Tilmissani (Meligi, Madi and Sultan). Furthermore, the Salsabil issue witnessed the 
emergence of al-Shater, who would become later the strategist and the most influential 
leader in the MB. 
In January 1995, the General Shura Council (Majlis al-Shura al-‘am), the 
legislative body of the MB, convened for the first time since the 1950s to choose the 16 
members of the MB’s General Guidance Bureau (Maktb al-Irshad al-‘Am), the most 
powerful executive body in the MB. Abulfotouh was the only reformist elected. 
Moreover, the regime arrested many of many of the reformists after the elections. After 
two successful decades for the reformers during 1970s and 1980s, their influence within 
the MB started to diminish. 
In conjunction with the waning influence of the reformists, a new line of 
conservatives was consolidating its power over the MB. After the death of Abu al-Nasr 
in January 1996, conservatives installed one of them as the new General Guide. In a 
strong show of power, a small group of the hardliners declared Mustafa Mashhur as the 
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fifth General Guide of the MB immediately after the burial of Abu al-Nasr in what 
became the infamous “cemetery pledge of allegiance” (bay‘at al-maqabir) (El-
Ghobashy, 2005, p.386). As El-Ghobashy aptly described it: 
A tight-knit circle led by Guidance Bureau members Ma’mun al-Hudaybi and 
Mashour himself essentially anointed Mashour to the highest executive post 
without election or consultation with Shura Council members, citing as 
justification the security clampdown on the last Shura Council meeting in 
1995 (2005, p.386).176  
 
The inauguration of Mashhur was a stark confirmation of the shift in power in 
the MB towards the conservatives; not only because it violated the rules and bylaws of 
the MB for choosing the General Guide but also because it paved the way for a new line 
of conservatives who would dominate and control the MB in the following years.  
Under the Mashhur tenure, which was dominated by his strong Deputy Ma‘mun 
al-Hudaybi, who would succeed him as General Guide, the conservatives adopted an 
uncompromising stance towards the reformists. Not surprisingly, the MB witnessed the 
first genuine split in three decades. 177  In addition, the ideological and religious 
development of the MB’s discourse, which flourished in the 1980s and the first half of 
the 1990s, stalled. Mashhur provoked many internally and externally by his 
controversial statements on the rights of women and Christians (Al-Awadi, 2004; El-
Ghobasy, 2005). By the end of the 1990s, the MB was entirely under the control of the 
conservatives who did not tolerate reformists’ attempt to claim power over the 
organization. 
7.5.2. The Make Up of the Conservative Power Centre 
By the turn of the new millennium, the reformist current in the MB was 
practically fading away. Only Abulfotouh remained as a member in the almost fully 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
176 Essam Sultan, a former MB member and prominent figure of Al-Wasat Party, highlights that Mashhur 
was pushed by al- Hudaybi to become the General Guide. He refers to a meeting between him and 
Mashhur after the crisis of Al-Wasat where he asked Mashhur about the illegal way of taking ba‘ya and 
Mashhur replied, “I was really surprised by what al-Hudaybi did” referring to al- Hudaybi profound role 
in  bay‘at al-maqabir.  
For more http://www.youm7.com/NewsPrint.asp?NewsID=132880	  
177	  The case of Al-Wasat Party.	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conservative Guidance Bureau but merely for decorative reasons (Eissa, 2009). Other 
reformist figures such as al-Eryan, Mohamed Habib, Gamal Heshmat and Ibrahim El-
Za’frani, were completely powerless. In addition, a new conservative power centre was 
being developed. The conservatives sought to consolidate their control over the MB by 
creating a power centre that could dominate the MB’s organization and structure, 
particularly in rural and urban governorates. It was primarily anchored in two key 
figures: Khairat al-Shater, the member of the Guidance Bureau and who was appointed 
as the Second Deputy of the General Guide in 2004, and Mahmoud Ezzat, the member 
of the Guidance Bureau and the former Secretary General of the MB from 2001 till 2010 
and who is currently serving as the Deputy of the General Guide.  
After the Salsabil issue and his arrest in 1992, al-Shater became a popular figure 
within the MB. The story of al-Shater’s promotion within the MB proves how 
commitment and submission to the leadership is more effective than adopting reformist 
views. Born to a middle class family in the rural area of El-Mansoura, 120km inside 
Egypt’s Delta, two years before the 23 July 1952 coup d’état, al-Shater promoted 
himself as a strong advocate for the MB’s organizational survival. Ironically, he started 
his political career as a socialist during the Nasser regime when he was in high school 
and was arrested after participating in the student’s protests against Nasser in 1968. 
However, when attending university in Alexandria he became more attached to the then 
emerging Islamic trend that had overwhelmed Egyptian universities, which resulted in 
him joining the MB in 1974. After he joined the MB, al-Shater was influenced mainly 
by two prominent yet conservative leaders, Shaykh Sabri Arafa, a veteran member of 
the Guidance Bureau for more than two decades, and Mohamed Al-Adawy, a veteran 
member of the MB. Both belonged to what was known as the generation of 1965 (Abu 
Khalil, 2012).178 During the 1980s, al-Shater, as many others did, spent around seven 
years in exile, in Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the UK in order to avoid prison in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
178 This generation refers to the MB leaders who were in prison during the 1960s and were profoundly 
affected by the MB’s ideologue Sayyid Qutb. Many of them were released under Sadat and became 
influential in the MB from the 1970s. It includes many incumbent leaders among them the General Guide 
Mohamed Badie, Mahmoud Ezzat, Sayyid Nezzili, Rashad El-Bayoumi, Mahmoud Hussien and Gomma 
Amin.	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the aftermath of Sadat’s assassination in 1981. During his travels he made a fortune and 
built a good business network that would allow him to become a key player in the MB. 
In 1992, al-Shater was arrested for one year due to the Salsabil case which 
brought him to the attention of the MB’s leadership. A businessman with strategic and 
outstanding managerial skills, al-Shater proved himself as an unflinching loyal member 
to the MB’s ideology and message. In 1995, in a surprising move, he became a member 
of the Guidance Bureau which was dominated by elderly and veteran conservative 
members. Between 1995 and 2000, al-Shater was the key player in the MB yet, a subtle 
influence. As a banned movement, the MB could not invest or generate money to enable 
it to run activities and recruit members. Moreover, front line leaders could not publicly 
use the financial sources of the MB or otherwise the funds would be confiscated. Hence, 
there was a need for someone who would have a relatively low political profile, with 
business experience and skills, and most importantly could be trusted. It was al-Shater 
who was chosen for this role. According to Haitham Abu Khalil, a former member of 
the MB, al-Shater’s main job was to boost and increase the MB financial resources. 179 
Hence, he created and supervised many small and medium-sized businesses that could 
serve as a front for the MB’s financial activities without drawing the attention of the 
regime (Abu Khalil, 2012). 180 Over time, al-Shater strengthened his position within the 
MB to become a key player responsible for its main financial assets and resources.181 
The other influential leader in the MB who helped al-Shater in creating the 
conservative power centre was Mahmoud Ezzat, the former Secretary General of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
179 The main source of finance is members’ dues and donations. Dues are divided into different schemes 
depending on members’ income. Generally, there are three main schemes: the first scheme is for lower 
income members who should pay between 1% and 2% of their income. The second is the medium income 
members who pay between 3% and 5 % and the last scheme is for those whose income is high and pay 
from 5% to 7 % of their earnings (al-Anani, 2007, p,258). 	  
180 There are different estimates as to al-Shater’s fortune. While he admits that his wealth is no more than 
five million dollars, others value it at more than 15 million dollars. Regardless of the accuracy of these 
numbers, it is widely known that al-Shater is the most important business tycoon in the MB. His fortune 
came mainly from a range of businesses that include furniture, textiles, supermarkets, car manufacturing, 
banking and software. Many claim that al-Shater’s business empire flourished even when he was in prison 
(Kaminski, 2012). 	  
181 Despite the blurred relationship between al-Shater and the MB financial resources, it is clear that he is 
the MB’s economic and business strategist. 	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MB and one of three current deputies of the General Guide and a member of the 
Guidance Bureau. He is considered as one of the most conservative and hardliners in the 
MB. He joined the MB at an early age and was heavily influenced by Sayyid Qutb when 
he spent around nine years between 1965 and 1974 in prison under Nasser. After he was 
released he became an active member and played an important role in rebuilding the 
movement as part of the old conservatives’ camp which included Mashhur, al-Hudaybi 
and Ahmed Hassanin. He fled to Yemen when he found out about Sadat’s arrest 
campaign in September 1981 and returned to Egypt in the mid-1980s with many other 
leaders. After returning from exile in 1986, Ezzat became a very influential leader. 
However, the turning point in Ezzat’s role came when he was selected as a member in 
the Guidance Bureau in 1995. Since then he has consolidated his position by taking 
responsibility for two sections in the organization, the Students Section (Qism al-
Talaba), which is responsible for recruiting new members in the universities’ campuses 
and the Education (Indoctrination) Section (Qism al-Tarbiyya), which is responsible for 
internalizing the MB ideology and reshaping individuals’ views and mindsets. Thus, he 
gained important experience and influence in the MB. However, Ezzat became 
significantly more powerful and influential after he became the Secretary-General of the 
MB in 2001, a post he held until 2010. Like al-Shater, the promotion of Ezzat within the 
MB was mainly because his loyalty to the movement’s ideology and conservative 
leadership. Due to his position, Ezzat controlled the structure of the MB. For instance, 
he was responsible for supervising and following the work of regional and the 
governorates offices and selecting their leaders. He also had a profound impact on the 
Shura Council members and influenced their decisions, particularly during internal 
elections.182 Hence, he played a significant role in the main decisions taken by the MB 
over 2000s. Not surprisingly, the domestic media have portrayed Ezzat as the ‘iron man’ 
in the MB and its devoted guardian (Nassar, 2012).  
The relationship between Ezzat and al-Shater dates back to the beginning of the 
1980s when they met in Yemen after they fled from Sadat. However, their relationship 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182 Interview with Mohamed Hamza on 11 January 2012.	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was intensified when they met in England where both were pursuing their postgraduate 
studies (Hussien, 2010). Since then, they became close allies and worked together to 
enhance the role and position of the conservatives in the MB. Some accounts highlight 
that Ezzat participated with al-Shater in establishing the Salsabil Company in the late 
1980s, highlighting his arrest in 1992 with Shater and Malek (Hussien, 2010). Moreover 
when al-Shater was in prison, Ezzat was his most trusted person in running MB 
activities. 
 
7.5.2.1. Ezzat and the al-Shater bloc: The kingmakers of the MB leaders 
The death of Ma’mun al-Hudaybi in 2004 helped al-Shater and Ezzat to become 
more influential and powerful in the MB. Both inherited the legacy of the older 
conservatives. Together, they became the spearhead of the new conservative bloc for the 
ensuing period. According to Abu Khalil (2012), the MB is gripped by al-Shater and 
Ezzat, the former though his financial control and the latter by his control over the 
organization. After al-Hudaybi, the MB selected Mohamed Mahdi Akef to be its seventh 
General Guide. Under Akef’s tenure (2004-2010), the alliance of al-Shater and Ezzat 
became more visible. Akef (76 by then), a veteran leader who joined the MB in 1940 
and was sentenced to death in absentia before the ruling was commuted to life 
imprisonment, was a continuation of the conservatives’ leadership, albeit with a more 
accommodating propensity. His tenure, therefore, was more participatory and inclusive 
than his predecessors and he tried to re-engage the reformers in order to counter-balance 
the hardliners. Hence he appointed Mohamed Habib as a first Deputy and maintained a 
good relationship with Abulfotouh, al-Eryan, al-Za’farani and other young reformers. 
However, al-Shater and Ezzat, who played a crucial role in selecting Akef, 
undermined his new policy. Benefiting from his financial and organizational capabilities, 
al-Shater became the second Deputy to Akef, a position that had not existed previously. 
Moreover, he sought to strengthen the new conservative power centre through different 
methods. First, he put in place plans to restructure the organization to become more 
active and dynamic. Hence, he rebuilt the media section and promoted many young 
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leaders in different organizational sections, such as the Students Section. Second, he 
engaged with the regional and administrative offices across the country and supported 
some of its leaders to become members in the Shura Council and the Guidance Bureau. 
Third, and more importantly, he became the mediator between the MB and the regime 
during the 2000s.183 According to Abu Khalil, al-Shater created a parallel organization 
within the MB which is loyal to him rather than anyone else including the General 
Guide (Abu Khalil, 2012). However, al-Shater could have not achieved his control 
without significant help from Ezzat who controlled the MB’s organization. Ezzat, who 
was Akef’s brother-in-law, utilized his strong position in the MB to promote many 
subordinates and followers in the MB’s regional offices (Al-Masry Al-Youm, 2009, 
accessed on 30 October 2012). 
Between 2005 and 2010, the al-Shater-Ezzat bloc solidified its grip over the MB 
and was finally able to completely sideline the reformers. This is illustrated by exploring 
the power struggle in the MB during 2008 and 2009 particularly after the decision of 
Akef to step down from the MB leadership after finishing his first term in January 2010. 
 
7.5.3. The Ascendance of the Conservatives and the Decline of the Reformists 
The second half of the 2000s witnessed the waning of the reformists in the MB. 
They were excluded from its highest institutions particularly the Guidance Bureau. The 
al-Shater-Ezzat bloc dominated the decision-making process within the MB and was 
able to marginalize the reformists. In May 2008, five new members joined the Guidance 
Bureau; the first time since 1995 there was such a significant change on its highest 
executive body.184 According to the MB’s bylaw, the Shura Council, which consists of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
183 The MB nominated 150 candidates in the 2005 parliamentary election after negotiating the number 
with the regime. Different media reports claimed that al-Shater and Mohamed Morsi, who by then was 
responsible for the elections section in the MB, were the two main members who dealt with the state 
security apparatus to handle this issue. However, after the startling performance of the MB in the first 
round of the elections, the security forces cracked down on the MB which was asked to withdraw some of 
its candidates in the second and third rounds. However, the MB rejected the proposal, which resulted in 
greater repression and the rigging of the elections by the regime in most constituencies (Al-Masry Al-
Youm, 2011, accessed on 28 October 2012).	  
184 The last election of the Guidance Bureau before 2008 was in 1995 in which the regime cracked down 
the MB and arrested many of the Shura Council’s members and tried them in a military court. The 
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105 members (90 by election and 15 by appointment from the Guidance Bureau), is 
responsible for electing the 16 members of the Guidance Bureau.185 However, some 
Shura Council’s members contested the results claiming that the new members had been 
selected by the conservative current.  
Moreover, they accused Ezzat of appointing those members without respecting 
the rules and bylaws of the MB. Hence, they signed a petition asking Akef to cancel the 
elections and open an investigation into their accusations which, was refused. (Al-Masry 
Al-Youm, 2008, accessed on 30 October 2012). Regardless of the claims and counter-
claims of the MB leaders, the promotion of the new members revealed how powerful the 
al-Shater-Ezzat bloc had become. The newly selected members belonged to the middle-
rank conservative generation and who had maintained a close relationship with al-Shater 
and Ezzat. They were Mohamed Sa‘ad al-Katatni, who by that time was the head of the 
MB’s parliamentary bloc in 2005 parliament and who a few years before was promoted 
to the head of the MB’s Administrative Office in Al-Menia,186 Sa‘ad al-Husseini, MP 
and the head of the MB’s Administrative Office in al-Mahalla, Mohei Hamed, head of 
the MB’s Administrative Office in al-Sharqia and very close associate of Ezzat, Osama 
Nasr the head of the MB office in Alexandria and close to al-Shater, and, finally, 
Mohamed Abdel Rahman who was the Deputy Administrator of al-Daqihla office. The 
promotion of these members outraged many in the MB and outside, not only because of 
the way in which they were selected but more importantly because of the exclusion of 
reformist figures such as al-Eryan, al-Za‘farani and Heshmat. Moreover, this crisis 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
selection of the new members was to fill the vacuum in the Guidance Bureau. By that time seven out of 16 
members were unable to exercise their role due to different reasons. Three of them were in prison, (al-
Shater, Badie and Mohamed Ali Beshr) and four of them were old and ill (Mohamed Hilal, Sabry Arafa, 
Abdullah al-Khatib, and Lashin Abu Shanab). (Al-Masry Al-Youm, 2009, accessed on 30 October 2012).	  
185 The MB’s internal elections have many curiosities. For instance, there are no candidates since all 
members are considered candidates and voters at the same time. On election day, a list containing Shura 
Council names is circulated among the members and each member has to choose a number of members, 
however, excluding himself. Those who gain the highest votes are promoted to become members in the 
Guidance Bureau. This way is also applied in all other elections in the MB. 	  
186 Some members claim that the promotion of Katatni is complete evidence of al-Shater’s power in the 
MB. Katatni was not supposed to be the Head of El-Menia since he belongs to a different governorate 
(Suhag). According to the MB’s traditions, the heads of the Administrative Offices should come from the 
same governorate or geographical area. Interview with Mohamed Hamza on 11 January 2012.	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opened the door to many to criticize the MB’s transparency and democracy. While some 
members accused the MB of lacking transparency and internal democracy, others cast 
doubts on the legality of the whole process of selection as they alleged it did not follow 
the bylaws and rules of the MB (Al-Masry Al-Youm 2008, accessed on 30 October 
2012). The selection was secretive and the MB did not issue any statement to clarify 
how and when this selection took place which gave a golden chance to the regime and 
its sponsored media to discredit the MB as an authoritarian movement. 
In September 2009, another crisis erupted in the MB, dubbed by the media as 
‘al-Eryan’s crisis’. On 23 September 2009, Mohamed Hilal, an aged member of the 
Guidance Bureau passed away. According to Article 7 of the MB’s bylaw his place was 
to be filled by the member who gained the highest number of votes in the preceding 
elections that is, al-Eryan. It was reported that Akef attempted to promote al-Eryan to 
the Guidance Bureau; however, the conservatives in the Bureau refused to accept his 
promotion, which heightened tensions between Akef and other senior leaders in the MB 
(Al-Masry Al-Youm, 2009, accessed on 30 October 2012). Moreover, different media 
reports claimed that Akef resigned from the MB in protest at the conservatives’ control 
over the Guidance Bureau (Elaph, 2009, accessed on 30 October 2012). However, Akef 
asserted later that he only delegated his powers to his Deputy, Mohamed Habib, and did 
not resign (Al-Masry Al-Youm, 2009, accessed on 1 November 2012).  
Habib, in turn, sought to use the crisis to strengthen his position (Al-Masry Al-
Youm, 2009, accessed on 3 November 2012. Initially he attempted to exercise some of 
Akef’s powers and sought to defuse the crisis by suggesting that new elections to the 
Guidance Bureau could be held in June 2010. However, the conservatives led by Ezzat 
rejected Habib’s proposal and campaigned for immediate elections. They interpreted 
Habib’s endeavour as an attempt to take over the MB and to instil himself as the de 
facto General Guide. Hence, they planned to remove him from his post as the Deputy of 
the General Guide as well as from the Guidance Bureau.  
The al-Eryan crisis was intensified by Akef’s decision in March 2009, to leave 
his office at the end of his six-year term (Al-Arabiya, 2009, accessed on 1 November 
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2012). The MB’s bylaw states that the General Guide has the right to two terms of four 
years each. Akef, unexpectedly, decided not to use his second term in order “to give a 
chance to a new generation and to give an example of change within the MB” 
(Ikhwanweb, 2009, accessed on 1 November 2012). Akef’s decision to step down 
appeared to take many by surprise inside and outside the MB. Not only because of it 
was the first time in the MB’s history that the General Guide had voluntarily stepped 
down187 but also because the critical status of the MB in terms of its relationship with 
the Mubarak regime and the mounting power struggle between different factions. 
Moreover, Akef’s decision can be interpreted as a sign of his disenchantment at the 
conflict between the conservatives and the reformists, which was worsened by the al-
Eryan crisis.  
Thus, the MB was divided over how to resolve the crisis and at the same time 
deal with the looming succession crisis. The conservatives led by Ezzat and backed by 
al-Shater, who was by then in prison, insisted on holding immediate elections to the 
Guidance Bureau and to elect a new General Guide. However, Habib rejected their 
suggestion and asked to postpone the elections until June 2010. The only way to resolve 
the impasse was to consult the Shura Council, the legislative body of the MB and which 
was responsible for choosing the General Guide and the Guidance Bureau. After a few 
weeks of in-fighting, it was reported that the Shura Council, which was entirely under 
the control of Ezzat,188 decided to hold immediate elections to select the Guidance 
Bureau and the new General Guide. Habaib rejected the decision of the Shura Council 
and threatened to resign from the MB. Moreover, he claimed that the Shura Council was 
in favour of postponing the elections and its members were pushed into changing their 
minds (Al-Jazeera Net, 2009, accessed on 1 November 2012). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
187 Traditionally, the MB’s General Guide used to be replaced by his Deputy after his death. At least that 
was the case with the previous two General Guides, Mashhur and al-Hudaybi. 	  
188 According to media reports before holding the Guidance Bureau elections, Ezzat along with other 
conservative leaders restructured the Shura Council in order to control the elections and direct the 
outcome. Hence, instead of waiting until the election of a new Council in July 2010, unannounced 
elections were conducted despite the rejection of many MB’s members (Al-Masry Al-Youm, 2009, 
accessed on 1 November 2012)	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At the end of December 2009, the MB announced that the Shura Council had 
elected a new Guidance Bureau which, unsurprisingly, was almost fully conservative 
with almost no representation of the reformists (Al-Youm Al-Sab’, 2009, accessed on 1 
November 2012). Apart from al-Eryan, who was elected, neither Abelfoftouh nor 
Habaib was re-elected. Dismayed by its results, some reformists rejected the elections 
and accused Ezzat of abusing the bylaws in order to exclude reformists and control the 
movement (Interview with Khaled Dawoud by Al-Masry Al-Youm, 21 February 2010). 
While Abulfotouh remained silent, Habib reacted furiously and accused Ezzat of 
dominating the MB and abusing its bylaws and rules (Al-Masry Al-Youm, 30 December 
2009, accessed on 1 November 2012). Moreover, the reformist al-Za‘farani rejected the 
outcome and sent a protest petition to the MB’s leadership asking for the elections to 
investigated and for reform of the MB’s bylaw (Al-Masry Al-Youm, 16 February 2010, 
accessed on 1 November 2012). However, this proved to be too late as a new 
conservative General Guide was installed.  
In 16 January 2010, the MB announced that Mohamed Badie was elected to be 
its eighth General Guide. At a press conference, Akef told journalists that Badie was 
“chosen by consensus by members of the consultative council” (Ikhwanweb, 16 January 
2010, accessed on 1 November 2012). A veteran member, who was described as a 
hardliner and a devotee of the Qutbist ideology and faction in the MB, Badie took office 
amidst an intensive power struggle over his legitimacy. Thus, under Badie it was 
unlikely that the reformists would be able to have an influential role in the MB. Not 
surprisingly, after the downfall of Mubarak many of reformists left the MB including 
Abulfotouh, Habib and al-Za‘farani, along with many young reformists who were 
completely disenchanted by the difficulty of reforming the MB even after the departure 
of Mubarak. 
By electing an almost fully conservative Guidance Bureau headed by a 
conservative General Guide, it is clear that the power struggle within the MB between 
the conservatives and reformists was finally settled in favour of the former who are 
likely to dominate the MB for years to come. 
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7.6. CONCLUSION 
This chapter explores the effects of repression on the MB’s coherence and 
identity. It examines how the MB was able to preserve its unity and integration under 
the Mubarak regime despite the attempts to eliminate the movement. Under Mubarak 
regime, security forces arrested and imprisoned many of the MB leaders and members in 
order to undermine and curb the movement’s activism. However, the movement was 
able to accommodate and tolerate regime suppression. It is argued that the MB benefited 
from the Mubarak repression in maintaining its organizational solidity and the loyalty of 
its members. The MB leadership used repression to create an ordeal narrative that bound 
members and fostered their solidarity and commitment. During times of repression, the 
sense of self-preservation was one of the main factors that enabled the MB to maintain 
its identity. It is also argued that the MB did not crack despite the various divisions 
among its members but rather because repression mitigated and lessened these divisions. 
It enabled the MB leadership to accommodate and contain any attempt to create splits. 
While the MB has experienced many attempts to divide it, they were marginal and did 
fragment the MB. 
In addition, this chapter contends that regime repression has had a significant 
impact on the power balance and structures within the MB. It served the conservatives at 
the expense of the reformists. The former employed Mubarak’s repression not only to 
preclude the latter’s attempts to reform the MB but also to maintain power and control 
over the MB. It is argued that the conservatives worked tirelessly to marginalize and 
exclude the reformers from the MB leadership. They utilized regime repression to de-
legitimize the reformers’ calls for change. Moreover, since the mid of the 1990s the 
balance of power within the MB has shifted in favour of the conservatives. It was 
Khairat al-Shater and Mahmoud Ezzat who were able to entrench the conservatives’ 
power in the MB at the expense of the reformists. They succeeded in creating a 
conservative power centre that was able to control the MB. Currently, the MB is entirely 
under the control of the conservatives who will likely dominate the movement for years 
to come.  
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Chapter Eight 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
8.1. INTRODUCTION  
This thesis explores the process of identity construction in the Muslim 
Brotherhood (MB). It focuses primarily on unpacking the underlying factors and 
processes that formulate the MB identity in everyday life. It aims to understand the 
ability of the MB to construct a distinctive and resilient identity for its members. The 
study findings reveal that the MB identity is a social construct that reflects the 
interactions between ideology and structure, religion and politics, and individuals and 
leadership. The MB employs different mechanisms and tools in order to reshape 
individuals’ perceptions and worldview. The study highlights the integral role of 
socialization and the indoctrination process in formulating the MB identity. It also 
explores the effects of the political environment on the MB identity. By unravelling the 
internal logic of the MB, the study creates a discursive analysis of the formation of the 
MB identity in everyday life. Thus, it accounts for the interplay between ideology, 
organization, structure, and environment in forming the MB identity. 
In addition, despite the literature on Islamist movements, many issues, i.e. 
recruitment, mobilization, socialization, still needs more scruitiny and studies. Therefore, 
this study sought to provide new insights that could enrich this literature and enhance 
our understanding to the internal dynamics and politics of these movements. Moreover, 
the vast majority of studies on Islamist movements tend to focus on their “external” 
behaviour and how it interacts with political regimes without looking at the underlying 
factors that shape this behaviour and bring it to the fore. This study sought to bridge this 
gap in the literature by providing an “insider” account to the processes of MB’s identity 
formation and its impact on the movement’s political and social activism. 
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8.2. RESEARCH SUMMARY 
This study answers the key question: how could the MB construct its identity in 
everyday life? In other words, what does it mean for members to be ikhwani? This 
question entails many points that directed the research. For instance, it revealed the 
mechanisms and processes that are used by the MB in recruiting members. It also 
explored how the MB reshapes its members’ identity and the relationship between the 
internal dynamics and the identity construction process. Moreover, the study illustrated 
the effects of the political environment on the MB identity and how the movement’s 
leaders employed repression to maintain unity and coherence. 
In order to answer these questions, I relied upon primary and secondary data. 
The primary data was collected from interviews that were conducted with several 
members at different levels of the MB and with academics and experts on the MB. The 
interviews provided compelling data on the MB which helped to answer the research 
questions.  
The research organization was designed in a way that connected hypothesis, 
argument, and methodology in a persuasive analysis. It is argued that the MB identity is 
the outcome of three main factors: the MB’s aims and objectives; its internal 
organization; and the political environment in which it operates. Chapters were designed 
in a way that illuminates these underpinnings of the MB identity.  
In addition to the introduction and the conclusion, the thesis was divided into six 
substantial chapters. After a critical survey of the literature on Islamist movements in 
chapter two, chapter three articulates theoretical framework. It sought to avoid the 
dichotomy of the essentialist and contextualist approaches that have dominated the 
terrain of Islamist movements since the beginning of the 1980s. Thus, it incorporated 
social constructivism with social movement theory (SMT), in order to provide a sound 
and plausible explanation for the formulation of the MB identity. The main findings of 
this chapter are that no single approach can explain the complexity of the MB as a socio-
political organization and there is a need to integrate more than one discipline in order to 
capture the real essence of the MB identity. 
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To understand the impact of the ideational factors on the MB identity, chapter 
four provides a comprehensive account of the impact of al-Banna’s views and thoughts 
on the MB. It reveals how al-Banna articulated the master framework of the MB identity. 
By blending the notion of al-fikra al-Islamiyya (the Islamic identity) with the ideology 
and structure of the MB, al-Banna was able to create the collective identity of the MB 
under the banner of the jama‘a. It refers to the code of values, standards and behaviour 
that members should abide by in everyday life. The chapter concludes that al-Banna was 
able to forge a unique and distinctive identity for the MB. 
Building on the legacy of al-Banna, the ensuing leaders maintained his impact on 
members’ identity through internalizing his ideas and views in the socialization process. 
Chapters five and six reveal how the MB integrates ideational and institutional factors in 
order to create its identity. Specifically, chapter five examines the mechanisms and tools 
that the MB employs in recruiting members and reshaping their views, perceptions, and 
identity. The chapter explores the multi-tiered system of membership. It unpacks this 
system and highlights the criteria and degrees of membership. Moreover, it analyzes the 
significance of this system and why the MB adopted it. It was clear that members have 
to fulfil certain prerequisites and conditions in order to obtain a fully-fledged 
membership. Therefore, they have to undergo an intensive process of indoctrination and 
education (tarbiyya) that facilitates the internalization of the MB ideology and doctrine. 
The study explores the strategy and tactics of the MB in selecting and recruiting new 
members. Interestingly, the MB employs social networks, friendship and kinship 
connections in seeking new members. It embraces a ‘ripple effect’ strategy to expand its 
grassroots and social networks. 
Moreover, the thesis explores the interaction between the MB’s structure, 
ideology, members and leadership, and norms and behaviour. It reveals that the MB 
creates a sub-culture that is termed ikhwanism which encompasses and guides members 
in their everyday life. Ikhwanism denotes a set of norms, values and standards that 
enhance the identification process within the MB which facilitates internal dynamics 
and interactions. It signifies the code of identity that directs the MB members in their 
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everyday life. Moreover, the study reveals that the institutionalization of ikhwanism 
plays a vital role in consolidating the MB identity. The MB by-laws and statements are 
set up in order to create a self-disciplined and resilient structure and identity for the 
movement. 
The study also reveals the importance of the organizational norms, values, and 
standards in preserving the MB identity. The norms of allegiance (bay‘a), commitment 
(ilitzam), trust (thiqa) and loyalty (intima) embody the core values of the MB. Members 
and leaders have to abide by these norms in their everyday life in order to achieve the 
MB objectives.  
Furthermore, the study investigates the effects of repression on the MB identity. 
Under the Mubarak regime, the MB experienced different forms of repression, exclusion, 
and oppression. However, it was able to preserve its unity and maintain its political and 
social activism. The findings reveal the ability of the MB to employ regime repression 
in solidifying its internal coherence. The movement’s leaders always capitalized on 
regime repression in order to strengthen members’ commitment and solidarity. 
Moreover, the study demonstrates that regime repression enabled the conservatives 
within the MB to dominate the organization at the expense of the reformers who were 
constantly marginalized. The study also highlights how the recurrent waves of 
oppression enabled the MB to create a resilient and solid identity.  
 
8.3. FINDINGS OF THE RESEARCH  
The findings are divided into two main aspects: the theoretical and the practical 
findings.  
 
8.3.1. The Theoretical Findings 
The study re-examines different theoretical assumptions that have dominated the 
terrain of social movements since the end of 1970s. It highlights the problems of relying 
on one theoretical approach or discipline in studying Islamist social movements. The 
study reveals that the multi-faceted nature of Islamist movements requires 
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interdisciplinary approaches that can capture their real essence. Therefore, the research 
avoids applying one single approach in analyzing the MB identity. Likewise, it shuns 
the dichotomy of the essentialist and contextualist approaches in studying Islamism. 
Since the study treats identity as a social construct, it incorporates social constructivism 
with SMT, in order to examine the process of identity construction as it occurs within 
the MB.   
The study findings on theoretical level can be divided into five points. The first 
is concerned with the study of Islamist movements. The study reveals that Islamist 
movements should not be treated as mere social movements but rather as multi-faceted 
agents which employ ideational, material, and institutional factors in order to formulate 
their own identity. Therefore, the study highlights several key distinctions between 
Islamist movements and conventional social movements, particularly those that emerged 
within a western context. One is that unlike other social movements, Islamist 
movements are mainly concerned with reshaping an individual’s identity to align with 
religious values and ideals regardless what are these values and ideals. Therefore, 
disseminating Islamic values and idioms in the public sphere is a key objective for 
Islamist movements. Hence they focus on reviving Islamic identity in everyday life. 
Another distinction is that while social movements concentrate on protest as the locus of 
collective action, Islamist movements focus on propagation and preaching as the centre 
of their activism. That is, Islamist movements, at least until the Arab Spring, avoided 
rebellion against autocratic regimes. True, they have unrivalled organizational and 
mobilizational capabilities; however, they utilize these for expanding their social 
networking and during elections. A final distinction is that unlike other social 
movements, membership in and affiliation with Islamist movements is not easily 
attained and is contingent upon certain criteria and prerequisites that individuals have to 
fulfil in order to become fully-fledged members. 
Nevertheless, these findings do not imply that Islamist movements are 
exceptional movements that cannot be studied by SMT; rather the thesis underlines the 
need to integrate other disciplines and approaches in order to understand Islamist 
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movements more accurately. Therefore, this study draws on different theoretical aspects 
in order to discern particular aspects of the MB. For instance, it is difficult to probe the 
changes in the identity and perceptions of the MB members without using social 
psychology. It helps to discern the process of indoctrination and socialization that occurs 
within the MB and how it alters members’ perceptions and worldview. 
The second theoretical finding pertains to the essence of identity. The study 
reveals that identity is not an immutable or rigid phenomenon; rather it is a social 
construct and subject to multiple influences. Therefore, unlike accounts that portray 
Islamist movements as rigid, this study has shown that Islamists’ identity is a product of 
many factors and processes. It reflects the interaction between individuals and society, 
ideology and organization, and the movement and environment in which the movement 
exists. In other words, Islamic identity is outcome of the interplay between institutional, 
material, symbolic, religious and cultural factors that exist within and outside the 
movement. 
The third theoretical point concerns the importance of examining the effects of 
collective action on an individual’s identity. Despite the abundant literature on social 
movements, individuals, the core element of collective action, are significantly 
disregarded. Therefore, this study examines how collective action can reshape an 
individual’s identity. It illuminates the relationship between the movement and 
individuals not only as members but also as human beings. While other studies focus on 
collective identity at the expense of individualistic identity, this study re-affirms the 
need to understand the changes that happen to individuals when they are involved in 
collective action. 
The fourth theoretical point is the relationship between membership and identity. 
The vast majority of studies on social movements neglect this important issue. This 
study demonstrates that there is a significant link between both variables (membership 
and identity). It highlights that Islamist movements utilize the multi-tiered system of 
membership in order to reshape and consolidate individuals’ identities. Thus, members 
have to inculcate the movement’s ideology, standards and rules before they can attain 
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full membership. Moving from one level of membership to another prompts members to 
acquire certain behaviours and values in their everyday life.  
The fifth, and final theoretical point is that the study reveals the interplay 
between collective identity and collective action. The vast majority of social movement 
studies concentrate on one of the two variants as the base of the analysis. However, this 
study highlights that both variants—action and identity—are mutually influenced and 
interacted. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that incorporating social constructivism with 
social movements theory reveals these findings. The infusion of Klandermans and 
Oegema’s participation model and the social networks models enabled us to discover the 
intricate process of recruiting and reshaping the mindset and identity of MB members. 
As a socio-religious movement, the MB tends to employ different factors, i.e. religious 
feelings, idioms, symbols, in order to recruit individuals and reshape their worldview. 
This process of reconfiguration is not possible without adopting a discipline and 
persuasive program of recruitment and socialization. 
 
8.3.2. Findings on the Dynamics of Islamist Movements Level 
On the practical level, the study findings are anchored around key themes. The 
first concerns Islamist movements as vibrant and dynamic social organizations. The 
study demonstrates that there is a crucial link between the internal dynamics and the 
external behaviour of Islamist movements. It demonstrates that Islamism, as a social 
phenomenon, is a reflection of multiple factors and processes.  Whereas the majority of 
studies on Islamist movements, particularly those on the MB, focus on political and 
social activism, this study unpacks the several underlying factors of this activism. In 
other words, instead of focusing on the external layer of Islamism, this study analyzes 
its internal layer and the resultant connotations. It provides an internal analysis of the 
interplay between ideology and structure, religion and politics, and values and actions. It 
uncovers the methods, mechanisms, and processes that forge Islamists and make them 
what they are. Therefore, instead of taking the MB ideology and behaviour as given, as 
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many accounts have done, this study investigates how this behaviour came into being. 
Moreover, the study does not treat Islamism as only a religious phenomenon, nor does it 
focus only on its social and political activism. Instead, it deals with Islamism as a social 
construct that entails different processes and dynamics and that can manifest itself in 
different forms. Thus, the study was mainly preoccupied by the interplay between these 
processes in everyday life.  
The second theme is the impact of the ideational and symbolic factors on the MB 
identity. The study reveals how Islamists, as social agents, think, behave and perceive 
the surrounding realities. It shows how Islamist movements can reshape and reformulate 
individuals’ perceptions and worldviews. The indoctrination and socialization process 
within the MB reveals an unrivalled ability to forge members’ views and personalities. 
The components of identity, e.g. culture, norms, values, and manners, are social 
constructs that reflect the alignment between the member’s and the movement’s 
ideology. In other words, after spending time in the MB, members become the 
mouthpiece of the movement’s ideology. The MB interweaves key religious values—
allegiance (bay‘a) and obedience (ta‘a)—with mundane ones—trust, commitment, and 
loyalty—to strengthen and articulate members’ identities.  
In addition, the study reveals how the MB infiltrates individuals’ private spheres 
in order to reshape their perceptions and worldviews. The ikhwanization process that 
dominates the socialization process embodies a key tool in the creation of identify. It 
refers to the way in which members perceive the world and interact with it. The study 
demonstrates that members are happy to align their views and behaviour with the norms 
and standards of the MB. Moreover, members are willing to follow their leaders without 
questioning their actions and decisions.  
The third point concerns the mechanisms of recruiting members in Islamist 
movements. The study reveals the complexity of recruiting new members into the MB. 
It demonstrates that despite the populist character of the MB, membership and affiliation 
with the movement is a complex yet meaningful process. It shows the mechanisms, tools, 
and procedures that are used to recruit new members. Moreover, the study underlines 
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the strong connection between membership and promotion within the MB. Members and 
cadres cannot be promoted without spending a certain period in the MB, embracing its 
ideology, and obeying the leaders. However, the study reveals the subjectivity of 
promotion procedures and rules. Therefore, members who adopt different views from 
that of the leadership are unlikely to be promoted from one level to another.  
The fourth key theme is the relationship between repression and identity. The 
study demonstrates that the response of Islamist movements to regime repression varies 
from one to another. While the majority of literature on Islamism focuses on 
inclusion/moderation versus exclusion/radicalization, this study discards this dichotomy 
by discerning the actual dynamics that happen within Islamist movements in their 
response to regime repression. It shows how Islamists adapt their discourse, structure, 
and strategy within different environments. Moreover, contrary to the conventional 
wisdom that assumes that Islamists do not thrive in an authoritarian environment, this 
study reveals the ability of the MB to benefit from regime repression. It highlights how 
the MB leaders capitalized on regime repression in order to foster members’ 
commitment and solidarity. By creating a sense of victimhood among members, they 
were able to maintain the unity and loyalty of members. This sense of ordeal (mihna) 
enables the MB to accommodate and defuse potential splits within the MB. 
Moreover, the study unveils the balance of power within the MB and how it 
shifted over the 1990s and 2000s. The relationship between the conservatives and 
reformists was affected profoundly by Mubarak repression. The conservatives were able 
to exclude and eliminate the reformists using the repression as a cover for avoiding 
criticism or permitting checks on their power. Moreover, they restructured the 
influential bodies in the MB, the Guidance Bureau and the Shura Council, in order to 
control and dominate the organization. The study also reveals how the conservatives 
utilized regime repression to suppress any calls for internal reform. During the second 
half of the 2000s, the conservatives solidified their grip on power within the MB. 
Therefore, many reformist figures, disillusioned by the conservatives’ hegemony, left 
the movement. 
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8.4. FUTURE RESEARCH 
This study attempted to provide new insights that can enhance future research on 
Islamism. Despite its contributions on the theoretical and practical levels, further 
research needs to be undertaken in order to capture the complexity of Islamism as a 
social phenomenon. In this regard, I highlight three main areas that require more 
research. The first concerns the paradigms and approaches that study Islamism. 
Although this study builds a new analytical framework that can capture the real essence 
of Islamist movements, there is a need for more research to explore the multi-faceted 
aspects of Islamism. This can only be achieved through conducting interdisciplinary 
research combining various disciplines and tools. Despite the significant contribution of 
SMT in studying Islamist movements, it is insufficient to unpack the complexity of 
Islamism. Scholars who study Islamism from a social movement perspective have 
neglected two key points. The first is the multi-faceted nature of Islamist movements 
which necessitates an interdisciplinary approach in order to understand these movements 
within their environment. For instance, it is important to incorporate social psychology 
in order to examine the ideational aspects of Islamism. The second neglected point is the 
role and place of individuals in the analysis of Islamism. There is a need to examine the 
effects of collective action on individuals’ identities, perceptions, and personalities. 
Therefore, instead of focusing on the macro and institutional factors in studying 
Islamism, we need to weigh the micro and individualistic aspects of the members. In 
other words, sociologists need to rethink how to move beyond the boundaries of SMT in 
order to explore the effects of Islamism on individuals’ lives. 
The second proposed area of research is to re-examine the relationship between 
Islamist movements and their wider environment. This study attempts to capture the 
effects of the political environment on the internal dynamics of Islamist movements. 
However, further research is required to unpack the mutual influences and interactions 
between Islamist movements and their environments and how each shapes the other.  
Third, and most important, are the effects of the so-called Arab Spring on 
Islamism. The new political landscape in the Middle East that followed the downfall of 
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a number of autocratic regimes provides a golden opportunity for research on Islamist 
movements. There is a fundamental need to compare between the state of Islamist 
movements before and after the Arab Spring. It appears that the Arab uprisings have 
significantly reshaped Islamist dynamics in many countries. Changes in Islamists’ 
discourse, ideology, and strategy are underway and it is vitally important to probe the 
consequences of these transformations which are set to change the terrain of Islamist 
politics in the years ahead. 
To sum up, the complexity of Islamist movements, as a social phenomenon, 
prompts us to continue the search for more nuanced approaches and tools that can 
capture the nature of this phenomenon.    
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